Elements of theology

 As one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. therefore

 Activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. for if all beings by nat

 It desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? bu

 Is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. for either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 Beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. for the mon

 The one being divided. but if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. if, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 The thing produced is other than it. therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 From something and reverting has a cyclical activity. for if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 Procession. for since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 Has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 The self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. for if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 Having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 A cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 Suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 Being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. but that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 Passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. but the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 Undiminished it contains in itself. but surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 Set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 But nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 All things. for since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 A turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. for the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 A hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 every god is supra-essenti

 Supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 Is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 Having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 Is more unified than beings. all divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 Of a henad working, with which it is connate. this, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 To the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. but the mean, s

 Proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 Presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 They have intelligible [qualities]. in the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 And sees itself. but seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. so that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 More akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. therefore, those that are h

 On the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 By its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 And to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 Of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 every period of a soul is measured by time

 The relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 It admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. but indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. for everything

all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist according to cause, and in the middle the first exists according to participation and the third according to cause, and in the third those before it exist according to participation, and thus in being, life and intellect are pre-contained, and since each is characterized by its existence and not by its cause (for it is the cause of other things) nor by its participation (for it has this from another source, of which it has partaken), truly there is both living and intellection, essential life and essential intellect; and in life, being is according to participation, and intellection according to cause, but each vitally (for in this consists its existence); and in intellect, both life and substance are according to participation, and each intellectually (for the being of intellect is cognitive and its life is knowledge). 104 Everything that is primarily eternal has both its substance and its activity eternal. For if it partakes primarily of the property of eternity, it does not partake in one respect but not in another, but it partakes in every respect. For either, partaking according to its activity it does not partake according to its substance (but this is impossible; for the activity will be superior to the substance); or partaking according to its substance it does not partake according to its activity, and the same thing will be primarily eternal and also primarily partake of time, and time will primarily measure the activity of some things, but eternity of nothing, though it is superior to all time, if indeed that which is primarily eternal is not contained in its activity by eternity. Therefore everything that is primarily eternal has both its substance and its activity eternal. 105 All that is immortal is everlasting; but not all that is everlasting is immortal. For if the immortal is that which always partakes of life, and that which always partakes of life also partakes of being, then that which is always living always is; so that all that is immortal is everlasting (for the immortal is that which is unsusceptible of death and is always living, while the everlasting is that which is unsusceptible of not-being and is always existent). But if many existent things are both superior and inferior to life, being unsusceptible of immortality, but being always existent, then not everything that is everlasting is immortal. But indeed that many things which are always existent are not immortal is clear; for there are some existent things that are devoid of life, but are always existent and indestructible. For as being is to life, so is the everlasting to the immortal (for inalienable life is immortality, and that which inalienably is is everlasting); but being is more comprehensive than life; therefore the everlasting is also more comprehensive than the immortal. 106 Between that which is in every way eternal in both substance and activity, and that which has its substance in time, the mean is that which is in one respect eternal, and in another measured by time. For that which has its substance contained by time is in all respects temporal (for much more has this received a temporal activity); but that which is in all respects temporal is in every way unlike that which is in all respects eternal; and all processions are through likes; therefore there is something intermediate between these. Either, then, the mean is eternal in substance but temporal in activity, or the reverse. But this is impossible; for the activity will be superior to the substance. It remains, then, that the other is the mean. 107 Everything that is in one respect eternal, and in another temporal, is at once both being and becoming. For everything eternal is being, and that which is measured by time is becoming; so that if the same thing partakes of time and of eternity, but not in the same respect, the same thing will be both being and becoming, though not both in one respect. From these things, then, it is manifest that becoming, which has its substance also in time, is suspended from that which partakes in one respect of being and in another of becoming, partaking at once of eternity and of time; and this is suspended from that which is in all respects eternal; and that which is in all respects eternal from eternity; and eternity from the pre-eternal Being. 108 Every particular in each order can partake in two ways of the monad in the immediately superior disposition: either through its own wholeness, or through the particular in that disposition which is coordinate with it according to the analogy to the whole series. For if the reversion for all things is through likeness, and if the particular in the inferior order is unlike the monadic and whole in the superior order, both as a particular to a whole and as of a different order, but is like the whole from the same series because of the communion of property, and like the member of the same rank in the immediately superior order because of their analogous subsistence, it is clear then that its reversion to that monad is naturally effected through these as intermediaries

πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον ἢ κατ' αἰτίαν ἔστιν ἢ καθ' ὕπαρξιν ἢ κατὰ μέθεξιν, ἔν τε τῷ πρώτῳ τὰ λοιπὰ κατ' αἰτίαν ἔστι, καὶ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κατὰ μέθεξιν τὸ δὲ τρίτον κατ' αἰτίαν, καὶ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ κατὰ μέθεξιν, καὶ ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἄρα ζωὴ προείληπται καὶ νοῦς, ἑκάστου δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὕπαρξιν χαρακτηρι ζομένου καὶ οὔτε κατὰ τὴν αἰτίαν (ἄλλων γάρ ἐστιν αἴτιον) οὔτε κατὰ τὴν μέθεξιν (ἀλλαχόθεν γὰρ ἔχει τοῦτο, οὗ μετείλη φεν), ὄντως ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, ζωὴ οὐσιώδης καὶ νοῦς οὐσιώδης· καὶ ἐν τῇ ζωῇ κατὰ μέθεξιν μὲν τὸ εἶναι, κατ' αἰτίαν δὲ τὸ νοεῖν, ἀλλὰ ζωτικῶς ἑκάτερον (κατὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ ὕπαρξις)· καὶ ἐν τῷ νῷ καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ οὐσία κατὰ μέθεξιν, καὶ νοερῶς ἑκάτερον (καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ νοῦ γνωστικὸν καὶ ἡ ζωὴ γνῶσις). 104 Πᾶν τὸ πρώτως αἰώνιον τήν τε οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αἰώνιον ἔχει. εἰ γὰρ πρώτως μεταλαγχάνει τῆς τοῦ αἰῶνος ἰδιότητος, οὐ τῇ μὲν αὐτοῦ μετέχει τῇ δὲ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάντῃ μετέχει. ἢ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν μετέχον οὐ μετέχει κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν (ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια κρείττων ἔσται τῆς οὐσίας)· ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν μετέχον οὐ μετέχει κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ἔσται πρώτως αἰώνιον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ χρόνου μετέχον πρώτως, καὶ χρόνος μέν τινων μετρήσει τὴν ἐνέργειαν πρώτως, αἰὼν δὲ οὐδενός, ὁ παντὸς χρόνου κρείττων, εἴπερ τὸ πρώτως αἰώνιον οὐ συνέχεται κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὑπὸ αἰῶνος. ἅπαν ἄρα τὸ πρώτως αἰώνιον τήν τε οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αἰώνιον. 105 Πᾶν τὸ ἀθάνατον ἀΐδιον· οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἀΐδιον ἀθάνατον. εἰ γὰρ ἀθάνατόν ἐστι τὸ ἀεὶ ζωῆς μετέχον, τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ζωῆς μετέχον καὶ τοῦ εἶναι μετέχει, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ ζῶν ἀεὶ ἔστιν· ὥστε τὸ ἀθάνατον πᾶν ἀΐδιον (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἀθάνατον τὸ ἄδεκτον θανάτου καὶ ἀεὶ ζῶν, ἀΐδιον δὲ τὸ ἄδεκτον τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀεὶ ὄν). εἰ δὲ πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ καὶ κρείττονα καὶ χείρονα τῆς ζωῆς, ἄδεκτα ὄντα τοῦ ἀθανάτου, ἀεὶ δὲ ὄντα, οὐ πᾶν ἄρα τὸ ἀΐδιον ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι πολλὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα οὐκ ἀθάνατά ἐστι, δῆλον· ἔστι γάρ τινα τῶν ὄντων ἄμοιρα μὲν ζωῆς, ἀεὶ δὲ ὄντα καὶ ἀνώλεθρα. ὡς γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ὂν πρὸς τὴν ζωήν, οὕτως τὸ ἀΐδιον πρὸς τὸ ἀθάνατον (ἡ γὰρ ἀναφαίρετος ζωὴ τὸ ἀθάνατόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἀναφαιρέτως ὂν ἀΐδιον)· τὸ δὲ ὂν τῆς ζωῆς περιληπτικώτερον· καὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου ἄρα τὸ ἀΐδιον. 106 Παντὸς τοῦ πάντῃ αἰωνίου κατά τε οὐσίαν καὶ ἐνέργειαν καὶ τοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχοντος ἐν χρόνῳ μέσον ἐστὶ τὸ πῇ μὲν αἰώνιον, πῇ δὲ χρόνῳ μετρούμενον. τὸ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχον ὑπὸ χρόνου περιεχομένην κατὰ πάντα ἐστὶν ἔγχρονον (πολλῷ γὰρ πρότερον τοῦτο καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔγχρονον ἔλαχε)· τὸ δὲ κατὰ πάντα ἔγχρονον τῷ κατὰ πάντα αἰωνίῳ πάντῃ ἀνόμοιον· αἱ δὲ πρόοδοι πᾶσαι διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων· ἔστιν ἄρα τι μεταξὺ τούτων. ἢ οὖν τῇ οὐσίᾳ αἰώ νιον, τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ἔγχρονον τὸ μέσον, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον· ἔσται γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ ἐνέργεια κρείττων. λείπεται δὴ θάτερον εἶναι τὸ μέσον. 107 Πᾶν τὸ πῇ μὲν αἰώνιον, πῇ δὲ ἔγχρονον, ὄν τέ ἐστιν ἅμα καὶ γένεσις. καὶ γὰρ τὸ αἰώνιον πᾶν ὄν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ μετρούμενον ὑπὸ χρόνου γένεσις· ὥστ' εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ χρόνου μετέχει καὶ αἰῶνος, οὐ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δέ, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται ὄν τε καὶ γένεσις, οὐ καθ' ἓν ἄμφω. ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ μὲν γένεσις, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔγχρονον ἔχουσα, ἀνήρτηται εἰς τὸ πῇ μὲν ὄντος, πῇ δὲ γενέ σεως κοινωνοῦν, αἰῶνος ἅμα καὶ χρόνου μετέχον· τοῦτο δὲ εἰς τὸ κατὰ πάντα αἰώνιον· τὸ δὲ κατὰ πάντα αἰώνιον εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα· ὁ δὲ αἰὼν εἰς τὸ ὂν τὸ προαιώνιον. 108 Πᾶν τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τάξει μερικὸν διχῶς μετέχειν δύναται τῆς ἐν τῇ προσεχῶς ὑπερκειμένῃ διακοσμήσει μονάδος· ἢ διὰ τῆς οἰκείας ὁλότητος, ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἐν ἐκείνῃ μερικοῦ καὶ συστοίχου πρὸς αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ὅλην τὴν σειρὰν ἀναλογίαν. εἰ γὰρ δι' ὁμοιότητος ἡ ἐπιστροφὴ πᾶσι, καὶ ἔστι τῷ ἐν τῇ ὑπερκειμένῃ τάξει μοναδικῷ καὶ ὅλῳ τὸ ἐν τῇ καταδεεστέρᾳ μερικὸν ἀνόμοιον καὶ ὡς ὅλῳ μερικὸν καὶ ὡς τάξεως ἄλλης καὶ ἄλλης, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς σειρᾶς ὅλον ὅμοιον διὰ τὴν τῆς ἰδιότητος κοινωνίαν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ὑπερκειμένης προσεχῶς ὁμοταγὲς διὰ τὴν ἀνάλογον ὑπόστασιν, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι διὰ τούτων αὐτῷ μέσων ἡ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν