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that vice cannot even be conceived of apart from the soul (for we know the virtues to be virtues of a human being, just as, therefore, also the vice opposed to them is not of a soul separated from the body and existing by itself), but that the honor or punishment for these things is brought upon the soul alone? Or how could one even conceive of courage or endurance in a soul alone, since it has no fear of death, nor of wound, nor of maiming, nor of loss, nor of torture, nor of the pains associated with these, or the suffering from these things? And how continence and temperance, when no desire draws it toward food or sexual union or the other pleasures and delights, nor with anything else disturbing it from within or provoking it from without? And how prudence, when there are not subject to it things to be done and not to be done, nor things to be chosen and to be avoided, or rather, when there is in it no movement at all or natural impulse toward any of the things to be done? And where at all for souls is justice toward one another suitable, or toward anything else of the same or of a different kind, since they have neither from where, nor through what means, nor how they might render what is according to worth or the equal according to proportion, the honor due to God being excepted, nor in any other way having an impulse or movement toward the use of their own things or toward abstinence from another's things, since both the use of things according to nature and abstinence are considered in the case of those who are by nature able to use them, but the soul neither needs anything nor is by nature able to use anything or anyone, and because of this not even the so-called proper functioning of the parts can be found in a soul so constituted? And indeed that is most irrational of all, that the established laws apply to human beings, but to turn the penalty for things done lawfully or unlawfully upon the souls alone. For if the one who received the laws would himself justly receive the penalty for the transgression of the law also, and a human being received the laws, not a soul by itself, then a human being must also undergo punishment for the things sinned, not a soul by itself; since God did not ordain for souls to abstain from things that do not concern them at all, such as adultery, murder, theft, robbery, dishonor toward parents, and in general all desire that arises for the injustice and harm of one's neighbors. For neither is "honor your father and your mother" well-suited for souls alone, since such names do not belong to them; for not souls begetting souls take to themselves the title of father or mother, but human beings human beings; Neither, therefore, could "you shall not commit adultery" ever be spoken or rightly conceived in the case of souls, since the difference between male and female does not exist in them, nor any suitability for sexual union or desire for it. And since such a desire does not exist, sexual union is not possible either; and among whom sexual union does not exist at all, neither does lawful union, which is marriage; and of lawful

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κακίαν μηδὲ νοηθῆναι δύνασθαι χωρὶς ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς (ἀνθρώπου γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἶναι γινώσκομεν τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τὴν ταύταις ἀντικειμένην κακίαν οὐ ψυχῆς κεχωρισμένης τοῦ σώματος καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὔσης), τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις τιμὴν ἢ τιμωρίαν ἐπὶ μόνης φέρεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς; ἢ πῶς ἄν τις καὶ νοήσειεν ἐπὶ ψυχῆς μόνης ἀνδρείαν ἢ καρτερίαν, οὐκ ἐχούσης οὐ θανάτου φόβον οὐ τραύματος οὐ πηρώσεως οὐ ζημίας οὐκ αἰκίας οὐ τῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀλγημάτων ἢ τῆς ἐκ τούτων κακοπαθείας; πῶς δὲ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ σωφροσύνην, οὐδεμιᾶς ἑλκούσης αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίας πρὸς τροφὴν ἢ μῖξιν ἢ τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονάς τε καὶ τέρψεις οὐδ' ἄλλου τινὸς οὔτ' ἔσωθεν ἐνοχλοῦντος οὔτ' ἔξωθεν ἐρεθίζοντος; πῶς δὲ φρόνησιν, οὐχ ὑποκειμένων αὐτῇ πρακτέων καὶ μὴ πρακτέων οὐδ' αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ μηδεμιᾶς ἐνούσης αὐτῇ κινήσεως τὸ παράπαν ἢ φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς ἐπί τι τῶν πρακτέων; ποῦ δὲ ὅλως ψυχαῖς ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλας δικαιοσύνη προσφυὴς ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν ὁμογενῶν ἢ τῶν ἑτερογενῶν, οὐκ ἐχούσαις οὔτε πόθεν οὔτε δι' ὧν οὔτε πῶς ἀπονείμωσι τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον ἐξῃρημένης τῆς εἰς θεὸν τιμῆς, οὐδ' ἄλλως ἐχούσαις ὁρμὴν ἢ κίνησιν πρὸς χρῆσιν ἰδίων ἢ πρὸς ἀποχὴν ἀλλοτρίων, τῆς μὲν χρήσεως τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τῆς ἀποχῆς ἐπὶ τῶν χρῆσθαι πεφυκότων θεωρουμένης, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς μήτε δεομένης τινὸς μήτε χρῆσθαι τισὶν ἢ τινὶ πεφυκυίας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μηδὲ τῆς λεγομένης ἰδιοπραγίας τῶν μερῶν ἐπὶ τῆς οὕτως ἐχούσης ψυχῆς εὑρεθῆναι δυναμένης; Καὶ μὴν κἀκεῖνο πάντων παραλογώτατον, τὸ τοὺς μὲν θεσ- πισθέντας νόμους ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους φέρειν, τῶν δὲ νομίμως ἢ παρα- νόμως πεπραγμένων τὴν δίκην ἐπὶ μόνας τρέπειν τὰς ψυχάς. εἰ γὰρ ὁ τοὺς νόμους δεξάμενος αὐτὸς δέξαιτ' ἂν δικαίως καὶ τῆς παρανομίας τὴν δίκην, ἐδέξατο δὲ τοὺς νόμους ἄνθρωπος, οὐ ψυχὴ καθ' ἑαυτήν, ἄνθρωπον δεῖ καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμαρτημένων ὑποσχεῖν δίκην, οὐ ψυχὴν καθ' ἑαυτήν· ἐπεὶ μὴ ψυχαῖς ἐθέσπισεν θεὸς ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν οὐδὲν αὐταῖς προσηκόντων, οἷον μοιχείας φόνου κλοπῆς ἁρπαγῆς τῆς κατὰ τῶν γεννησάντων ἀτιμίας πάσης τε κοινῶς τῆς ἐπ' ἀδικίᾳ καὶ βλάβῃ τῶν πέλας γινομένης ἐπιθυμίας. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ "τίμα τὸν πατέρα σου καὶ τὴν μητέρα" ψυχαῖς μόνον εὐάρμοστον, οὐ προσηκόντων αὐταῖς τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων· οὐ γὰρ ψυχαὶ ψυχὰς γεννῶσαι τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ τῆς μητρὸς οἰκειοῦνται προσηγορίαν, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπους ἄνθρωποι· οὔτε οὖν τὸ "οὐ μοιχεύσεις" ἐπὶ ψυχῶν λεχθείη ποτ' ἂν ἢ νοηθείη δεόντως, οὐκ οὔσης ἐν αὐταῖς τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ διαφορᾶς οὐδὲ πρὸς μῖξιν τινὸς ἐπιτηδειότητος ἢ πρὸς ταύτην ὀρέξεως. ὀρέξεως δὲ τοιαύτης οὐκ οὔσης, οὐδὲ μῖξιν εἶναι δυνατόν· παρ' οἷς δὲ μῖξις ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἔνθεσμος μῖξις, ὅπερ ἐστὶν γάμος· ἐννόμου δὲ