Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

supra-essential, being nothing other than the one; for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one, but only one. 120 Every god in its own existence possesses the providential care of the wholes; and to have providence primarily is in the gods. For all other things that exist after the gods exercise providence through participation in them, but for the gods providence is connate. For if the imparting of goods to the objects of providence is the special characteristic of the providential property, and all the gods are goodnesses, either they will impart nothing of themselves, and there will be nothing good in secondary beings (for whence could what exists by participation come, if not from those that primarily possess the properties?); or by imparting goods they do impart, and in this way they will exercise providence over all things. In the gods, therefore, providence exists primarily. And where else would the activity prior to intellect be, if not in the supra-essential beings? And providence, as its name indicates, is an activity prior to intellect. By being gods, therefore, and by being goodnesses, they have providence over all things, filling all things with the goodness that is prior to intellect. 121 All that is divine has for its existence goodness, but for its power a unitary power and for its knowledge a hidden knowledge, incomprehensible to all secondary beings together. For if it is provident for the wholes, there is in it a power that holds the objects of providence, through which, being irresistible and uncircumscribed for all, they have filled all things with themselves, having subordinated all things to themselves; for everything that is a ruling cause of other things and has mastery over them rules and has mastery by nature through an excess of power. There is, then, the primary power in the gods, not mastering some things but not others, but having equally pre-comprehended within itself the powers of all beings, being neither an essential power nor, much more, a non-essential one, but connate with the existence of the gods and supra-essential. But indeed, the limits of all knowledges also pre-exist in a unitary mode in the gods; for through the divine knowledge, which is transcendent of the wholes, all other knowledges also have come to subsist, being neither an intellectual knowledge nor, still less, one of the knowledges that are after intellect, but established above intellect according to the divine property. If, then, there is divine knowledge, this knowledge is hidden and unitary; if power, it is uncircumscribed for all and comprehensive of all things likewise; if goodness, it is what defines their existence. For even if all things are in them, knowledge, power, goodness, yet their existence is characterized by the best, and their subsistence is according to the best; and this is goodness. 122 All that is divine both has providence for secondary beings and is transcendent of the objects of its providence, with neither its providence relaxing its unmingled and unitary transcendence, nor its separate unity destroying its providence. For remaining in their own unitary state and in their existence, they have filled all things with their own power; and everything that is able to participate in them enjoys those goods which it is able to receive according to the measures of its own subsistence, while they, by their very being, or rather pre-being, shine forth their goods upon existing things. For being nothing other than goodnesses, by their very being they supply goods ungrudgingly to all, not making the distribution according to calculation, but while these receive according to their own worthiness, they give according to their own existence. Therefore, in exercising providence they do not take on a relation towards the objects of their providence; for by being what they are they make all things good, and everything that acts by its being, acts without relation (for relation is an addition to being; for which reason it is also contrary to nature); nor being separate do they annul their providence; for thus they would annul (which it is not even lawful to say) their own existence, whose property is goodness. For the imparting to everything capable of participating belongs to the good, and the greatest thing is not the good-like, but the good-producing. This, therefore, either no being will possess, or the gods before all beings; for the greater good could not possibly belong to things that are good by participation, and the lesser to things that are primarily good. 123 All that is divine is in itself, through its supra-essential unification, ineffable and unknowable to all secondary beings, but from its participants it is apprehensible and knowable; wherefore only the First is completely unknowable, inasmuch as it is unparticipated. For all knowledge of beings through discourse

