Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of the same series; but that which is the whole of the transcendent series is dissimilar in both respects. 109 Every particular intellect participates in the henad which is above intellect and primary both through the whole intellect and through the particular henad which is of the same rank as it; and every particular soul participates in the whole intellect both through the whole soul and through the particular intellect; and every particular nature of a body participates in the whole soul both through the whole of nature and through a particular soul. For every particular thing participates in the monad in the transcendent rank either through its own totality or through the particular in that rank and of the same rank as it. 110 Of all things disposed in each series, the first and those united to their own monad are able to participate immediately in those established in the transcendent series by analogy, but the more imperfect and those many steps removed from their own principle are by nature not able to enjoy them. For because some are kindred to those, having obtained a nature in their own rank that is superior and more divine, while others have proceeded further away, having been allotted a secondary and subordinate procession in the whole series, but not a primary and ruling one, by necessity some are conjoined with those from the transcendent rank in a cognate way, while others are unjoinable with it. For not all are of equal worth, even if they are from the same cosmic order; for neither is the principle one, but as from one and to one [all things proceed from their own monad]. So that they have not obtained the same power, but some are able to receive the immediate participations of the transcendent beings, while others, being made dissimilar by their very extensive processions from the principles, have been deprived of such a power. 111 Of the whole intellectual series, some are divine intellects, having received participations of gods, while others are intellects only; and of the whole psychical series, some are intellectual souls, suspended from their proper intellects, while others are souls only; and of the whole corporeal nature, some also have souls presiding over them from above, while others are natures only, devoid of the presence of souls. For of each series, not the whole kind is by nature suspended from that which is before it, but that in it which is more perfect and capable of being conjoined with the transcendent beings. Therefore, not every intellect is attached to god, but the highest and most unitary of intellects (for these are kindred to the divine henads); nor do all souls participate in the participable intellect, but only those which are most intellectual; nor do all corporeal natures enjoy a soul that is present and participated, but the more perfect and more rational ones. And this is the principle of the proof in all cases. 112 The primary members of every rank have the form of those before them. For the highest kinds in each rank are joined to the transcendent beings through their similarity and through the continuity of the procession of the wholes; so that just as those are primarily, these also have obtained such a form, kindred to their nature; and they appear to be such, according to the property of their substance, as those before them. 113 The entire divine number is unitary. For if the divine number has the One as its pre-eminent cause, as the intellectual has the Intellect and the psychical has the Soul, and the multitude is everywhere analogous to its cause, it is clear indeed that the divine number is also unitary, if the One is god; and this is so, if the Good and the One are the same; for the Good and God are also the same (for that beyond which there is nothing and which all things desire, this is God; and that from which and to which all things are, this is the Good). If, therefore, there is a multitude of gods, the multitude is unitary. But that there is, is clear, if every archetypal cause leads a multitude of its own, similar to it and kindred. 114 Every god is a self-complete henad, and every self-complete henad is a god. For if the number of henads is twofold, as has been shown before, and some are self-complete while others are illuminations from them, and the divine number is kindred and cognate to the One and the Good, the gods are self-complete henads. And conversely, if there is a self-complete henad, it is a god. For both as a henad it is pre-eminently most kindred to the One and as self-complete to the Good, and in both respects it partakes of the divine property, and is a god. But if it were a henad but not self-complete, or self-complete

