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Therefore, was the term "portion" usefully spoken by the Teacher, according to the ways that have been given, and would not every noble man, both in soul and character, accept 1100 the term spoken thus, generating in himself no hazard of reasoning, knowing that "portion" is the same as "member" in such cases. For if the member is a part of the body, and the member is the same as the portion, then the member will be the same as the portion. And if the portion is the same as the member, and a collection and composition of members makes an organic body, and an organic body united with a rational soul shows a complete man, therefore he who says that the soul or the body or a member of it is a part of man will not err from the truth. But if the body exists as an instrument of the rational soul, as of a man, (14∆_108> and the whole soul, pervading the whole body, gives it life and movement, since it is simple in nature and incorporeal, not being cut apart or confined with it, but to the whole and to each of its members, as each is naturally suited to receive it according to the power naturally underlying it for receiving its energy, being wholly present, it binds together the members which are receptive of it in different ways, in proportion to the preservation of the one body, let him be led to the great and ineffable mystery of the blessed hope of Christians, taking from small things that concern us not ignoble likenesses of great things beyond us, whoever still possesses a mind about these things that is unfixed and easily swayed. And abandoning the unreasonable opinion about the pre-existence of souls to bodies, he will believe with us the Lord who says concerning those raised in the resurrection that they cannot die, namely, because of the clearer manifestation and participation of Him Who is the ultimate object of desire. And again, Everyone who lives and believes in me will never die. For if this had ever happened before, it would be impossible, as has been shown before, for one to receive any death whatsoever by some kind of change.

And let him not go outside natural reasonings, laying down in vain a non-existent opinion about the soul. For if the body and the soul are parts of man, as has been shown before, and parts by necessity have a relation to something (for a whole is always predicated of them), and things so spoken of in relation to something are among those that exist entirely and altogether at the same time in their generation, as parts completing a whole form by their union, being separated from one another only by a concept for the purpose of discerning what each is in essence, then it is impossible for the soul and body, as parts of man, to pre-exist or post-exist one another in time, since the principle of what is so called "in relation to something" will be dissolved. And again: For if the soul or the body is a form in itself before the body, and (14∆_110> each of these constitutes another form according to the composition of the soul with the body, or of the body with the soul, it does this either by undergoing something, or by nature. And if by undergoing something, they have suffered by departing into what they were not, and are corrupted; but if by nature, it will clearly always do this because it is natural, and the soul will never cease from being reincarnated, nor the body from being re-ensouled. But it is not, 1101 I think, from suffering or from the natural power of the parts in the union of one with the other that the fulfillment of the whole according to its form occurs, but from their generation together as a whole form. Therefore it is not possible for any form to change from form to form without corruption.

But if they say that because the soul exists and subsists after death and the dissolution of the body, it can also exist and subsist before the body, their argument, it seems to me, proceeds without due consideration. For the principle of generation and of essence is not the same. For the one has to do with being at some time and in some place and in relation to something, while the other is indicative of being, and being something, and being in a certain way. And if this is so, the soul indeed always exists after it has come into being, on account of its essence, but it is not independent on account of its generation, but exists with the relation of when and where and in relation to something. For the soul is not spoken of simply after the death of the body, the

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Ἄρ᾿ οὖν χρησίμως εἴρηται τῷ διδασκάλῳ ἡ τῆς μοίρας φωνή, κατά τούς ἀποδοθέντας τρόπους, καί πᾶς εὐγενής καί ψυχήν καί τρόπον δέξαιτο ἄν οὕτω λεγομένην 1100 τήν φωνήν, μηδεμίαν ἑαυτῷ κυβείαν λογισμῶν παραγεννῶν, εἰδώς ταὐτόν εἶναι τῷ μέλει τήν μοῖραν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις. Εἰ γάρ μέρος τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχει τό μέλος, τό δέ μέλος ταὐτόν ἐστι τῇ μοίρᾳ, ταὐτόν ἄρα τό μέλος τῇ μοίρᾳ ἔσται. Εἰ δέ ταὐτόν τῷ μέλει ἐστίν ἡ μοῖρα, μελῶν δέ ἀθροισμός καί σύνθεσις σῶμα ποιεῖ ὀργανικόν, σῶμα δέ ὀργανικόν ψυχῇ ἑνωθέν νοερᾷ ἄνθρωπον τέλειον δείκνυσιν, ἄρα μέρος ἀνθρώπου ὁ λέγων εἶναι ψυχήν ἤ τό σῶμα ἤ μέλος αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀληθείας οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται. Εἰ δέ τῆς νοερᾶς ψυχῆς ὡς ἀνθρώπου ὑπάρχει τό σῶμα ὄργανον, (14∆_108> δι᾿ ὅλου δέ τοῦ σώματος ὅλη χωροῦσα ἡ ψυχή τό ζῇν αὐτῷ κινεῖσθαι δίδωσιν, ὡς ἁπλῆ τήν φύσιν καί ἀσώματος, μή συνδιατεμνομένη ἤ συναποκλειομένη αὐτῷ, ἀλλ᾿ ὅλῳ καί ἑκάστῳ τῶν αὐτοῦ μελῶν, ὡς πέφυκεν αὐτήν ὑποδέχεσθαι κατά τήν φυσικῶς ὑποκειμένην αὐτῷ δεκτικήν τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτῆς δύναμιν, ὅλη παροῦσα τά διαφόρως αὐτῆς δεκτικά μέλη ἀναλόγως πρός τήν τοῦ ἕν εἶναι σῶμα συντήρησιν ἐπισφίγγει, ὁδηγεῖσθω ἐπί τό μέγα καί ἄῤῥητον τῆς τῶν Χριστανῶν μακαρίας ἐλπίδος μυστήριον, ἐκ τῶν μικρῶν καί καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς τῶν μεγάλων καί ὑπέρ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἀγεννῆ λαβών τά εἰκάσματα, ὅστις ἀπαγῆ καί εὐκράδαντον περί τούτων ἔτι τήν διάνοιαν κέκτηται. Καί τήν περί τοῦ προϋπάρχειν τῶν σωμάτων τάς ψυχάς οὐκ εὔλογον δόξαν ἀφείς μεθ᾿ ἡμῶν πιστεύσει τῷ Κυρίῳ λέγοντι περί τῶν εἰς τήν ἀνάστασιν ἐγειρομένων μή δύνασθαι ἀποθνήσκειν, διά τήν αὐτοῦ δηλαδή καθαρωτέραν ἐσχάτου ὀρεκτοῦ φανέρωσίν τε καί μετουσίαν. Καί πάλιν, Πᾶς ὁ ζῶν καί πιστεύων εἰς ἐμέ, οὐ μή ἀποθάνῃ εἰς τόν αἰῶνα. Ὅπερ εἰ προεγεγόνει ποτέ, ἀδύνατον ἦν, ὡς προαποδέδεικται, τόν κατά τροπήν τινα οἷον δήποτε δέξασθαι θάνατον.

