Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection); but the gods are beyond all beings. Therefore the divine is neither an object of opinion, nor an object of discursive thought, nor an object of intellection. For every being is either sensible, and for this reason an object of opinion; or truly being, and for this reason an object of intellection; or between these, being at once a being and generated, and for this reason an object of discursive thought. If, therefore, the gods are supra-essential and subsist prior to beings, there is of them neither opinion nor science and discursive thought nor intellection. But from the things dependent upon them their properties, such as they are, are known, and this necessarily. For according to the properties of the things participated, the differences of the participants are also distinguished, and neither does everything participate in everything (for there is no coordination of things completely dissimilar) nor does a random thing participate in a random thing, but that which is akin is conjoined with each and proceeds from each. 124 Every god knows divisible things indivisibly, temporal things atemporally, non-necessary things necessarily, and mutable things immutably, and in general all things in a manner superior to their own rank. For if everything, whatsoever exists with the gods, exists according to their own property, it is surely clear that their knowledge, existing in the gods, will not be according to the nature of inferior things, but according to their own transcendent superiority. Therefore the knowledge of multiplied and passible things will be uniform and impassible. Thus if the known object be divisible, yet the divine knowledge is indivisible, even of divisible things; and if mutable, it is immutable; and if contingent, necessary; and if indefinite, definite. For the divine does not receive knowledge from inferior things, so that its knowledge would be conditioned as the known object is by nature. But inferior things are related indefinitely to the definite nature of the gods, and are changed in relation to the immutable, and receive the impassible passibly, and the atemporal temporally. For it is possible for the inferior to deviate from the superior, but it is not lawful for the gods to receive anything from the inferior. 125 Every god, from whatever rank he begins to manifest himself, proceeds through all the secondary orders, always multiplying and dividing his own communications, but preserving the property of his own hypostasis. For processions, which come to be through remission, everywhere multiply the first things into the subordinate stages of the second things, and the things that proceed, according to their likeness to their producers, receive their own disposition, so that the whole is in a way the same, and the thing proceeding is other than that which remains, appearing different because of the remission, but because of its continuity with that [producer] not departing from its identity, and what that [producer] is in the first things, such it itself subsists in the second things, preserving the indissoluble communion of the series. Therefore each of the gods is manifested appropriately to the orders in which he makes his manifestation, and from thence proceeds to the last things through the generative power of the first things; and he is always multiplied through the procession which goes from one to many, but he preserves sameness in the procession through the likeness of the proceeding things to the ruling and primary cause of each series. 126 Every god that is nearer to the One is more universal, and he that is more remote is more particular. For he who is the cause of more things is nearer to the producer of all things, while he who is the cause of fewer things is more remote; and the cause of more things is more universal, while the cause of fewer things is more particular. And each is a henad; but the one is greater in power, the other is lesser in power. And the more particular are generated from the more universal, neither by the division of the latter (for they are henads), nor by their alteration (for they are immovable), nor by multiplication in relation (for they are unmixed), but through their begetting secondary processions from themselves on account of a superabundance of power, which are subordinate to those before them. 127 All that is divine is primarily and especially simple, and for this reason most self-sufficient. For that it is simple is manifest from its unification; for everything [divine] is most unitary, and such a thing is pre-eminently simple. That it is most self-sufficient, one might learn by considering that the composite is in need, if not of other things which are external to it, yet at least of those things of which it was composed; but the most simple and unitary and the one with the good

ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔχει τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας καταληπτικόν (καὶ γὰρ νοημάτων ἐφάπτεται καὶ ἐν νοήσεσιν ὑφέστηκεν)· οἱ δὲ θεοὶ πάντων εἰσὶν ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων. οὔτε οὖν δοξαστὸν τὸ θεῖον οὔτε διανοη τὸν οὔτε νοητόν. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἢ αἰσθητόν ἐστι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοξαστόν· ἢ ὄντως ὄν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο νοητόν· ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, ὂν ἅμα καὶ γενητόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διανοητόν. εἰ οὖν οἱ θεοὶ ὑπερούσιοι καὶ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων ὑφεστήκασιν, οὔτε δόξα ἔστιν αὐτῶν οὔτε ἐπιστήμη καὶ διάνοια οὔτε νόησις. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξηρτημένων οἷαί πέρ εἰσιν αὐτῶν αἱ ἰδιότητες γνωρίζονται, καὶ τοῦτο ἀναγκαίως. κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῶν μετ εχομένων ἰδιότητας καὶ αἱ τῶν μετεχόντων συνδιαιροῦνται δια φορότητες, καὶ οὔτε πᾶν μετέχει παντός (οὐ γὰρ ἔστι σύνταξις τῶν πάντῃ ἀνομοίων) οὔτε τὸ τυχὸν τοῦ τυχόντος μετέχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ συγγενὲς ἑκάστῳ συνῆπται καὶ ἀφ' ἑκάστου πρόεισιν. 124 Πᾶς θεὸς ἀμερίστως μὲν τὰ μεριστὰ γινώσκει, ἀχρόνως δὲ τὰ ἔγχρονα, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖα ἀναγκαίως, καὶ τὰ μεταβλητὰ ἀμεταβλήτως, καὶ ὅλως πάντα κρειττόνως ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τάξιν. εἰ γὰρ ἅπαν, ὅ τι περ ἂν ᾖ παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς, κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἰδιότητα, δῆλον δήπουθεν ὡς οὐχὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν χειρόνων φύσιν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς οὖσα ἡ γνῶσις αὐτῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἐξῃρημένην ὑπεροχήν. ἑνοειδὴς ἄρα καὶ ἀπαθὴς ἡ γνῶσις ἔσται τῶν πεπληθυσμένων καὶ παθητῶν. εἰ ἄρα καὶ τὸ γνωστὸν εἴη μεριστόν, ἀλλ' ἡ θεία γνῶσις ἀμέριστος καὶ ἡ τῶν μεριστῶν· καὶ εἰ μεταβλητόν, ἀμετάβλητος· καὶ εἰ ἐνδεχό μενον, ἀναγκαία· καὶ εἰ ἀόριστον, ὡρισμένη. οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν χειρόνων εἰσδέχεται τὸ θεῖον τὴν γνῶσιν, ἵνα οὕτως ἡ γνῶσις ἔχῃ, ὡς τὸ γνωστὸν ἔχει φύσεως. ἀλλὰ τὰ χείρονα περὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον τῶν θεῶν ἀορισταίνει, καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀμετάβλητον μεταβάλλει, καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς παθητικῶς ὑποδέχεται καὶ τὸ ἄχρονον ἐγχρόνως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ χείροσιν ἀπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων παρεκβαίνειν δυνατόν, τοῖς δὲ θεοῖς εἰσδέχεσθαί τι παρὰ τῶν χειρόνων οὐ θέμις. 125 Πᾶς θεός, ἀφ' ἧς ἂν ἄρξηται τάξεως ἐκφαίνειν ἑαυτόν, πρόεισι διὰ πάντων τῶν δευτέρων, ἀεὶ μὲν πληθύνων τὰς ἑαυτοῦ μεταδόσεις καὶ μερίζων, φυλάττων δὲ τὴν ἰδιότητα τῆς οἰκείας ὑποστάσεως. αἱ μὲν γὰρ πρόοδοι δι' ὑφέσεως γινόμεναι τὰ πρῶτα πανταχοῦ πληθύνουσιν εἰς τὰς τῶν δευτέρων ὑποβάσεις, τὰ δὲ προϊόντα κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὰ παράγοντα ὁμοιότητα τὴν ἑαυτῶν ὑποδέ χεται διάταξιν, ὥστε τὸ ὅλον ταὐτόν πως εἶναι, καὶ ἕτερον τὸ προϊὸν τῷ μένοντι, διὰ μὲν τὴν ὕφεσιν ἀλλοῖον φαινόμενον, διὰ δὲ τὴν συνέχειαν τὴν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τῆς ταυτότητος οὐκ ἐξιστά μενον, οἷον δέ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς δευτέροις ὑφιστάμενον αὐτό, καὶ τῆς σειρᾶς τὴν ἀδιάλυτον κοι νωνίαν διαφυλάττον. ἐκφαίνεται μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν οἰκείως ταῖς τάξεσιν, ἐν αἷς ποιεῖται τὴν ἔκφανσιν, πρόεισι δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ἄχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων διὰ τὴν γεννητικὴν τῶν πρώτων δύναμιν· πληθύνεται δὲ ἀεὶ διὰ τὴν πρόοδον ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἰς πλῆθος γινομένην, φυλάττει δὲ τὸ ταὐτὸν ἐν τῇ προόδῳ διὰ τὴν ὁμοιό τητα τῶν προϊόντων πρὸς τὸ ἑκάστης σειρᾶς ἡγεμονοῦν καὶ πρωτουργὸν αἴτιον. 126 Πᾶς θεὸς ὁλικώτερος μέν ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐγγυτέρω, μερικώτερος δὲ ὁ πορρώτερον. τοῦ γὰρ πάντα παράγοντος ὁ πλειόνων αἴτιος ἐγγυτέρω, ὁ δὲ ἐλαττόνων πορρωτέρω· καὶ ὁ μὲν πλειόνων αἴτιος ὁλικώτερος, ὁ δὲ ἐλαττόνων μερικώτερος. καὶ ἑκάτερος μὲν ἑνάς ἐστιν· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν δυνάμει μείζων, ὁ δὲ ἐλάττων κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ οἱ μερικώτεροι γεννῶνται ἐκ τῶν ὁλικωτέρων οὔτε μεριζομένων ἐκείνων (ἑνάδες γάρ) οὔτε ἀλλοιουμένων (ἀκίνητοι γάρ) οὔτε σχέσει πληθυνομένων (ἀμιγεῖς γάρ), ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν δευτέρας ἀπογεννώντων προόδους διὰ δυνάμεως περιουσίαν, ὑφειμένας τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν. 127 Πᾶν τὸ θεῖον ἁπλοῦν πρώτως ἐστὶ καὶ μάλιστα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐταρκέστατον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἁπλοῦν, ἐκ τῆς ἑνώσεως φανερόν· ἑνικώτατον γάρ ἐστι πᾶν, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον διαφερόντως ἁπλοῦν. ὅτι δὲ αὐταρκέστατον, μάθοι τις ἂν ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸ μὲν σύνθετον ἐνδεές ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων, ὧν ἐστιν ἔξω, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων γε, ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη· τὸ δὲ ἁπλούστατον καὶ ἑνιαῖον καὶ τὸ ἓν τῷ ἀγαθῷ