ἐπιστροφὴ ὡς δι' ὁμοίων, ἀνόμοιον <ὄν>. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς μερικῷ μερικὸν ὅμοιον, τὸ δὲ ὡς τῆς αὐτῆς ὂν σειρᾶς οἰκεῖον· ἐκεῖνο δὲ τὸ τῆς ὑπερκει μένης ὅλον κατ' ἀμφότερα ἀνόμοιον. 109 Πᾶς μερικὸς νοῦς μετέχει τῆς ὑπὲρ νοῦν καὶ πρωτίστης ἑνάδος διά τε τοῦ ὅλου νοῦ καὶ διὰ τῆς ὁμοταγοῦς αὐτῷ μερικῆς ἑνάδος· καὶ πᾶσα μερικὴ ψυχὴ τοῦ ὅλου μετέχει νοῦ διά τε τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ μερικοῦ νοῦ· καὶ πᾶσα σώματος μερικὴ φύσις διά τε τῆς ὅλης φύσεως καὶ μερικῆς ψυχῆς μετέχει τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς. πᾶν γὰρ μερικὸν μετέχει τῆς ἐν τῇ ὑπερκειμένῃ τάξει μονά δος ἢ διὰ τῆς οἰκείας ὁλότητος ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἐν ἐκείνῃ μερικοῦ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὁμοταγοῦς. 110 Πάντων τῶν καθ' ἑκάστην σειρὰν διατεταγμένων τὰ μὲν πρῶτα καὶ τῇ ἑαυτῶν μονάδι συνημμένα μετέχειν δύναται τῶν ἐν τῇ ὑπερκειμένῃ σειρᾷ προσεχῶς ἱδρυμένων διὰ τῆς ἀναλογίας, τὰ δὲ ἀτελέστερα καὶ πολλοστὰ ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς οὐ πέφυκεν ἐκείνων ἀπολαύειν. διότι γὰρ τὰ μέν ἐστι συγγενῆ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, φύσιν ἐν τῇ σφετέρᾳ τάξει λαχόντα κρείττονα καὶ θειοτέραν, τὰ δὲ πορρώ τερον προελήλυθε, δευτέραν καὶ ὑπηρετικὴν ἀλλ' οὐ πρωτουργὸν καὶ ἡγεμονικὴν ἐν τῇ σειρᾷ πάσῃ κεκληρωμένα πρόοδον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν ὁμοφυῶς συζεύγνυται τοῖς ἐκ τῆς ὑπερκειμένης τάξεως, τὰ δὲ ἀσύναπτά ἐστι πρὸς ἐκείνην. οὐ γὰρ ἅπαντα τῆς ἴσης ἐστὶν ἀξίας, κἂν ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ᾖ διακοσμήσεως· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἷς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν [πάντα πρόεισιν ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας μονάδος]. ὥστε οὐδὲ δύναμιν ἔλαχε τὴν αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὑποδέχεσθαι δύναται τὰς τῶν ὑπερκειμένων προσ εχῶς μεθέξεις, τὰ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενα ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον προόδοις τῆς τοιαύτης παρῄρηται δυνάμεως. 111 Πάσης τῆς νοερᾶς σειρᾶς οἱ μέν εἰσι θεῖοι νόες ὑποδε ξάμενοι θεῶν μεθέξεις, οἱ δὲ νόες μόνον· καὶ πάσης τῆς ψυχικῆς αἱ μέν εἰσι νοεραὶ ψυχαὶ εἰς νοῦς ἀνηρτημέναι οἰκείους, αἱ δὲ ψυχαὶ μόνον· καὶ πάσης τῆς σωματικῆς φύσεως αἱ μὲν καὶ ψυχὰς ἔχουσιν ἐφεστώσας ἄνωθεν, αἱ δέ εἰσι φύσεις μόνον, τῆς τῶν ψυχῶν ἄμοιροι παρουσίας. ἑκάστης γὰρ σειρᾶς οὐχ ὅλον τὸ γένος εἰς τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀνηρτῆσθαι πέφυκεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ τελειότερον καὶ συμ φύεσθαι τοῖς ὑπερκειμένοις ἱκανόν. οὔτε οὖν πᾶς νοῦς θεοῦ ἐξῆπται, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀκρότατοι καὶ ἑνικώτατοι τῶν νόων (οὗτοι γὰρ ταῖς θείαις ἑνάσι συγγενεῖς)· οὔτε πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ μετέχουσι νοῦ τοῦ μεθεκτοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅσαι νοερώταται· οὔτε πᾶσαι σωματικαὶ φύσεις ἀπολαύουσι ψυχῆς παρούσης καὶ μετεχομένης, ἀλλ' αἱ τελειότεραι καὶ λογοειδέστεραι. καὶ οὗτος ἐπὶ πάντων ὁ λόγος τῆς ἀποδείξεως. 112 Πάσης τάξεως τὰ πρώτιστα μορφὴν ἔχει τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν. τὰ γὰρ καθ' ἑκάστην ἀκρότατα γένη διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα συνάπτεται τοῖς ὑπερκειμένοις καὶ διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς προ όδου τῶν ὅλων· ὥστε οἷά πέρ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνα πρώτως, τοιαύτην ἔλαχε καὶ ταῦτα μορφήν, συγγενῆ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων φύσιν· καὶ φαίνεται εἶναι τοιαῦτα κατὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα τῆς ὑποστάσεως, οἷα τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν. 113 Πᾶς ὁ θεῖος ἀριθμὸς ἑνιαῖός ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ὁ θεῖος ἀριθμὸς αἰτίαν ἔχει προηγουμένην τὸ ἕν, ὡς ὁ νοερὸς τὸν νοῦν καὶ ὁ ψυχικὸς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἔστιν ἀνάλογον τὸ πλῆθος πανταχοῦ πρὸς τὴν αἰτίαν, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι καὶ ὁ θεῖος ἀριθμὸς ἑνιαῖός ἐστιν, εἴπερ τὸ ἓν θεός· τοῦτο δέ, εἴπερ τἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ταὐτόν· καὶ γὰρ τἀγαθὸν καὶ θεὸς ταὐτόν (οὗ γὰρ μηδέν ἐστιν ἐπέκεινα καὶ οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται, θεὸς τοῦτο· καὶ ἀφ' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ πρὸς ὅ, τοῦτο δὲ τἀγαθόν). εἰ ἄρα ἔστι πλῆθος θεῶν, ἑνιαῖόν ἐστι τὸ πλῆθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι ἔστι, δῆλον, εἴπερ πᾶν αἴτιον ἀρχικὸν οἰκείου πλήθους ἡγεῖται καὶ ὁμοίου πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ συγγενοῦς. 114 Πᾶς θεὸς ἑνάς ἐστιν αὐτοτελής, καὶ πᾶσα αὐτοτελὴς ἑνὰς θεός. εἰ γὰρ τῶν ἑνάδων διττὸς ὁ ἀριθμός, ὡς δέδεικται πρότερον, καὶ αἱ μὲν αὐτοτελεῖς εἰσιν αἱ δὲ ἐλλάμψεις ἀπ' ἐκείνων, τῷ δὲ ἑνὶ καὶ τἀγαθῷ συγγενὴς καὶ ὁμοφυὴς ὁ θεῖος ἀριθμός, ἑνάδες εἰσὶν αὐτοτελεῖς οἱ θεοί. καὶ ἔμπαλιν, εἰ ἔστιν αὐτοτελὴς ἑνάς, θεός ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἑνὰς τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ ὡς αὐτοτελὴς τἀγαθῷ συγγενεστάτη διαφε ρόντως ἐστί, καὶ κατ' ἄμφω τῆς θείας ἰδιότητος μετέχει, καὶ ἔστι θεός. εἰ δὲ ἦν ἑνὰς μὲν οὐκ αὐτοτελὴς δέ, ἢ αὐτοτελὴς