<24> But would someone say that souls are evil? If, because they associate with evil things providentially and for salvation, this is not evil, but good and from the Good which makes even evil good. But if we say that souls become evil, in what do they become evil, if not in the lack of good states and energies and through their own weakness, failure, and falling away? For we also say that the air around us is darkened by the lack and absence of light. But the light itself is always light, which also illuminates the darkness. Therefore, evil is not in demons nor in us as an existing evil, but as a lack and privation of the perfection of our own goods. <25> But evil is not even in irrational animals. For if you were to take away anger and desire and the other things, which are called and are not simply evil by their own nature, the lion, having lost its fierceness and pride, will not even be a lion, and the dog, having become gentle to all, will not be a dog, if indeed the property of a dog is to be watchful and to admit what is its own, but to drive away what is alien. So that not corrupting nature is not evil, but the corruption of nature is a weakness and lack of natural states and energies and powers. And if all things that come into being through generation have their perfection in time, not even that which is imperfect is entirely contrary to all nature. <26> But evil is not even in nature as a whole. For if all the principles of nature are from universal nature, there is nothing contrary to it. But for each individual thing, one thing will be according to nature, another not according to nature. For what is contrary to nature for one is not for another, and what is according to nature for this one is contrary to nature for that one. And the evil of a nature is what is contrary to nature, the privation of the things of nature. So there is not an evil nature, but this is evil for a nature: to be unable to fulfill the things of its own nature. <27> But evil is not even in bodies. For ugliness and disease are a lack of form and a privation of order. But this is not entirely evil, but less beautiful. For if there were a complete dissolution of beauty and form and order, the body itself would also perish. And that the body is not the cause of evil for the soul is clear from the fact that it is possible for evil to subsist even without a body, as in demons. For this is evil for minds and souls and bodies: the weakness and falling away from the state of their own goods. <28> Nor even the much-talked-about idea: "Evil is in matter," as they say, insofar as it is matter. For this too has a share in order and beauty and form. But if matter, being outside of these things, is in itself without quality and without form, how does matter, which in itself does not even have the capacity to be acted upon, do anything? Besides, how is matter evil? For if it in no way exists, it is neither good nor evil. But if it somehow exists, and all existing things are from the Good, then it too would be from the Good, and either the Good is productive of evil, or evil, as being from the Good, is good, or evil is productive of the Good, or even the Good, as from evil, is evil, or again there are two principles, and these themselves depend on another single summit. But if they say that matter is necessary for the completion of the whole universe, how is matter evil? For what is evil is one thing, and what is necessary is another. And how does the Good bring things into being out of evil? Or how is that which needs the Good evil? For evil flees the nature of the Good. And how does matter, being evil, beget and nourish nature? For evil, insofar as it is evil, is not generative or nourishing or in any way productive or preservative of anything. But if they should say that it does not produce evil in souls, but draws them to itself, how can this be true? For many of them look to the Good. And yet how could this happen if matter were in every way drawing them to evil? Therefore, evil in souls is not from matter, but from a disordered and discordant movement. But if they also say that this in every way follows from matter, and unstable matter is necessary for those who are unable to be established in themselves, how is what is evil necessary, or what is necessary evil? <29> Nor this either, which we say: Privation fights against the Good by its own power. For complete privation is altogether powerless, and partial privation does not have its power insofar as it is privation, but insofar as it is not complete privation. For while the privation of the good is partial, it is not yet evil, and when it becomes complete, the nature of the evil has also departed.
<24> Ἀλλὰ ψυχάς τις εἶναι λέγοι κακάς; Eἰ μέν, ὅτι συγγίνονται κακοῖς προνοητικῶς καὶ σωστικῶς, τοῦτο οὐ κακόν, ἀλλ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐκ τἀγαθοῦ τοῦ καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἀγαθύνοντος. Eἰ δὲ τὸ κακύνεσθαι ψυχάς φαμεν, ἐν τίνι κακύνονται, εἰ μὴ ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἕξεων καὶ ἐνεργειῶν ἐλλείψει καὶ δι' οἰκείαν ἀσθένειαν ἀτευξίᾳ καὶ ἀπολισθήσει; Καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸν ἀέρα τὸν περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐσκοτῶσθαί φαμεν ἐλλείψει καὶ ἀπουσίᾳ φωτός. Aὐτὸ δὲ τὸ φῶς ἀεὶ φῶς ἐστι τὸ καὶ τὸ σκότος φωτίζον. Oὐκ ἄρα οὔτε ἐν δαίμοσιν οὔτε ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ κακὸν ὡς ὂν κακόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔλλειψις καὶ ἐρημία τῆς τῶν οἰκείων ἀγαθῶν τελειότητος. <25> Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν ζῴοις ἀλόγοις ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν. Eἰ γὰρ ἀνέλῃς θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τἄλλα, ὅσα λέγεται καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει κακά, τὸ μὲν ἁδρὸν καὶ γαῦρον ὁ λέων ἀπολέσας οὐδὲ λέων ἔσται, προσηνὴς δὲ πᾶσι γενόμενος ὁ κύων οὐκ ἔσται κύων, εἴπερ κυνὸς τὸ φυλακτικὸν καὶ τὸ προσίεσθαι μὲν τὸ οἰκεῖον, ἀπελαύνειν δὲ τὸ ἀλλότριον. Ὥστε τὸ μὴ φθείρεσθαι τὴν φύσιν οὐ κακόν, φθορὰ δὲ φύσεως ἀσθένεια καὶ ἔλλειψις τῶν φυσικῶν ἕξεων καὶ ἐνεργειῶν καὶ δυνάμεων. Καὶ εἰ πάντα τὰ διὰ γενέσεως ἐν χρόνῳ ἔχει τὸ τέλειον, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀτελὲς πάντη παρὰ πᾶσαν φύσιν. <26> Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ φύσει τὸ κακόν. Eἰ γὰρ οἱ πάντες φυσικοὶ λόγοι παρὰ τῆς καθόλου φύσεως, οὐδὲν ἔστιν αὐτῇ τὸ ἐναντίον. Τῇ καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ἔσται, τὸ δὲ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. Ἄλλῃ γὰρ ἄλλο παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ τῇδε κατὰ φύσιν, τῇδε παρὰ φύσιν. Φύσεως δὲ κακία τὸ παρὰ φύσιν, ἡ στέρησις τῶν τῆς φύσεως. Ὥστε οὐκ ἔστι κακὴ φύσις, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο τῇ φύσει κακὸν τὸ ἀδυνατεῖν τὰ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως ἐκτελεῖν. <27> Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν σώμασι τὸ κακόν. Aἶσχος γὰρ καὶ νόσος ἔλλειψις εἴδους καὶ στέρησις τάξεως. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐ πάντη κακόν, ἀλλ' ἧττον καλόν. Eἰ γὰρ παντελὴς γένοιτο λύσις κάλλους καὶ εἴδους καὶ τάξεως, οἰχήσεται καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα. Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ κακίας αἴτιον τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ σῶμα, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ ἄνευ σώματος παρυφίστασθαι κακίαν ὥσπερ ἐν δαίμοσιν. Τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι καὶ νόοις καὶ ψυχαῖς καὶ σώμασι κακὸν ἡ τῆς ἕξεως τῶν οἰκείων ἀγαθῶν ἀσθένεια καὶ ἀπόπτωσις. <28> Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ πολυθρύλητον· Ἐν ὕλῃ τὸ κακόν, ὥς φασι, καθ' ὃ ὕλη. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη κόσμου καὶ κάλλους καὶ εἴδους ἔχει μετουσίαν. Eἰ δὲ τούτων ἐκτὸς οὖσα ἡ ὕλη καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἄποιός ἐστι καὶ ἀνείδεος, πῶς ποιεῖ τι ἡ ὕλη ἡ μηδὲ τὸ πάσχειν δύνασθαι καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἔχουσα; Ἄλλως τε πῶς ἡ ὕλη κακόν; Eἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν. Eἰ δέ πως ὄν, τὰ δὲ ὄντα πάντα ἐκ τἀγαθοῦ, καὶ αὐτὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἂν εἴη, καὶ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ κακοῦ ποιητικὸν ἢ τὸ κακὸν ὡς ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὂν ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὸν ἢ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦ κακὸν ἢ δύο αὖθις ἀρχαί, καὶ αὗται ἄλλης μιᾶς ἐξημμέναι κορυφῆς. Eἰ δὲ ἀναγκαῖόν φασι τὴν ὕλην πρὸς συμπλήρωσιν τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου, πῶς ἡ ὕλη κακόν; Ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Πῶς δὲ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦ παράγει τινὰ πρὸς γένεσιν; Ἢ πῶς κακὸν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δεόμενον; Φεύγει γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν τὸ κακόν. Πῶς δὲ γεννᾷ καὶ τρέφει τὴν φύσιν ἡ ὕλη κακὴ οὖσα; Τὸ γὰρ κακόν, ᾗ κακόν, οὐδενός ἐστι γεννητικὸν ἢ θρεπτικὸν ἢ ὅλως ποιητικὸν ἢ σωστικόν. Eἰ δὲ φαῖεν αὐτὴν μὲν οὐ ποιεῖν κακίαν ἐν ψυχαῖς, ἐφέλκεσθαι δὲ αὐτάς, πῶς ἔσται τοῦτο ἀληθές; Πολλαὶ γὰρ αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν βλέπουσιν. Καίτοι πῶς ἐγίνετο τοῦτο τῆς ὕλης πάντως αὐτὰς εἰς τὸ κακὸν ἐφελκομένης; Ὥστε οὐκ ἐξ ὕλης ἐν ψυχαῖς τὸ κακόν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀτάκτου καὶ πλημμελοῦς κινήσεως. Eἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτό φασι τῇ ὕλῃ πάντως ἕπεσθαι, καὶ ἀναγκαία ἡ ἄστατος ὕλη τοῖς ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἱδρῦσθαι μὴ δυναμένοις, πῶς τὸ κακὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον κακόν; <29> Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ὅ φαμεν· Ἡ στέρησις κατὰ δύναμιν οἰκείαν μάχεται τῷ ἀγαθῷ. Ἡ γὰρ παντελὴς στέρησις καθόλου ἀδύναμος, ἡ δὲ μερικὴ οὐ, καθ' ὃ στέρησις, ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὃ οὐ παντελής ἐστι στέρησις. Στερήσεως γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μερικῆς οὔσης οὔπω κακόν, καὶ γενομένης καὶ ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ φύσις ἀπελήλυθεν.