Book I Chapter I.—Preface—The Author’s Object—The Utility of Written Compositions.
Chapter III.—Against the Sophists.
Chapter IV.—Human Arts as Well as Divine Knowledge Proceed from God.
Chapter V.—Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology.
Chapter VI.—The Benefit of Culture.
Chapter VII.—The Eclectic Philosophy Paves the Way for Divine Virtue.
Chapter VIII.—The Sophistical Arts Useless.
Chapter IX.—Human Knowledge Necessary for the Understanding of the Scriptures.
Chapter X.—To Act Well of Greater Consequence Than to Speak Well.
Chapter XI.—What is the Philosophy Which the Apostle Bids Us Shun?
Chapter XII.—The Mysteries of the Faith Not to Be Divulged to All.
Chapter XIII.—All Sects of Philosophy Contain a Germ of Truth.
Chapter XIV.—Succession of Philosophers in Greece.
Chapter XV.—The Greek Philosophy in Great Part Derived from the Barbarians.
Chapter XVI.—That the Inventors of Other Arts Were Mostly Barbarians.
Chapter XVII.—On the Saying of the Saviour, “All that Came Before Me Were Thieves and Robbers.”
Chapter XVIII.—He Illustrates the Apostle’s Saying, “I Will Destroy the Wisdom of the Wise.”
Chapter XIX.—That the Philosophers Have Attained to Some Portion of Truth.
Chapter XX.—In What Respect Philosophy Contributes to the Comprehension of Divine Truth.
Chapter XXII.—On the Greek Translation of the Old Testament.
Chapter XXIII.—The Age, Birth, and Life of Moses.
Chapter XXIV.—How Moses Discharged the Part of a Military Leader.
Chapter XXV.—Plato an Imitator of Moses in Framing Laws.
Chapter XXVII.—The Law, Even in Correcting and Punishing, Aims at the Good of Men.
Chapter XXVIII.—The Fourfold Division of the Mosaic Law.
Chapter XXIX.—The Greeks But Children Compared with the Hebrews.
Book II. Chapter I.—Introductory.
Chapter II.—The Knowledge of God Can Be Attained Only Through Faith.
Chapter III.—Faith Not a Product of Nature.
Chapter IV.—Faith the Foundation of All Knowledge.
Chapter V.—He Proves by Several Examples that the Greeks Drew from the Sacred Writers.
Chapter VI.—The Excellence and Utility of Faith.
Chapter VII.—The Utility of Fear. Objections Answered.
Chapter VIII.—The Vagaries of Basilides and Valentinus as to Fear Being the Cause of Things.
Chapter IX.—The Connection of the Christian Virtues.
Chapter X.—To What the Philosopher Applies Himself.
Chapter XI.—The Knowledge Which Comes Through Faith the Surest of All.
Chapter XIII.—On First and Second Repentance.
Chapter XIV.—How a Thing May Be Involuntary.
Chapter XV.—On the Different Kinds of Voluntary Actions, and the Sins Thence Proceeding.
Chapter XVI.—How We are to Explain the Passages of Scripture Which Ascribe to God Human Affections.
Chapter XVII.—On the Various Kinds of Knowledge.
Chapter XIX.—The True Gnostic is an Imitator of God, Especially in Beneficence.
Chapter XX.—The True Gnostic Exercises Patience and Self-Restraint.
Chapter XXI.—Opinions of Various Philosophers on the Chief Good.
Book III. Caput I.—Basilidis Sententiam de Continentia Et Nuptiis Refutat.
Caput II.—Carpocratis Et Epiphanis Sententiam de Feminarum Communitate Refutat.
Caput IV.—Quibus Prætextibus Utantur Hæretici ad Omnis Genetis Licentiam Et Libidinem Exercendam.
Caput VII.—Qua in Re Christianorum Continentia Eam Quam Sibi Vindicant Philosophi Antecellat.
Caput X.—Verba Christi Matt. xviii. 20, Mystice Exponit.
Caput XI.—Legis Et Christi Mandatum de Non Concupiscendo Exponit.
Caput XIV.—2 Cor. xi. 3, Et Eph. iv. 24, Exponit.
Caput XV.—1 Cor. vii. 1 Luc. xiv. 26 Isa. lvi. 2, 3, Explicat.
Caput XVI.—Jer. xx. 14 Job xiv. 3 Ps. l. 5 1 Cor. ix. 27, Exponit.
Book IV. Chapter I.—Order of Contents.
Chapter II.—The Meaning of the Name Stromata or Miscellanies.
Chapter III.—The True Excellence of Man.
Chapter IV.—The Praises of Martyrdom.
Chapter V.—On Contempt for Pain, Poverty, and Other External Things.
Chapter VI.—Some Points in the Beatitudes.
Chapter VII.—The Blessedness of the Martyr.
Chapter VIII.—Women as Well as Men, Slaves as Well as Freemen, Candidates for the Martyr’s Crown.
Chapter IX.—Christ’s Sayings Respecting Martyrdom.
Chapter X.—Those Who Offered Themselves for Martyrdom Reproved.
Chapter XI.—The Objection, Why Do You Suffer If God Cares for You, Answered.
Chapter XII.—Basilides’ Idea of Martyrdom Refuted.
Chapter XIII.—Valentinian’s Vagaries About the Abolition of Death Refuted.
Chapter XIV.—The Love of All, Even of Our Enemies.
Chapter XV.—On Avoiding Offence.
Chapter XVI.—Passages of Scripture Respecting the Constancy, Patience, and Love of the Martyrs.
Chapter XVII.—Passages from Clement’s Epistle to the Corinthians on Martyrdom.
Chapter XVIII.—On Love, and the Repressing of Our Desires.
Chap. XIX.—Women as well as Men Capable of Perfection.
Chapter XXI.—Description of the Perfect Man, or Gnostic.
Chapter XXIII.—The Same Subject Continued.
Chapter XXIV.—The Reason and End of Divine Punishments.
Chapter XXV.—True Perfection Consists in the Knowledge and Love of God.
Chapter XXVI.—How the Perfect Man Treats the Body and the Things of the World.
Chapter III.—The Objects of Faith and Hope Perceived by the Mind Alone.
Chapter IV.—Divine Things Wrapped Up in Figures Both in the Sacred and in Heathen Writers.
Chapter V.—On the Symbols of Pythagoras.
Chapter VI.—The Mystic Meaning of the Tabernacle and Its Furniture.
Chapter VII.—The Egyptian Symbols and Enigmas of Sacred Things.
Chapter VIII.—The Use of the Symbolic Style by Poets and Philosophers.
Chapter IX.—Reasons for Veiling the Truth in Symbols.
Chapter X.—The Opinion of the Apostles on Veiling the Mysteries of the Faith.
Chapter XII.—God Cannot Be Embraced in Words or by the Mind.
Chapter XIII.—The Knowledge of God a Divine Gift, According to the Philosophers.
Chapter XIV.—Greek Plagiarism from the Hebrews.
Chapter II.—The Subject of Plagiarisms Resumed. The Greeks Plagiarized from One Another.
Chapter III.—Plagiarism by the Greeks of the Miracles Related in the Sacred Books of the Hebrews.
Chapter V.—The Greeks Had Some Knowledge of the True God.
Chapter VI.—The Gospel Was Preached to Jews and Gentiles in Hades.
Chapter VII.—What True Philosophy Is, and Whence So Called.
Chapter VIII.—Philosophy is Knowledge Given by God.
Chapter IX.—The Gnostic Free of All Perturbations of the Soul.
Chapter X.—The Gnostic Avails Himself of the Help of All Human Knowledge.
Chapter XI.—The Mystical Meanings in the Proportions of Numbers, Geometrical Ratios, and Music.
Chapter XII.—Human Nature Possesses an Adaptation for Perfection The Gnostic Alone Attains It.
Chapter XIII.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven Corresponding with the Dignities of the Church Below.
Chapter XIV.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven.
Chapter XV.—Different Degrees of Knowledge.
Chapter XVI.—Gnostic Exposition of the Decalogue.
Chapter XVII.—Philosophy Conveys Only an Imperfect Knowledge of God.
Chapter XVIII.—The Use of Philosophy to the Gnostic.
Chapter II.—The Son the Ruler and Saviour of All.
Chapter III.—The Gnostic Aims at the Nearest Likeness Possible to God and His Son.
Chapter IV.—The Heathens Made Gods Like Themselves, Whence Springs All Superstition.
Chapter V.—The Holy Soul a More Excellent Temple Than Any Edifice Built by Man.
Chapter VI.—Prayers and Praise from a Pure Mind, Ceaselessly Offered, Far Better Than Sacrifices.
Chapter VII.—What Sort of Prayer the Gnostic Employs, and How It is Heard by God.
Chapter VIII.—The Gnostic So Addicted to Truth as Not to Need to Use an Oath.
Chapter IX.—Those Who Teach Others, Ought to Excel in Virtues.
Chapter X.—Steps to Perfection.
Chapter XI.—Description of the Gnostic’s Life.
Chapter XII.—The True Gnostic is Beneficent, Continent, and Despises Worldly Things.
Chapter XIII.—Description of the Gnostic Continued.
Chapter XIV.—Description of the Gnostic Furnished by an Exposition of 1 Cor. vi. 1, Etc.
Chapter XV.—The Objection to Join the Church on Account of the Diversity of Heresies Answered.
Chapter XVI.—Scripture the Criterion by Which Truth and Heresy are Distinguished.
Chapter XVII.—The Tradition of the Church Prior to that of the Heresies.
Book VIII. Chapter I.—The Object of Philosophical and Theological Inquiry—The Discovery of Truth.
Chapter II.—The Necessity of Perspicuous Definition.
Chapter III.—Demonstration Defined.
Chapter IV.—To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition.
Chapter V.—Application of Demonstration to Sceptical Suspense of Judgment.
Chapter VI.—Definitions, Genera, and Species.
Chapter VII.—On the Causes of Doubt or Assent.
As many men drawing down the ship, cannot be called many causes, but one cause consisting of many;—for each individual by himself is not the cause of the ship being drawn, but along with the rest;—so also philosophy, being the search for truth, contributes to the comprehension of truth; not as being the cause of comprehension, but a cause along with other things, and co-operator; perhaps also a joint cause. And as the several virtues are causes of the happiness of one individual; and as both the sun, and the fire, and the bath, and clothing are of one getting warm: so while truth is one, many things contribute to its investigation. But its discovery is by the Son. If then we consider, virtue is, in power, one. But it is the case, that when exhibited in some things, it is called prudence, in others temperance, and in others manliness or righteousness. By the same analogy, while truth is one, in geometry there is the truth of geometry; in music, that of music; and in the right philosophy, there will be Hellenic truth. But that is the only authentic truth, unassailable, in which we are instructed by the Son of God. In the same way we say, that the drachma being one and the same, when given to the shipmaster, is called the fare; to the tax-gatherer, tax; to the landlord, rent; to the teacher, fees; to the seller, an earnest. And each, whether it be virtue or truth, called by the same name, is the cause of its own peculiar effect alone; and from the blending of them arises a happy life. For we are not made happy by names alone, when we say that a good life is happiness, and that the man who is adorned in his soul with virtue is happy. But if philosophy contributes remotely to the discovery of truth, by reaching, by diverse essays, after the knowledge which touches close on the truth, the knowledge possessed by us, it aids him who aims at grasping it, in accordance with the Word, to apprehend knowledge. But the Hellenic truth is distinct from that held by us (although it has got the same name), both in respect of extent of knowledge, certainly of demonstration, divine power, and the like. For we are taught of God, being instructed in the truly “sacred letters”229 ίερἀ γράυυατα (2 Tim. iii. 15), translated in A. V. “sacred Scriptures:” also in contradistinction to the so-called sacred letters of the Egyptians, Chaldeans, etc. by the Son of God. Whence those, to whom we refer, influence souls not in the way we do, but by different teaching. And if, for the sake of those who are fond of fault-finding, we must draw a distinction, by saying that philosophy is a concurrent and cooperating cause of true apprehension, being the search for truth, then we shall avow it to be a preparatory training for the enlightened man (τοῦ γνωστικοῦ); not assigning as the cause that which is but the joint-cause; nor as the upholding cause, what is merely co-operative; nor giving to philosophy the place of a sine quâ non. Since almost all of us, without training in arts and sciences, and the Hellenic philosophy, and some even without learning at all, through the influence of a philosophy divine and barbarous, and by power, have through faith received the word concerning God, trained by self-operating wisdom. But that which acts in conjunction with something else, being of itself incapable of operating by itself, we describe as co-operating and concausing, and say that it becomes a cause only in virtue of its being a joint-cause, and receives the name of cause only in respect of its concurring with something else, but that it cannot by itself produce the right effect.
Although at one time philosophy justified the Greeks,230 [Kaye, p. 426. A most valuable exposition of these passages on justification. See Elucidation XIV., infra.] not conducting them to that entire righteousness to which it is ascertained to cooperate, as the first and second flight of steps help you in your ascent to the upper room, and the grammarian helps the philosopher. Not as if by its abstraction, the perfect Word would be rendered incomplete, or truth perish; since also sight, and hearing, and the voice contribute to truth, but it is the mind which is the appropriate faculty for knowing it. But of those things which co-operate, some contribute a greater amount of power; some, a less. Perspicuity accordingly aids in the communication of truth, and logic in preventing us from falling under the heresies by which we are assailed. But the teaching, which is according to the Saviour, is complete in itself and without defect, being “the power and wisdom of God;”231 1 Cor. i. 24. and the Hellenic philosophy does not, by its approach, make the truth more powerful; but rendering powerless the assault of sophistry against it, and frustrating the treacherous plots laid against the truth, is said to be the proper “fence and wall of the vineyard.” And the truth which is according to faith is as necessary for life as bread; while the preparatory discipline is like sauce and sweetmeats. “At the end of the dinner, the dessert is pleasant,” according to the Theban Pindar. And the Scripture has expressly said, “The innocent will become wiser by understanding, and the wise will receive knowledge.”232 Prov. xxi. 11. “And he that speaketh of himself,” saith the Lord, “seeketh his own glory; but He that seeketh His glory that sent Him is true, and there is no unrighteousness in Him.”233 John vii. 18. On the other hand, therefore, he who appropriates what belongs to the barbarians, and vaunts it is his own, does wrong, increasing his own glory, and falsifying the truth. It is such an one that is by Scripture called a “thief.” It is therefore said, “Son, be not a liar; for falsehood leads to theft.” Nevertheless the thief possesses really, what he has possessed himself of dishonestly,234 [This ingenious statement explains the author’s constant assertion that truth, and to some extent saving truth, was to be found in Greek philosophy.] whether it be gold, or silver, or speech, or dogma. The ideas, then, which they have stolen, and which are partially true, they know by conjecture and necessary logical deduction: on becoming disciples, therefore, they will know them with intelligent apprehension.
Ὡς δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ καθέλκοντες τὴν ναῦν οὐ πολλὰ αἴτια λέγοιντ' ἄν, ἀλλ' ἐκ πολλῶν αἴτιον ἕν (οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ αἴτιος ἕκαστος τοῦ καθέλκεσθαι τὴν ναῦν, ἀλλὰ σὺν τοῖς ἄλλοις), οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία πρὸς κατάληψιν τῆς ἀληθείας, ζήτησις οὖσα ἀληθείας, συλλαμβάνεται, οὐκ αἰτία οὖσα καταλήψεως, σὺν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰτία καὶ συνεργός. τάχα δὲ καὶ τὸ συναίτιον αἴτιον. ὡς δέ, ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν, αἴτιαι τυγχάνουσιν αἱ ἀρεταὶ πλείονες ὑπάρχουσαι, καὶ ὡς τοῦ θερμαίνεσθαι ὅ τε ἥλιος τό τε πῦρ βαλανεῖόν τε καὶ ἐσθής, οὕτω μιᾶς οὔσης τῆς ἀληθείας πολλὰ τὰ συλλαμβανόμενα πρὸς ζήτησιν αὐτῆς, ἡ δὲ εὕρεσις δι' υἱοῦ. εἰ γοῦν σκοποῖμεν, μία κατὰ δύναμίν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, ταύτην δὲ συμβέβηκεν τούτοις μὲν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐγγενομένην λέγεσθαι φρόνησιν, ἐν τούτοις δὲ σωφροσύνην, ἐν τούτοις δὲ ἀνδρείαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην. ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν οὖν λόγον, καὶ μιᾶς οὔσης ἀληθείας, ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ μὲν γεωμετρίας ἀλήθεια, ἐν μουσικῇ δὲ μουσικῆς, κἀν φιλοσοφίᾳ τῇ ὀρθῇ Ἑλληνικὴ εἴη ἂν ἀλήθεια. μόνη δὲ ἡ κυρία αὕτη ἀλήθεια ἀπαρεγχείρητος, ἣν παρὰ τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ θεοῦ παιδευόμεθα. τοῦτόν φαμεν τὸν τρόπον μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς δραχμῆς τῷ μὲν ναυκλήρῳ δοθείσης λέγεσθαι ναῦλον, τῷ δὲ τελώνῃ τέλος καὶ ἐνοίκιον μὲν τῷ σταθμούχῳ, μισθὸν δὲ τῷ διδασκάλῳ καὶ τῷ πιπράσκοντι ἀρραβῶνα. ἑκάστη δὲ εἴτε ἀρετὴ εἴτε καὶ ἀλήθεια συνωνύμως καλουμένη μόνου τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἀποτελέσματός ἐστιν αἰτία. κατὰ σύγχρησιν δὲ τούτων γίνεται τὸ εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν (μὴ γὰρ δὴ εὐδαιμονῶμεν πρὸς τὰ ὀνόματα), ὅταν τὸν ὀρθὸν βίον εὐδαιμονίαν λέγωμεν καὶ εὐδαίμονα τὸν κεκοσμημένον τὴν ψυχὴν ἐναρέτως. εἰ δὲ καὶ πόρρωθεν συλλαμβάνεται φιλοσοφία πρὸς τὴν ἀληθείας εὕρεσιν, κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς διατείνουσα ἐπὶ τὴν προσεχῶς ἁπτομένην τῆς ἀληθείας τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς εἴδησιν, ἀλλὰ συλλαμβάνεταί γε τῷ λογικῶς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐσπουδακότι ἀνθάπτεσθαι γνώσεως. χωρίζεται δὲ ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ ἀλήθεια τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς, εἰ καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετείληφεν ὀνόματος, καὶ μεγέθει γνώσεως καὶ ἀποδείξει κυριωτέρᾳ καὶ θείᾳ δυνάμει καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις· θεοδίδακτοι γὰρ ἡμεῖς, ἱερὰ ὄντως γράμματα παρὰ τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ θεοῦ παιδευόμενοι· ἔνθεν οὐδ' ὡσαύτως κινοῦσι τὰς ψυχάς, ἀλλὰ διαφόρῳ διδασκαλίᾳ. εἰ δὲ καὶ διαστέλλεσθαι ἡμᾶς διὰ τοὺς φιλεγκλήμονας δεήσει, συναίτιον [τὴν] φιλοσοφίαν καὶ συνεργὸν λέγοντες τῆς ἀληθοῦς καταλήψεως, ζήτησιν οὖσαν ἀληθείας, προπαιδείαν αὐτὴν ὁμολογήσομεν τοῦ γνωστικοῦ, οὐκ αἴτιον τιθέμενοι τὸ συναίτιον οὐδὲ μὴν τὸ συνεργὸν συνεκτικὸν οὐδ' ὡς οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ἐπεὶ σχεδὸν οἱ πάντες ἄνευ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας καὶ φιλοσοφίας τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς, οἳ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ γραμμάτων, τῇ θείᾳ καὶ βαρβάρῳ κινηθέντες φιλοσοφίᾳ, δυνάμει τὸν περὶ θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως παρειλήφαμεν λόγον, αὐτουργῷ σοφίᾳ πεπαιδευμένοι. ὃ δὲ μεθ' ἑτέρου ποιεῖ, ἀτελὲς ὂν καθ' αὑτὸ ἐνεργεῖν, συνεργόν φαμεν καὶ συναίτιον ἀπὸ τοῦ σὺν αἰτίῳ αἴτιον ὑπάρχειν [ἢ] ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρῳ συνελθὸν αἴτιον γίγνεσθαι ὠνομασμένον, καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν παρέχειν. καίτοι καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἐδικαίου ποτὲ καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία τοὺς Ἕλληνας, οὐκ εἰς τὴν καθόλου δὲ δικαιοσύνην (εἰς ἣν εὑρίσκεται συνεργός, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος βαθμὸς τῷ εἰς τὸ ὑπερῷον ἀνιόντι καὶ ὁ γραμματιστὴς τῷ φιλοσοφήσοντι), οὐδ' ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν αὐτῆς ἤτοι ἐλλείπειν τῷ καθόλου λόγῳ ἢ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ὄψις συμβάλλεται καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, νοῦς δὲ ὁ γνωρίζων αὐτὴν προσφυῶς. ἀλλὰ τῶν συνεργῶν τὰ μὲν πλείονα, τὰ δ' ἐλάσσονα προσφέρεται δύναμιν. ἡ γοῦν σαφήνεια συνεργεῖ πρὸς τὴν παράδοσιν τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὑποπίπτειν ταῖς κατατρεχούσαις αἱρέσεσιν. αὐτοτελὴς μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀπροσδεὴς ἡ κατὰ τὸν σωτῆρα διδασκαλία, δύναμις οὖσα καὶ σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ, προσιοῦσα δὲ φιλοσοφία ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ οὐ δυνατωτέραν ποιεῖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον παρέχουσα τὴν κατ' αὐτῆς σοφιστικὴν ἐπιχεί ρησιν καὶ διακρουομένη τὰς δολερὰς κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπιβουλὰς φραγμὸς οἰκείως εἴρηται καὶ θριγκὸς εἶναι τοῦ ἀμπελῶνος. καὶ ἣ μὲν ὡς ἄρτος ἀναγκαία πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν πίστιν ἀλήθεια· ἡ προπαιδεία δὲ προσοψήματι ἔοικεν καὶ τραγήματι, δείπνου δὲ λήγοντος γλυκὺ τρωγάλιον κατὰ τὸν Θηβαῖον Πίνδαρον. ἄντικρυς δὲ ἐξεῖπεν ἡ γραφή· πανουργότερος ἔσται ἄκακος συνίων, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς δέξεται γνῶσιν. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ λαλῶν τὴν δόξαν τὴν ἰδίαν ζητεῖ, φησὶν ὁ κύριος, ὁ δὲ ζητῶν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ πέμψαντος αὐτὸν ἀληθής ἐστι καὶ ἀδικία οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ. ἔμπαλιν οὖν ἀδικεῖ ὁ σφετερισάμενος τὰ βαρβάρων καὶ ὡς ἴδια αὐχῶν, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δόξαν αὔξων καὶ ψευδόμενος τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὗτος κλέπτης ὑπὸ τῆς γραφῆς εἴρηται. φησὶ γοῦν· υἱέ, μὴ γίνου ψεύστης· ὁδηγεῖ γὰρ τὸ ψεῦσμα πρὸς τὴν κλοπήν. ἤδη δὲ ὁ κλέπτης ὅπερ ὑφελόμενος ἔχει ἀληθῶς ἔχει, κἂν χρυσίον ᾖ κἂν ἄργυρος κἂν λόγος κἂν δόγμα. ἐκ μέρους τοίνυν, ἃ κεκλόφασιν, ἀληθῆ μέν, στοχαστικῶς δὲ καὶ ταῖς τῶν λόγων ἀνάγκαις ἴσασι. μαθητευθέντες οὖν καταληπτικῶς ἐπιγνώσονται.