Καί τῶν φυσικῶν ἔξω μή βαινέτω λογισμῶν διακενῆς τήν οὐκ οὖσαν περί ψυχῆς δόξαν θεσπίζων. Εἰ γάρ ἀνθρώπου μέρη, καθώς προαποδέδοται τό σῶμα καί ἡ ψυχή τυγχάνουσι, τά δέ μέρη τήν εἰς τό πρός τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀναφοράν δέχεται (ὅλον γάρ ἔχει πάντως κατηγορούμενον) , τά δέ οὕτω λεγόμενα πρός τι τῶν ἅμα πάντη τε καί πάντως κατά τήν γένεσίν ἐστιν, ὡς μέρη εἶδος ὅλον τῇ συνόδῳ ἀποτελοῦντα, ἐπινοίᾳ μόνῃ τῇ πρός διάγνωσιν τοῦ τί κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ἕκαστον ἀλλήλων διαιρούμενα, ψυχήν ἄρα καί σῶμα, ὡς μέρη ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλήλων προϋπάρχειν χρονικῶς ἤ μεθυπάρχειν ἀμήχανον, ἐπεί ὁ τοῦ πρός τι οὕτω λεγόμενος λυθήσεται λόγος. Καί πάλιν· Εἰ γάρ καθ᾿ αὐτό εἶδος πρό τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή ἤ τό σῶμα, εἶδος (14∆_110> δέ ἄλλο τούτων ἑκάτερον κατά τήν ψυχῆς πρός τό σῶμα σύνθεσιν, ἤ σώματος πρός ψυχήν, ἀποτελεῖ, ἤ πάσχοντα πάντως τοῦτο ποιεῖ, ἤ πεφυκότα. Καί εἰ μέν πάσχοντα, πεπόνθασιν εἰς ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν ἐξιστάμενα, καί φθείρεται, εἰ δέ πεφυκότα, ἀεί τοῦτο διά τό πεφυκός ἐργάσεται δηλονότι, καί οὐδέποτε παύσεται ἡ ψυχή τοῦ μετενσωματοῦσθαι, οὐδέ τοῦ μετεμψυχοῦσθαι τό σῶμα. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἔστιν, 1101 ὡς οἶμαι, τοῦ πάθους ἤ τῆς τῶν μερῶν φυσικῆς δυνάμεως κατά τήν πρός θάτερον θατέρου σύνοδον ἡ τοῦ ὅλου κατ᾿ εἶδος ἐκπλήρωσις, ἀλλά τῆς ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῖς ἅμα κατ᾿ εἶδος ὅλον γενέσεως. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν δυνατόν ἄνευ φθορᾶς ἐξ εἴδους εἰς εἶδος μεταβάλλειν τό οἱονοῦν εἶδος.

Εἰ δέ ὅτι μετά τόν θάνατον καί τήν λύσιν τοῦ σώματος ἔστιν ἡ ψυχή καί ὑφέστηκε φήσουσι καί πρό τοῦ σώματος εἶναι αὐτήν δύνασθαι καί ὑφεστάναι, οὐκ ἐστοχασμένως, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς προέρχεται. Οὐχ ὁ αὐτός γάρ γενέσεως καί οὐσίας λόγος. Ὁ μέν γάρ τοῦ ποτε καί που εἶναι καί πρός τι ἐστίν, ὁ δέ τοῦ εἶναι καί τι καί πως εἶναί ἐστι δηλωτικός. Εἰ δέ τοῦτο, ἐστί μέν ἀεί μετά τό γενέσθαι διά τήν οὐσίαν ἡ ψυχή, οὐκ ἄφετος δέ διά τήν γένεσιν, ἀλλά μετά τῆς σχέσεως τοῦ ποτε καί που καί πρός τι . Οὐχ ἁπλῶς γάρ λέγεται ψυχή μετά τόν τοῦ σώματος θάνατον ἡ