ὑπερ ούσιον, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ὂν παρὰ τὸ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο ἕκαστος, εἶτα ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἄλλο, εἶτα ἕν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἕν. 120 Πᾶς θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὑπάρξει τὸ προνοεῖν τῶν ὅλων κέκτηται· καὶ τὸ πρώτως προνοεῖν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα πάντα μετὰ θεοὺς ὄντα διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων μετουσίαν προνοεῖ, τοῖς δὲ θεοῖς ἡ πρόνοια συμφυής ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μεταδιδόναι τοῖς προνοουμένοις ἐξαίρετόν ἐστι τῆς προνοητικῆς ἰδιότητος, οἱ δὲ θεοὶ πάντες ἀγαθότητές εἰσιν, ἢ οὐδενὶ μεταδώσουσιν ἑαυτῶν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀγαθὸν ἐν τοῖς δευτέροις (πόθεν γὰρ τὸ κατὰ μέθεξιν ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτως τὰς ἰδιότητας ἐχόντων;)· ἢ μεταδιδόντες ἀγαθῶν μεταδιδοῦσι, καὶ ταύτῃ προνοήσουσι τῶν πάντων. ἐν θεοῖς οὖν ἡ πρόνοια πρώτως. καὶ ποῦ γὰρ ἡ πρὸ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ἢ ἐν τοῖς ὑπερουσίοις; ἡ δὲ πρόνοια, ὡς τοὔνομα ἐμφαίνει, ἐνέργειά ἐστι πρὸ νοῦ. τῷ εἶναι ἄρα θεοὶ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθότητες εἶναι πάντων προνοοῦσι, πάντα τῆς πρὸ νοῦ πληροῦντες ἀγαθότητος. 121 Πᾶν τὸ θεῖον ὕπαρξιν μὲν ἔχει τὴν ἀγαθότητα, δύναμιν δὲ ἑνιαίαν καὶ γνῶσιν κρύφιον καὶ ἄληπτον πᾶσιν ὁμοῦ τοῖς δευτέροις. εἰ γάρ ἐστι προνοητικὸν τῶν ὅλων, ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ δύναμις κρατητικὴ τῶν προνοουμένων, δι' ἥν, ἀκράτητον καὶ ἀπερί γραφον τοῖς πᾶσιν ὑπάρχουσαν, πάντα πεπληρώκασιν ἑαυτῶν, πάντα ὑποστρώσαντες ἑαυτοῖς· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἀρχικὸν ἄλλων αἴτιον καὶ κρατητικὸν διὰ δυνάμεως περιουσίαν ἄρχει καὶ κρατεῖ κατὰ φύσιν. ἔστι δὴ οὖν ἡ πρωτίστη δύναμις ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς, οὐ τῶν μὲν κρατοῦσα τῶν δὲ οὔ, πάντων δὲ ἐξ ἴσου προλαβοῦσα τὰς δυνάμεις ἐν ἑαυτῇ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε οὐσιώδης οὖσα δύναμις οὔτε πολλῷ πλέον ἀνούσιος, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὑπάρξει τῶν θεῶν συμφυὴς καὶ ὑπερούσιος. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ πέρατα πασῶν τῶν γνώσεων ἑνοειδῶς ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς προϋφέστηκε· διὰ γὰρ τὴν θείαν γνῶσιν τὴν ἐξῃρη μένην τῶν ὅλων καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι γνώσεις ὑπέστησαν, οὔτε νοερὰν οὖσαν οὔτε ἔτι μᾶλλον τῶν μετὰ νοῦν τινα γνώσεων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα τὴν θείαν ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἱδρυμένην. εἴτε ἄρα γνῶσίς ἐστι θεία, κρύφιός ἐστιν αὕτη καὶ ἑνοειδὴς ἡ γνῶσις· εἴτε δύναμις, ἀπερίγραφος πᾶσι καὶ περιληπτικὴ πάντων ὡσαύτως· εἴτε ἀγαθότης, τὴν ὕπαρξιν αὐτῶν ἀφορί ζουσα. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς, γνῶσις δύναμις ἀγαθότης, ἀλλ' ἡ ὕπαρξις τῷ ἀρίστῳ χαρακτηρίζεται καὶ ἡ ὑπόστασις κατὰ τὸ ἄριστον· τοῦτο δὲ ἡ ἀγαθότης. 122 Πᾶν τὸ θεῖον καὶ προνοεῖ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ ἐξῄρηται τῶν προνοουμένων, μήτε τῆς προνοίας χαλώσης τὴν ἄμικτον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνιαίαν ὑπεροχὴν μήτε τῆς χωριστῆς ἑνώσεως τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀφανιζούσης. μένοντες γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἑνιαίῳ τῷ ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑπάρξει τὰ πάντα πεπληρώκασι τῆς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεως· καὶ πᾶν τὸ δυνά μενον αὐτῶν μεταλαγχάνειν ἀπολαύει τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὧν δέχεσθαι δύναται κατὰ τὰ μέτρα τῆς οἰκείας ὑποστάσεως, ἐκείνων αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι, μᾶλλον δὲ προεῖναι, τἀγαθὰ τοῖς οὖσιν ἐπιλαμπόντων. ὄντες γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀγαθότητες, αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι τοῖς πᾶσιν ἀφθόνως τἀγαθὰ χορηγοῦσιν, οὐ κατὰ λογισμὸν ποιούμενοι τὴν διανομήν, ἀλλὰ τούτων μὲν κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀξίαν δεχομένων, ἐκείνων δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ὕπαρξιν διδόντων. οὔτε οὖν προ νοοῦντες σχέσιν ἀναδέχονται πρὸς τὰ προνοούμενα· τῷ γὰρ εἶναι ὅ εἰσι πάντα ἀγαθύνουσιν, πᾶν δὲ τὸ τῷ εἶναι ποιοῦν ἀσχέτως ποιεῖ (ἡ γὰρ σχέσις πρόσθεσίς ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν)· οὔτε χωριστοὶ ὄντες ἀναιροῦσι τὴν πρόνοιαν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀναιροῖεν (ὃ μηδὲ θέμις εἰπεῖν) τὴν ὕπαρξιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν, ἧς ἰδιότης ἡ ἀγαθότης ἐστίν. ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ ἡ μετάδοσις εἰς πᾶν τὸ μετέχειν δυνάμενον, καὶ τὸ μέγιστόν ἐστιν οὐ τὸ ἀγαθοειδές, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀγαθουργόν. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἢ οὐδὲν ἕξει τῶν ὄντων ἢ θεοὶ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων· οὐ γὰρ ἄν που τοῖς μὲν κατὰ μέθεξιν ἀγαθοῖς ὑπάρχοι τὸ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ πρώτως ἀγαθοῖς τὸ ἔλαττον. 123 Πᾶν τὸ θεῖον αὐτὸ μὲν διὰ τὴν ὑπερούσιον ἕνωσιν ἄρρητόν ἐστι καὶ ἄγνωστον πᾶσι τοῖς δευτέροις, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν μετεχόντων ληπτόν ἐστι καὶ γνωστόν· διὸ μόνον τὸ πρῶτον παντελῶς ἄγνωστον, ἅτε ἀμέθεκτον ὄν. πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ διὰ λόγου γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων