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and you know precisely what is right and you make arguments about this, and that what happens is worthy of blame even if you sin, you understand so well that you even absolve yourself of the charges and transfer the cause of the offense to another, providing through all this the clearest sign of the power of reason within you, according to which you know how to distinguish the good from the worse and are able to choose what you wish with great ease. If, then, God had fashioned your nature for that which he willed, it would have been necessary for you to rejoice, even in evil, 147 having been made for this. But if you make arguments about the distinction between good and evil, clearly blaming the working of wicked things, you are clearly not made for this by God, but choosing what you think best by your own judgment. Having thus exercised the arguments concerning free will, he speaks also about those who are either subjected to punishments, or are tested in better circumstances according to the will of God. Rom 9:22-24 That he was not concerned with the beauty of expression we have also said in the preceding, and that there are many things which he says elliptically, especially by the excess of brevity which it is his custom to use according to a certain personal idiom, he works obscurity into his sayings. Something of this sort can also be found in the present expression of the apostle, the 'if' being placed instead of a complete thought; for having shown that they have discernment of what is proper and are able to choose what seems best, instead of saying: 'But if he asks this, for what reason are there few of the evil who pay the penalty while the rest are tried in prosperity, and few of the good who are well-regarded in this life, while the majority of them enjoy no good at present,' he has placed only the 'But if,' as if the question would be clear to the readers from what has been said before, considering its repetition to be something superfluous. Then he adds the solution to the problem: ‘God, willing to show his wrath,’ and what follows. What he says is something like this: God has made the present life to be one of contests, not of retribution, permitting both the wicked and the good among men to be tested alike in both good and bad circumstances, so that there may be a precise test of the choice of all, and that the good may be shown to pursue virtue by disposition, when in both of life’s changes they are seen practicing the same things, neither boasting in prosperity, nor being compelled to be discontented in adversities, while the evil may be proven to be lovers of worse things through everything, being ungratefully disposed toward the author in the enjoyment of good things and intensifying the wickedness of their character in the experience of painful things. And he repays to each what is deserved in the age to come. So that, therefore, the outcome of these things may not be disbelieved, he provides shadows of them in the present life for the correction of all; and he punishes some of the wicked for the discipline of those wishing to practice wicked things, and he makes some of the good renowned as an encouragement for those who have been zealous to pursue the virtuous life. ‘Therefore,’ he says, ‘God, willing to show his wrath and his power,’ so that he might say: so that he might punish all those who commit wicked acts, he often endures evils, permitting them both to grow and to increase in this life, just as 148 he also did in the case of Pharaoh; then, when they have become manifest to all for their own wickedness, he punishes them justly, providing to all a clearer sign that those who sin do not offend without punishment. He does this very same thing again in the case of the good also, having made them renowned from obscurity against all hope. And this he has done in the case of both Moses and many others at various times; he provides the proof of the glory that will be for the virtuous in the age to come. Having concluded in these things the answer to the questions, he takes up the sequence of the argument. For his purpose was to show that God does not look to nature, but by grace

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καὶ οἶδας ἀκριβῶς τὸ δέον καὶ λόγους περὶ τούτου ποιῇ, καὶ ὅτι μέμψεως ἄξιον τὸ γιγνόμενον κἂν ἁμαρτάνῃς, οὕτως ἐπίστασαι ὥστε καὶ ἀπολύεις σαυτὸν τῶν ἐγκλημάτων καὶ μεταφέρεις ἐφ' ἕτερον τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ πταίσματος, διὰ πάντων σαφέστατον γνώρισμα τῆς ἐνούσης σοι τοῦ λογικοῦ δυνάμεως παρεχόμενος, καθ' ἣν καὶ διακρίνειν ἐπίστασαι τὸ καλὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι μετὰ πολλῆς ὃ βούλει δύνῃ τῆς εὐμαρείας. εἰ μὲν οὖν θεός σοι πρὸς ὅπερ ἐβούλετο κατεσκεύασε τὴν φύσιν, χαίρειν ἦν σε ἀνάγκη καὶ τῷ κακῷ 147 γεγονότα πρὸς τοῦτο· εἰ δὲ λόγους ποιῇ περί τε καλοῦ καὶ κακοῦ διακρίσεως, τὴν τῶν ἀτόπων ἐργασίαν σαφῶς αἰτιώμενος, εὔδηλος εἶ οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο γεγονὼς ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, οἰκείᾳ δὲ γνώμῃ τὸ δοκοῦν αἱρούμενος. οὕτω τοὺς περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου γυμνάσας λόγους λέγει καὶ περὶ τῶν εἴτε τιμωρίαις ὑποβαλλομένων, εἴτε καὶ ἐν κρείττοσιν ἐξεταζο μένων κατὰ γνώμην θεοῦ. Ro+m 9,22-24 Ὅτι μὴ κάλλους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἐσπούδακεν φράσεως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέροις εἰρήκαμεν, καὶ ὅτι πολλὰ μέν ἐστιν ἃ κατ' ἔλλειψιν λέγει, μάλιστα μὲν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς συντομίας ᾗ κατά τι οἰκεῖον ἰδίωμα κεχρῆσθαι ἔθος αὐτῷ, ἀσάφειαν τοῖς ῥητοῖς ἐνεργάζεται. τοιοῦτο δή τι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς παρούσης ἔνεστι λέξεως εὑρεῖν τοῦ ἀποστόλου, εἰ δὲ ἀντὶ ὁλοτελοῦς τεθεικότος διανοίας· δείξας γὰρ αὐτοὺς τῶν προσηκόντων τὴν διάγνωσιν ἔχοντας καὶ τὸ δοκοῦν δυναμένους αἱρεῖσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο πυνθάνει, τίνος ἕνεκεν ὀλίγοι μὲν τῶν κακῶν οἱ δίκας διδόντες τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν εὐθηνίαις ἐξεταζομένων, ὀλίγοι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εὐδόκιμοι κατὰ τόνδε γίνονται τὸν βίον, τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἀπολαύει κατά γε τὸ παρὸν ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ εἰ δὲ τέθεικε μόνον ὡς ἂν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων δήλου τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τοῦ ζητήματος ὄντος, περιττόν τι νομίζων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνάληψιν. εἶτα ἐπισυνάπτει τοῦ ζητή ματος τὴν λύσιν· θέλων ὁ θεὸς ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. ὃ δὲ λέγει τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· τὸν παρόντα βίον ἀγώνων οὐκ ἀνταποδόσεως εἶναι πεποίηκεν ὁ θεός, συγχωρῶν καὶ τοὺς φαύλους καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔν τε τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ τοῖς χείροσιν ἐξετάζεσθαι ὁμοίως, ὥστε βάσανον ἀκριβῆ τῆς ἁπάντων γενέσθαι προαιρέσεως, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς φανῆναι διαθέσει τὴν ἀρετὴν μετιόντας, ὅταν ἐν ἑκατέραις τοῦ βίου ταῖς μεταβολαῖς τὰ ὅμοια ἐπιτηδεύοντες φαίνωνται, οὔτε ἐν εὐθηνίαις καυχώμενοι, οὔτε ἐν δυσπρα γίαις δυσανασχετεῖν ἀναγκαζόμενοι, τοὺς δέ γε κακοὺς διὰ πάντων ἐραστὰς ἐλέγχεσθαι τῶν χειρόνων, ἔν τε τῇ ἀπολαύσει τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀγνωμόνως περὶ τὸν αἴτιον διατιθεμένους καὶ ἐν τῇ πείρᾳ τῶν λυπηρῶν ἐπιτείνοντας τοῦ τρόπου τὴν μοχθηρίαν. ἀποδίδωσι δὲ ἑκάστῳ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος. ὥστε τοίνυν μὴ ἀπιστεῖσθαι τούτων τὴν ἔκβασιν, αἰνίγματα αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος βίου διὰ τὴν ἁπάντων παρέχεται διόρθωσιν· καὶ τιμωρεῖται μὲν ἐνίους τῶν φαύλων εἰς σωφρονισμὸν τῶν ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰ ἄτοπα βουλομένων, εὐδοκίμους δὲ ἐνίους ἐργάζεται τῶν καλῶν εἰς προτροπὴν τῶν τὸν ἐνάρετον βίον μετιέναι ἐσπουδακότων. θέλων οὖν, φησίν, ὁ θεὸς ἐνδεῖξαι τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ τὸ δυνατόν, ἵνα εἴπῃ· ὅπως ἅπαντας τιμωρῆται τοὺς τὰ ἄτοπα διαπραττομένους, ἀνέχεται πολλάκις κακῶν, συγχωρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ αὔξειν καὶ ἐπιδιδόναι κατὰ τόνδε τὸν βίον, ὥσπερ οὖν 148 πεποίηκεν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Φαραώ· εἶτα καταφανεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτῶν κακίᾳ παρὰ πᾶσι γεγονότας τιμωρεῖται δικαίως, σαφέστερον γνώρισμα παρε χόμενος ἅπασι τοῦ μὴ ἀτιμώρητα πταίειν τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας. ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν διαπράττεται πάλιν καὶ ἐξ ἀδόξων αὐτοὺς παρὰ πᾶσαν ἐλπίδα περιφανεῖς ἐργασάμενος. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπί τε τοῦ Μωϋσέως καὶ ἑτέρων πολλῶν κατὰ διαφόρους πεποίηκε τοὺς καιρούς, τῆς ἐσομένης ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος τοῖς ἐναρέτοις δόξης παρέχεται τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. συμπεράνας τὴν πρὸς τὰ ζητήματα ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τούτοις ἀναλαμβάνει τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀκολουθίαν. προὔκειτο μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ δεῖξαι ὅτι θεὸς οὐ πρὸς φύσιν βλέπει, χάριτι δὲ