25

thinks that man, and then so to superimpose the intellectual, which he says is something other than the spirit, calling it mind in our case, but God in his; for if some formation of a heavenly man according to the likeness of the earthly had been previously shown by him, we would have been led on by consequence to the myth, having learned from this new wisdom, that the earthly race of men has its composition from an intellectual soul and a body, but that there is a certain race of heavenly men, for whom the soul is irrational but the body human, and God instead of mind is mingled with the substance of the body and the soul, from whom Apollinarius thinks the one who appeared on earth to be. But since that one has been neither demonstrated nor exists, and since the one born through the virgin is rejected as not even having partaken of our nature, I consider it strange and inconsistent for what is not a body to be called a body, and for what is not a human soul to be called a human soul.

For if one would not confess it to be intellectual, he will not agree that it is a human soul at all. But these things not being so, what relevance has that three-part division of man, of which two parts are man, and the third part is God? For he would not, he says, have come to be in the likeness of man, if he were not, just like a man, an incarnate mind. But as for me, whether that man was without a mind, in whom God reconciled the world to himself, I cannot say; but that the one writing these things was out of his mind, at the time he was writing them, even if I do not say it, his writings cry out. How does one who is something other than man and entirely <without a share> in our nature come to be in the likeness of man? For if the human constitution is an intellectual soul and a body, and neither this body nor that soul is in the one refashioned by him, how does that which is foreign to our nature accept the likeness of man? But he says that he is not a man, but like a man, being an incarnate mind. These are the things which persuade me that the writer is out of his mind. How is that which does not partake of the nature made like the nature? And who is that incarnate mind which is connate with the flesh and inseparable, being always such? Is he not then entirely from such a one? For there could not be generated flesh, unless it came from flesh, as the Lord says somewhere, That which is born of the flesh is flesh. [but it comes into being later.] Putting on what flesh, then, does he become incarnate? That which exists? <but it comes into being later. That which does not exist?> but from the same. [That which does not exist?] Therefore he is not called incarnate; for he would not be named after that which does not exist. But let us see his inescapable necessities of syllogisms, by which he compels us to the condescension of the only-begotten God being an incarnate mind. If the Lord, he says, is not an incarnate mind, he would be wisdom. O the invincible proposition! to think that the Lord is necessarily one of the two, either an incarnate mind or wisdom; because of this he says that he is that, if he is not this, that whenever he is not an incarnate mind, everything that is not an incarnate mind, is wisdom. What then of the stone? And what of the beetle? And what of the rest of visible things? For he will grant that concerning these things, it is necessarily one of the two, either that they are an incarnate mind or wisdom; but surely none of these is either mind or wisdom. Therefore the proposition has failed the writer, and the whole contrivance has collapsed, the argument having fallen along with the dissolution of its premise. For it was not shown that these things have a mutual distinction such that, if one of them should exist, the other would not, or conversely, if the one did not exist, the remaining one would necessarily exist. But nothing prevents both from being the same, and neither. But let us also see from the converse the incoherence of the proposition. For if it is proposed as true that "if he is not an incarnate mind, he would be wisdom," then what appears from the converse is also true, namely that, "if he is wisdom, he is not an incarnate mind." But surely everyone who has accepted the faith agrees that Christ is wisdom; therefore according to the proposition of the wise man it is confessed that he is not an incarnate mind so that on both counts, according to the first and the second and according to the present argument, he himself

25

ἄνθρωπον ἐκεῖνον οἴεται, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐπεμβαλεῖν τὸ νοερόν, ὅπερ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ πνεῦμα εἶναί φησιν, ἐπὶ μὲν ἡμῶν νοῦν, ἐπὶ ἐκείνου δὲ θεὸν ὀνομάζων· εἰ γάρ τις οὐρανίου ἀνθρώπου πλάσις καθ' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἐπεδείχθη, προήχθημεν ἂν δι' ἀκολουθίας τῷ μύθῳ, μαθόντες παρὰ τῆς καινῆς ταύτης σοφίας, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπίγειον τῶν ἀνθρώπων φῦλον ἐκ νοερᾶς ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος τὴν σύ στασιν ἔχει, γένος δέ τι ἔστιν ἐπουρανίων ἀνθρώπων, οἷς ἄλογος μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμα δὲ ἀνθρώπινον καὶ θεὸς ἀντὶ νοῦ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνακιρνᾶται, ἐξ ὧν εἶναι τὸν ἐπὶ γῆς φανέντα Ἀπολινάριος οἴεται. ἐκείνου δὲ μήτε ἀποδειχθέντος μήτε ὄντος, τοῦ δὲ διὰ τῆς παρθένου γεννηθέντος ἀθετουμένου ὡς οὐδὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας μετασχόντος φύσεως, ἀλλότριον ἡγοῦμαι καὶ ἀνακόλουθον σῶμα μὲν ὀνομάζεσθαι τὸ μὴ σῶμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἀνθρώπου τὴν μὴ ψυχήν.

Εἰ γὰρ μὴ νοερὰν αὐτήν τις εἶναι ὁμολογοίη, οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπου αὐτὴν ὅλως συνθήσεται. τούτων δὲ μὴ ὄντων τίνα καιρὸν ἔχει ἡ τριμερὴς ἐκείνη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τομή, ἧς τὸ μὲν δίμοιρον ἄνθρωπος, θεὸς δὲ τὸ τριτημόριον; Οὐ γὰρ ἄν, φησίν, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπου γεγονὼς εἴη, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος νοῦς ἔνσαρκος ὤν. ἐγὼ δὲ εἰ μὲν ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνους ἦν, ἐν ᾧ θεὸς κατήλ λαξε τὸν κόσμον ἑαυτῷ, εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔχω· ὅτι δὲ ὁ ταῦτα γρά φων ἔξω διανοίας ἦν, καθ' ὃν ἔγραφε ταῦτα χρόνον, κἂν ἐγὼ μὴ εἴπω, τὰ γεγραμμένα βοᾷ. πῶς γίνεται ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώ που ὁ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὢν καὶ πάντῃ <ἀμέτοχον> τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως; εἰ γὰρ νοερὰ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα τὸ ἀνθρώπινον σύγκριμα, μήτε δὲ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο μήτε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνη ἐν τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀναπλασθέντι ἐστί, πῶς 3,1.187 δέχεται τὴν ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἔκφυλον φύσεως; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν εἶναί φησιν, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον, νοῦν ἔνσαρκον ὄντα. ταῦτά ἐστιν, ἅ με πείθει ἔξω διανοίας εἶναι τὸν γράφοντα. πῶς ὁμοιοῦται τῇ φύσει τὸ μὴ μέτοχον τῆς φύσεως; τίς δέ ἐστιν ὁ ἔνσαρκος ἐκεῖνος νοῦς ὁ συμφυὴς τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ ἀχώριστος, ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος ὤν; οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐκ τοιούτου πάντως ἐστίν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη γεννητὴ σάρξ, εἰ μὴ ἀπὸ σαρκὸς γένοιτο, καθώς φησί που ὁ κύριος ὅτι Τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς σάρξ ἐστιν. [ἀλλ' ὕστερον γίνεται.] ποίαν οὖν περιτιθέμενος σάρκα ἔνσαρκος γίνεται; τὴν οὖσαν; <ἀλλ' ὕστερον γίνεται. τὴν μὴ οὖσαν;> ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς. [τὴν μὴ οὖσαν;] οὐκοῦν οὐ λέγεται ἔνσαρκος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τῷ μὴ ὄντι ἐπονομάζοιτο. Ἀλλ' ἴδωμεν τὰς ἀφύκτους αὐτοῦ τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἀνάγκας, δι' ὧν ἡμᾶς πρὸς συγκατάβασιν τοῦ ἔνσαρκον εἶναι νοῦν τὸν μονογενῆ θεὸν συναναγκάζει. Εἰ μὴ νοῦς, φησίν, ἔνσαρκός ἐστιν ὁ κύριος, σοφία ἂν εἴη. ὢ τῆς ἀμάχου προτάσεως! τὸ ἕτερον ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων οἴεσθαι πάντως εἶναι τὸν κύριον, ἢ νοῦν ἔνσαρκον ἢ σοφίαν· διὰ τοῦτό φησιν ἐκεῖνο εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅτ' ἂν μὴ νοῦς ἔνσαρκος ᾖ, πᾶν ὃ μή ἐστι νοῦς ἔνσαρκος, σοφία ἐστίν. τί οὖν ὁ λίθος; τί δὲ ὁ κάνθαρος; τί δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν φαινομένων; δώσει γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων πάντως τῶν δύο τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ νοῦν αὐτὰ ἔνσαρκον ἢ σοφίαν εἶναι· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε νοῦς οὔτε σοφία τούτων ἐστὶν οὐδέν. διαπέπτωκεν ἄρα τῷ λογογράφῳ ἡ πρότασις καὶ διερρύη πᾶν τὸ σκευώρημα τῇ τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλύσει συνδιαπεπτωκότος τοῦ λόγου. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐδείχθη ταῦτα τὴν ἀντιδιαστολὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχοντα ὥστε, εἰ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων εἴη, μὴ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον ἢ τὸ ἔμπαλιν, εἰ τὸ 3,1.188 ἓν μὴ ὑπάρχοι, τὸ λειπόμενον ὑπάρχειν πάντως. ἀλλὰ κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἀμφότερα εἶναι κατὰ ταὐτὸν καὶ οὐθ έτερον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀντιστρόφου τὸ τῆς προτάσεως ἀσύστατον ἴδωμεν. εἰ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθὲς προτείνεται τὸ εἰ μὴ νοῦς ἐστιν ἔνσαρκος, σοφία ἂν εἴη, ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀντιστρόφου ἀναφαινόμενον ὅτι, εἰ σοφία ἐστί, νοῦς ἔνσαρκος οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν σοφίαν εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν πᾶς ὁ παραδεξάμενος τὴν πίστιν συντίθεται· ἄρα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ πρότασιν τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸν νοῦν ἔνσαρκον ὁμολογεῖται ὥστε κατ' ἀμφότερα, κατά τε τὸν πρῶτον καὶ τὸν δεύτερον καὶ κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον, αὐτὸς ὁ