John of Damascus, Dialectic Brief Recension

and of suffering; For just as things that act and suffer are either animate or inanimate, so also here what has and is had is either animate or inanimate. How then will different genera have the same differentiae? But it can be said that what is had is either around the whole body or around a part, and again this is either for defense or for adornment. 47 Concerning assertion, both negation and affirmation. It is necessary to know that affirmation and negation are called assertion. Affirmation, then, is that which signifies what belongs to something, that is, what something is; for example, "Socrates is wise," "Socrates is walking." And negation is that which declares what does not belong to something, that is, what something is not, for example, "so-and-so is not wise," "so-and-so is not walking." And since to every affirmation a negation is opposed and to every negation an affirmation, the negation opposed to the affirmation and the affirmation opposed to the negation is called a contradiction; and it is necessary that one be false and one be true. 48 Concerning term and proposition and syllogism. It is necessary to know that the logical treatise has as its aim [to be] about demonstration. And demonstration is a syllogism; and the syllogism is composed of two true propositions and the conclusion; for example, wishing to demonstrate that the soul is immortal, I say that everything that is ever-moving is immortal; this is a proposition. Then I also say a second proposition: The soul is ever-moving; then the conclusion: Therefore, the soul is immortal. And each proposition is composed of terms, for each word of the proposition is called a term; for a term is that into which the proposition is resolved. For example, the proposition says: Everything that is ever-moving is immortal; "everything" is called a term as part of a proposition, and "ever-moving" is likewise called a term, and "immortal" is called a term, and "is" is called a term. It is necessary to know that the propositions must be true and the conclusion must follow from the propositions. For if one of the propositions is found to be false, or the conclusion, it is a paralogism and not a syllogism. Simple expression, noun, verb, statement, term; these five do not differ from one another with respect to the subject, but their difference is only with respect to relation; for example, "man," insofar as it simply signifies something, is called a simple expression, insofar as it is a subject it is called a noun, insofar as it holds the place of a predicate it is called a verb, insofar as it is part of an affirmation or negation it is called a statement, and insofar as it is part of a proposition and a syllogism it is called a term. And it is necessary to know that in the proposition, that is, in the affirmation and negation, the subject is called a noun, and the predicate is called a verb. For example, there is an affirmation: "A man is walking," "man" is the subject and is called a noun, "is walking" holds the place of a predicate and is called a verb; "Socrates is beautiful," "Socrates" is the subject and is called a noun, "is beautiful" holds the place of a predicate and is called a verb as part of an affirmation, even if "beautiful" is called a noun by the grammarians. And simply, whatever follows "is" is a verb both in negation and in affirmation, whether it is a noun or a verb, it is called a verb by the philosophers as being predicated. It must be known that these five have no difference from one another: assertion, proposition, problem, objection, conclusion. For when I simply assert that the soul is immortal, it is called an assertion. But when it is taken as part of a syllogism, then to say, "The soul is immortal," is a proposition. And when someone objects to the proposition, saying, "How is it clear that the soul is immortal?" then such a thing is called an objection. And when again we propose for inquiry, "Is the soul immortal?" it is called a problem. And when it is inferred from a proposition, it is called

καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν· ὡς γὰρ τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ πάσχοντα ἢ ἔμψυχά ἐστιν ἢ ἄψυχα, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἔμψυχόν ἐστι τὸ ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἐχόμενον ἢ ἄψυχον. Πῶς οὖν τῶν διαφόρων γενῶν αἱ αὐταὶ διαφοραὶ ἔσονται; Ἀλλ' ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τὸ ἔχον ἢ περὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ περὶ μέρος, καὶ πάλιν τοῦτο ἢ ἀμυντήριόν ἐστιν ἢ κόσμος. 47 Περὶ ἀποφάνσεως ἀποφάσεώς τε καὶ καταφάσεως. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι ἡ κατάφασις καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἀπόφανσις λέγεται. Κατάφασις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ σημαίνουσα, τί τινι ὑπάρχει, τουτέστι τί ὑπάρχει τις· οἷον «Σωκράτης σοφός ἐστι», «Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ». Ἀπόφασις δὲ ἡ δηλοῦσα τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον τινὶ ἤγουν τί οὐκ ἔστι τις, οἷον «ὁ δεῖνα οὐκ ἔστι σοφός», «ὁ δεῖνα οὐ περιπατεῖ». Ἐπειδὴ δὲ πάσῃ καταφάσει ἀντίκειται ἀπόφασις καὶ πάσῃ ἀποφάσει κατάφασις, ἡ ἀπόφασις ἡ ἀντικειμένη τῇ καταφάσει καὶ ἡ κατάφασις ἡ ἀντικειμένη τῇ ἀποφάσει ἀντίφασις λέγεται· ἀνάγκη δὲ τὴν μίαν ψεύδεσθαι καὶ τὴν μίαν ἀληθεύειν. 48 Περὶ ὅρου καὶ προτάσεως καὶ συλλογισμοῦ. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι σκοπὸν ἔχει ἡ λογικὴ πραγματεία περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως. Ἡ δὲ ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμός ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς σύγκειται ἐκ δύο ἀληθῶν προτάσεων καὶ τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οἷον θέλων ἀποδεῖξαι, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι, λέγω, ὅτι πᾶν ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν· αὕτη πρότασίς ἐστιν. Εἶτα λέγω καὶ δευτέραν πρότασιν· Ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεικίνητός ἐστιν· εἶτα τὸ συμπέρασμα· Ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἀθάνατός ἐστιν. Ἑκάστη δὲ πρότασις ἐξ ὅρων σύγκειται, ἑκάστη γὰρ λέξις τῆς προτάσεως ὅρος λέγεται· ὅρος γάρ ἐστιν, εἰς ὃν ἀναλύεται ἡ πρότασις. Οἷον ἡ πρότασις λέγει· Πᾶν ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατόν ἐστι· τὸ «Πᾶν» ὅρος λέγεται ὡς μέρος προτάσεως καὶ τὸ «ἀεικίνητον» ὁμοίως ὅρος λέγεται καὶ τὸ «ἀθάνατον» ὅρος λέγεται καὶ τὸ «ἐστιν» ὅρος λέγεται. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰς προτάσεις ἀληθεῖς εἶναι καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς προτάσεσιν. Εἰ γὰρ εὑρεθῇ ἡ μία τῶν προτάσεων ψευδὴς ἢ τὸ συμπέρασμα, παραλογισμός ἐστι καὶ οὐ συλλογισμός. Ἁπλῆ φωνή, ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, φάσις, ὅρος· ταῦτα τὰ πέντε κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐδὲν ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσι, μόνον δὲ κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἡ διαφορά· οἷον ἄνθρωπος ὡς μὲν ἁπλῶς σημαντικόν τινος λέγεται ἁπλῆ φωνή, ὡς δὲ ὑποκείμενον λέγεται ὄνομα, ὡς δὲ τάξιν ἐπέχον κατηγορουμένου λέγεται ῥῆμα, ὡς δὲ μέρος καταφάσεως ἢ ἀποφάσεως λέγεται φάσις, ὡς δὲ μέρος προτάσεως καὶ συλλογισμοῦ λέγεται ὅρος. Χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὅτι ἐν τῇ προτάσει ἤτοι τῇ καταφάσει καὶ ἀποφάσει τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὄνομα λέγεται, τὸ δὲ κατηγορούμενον λέγεται ῥῆμα. Οἷον κατάφασίς ἐστιν· Ἄνθρωπος περιπατεῖ, τὸ «ἄνθρωπος» ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι καὶ λέγεται ὄνομα, τὸ «περιπατεῖ» τάξιν ἐπέχει κατηγορουμένου καὶ λέγεται ῥῆμα· «Σωκράτης καλός ἐστι», τὸ «Σωκράτης» ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι καὶ λέγεται ὄνομα, τὸ «καλός ἐστι» τάξιν ἐπέχει κατηγορουμένου καὶ λέγεται ῥῆμα ὡς μέρος καταφάσεως, εἰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς γραμματικοῖς ὄνομα λέγεται τὸ «καλός». Καὶ ἁπλῶς, ᾧτινι ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ «ἐστι», ῥῆμά ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσει καὶ ἐν τῇ καταφάσει, κἂν ὄνομά ἐστι κἂν ῥῆμα, ῥῆμα λέγεται παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὡς κατηγορούμενον. Ἰστέον, ὅτι τὰ πέντε ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἀλλήλων διενηνόχασιν, ἀπόφανσις, πρότασις, πρόβλημα, ἔνστασις, συμπέρασμα. Ὅταν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἀποφαίνωμαι, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν, ἀπόφανσις λέγεται. Ὅταν δὲ ὡς μέρος συλλογισμοῦ ληφθῇ, τότε πρότασίς ἐστιν τὸ λέγειν· Ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν. Ἡνίκα δέ τις ἐνίσταται πρὸς τὴν πρότασιν λέγων· Πόθεν δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι; τότε τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔνστασις προσαγορεύεται. Ἡνίκα δὲ πάλιν προτείνομεν εἰς ζήτησιν· Ἆρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι; καλεῖται πρόβλημα. Ὅτε δὲ ἐκ προτάσεως συναχθῇ, καλεῖται