Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essential, and beyond life, and beyond intellect. For if each is a self-complete henad, while each of these is not a henad but a unified thing, it is clear indeed that every god is beyond all the things that have been mentioned: beyond substance and life and intellect. For if these are distinct from one another, yet all are in all, each, being all things, would not be one only. Further, if the first is supra-essential, and every god, insofar as it is a god, belongs to the series of the first, then each would be supra-essential. But indeed, that the first is supra-essential is manifest. For to be one and to be substance is not the same thing, nor are "it is" and "it is unified" the same. But if they are not the same, either the first is both, and it will be not one only but also something other besides the one, and thus it will be a participant in one but not the one-itself; or it is one of the two. But if it is substance, it will be in want of the one; which is impossible, for the good and the first to be in want. That, therefore, is one only; so that it is supra-essential. But if that which each thing is primarily, it gives the property of this to its entire series, then the whole divine number is supra-essential. Since indeed each of the ruling causes produces like things before unlike things; if, therefore, the first god is supra-essential, then all gods are supra-essential (for in this respect they will be like); but if they were substances, they would be produced from a first substance, as from a monad of substances. 116 Every god is participable, except the One. For that the One is imparticipable is clear, lest by being participated in and thereby becoming a particular thing it should no longer be in like manner the cause of all things, both those which pre-exist and those which exist. But that the other henads are indeed participated in, we shall show as follows. For if there is another imparticipable henad after the first, how will it differ from the One? For either it is one in the same way as that is—and how then can one be second, and the other first?—or not in the same way, and the one is the one-itself, while the other is both one and not-one. But as to this 'not-one', if it is no hypostasis, the whole will be one only; but if it is some other hypostasis besides the one, the one will be participated in by the not-one. And the self-complete thing is the one, by which it is joined to the one-itself (so that this in turn is the god, insofar as it is a god); while the not-one, having become a unity, subsists through participation in the one. Therefore every henad that has its subsistence after the One is participable, and every god is participable. 117 Every god is a measure of beings. For if every god is unitary, it delimits and measures all the multitudes of beings. For all multitudes, being indefinite in their own nature, are defined through the one; and the unitary wills to measure and to limit those things to which it is present, and to bring to a bound, according to its own power, that which is not of such a nature. For that thing too becomes of the form of one by participation; and this departs from indefiniteness and infinity; and the more of the form of one it is, the less it is indefinite and unmeasured. Therefore every multitude of beings is measured by the divine henads. 118 All whatsoever is in the gods pre-subsists in them in accordance with their own property, and their property is unitary and supra-essential; therefore all things are in them in a unitary and supra-essential manner. For if each thing subsists in a threefold manner, either causally or by existence or by participation, and the divine number is the first of all numbers, nothing will be in them by participation, but all things by existence or causally. But also whatever they have preconceived as causes of all, they have preconceived in a manner appropriate to their own unity; for everything that causally rules over secondary things contains the cause of the inferiors in the manner that it itself is by nature. Therefore all things are in the gods in a unitary and supra-essential manner. 119 Every god subsists in accordance with supra-essential goodness, and is good neither by state nor by substance (for both states and substances have obtained a secondary and much lower rank from the gods), but supra-essentially. For if the first is one and the good, and insofar as it is one it is the good, and insofar as it is the good it is one, and the whole series of the gods is both of the form of one and of the form of good according to a single property, and each is not a henad in one respect and a goodness in another, but insofar as it is a henad, in that respect it is a goodness, and insofar as it is a goodness, it is a henad; and having proceeded from the first, those after the first are of the form of good and of the form of one, if indeed that is one and the good; and as gods, all are henads and goodnesses. As, therefore, the one of the gods is supra-essential, so also is their good

μὲν ἡ ὑπόστασις οὐκέτι δὲ ἑνάς, εἰς ἑτέραν ἂν ἐτάττετο τάξιν διὰ τὴν τῆς ἰδιότητος ἐξαλλαγήν. 115 Πᾶς θεὸς ὑπερούσιός ἐστι καὶ ὑπέρζωος καὶ ὑπέρνους. εἰ γὰρ ἑνάς ἐστιν ἕκαστος αὐτοτελής, ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων οὐχὶ ἑνὰς ἀλλ' ἡνωμένον, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι πάντων ἐστὶν ἐπέκεινα τῶν εἰρημένων ἅπας θεός, οὐσίας καὶ ζωῆς καὶ νοῦ. εἰ γὰρ δι έστηκε μὲν ταῦτα ἀλλήλων, πάντα δέ ἐστιν ἐν πᾶσιν, ἕκαστον τὰ πάντα ὂν ἓν ἂν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μόνον. ἔτι δέ, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον ὑπερούσιον, ἅπας δὲ θεὸς τῆς τοῦ πρώτου σειρᾶς ἐστιν ᾗ θεός, ὑπερούσιος ἕκαστος ἂν εἴη. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον ὑπερούσιον, φανερόν. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἑνί τε εἶναι καὶ οὐσίᾳ εἶναι, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἥνωται. εἰ δὲ μὴ ταὐτόν, ἢ ἄμφω τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ ἔσται οὐχ ἓν μόνον ἀλλά τι καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τὸ ἕν, καὶ μετέχον δὴ λοιπὸν ἑνὸς ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοέν· ἢ θάτερον τούτων. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐσία, ἐνδεὲς ἔσται τοῦ ἑνός· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον, εἶναι τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐνδεές. ἓν ἄρα μόνον ἐκεῖνο· ὥστε ὑπερούσιον. εἰ δέ, ὃ ἕκαστόν ἐστι πρώτως, τούτου τὴν ἰδιότητα πάσῃ τῇ σειρᾷ δίδωσι, καὶ ὁ θεῖος ἀριθμὸς ἅπας ὑπερούσιός ἐστιν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια παράγει πρὸ τῶν ἀνομοίων ἕκαστον τῶν ἀρχικῶν αἰτίων· εἰ ἄρα ὁ πρώτιστος θεὸς ὑπερούσιος, καὶ θεοὶ πάντες ὑπερούσιοι (ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοιοι ἔσονται)· οὐσίαι δὲ ὄντες, ἀπὸ οὐσίας ἂν παράγοιντο τῆς πρώτης, ὡς μονάδος τῶν οὐσιῶν. 116 Πᾶς θεὸς μεθεκτός ἐστι, πλὴν τοῦ ἑνός. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἀμέθεκτον, δῆλον, ἵνα μὴ μετεχόμενον καὶ τινὸς διὰ τοῦτο γενόμενον μηκέτι πάντων ὁμοίως ᾖ τῶν τε προόντων καὶ τῶν ὄντων αἴτιον. ὅτι δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι ἑνάδες μετέχονται ἤδη, δείξομεν οὕτως. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλη μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἀμέθεκτος ἑνάς, τί διοίσει τοῦ ἑνός; ἢ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ἕν ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνο-καὶ πῶς τὸ μὲν δεύτερον, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον; -ἢ οὐχ ὡσαύτως, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτοέν, τὸ δὲ ἕν τε καὶ οὐχ ἕν. ἀλλὰ τὸ οὐχ ἓν τοῦτο εἰ μὲν μηδεμία ὑπό στασις, ἔσται μόνον ἕν· εἰ δὲ ὑπόστασίς τις ἄλλη παρὰ τὸ ἕν, μετεχόμενον ἔσται τὸ ἓν ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐχ ἑνός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτοτελὲς τὸ ἕν, ᾧ συνάπτει πρὸς τὸ αὐτοέν, ὥστε τοῦτο πάλιν ὁ θεός, ᾗ θεός· τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἓν ὑποστὰν ἓν μεθέξει τοῦ ἑνὸς ὑφέστηκε. μεθεκτὴ ἄρα ἐστὶ πᾶσα ἑνὰς μετὰ τὸ ἓν ὑποστᾶσα, καὶ πᾶς θεὸς μεθεκτός. 117 Πᾶς θεὸς μέτρον ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἑνιαῖος ἅπας θεός, τὰ πλήθη πάντα τῶν ὄντων ἀφορίζει καὶ μετρεῖ. πάντα μὲν γὰρ τὰ πλήθη, τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει ἀόριστα ὄντα, διὰ τὸ ἓν ὁρίζεται· τὸ δὲ ἑνιαῖον μετρεῖν καὶ περατοῦν, οἷς ἂν παρῇ, βούλεται, καὶ περιάγειν εἰς ὅρον τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν. γίνεται γὰρ κἀκεῖνο ἑνοειδὲς τῇ μεθέξει· τοῦτο δέ, τῆς ἀοριστίας τε καὶ ἀπειρίας ἀφίσταται· καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἑνοειδές, τοσούτῳ ἧττον ἀόριστον καὶ ἄμετρον. μετρεῖται ἄρα πᾶν πλῆθος τῶν ὄντων ὑπὸ τῶν θείων ἑνάδων. 118 Πᾶν ὅ τι περ ἂν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς ᾖ, κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἰδιό τητα προϋφέστηκεν ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ἰδιότης αὐτῶν ἑνιαία καὶ ὑπερούσιος· ἑνιαίως ἄρα καὶ ὑπερουσίως πάντα ἐν αὐτοῖς. καὶ γὰρ εἰ τριχῶς ἕκαστον ὑφέστηκεν, ἢ κατ' αἰτίαν ἢ καθ' ὕπαρξιν ἢ κατὰ μέθεξιν, πρῶτος δὲ πάντων ἀριθμὸς ὁ θεῖος ἀριθμός, οὐδὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔσται κατὰ μέθεξιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα καθ' ὕπαρξιν ἢ κατ' αἰτίαν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα ὡς αἴτιοι πάντων προει λήφασιν, οἰκείως τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἑνώσει προειλήφασι· καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ κατ' αἰτίαν τῶν δευτέρων ἡγεμονοῦν, ὡς αὐτὸ πέφυκεν, οὕτως ἔχει τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν καταδεεστέρων. πάντα ἄρα ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς ἑνιαίως καὶ ὑπερουσίως. 119 Πᾶς θεὸς κατὰ τὴν ὑπερούσιον ἀγαθότητα ὑφέστηκε, καὶ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸς οὔτε καθ' ἕξιν οὔτε κατ' οὐσίαν (καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἕξεις καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι δευτέραν καὶ πολλοστὴν ἔλαχον τάξιν ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν), ἀλλ' ὑπερουσίως. εἰ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἓν καὶ τἀγαθόν, καὶ ᾗ ἕν, τἀγαθόν, καὶ ᾗ τἀγαθόν, ἕν, καὶ πᾶσα ἡ σειρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἑνοειδής τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀγαθοειδὴς κατὰ μίαν ἰδιότητα, καὶ οὐ κατ' ἄλλο ἕκαστος ἑνὰς καὶ ἀγαθότης, ἀλλ' ᾗ ἑνάς, ταύτῃ ἀγαθότης, καὶ ᾗ ἀγαθότης, ἑνάς· καὶ ὡς μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου προελθόντες, οἱ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθοειδεῖς καὶ ἑνοειδεῖς, εἴπερ ἐκεῖνο ἓν καὶ τἀγα θόν· ὡς δὲ θεοί, πάντες ἑνάδες καὶ ἀγαθότητες. ὡς οὖν τὸ ἓν τὸ τῶν θεῶν ὑπερούσιον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῶν