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finding this a pretext for his own godlessness. For we have all embarked upon it and have it, even if not all wish to travel on it, but rather to pass it by, turning aside on account of the external pleasures of life which draw them. And if anyone should ask, what this might be; I say indeed that it is the soul of each person, and the mind within it. For through it alone can God be contemplated and perceived; unless, just as they denied God, so too the impious will refuse to have a soul, saying this reasonably before all else. For it is not characteristic of those who have a mind to deny its poet and creator, God. That each human being, then, has a soul and that it is rational, it is necessary to show this also in a few words for the sake of the simple, since some from the heresies deny this as well, supposing man to be nothing more than the visible form of the body; so that, this having been shown, they may be able to have a clearer refutation of idols through themselves.

31 First, then, it is no small token of the human soul being rational that it differs from irrational creatures; for nature is accustomed to call those creatures irrational for this reason, because the human race is rational; then this too would be no slight proof, that man alone reasons about things external to himself, and reflects on things not present, and again deliberates and by judgment chooses the better of his reasonings; for irrational creatures see only present things, and are impelled only towards things before their eyes, even if harm should follow. But man is not impelled towards the things he sees, but by reason judges the things seen through his eyes; for often, having been impelled, he is restrained by reason; and having reasoned, he reasoned again, and each one perceives, if he be a friend of truth, that the mind of man is other than the bodily senses. For this reason, then, being other, it becomes the judge of the senses themselves; and what they perceive, this it discerns, and remembers, and shows them what is better. For it is the part of the eye only to see, and of the ears to hear, and of the mouth to taste, and of the nose to perceive smells, and of the hands to touch; but what one ought to see and hear, and what one ought to touch and taste and smell, is no longer the part of the senses, but for the soul and its mind to discern. Doubtless the hand can take hold of a sword, and the mouth taste poison; but it does not know that these things are harmful, unless the mind discerns it. And such a thing is like, that we may consider it in an image, a lyre beautifully constructed, and the musician who holds it with skill. For just as the strings on the lyre each has its own sound, one low, one high, one middle, one sharp, and another different; but their harmony is indistinct and their composition indiscernible without the skilled person; for then their harmony is revealed and their arrangement is correct, when the one holding the lyre strikes the strings, and touches each one fittingly; in this way also with the senses in the body, which are tuned like a lyre, when the skilled mind rules them; then the soul also discerns, and knows what it does and performs. This is peculiar to human beings alone, and this is the rational part of the human soul, by which it differs from the irrational creatures, and shows that it is truly other than the phenomena in the body. For often when the body is lying on the ground, man imagines and contemplates the things in heaven; and often when the body is resting and is quiet and is sleeping, man is moved within, and contemplates things external to himself, journeying to countries and walking about, and meeting acquaintances, and often through these things divining and foreknowing his actions for the following day. But what else could this be than a rational soul, in which man reasons and perceives things beyond himself?

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τοῦτο τῆς ἀθεότητος ἑαυτοῦ πρόφασιν εὑρίσκων. πάντες γὰρ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐπιβεβήκαμεν καὶ ἔχομεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντες αὐτὴν ὁδεύειν, ἀλλὰ παροδεύειν ἐκβαίνοντες θέλουσι διὰ τὰς ἔξωθεν αὐτοὺς ἑλκούσας ἡδονὰς τοῦ βίου. καὶ εἴ τις ἂν ἔροιτο, τίς ἂν εἴη αὕτη· φημὶ δὴ τὴν ἑκάστου ψυχὴν εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ νοῦν. δι' αὐτοῦ γὰρ μόνου δύναται Θεὸς θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ νοεῖσθαι· ἐκτὸς εἰ μή, ὥσπερ τὸν Θεὸν ἠρνήσαντο, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχειν παραιτήσονται οἱ ἀσεβεῖς, εἰκότως τοῦτο πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοντες. οὐ γὰρ ἐχόντων ἔστι νοῦν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὸν τούτου ποιητὴν καὶ δημιουργὸν Θεόν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ψυχὴν ἕκαστος ἀνθρώπων ἔχει καὶ ταύτην λογικήν, καὶ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι δεῖξαι δι' ὀλίγων διὰ τοὺς ἀκεραίους, ἐπεὶ μάλιστά τινες ἀπὸ τῶν αἱρέσεων ἀρνοῦνται καὶ τοῦτο, οἰόμενοι μηδὲν πλέον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον εἶδος τοῦ σώματος· ἵνα ταύτης δειχθεί σης, φανερώτερον δι' ἑαυτῶν τὸν κατὰ τῶν εἰδώλων ἔλεγχον ἔχειν δυνηθῶσι.

31 Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐ μικρὸν γνώρισμα τοῦ λογικὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα διαλλάττειν αὐτήν· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἄλογα καλεῖν ἡ φύσις εἴωθεν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ γένος ἐστὶ λογικόν· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν οὐ τὸ τυχὸν ἂν εἴη, ἐκ τοῦ μόνον τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰ ἔξωθεν ἑαυτοῦ λογίζε σθαι, καὶ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι τὰ μὴ παρόντα, καὶ πάλιν ἐπιλογίζεσθαι καὶ κρίσει τὸ κρεῖττον τῶν λογισμῶν αἱρεῖσθαι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλογα μόνα τὰ παρόντα βλέπει, καὶ πρὸς μόνα τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρμᾷ, κἂν μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν βλάβην ἔχῃ. ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὐ πρὸς τὰ βλεπόμενα ὁρμᾷ, ἀλλὰ τῷ λογισμῷ τὰ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ὁρώμενα κρίνει· πολλάκις γοῦν ὁρμήσας κεκράτηται τῷ λογισμῷ· καὶ λογισάμενος, πάλιν ἐπελογίσατο, καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, εἰ τῆς ἀληθείας γένοιτο φίλος, ὅτι ἄλλος παρὰ τὰς σωματικὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐστὶν ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νοῦς. διὰ τοῦτο γοῦν ὡς ἄλλος ὤν, αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων γίνεται κριτής· καὶ ὧν ἐκεῖναι ἀντιλαμβάνονται, ταῦτα οὗτος διακρίνει, καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκει, καὶ δείκνυσιν αὐταῖς τὸ κρεῖττον. ὀφθαλμοῦ μὲν γάρ ἐστι μόνον τὸ ὁρᾷν, καὶ ὤτων τὸ ἀκούειν, καὶ στόματος γεύεσθαι, καὶ ῥινὸς ὀδμῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ χειρῶν τὸ ἅπτεσθαι· ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ ὁρᾷν καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ὧν ἅπτεσθαι δεῖ καὶ γεύεσθαι καὶ ὀδμᾶσθαι, οὐκέτι τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ ταύτης νοῦ διακρῖναι. ἀμέλει καὶ ξίφους λαβέσθαι δύναται ἡ χείρ, καὶ δηλητηρίου γεύσασθαι τὸ στόμα· ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι βλάπτει ταῦτα, εἰ μὴ ὁ νοῦς διακρίνῃ. Καὶ ἔοικέ γε τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἵνα ἐπὶ εἰκόνος αὐτὸ θεωρήσωμεν, λύρᾳ καλῶς κατεσκευασμένῃ, καὶ τῷ ταύτην κρατοῦντι μουσικῷ μετ' ἐπιστήμης. ὡς γὰρ αἱ ἐν τῇ λύρᾳ νευραὶ ἑκάστη μὲν ἔχει τὸν ἴδιον φθόγγον, ἡ μὲν βαρύν, ἡ δὲ ὀξύν, ἡ δὲ μέσον, ἡ δὲ ὀξύτονον, ἡ δὲ ἄλλον· ἀδιάκριτος δέ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ ἀδιάγνωστος ἡ σύνθεσις χωρὶς τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος· τότε γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἁρμονία αὐτῶν δείκνυται καὶ ἡ σύνταξις ὀρθή, ὅταν ὁ κατέχων τὴν λύραν πλήξῃ τὰς νευράς, καὶ ἁρμοδίως ἑκάστης ἅψηται· τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐν τῷ σώματι ὡς λύρας ἡρμοσμένων, ὅταν ὁ ἐπι στήμων νοῦς αὐτῶν ἡγεμονεύῃ· τότε καὶ διακρίνει ἡ ψυχή, καὶ οἶδεν ὃ ποιεῖ καὶ πράττει. τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἴδιον ἀνθρώπων ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ λογικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ᾧ χρωμένη διαλλάττει τῶν ἀλόγων, καὶ δείκνυσιν ὅτι ἀληθῶς ἄλλη παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐν σώματί ἐστιν. πολλάκις γοῦν κειμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ γῆς, τὰ ἐν οὐρανοῖς φαντάζεται καὶ θεωρεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ πολλάκις τοῦ σώματος ἠρεμοῦντος καὶ ἡσυχάζοντος καὶ καθεύδοντος, κινεῖται ἔνδον ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἑαυτοῦ θεωρεῖ, χώρας ἀποδημῶν καὶ περιπατῶν, καὶ ἀπαντῶν τοῖς γνωρίμοις, καὶ πολλάκις διὰ τούτων τὰς μεθ' ἡμέραν πράξεις ἑαυτοῦ μαντευόμενος καὶ προγινώ σκων. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη ἕτερον ἢ ψυχὴ λογική, ἐν ᾗ λογίζεται καὶ νοεῖ τὰ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος;