22

he uses insults, calling those who heed the voice of the Gospel without examination disturbed and unbelieving, which says, "If it is possible, let this cup pass from me; yet not my will, but yours be done." To these things he adds his own wording, which is as follows. "And they do not remember," he says, "that this will is said to be the own will not of the man from earth, as they suppose, but of the God who came down from heaven." What could one find to say of such a thing? I am not speaking of any of those condemned for heresy; but I think not even the father of impiety and falsehood himself could find anything more terrible to say in blasphemy than what has been said. Does the writer know what he is uttering? The God who came down from heaven rejects the will proper to his divinity and does not want to come to the action which he wants. Therefore the wills of the Son and of the Father are divided. And how could the will be common to both? And how could the identity of nature be shown in the difference of wills? For it is absolutely necessary for the will to be concurrent with the nature, as the Lord says somewhere: "A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a rotten tree bear good fruit." And choice would be the fruit of nature, so that of a good nature it is good, and of an evil nature, such as it is. If, therefore, the 3,1.180 fruit of the will is different in the Father and the Son, they will necessarily confess that the nature of each is also different. Why then is Arius opposed? And why do they not desert to Eunomius, who, dividing the nature of the Father and the Son, also cuts the will along with the nature and for this reason especially establishes the foreignness of substance, by cleaving apart the account of the divinity in the inferior with respect to the pre-eminent? But let us take up again what was said by him.

"They do not remember," he says, "that this will is said to be the own will, not of the man from earth, as they suppose, but of the God who came down from heaven." What will does the writer mean? That which the Lord clearly wills not to happen, saying to the Father, "Not my will, but yours be done." Does he understand into what contradiction his argument has fallen? The passion draws near and the betrayer is about to arrive with the crowd, and then this prayer takes place. Is the one praying man or God? If he thinks the one praying is God, he perceives in him a weakness equal to that of men. How then is he God who has no good from himself, but is in need of the alliance of one who is superior? Then also how does the divinity condemn its own will? Was what it willed good or evil? For if it was good, why is what it willed not brought to completion? But if it was evil, what is the divinity's affinity for evil? But as I was saying, he does not understand, turning the argument to its opposite. For if the voice saying, "Let not my will be done, but yours," is of the only-begotten God, the argument itself always revolves around itself through a certain contradiction and has no stable 3,1.181 point. For he who does not will his own will to be done, absolutely wills this very thing, that what he wills not be done. How then will the prayer be brought to completion, when he says, "I will this, that what I will may not happen"? It will surely be turned to the opposite of what is sought, and he who hears such a prayer will be at a loss in either case. For whatever he may do, he turns the outcome to what is unwanted by the one praying. Will he do the will of the one praying? But the prayer is that what he wills should not happen. Should he not do what he wills? But the one praying wills that what he does not will should happen to him; so that, being taken in every way, the thought will be unstable, fighting with itself and being overthrown by itself. And of such an impasse in the argument, there would be one consolation: the true confession of the mystery, that shrinking from the passion belongs to human weakness, as the Lord also says, stating that the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak; but enduring the passion according to the economy belongs to the divine will and power. ] Since, therefore, the one is different from the

22

χρῆται τῇ λοιδορίᾳ ταρασσομένους καὶ ἀπίστους ἀποκαλῶν τοὺς τῇ εὐαγγελικῇ φωνῇ ἀνεξετά στως προσέχοντας, ἥ φησιν Εἰ δυνατόν, παρελθέτω τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο ἀπ' ἐμοῦ· πλὴν μὴ τὸ ἐμόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν γενέσθω θέλημα. τούτοις δὲ προστίθησι τὴν ἰδίαν λέξιν ἔχουσαν οὕτως. Καὶ οὐ μνημονεύουσι, φησίν, ὅτι τὸ θέλημα τοῦτο ἴδιον εἴρηται οὐκ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἐκ γῆς, καθὼς αὐτοὶ νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ καταβάντος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. τί ἂν ἐξεύροι τις τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν; οὐ λέγω τούτων τινὰ τῶν ἐπὶ αἱρέσει κατεγνωσμένων· ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτὸν οἶμαι τὸν ἀσεβείας τε καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους πατέρα εὑρεῖν τι τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς βλασφημίαν δεινότερον. ἆρα οἶδεν ὁ λογογράφος ἃ φθέγγεται; ὁ θεὸς ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καταβὰς τὸ ἴδιον τῆς θεότητος θέλημα παραγράφεται καὶ οὐ βούλεται εἰς ἔργον ἐλθεῖν, ὅπερ βούλεται. οὐκοῦν μεμέρισται τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τὰ θελήματα. καὶ πῶς ἂν εἴη κοινὸν ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων τὸ θέλημα; πῶς δ' ἂν ἡ τῆς φύσεως ταυτότης τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν θελημάτων ἐμφαίνοιτο; ἀνάγκη γὰρ πᾶσα σύνδρομον εἶναι τῇ φύσει τὴν βούλησιν, καθώς φησί που ὁ κύριος· Οὐ δύναται δένδρον καλὸν καρποὺς πονηροὺς ποιεῖν οὐδὲ δένδρον σαπρὸν καρποὺς ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν· καρπὸς δ' ἂν εἴη φύσεως ἡ προαίρεσις, ὥστε ἀγαθῆς μὲν ἀγαθὴν εἶναι, κακῆς δὲ τοιαύτην. εἰ οὖν διάφορος ἐπὶ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ ὁ 3,1.180 καρπὸς τοῦ θελήματος, διάφορον ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἑκατέρων φύσιν ὁμολογήσουσιν. τί οὖν πολεμεῖται ὁ Ἄρειος; τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτομολοῦσι πρὸς τὸν Εὐνόμιον, ὃς διαιρῶν τοῦ πατρός τε καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν φύσιν συνδιατέμνει τῇ φύσει τὴν βούλησιν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα κατασκευάζει τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλότριον, τῷ ὑποβεβηκότι πρὸς τὸ προέχον συνδιασχίζων τὸν τῆς θεότητος λόγον; Πάλιν δὲ τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ ῥηθὲν ἀναλάβωμεν.

Οὐ μνημονεύουσι, φησίν, ὅτι τὸ θέλημα τοῦτο ἴδιον εἴρηται, οὐκ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἐκ γῆς, καθὼς αὐτοὶ νομίζου σιν, ἀλλὰ θεοῦ τοῦ καταβάντος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. ποῖον θέλημα φησὶν ὁ λογογράφος; ὃ βούλεται δηλαδὴ μὴ γενέσθαι ὁ κύριος λέγων πρὸς τὸν πατέρα Μὴ τὸ ἐμὸν θέλημα, ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν γενέσθω. ἆρα συνίησιν, οἵᾳ περι πέπτωκεν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος ἐναντιότητι; ἐγγίζει τὸ πάθος καὶ ὅσον οὔπω μέλλει ὁ προδότης ἐφίστασθαι μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους καὶ τότε γίνεται ἡ τοιαύτη εὐχή. ὁ εὐχόμενος ἄνθρωπος ἢ θεός, εἰ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν εὐχόμενον οἴεται, ἴσην αὐτῷ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐνορᾷ τὴν ἀσθένειαν. πῶς οὖν θεὸς ὁ μηδὲν οἴκοθεν ἀγαθὸν ἔχων, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑπερκειμένης συμμαχίας δεόμενος; εἶτα καὶ πῶς καταγινώσκει ἡ θεότης τοῦ ἰδίου θελήματος; ἀγαθὸν ἦν ἢ κακόν, ὃ ἠβούλετο; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀγα θόν, διὰ τί οὐκ εἰς πέρας ἄγεται ὃ ἠβούλετο; εἰ δὲ κακόν, τίς πρὸς τὸ κακὸν τῇ θεότητι ἡ οἰκείωσις; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἔφην, ὅτι οὐ συνίησιν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον περιτρέπων τὸν λόγον. εἰ γὰρ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἐστι θεοῦ ἡ φωνὴ ἡ λέγουσα Μὴ τὸ ἐμὸν θέλημα γινέσθω, ἀλλὰ τὸ σόν, αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀεὶ διά τινος ἐναντιότητος στρέφεται καὶ οὐδαμοῦ τὸ στά 3,1.181 σιμον ἔχει. ὁ γὰρ μὴ βουλόμενος τὸ ἴδιον θέλημα γενέσθαι, αὐτὸ τοῦτο βούλεται πάντως, τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι ὃ βούλεται. πῶς οὖν ἡ εὐχὴ πρὸς πέρας ἀχθήσεται λέγοντος, ὅτι τοῦτο θέλω, ἵνα ὃ θέλω μὴ γένηται; πρὸς τοὐναντίον πάντως τοῦ σπουδαζομένου περιτραπήσεται καὶ ἀμηχανήσει καθ' ἑκάτερον ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπαΐων εὐχῆς. ὅπερ γὰρ ἂν ποιήσῃ, πρὸς τὸ ἀβούλητον τῷ εὐχομένῳ περιτρέπει τὴν ἔκβασιν. ποιήσει τὸ θέλημα τοῦ εὐχομένου; ἀλλ' ἡ εὐχή ἐστι τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι ἃ βούλεται. μὴ ποιήσῃ ὃ βούλεται; ἀλλ' ὁ εὐχόμενος βούλεται γενέσθαι αὐτῷ, ὃ μὴ βούλεται· ὥστε κατὰ πάντα τρόπον πάντῃ μεταλαμβανόμενον ἀστατήσει τὸ νόημα αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ μαχόμενον καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καθαιρούμενον. Τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀμηχανίας μία γένοιτο ἂν παρα μυθία, ἡ ἀληθὴς τοῦ μυστηρίου ὁμολογία, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δειλιᾶν πρὸς τὸ πάθος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἀσθενείας ἐστί, καθώς φησι καὶ ὁ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμα πρόθυμον εἶναι λέγων, ἀσθενῆ δὲ τὴν σάρκα· τὸ δὲ ἀνέχεσθαι τὸ ἐξ οἰκονομίας πάθος τῆς θείας ἐστι καὶ βουλῆς καὶ δυνάμεως. ] Επειδὴ τοίνυν ἄλλο τὸ