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a knowledgeable man and knowledge, are no longer referred to the category of 'having'. The different senses of 'having' arise according to the difference of beings; for a thing is either animate or inanimate, and we are said to 'have' an animate thing, as a child, a horse, and the like, but an inanimate thing, as a ring, a shoe, and the like. 'Having' is also said homonymously according to many other meanings, about which we will speak later. 58 Concerning Opposites. Every opposite is opposed either as a thing or as a statement. And if as a statement to a statement, it produces affirmation and negation. Affirmation, then, is to say what belongs to something, for example 'he is beautiful', and negation is to say what does not belong to something, for example 'he is not beautiful'; both are called a declaration. But if they are opposed as things, they are either spoken of in reference to a correlative and constitute relatives, which both imply one another and destroy one another, or not in reference to a correlative and do not have a relation. And these either do not change into one another, yet both are according to nature and constitute contraries, as heat and cold, or the one changes into the other, but the other does not change. And one of them is according to nature and the other contrary to nature, and they constitute opposites according to privation and state, like sight and blindness; for sight is a state, as from 'to have', while blindness is the privation of the state, that is, of sight. Of contraries, some are immediate, others mediate. Immediate, then, are those of which it is necessary for the other, that is, one of them, to belong to their subject or to those things of which they are predicated, for example, sickness and health in the body of a living creature as a subject, and it is absolutely necessary for there to be either sickness or health in the body; and we call sickness every perversion of nature. -Mediate, however, are those of which it is not necessary for one of them to belong to the subject or to those things of which they are predicated, as white and black; for they are contraries, and it is not at all necessary for one of them to belong to the body; for it is not necessary for every body to be either white or black, for there are grey and reddish bodies; - unless, indeed, one of the opposites belongs by nature definitively to something, as heat to fire and cold to snow. Now, of the mediate contraries, some have names, as the intermediate between white and black is called grey, but others do not have names; for the intermediate between just and unjust has no name, but the intermediate is known by the negation of each, for instance, neither just nor unjust. Four properties follow contraries: first, that to the good, the contrary is necessarily the bad, but to the bad, sometimes the good, and sometimes another bad; for to temperance, the contrary is intemperance, but to intemperance, sometimes temperance, and sometimes foolishness. Foolishness is for the passions not to be moved nor aroused. Intemperance, then, is a deficiency of temperance, while foolishness is an excess, and excess is contrary to deficiency. -second, that it is impossible for contraries to be present in individuals at the same time in the same respect, for it is not possible for Socrates to be healthy and sick at the same time, or for the same member to be warmed and cooled at the same time. -third, that contraries are in the same subject either in genus or in species or in number, in genus, as white and black are in a simple body; in species, as health and sickness are in the body of a living creature; and in number is clear; for the same body can be receptive of contraries according to its own change. - fourth, that contraries are either under the same genus, as white and black are under color, or under contrary genera, as justice and injustice are under the good and the bad, which are contraries, or they themselves are contrary genera, as the good and the bad are contrary genera. 59 Concerning State and Privation. State is said of the activity of the thing held and of the one holding, as of the weapon and the one armed, or of the one dressing and the one being dressed; -second, the adventitious activities being permanent, whether physical or psychical; and physical, as heat in things being heated, but psychical, as knowledge; -third, that which one does not yet have, but has the aptitude to receive, which is the first meaning of 'in potentiality'; -fourth, the natural quality, that is, the natural state, as the heat of fire and the sight of one sleeping, which is the second

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ἐπιστήμων καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οὐκέτι ὑπὸ τὸ ἔχειν ἀνάγεται. ∆ιαφοραὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν γίνονται κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὄντων· ἢ γὰρ ἔμψυχόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄψυχον, καὶ ἔμψυχον μὲν ἔχειν λεγόμεθα ὡς παῖδα, ἵππον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἄψυχον δὲ ὡς δακτύλιον, ὑπόδημα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Λέγεται δὲ τὸ ἔχειν καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν ἑτέρων σημαινομένων ὁμωνύμως, περὶ ὧν ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. 58 Περὶ ἀντικειμένων. Πᾶν ἀντικείμενον ἢ ὡς πρᾶγμα ἀντίκειται ἢ ὡς λόγος. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ὡς λόγος λόγῳ, ποιεῖ κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν. Κατάφασις μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ εἰπεῖν, τί τινι ὑπάρχει, οἷον καλός ἐστιν, ἀπόφασις δὲ τὸ εἰπεῖν, τί τινι οὐχ ὑπάρχει, οἷον οὐκ ἔστι καλός· λέγονται δὲ ἀμφότερα ἀπόφανσις. Εἰ δὲ ὡς πρᾶγμα ἀντίκεινται, ἢ ὡς πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγονται καὶ ποιεῖ τὰ πρός τι, ἅτινα καὶ συνεισάγουσιν ἄλληλα καὶ συναναιροῦσιν, ἢ οὐ πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσι σχέσιν. Καὶ ταῦτα ἢ οὐ μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα, ὅμως δὲ ἄμφω κατὰ φύσιν εἰσὶ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰ ἐναντία ὡς ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ ψύξις, ἢ τὸ μὲν μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον οὐ μεταβάλλει. Καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν τὸ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ ποιεῖ τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν ἀντικείμενα ὡς ὄψις καὶ τυφλότης· ἕξις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις ὡς ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν, στέρησις δὲ τῆς ἕξεως ἤγουν τῆς ὁράσεως ἡ τυφλότης. Τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων τὰ μέν εἰσιν ἄμεσα, τὰ δὲ ἔμμεσα. Ἄμεσα μὲν οὖν εἰσιν, ὧν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἕτερον ἤγουν τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχειν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ αὐτοῖς ἢ τοῦτοις, ὧν κατηγοροῦνται, οἷον νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου ὑποκειμένῳ, καὶ ἀνάγκη πάντως ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ νόσον εἶναι ἢ ὑγίειαν· νόσον δέ φαμεν πᾶσαν τὴν παρατροπὴν τῆς φύσεως. -Ἔμμεσα δέ, ὧν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ ἕτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἢ τούτοις, ὧν κατηγοροῦνται, ὡς τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν· ἐναντία γάρ εἰσι, καὶ οὐ πάντως ἀνάγκη ἓν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τῷ σώματι· οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν σῶμα ἢ λευκὸν εἶναι ἢ μέλαν, εἰσὶ γὰρ σώματα φαιὰ καὶ πυῤῥά· - εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ ἓν τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀφωρισμένως φύσει ὑπάρχει τινὶ ὡς ἡ θερμότης τῷ πυρὶ καὶ ἡ ψύξις τῇ χιόνι. Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐμμέσων τὰ μὲν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὡς τὸ μέσον τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ μέλανος λέγεται φαιόν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα· τὸ μέσον γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου οὐκ ἔχει ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀποφάσει ἑκατέρου τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον γνωρίζεται οἷον οὐδὲ δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον. Ἀκολουθοῦσι δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἰδιώματα τέσσαρα· πρῶτον, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ κακὸν ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ ποτὲ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ποτὲ δὲ ἄλλο κακόν· τῇ μὲν γὰρ σωφροσύνῃ ἐναντίον ἡ ἀκολασία, τῇ δὲ ἀκολασίᾳ ποτὲ μὲν σωφροσύνη, ποτὲ δὲ ἠλιθιότης. Ἠλιθιότης δέ ἐστι τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μηδὲ ἐγείρεσθαι τὰ πάθη. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀκολασία ἔλλειψίς ἐστι τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἡ δὲ ἠλιθιότης ὑπερβολή, ἐναντία δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῇ ἐλλείψει. -δεύτερον, ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων εἶναι κατὰ τὸ αὐτό, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἅμα Σωκράτην ὑγιαίνειν καὶ νοσεῖν, ἢ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέλος θερμαίνεσθαι ἅμα καὶ ψύχεσθαι. -τρίτον, ὅτι τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἢ γένει ἢ εἴδει ἢ ἀριθμῷ, γένει μὲν ὡς ἐν ἁπλῷ σώματι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, εἴδει δὲ ὡς ἐν σώματι ζῴου ὑγίεια καὶ νόσος, ἀριθμῷ δὲ δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὸν ἐνδέχεται κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μεταβολήν. - τέταρτον, ὅτι τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος ὡς τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν ὑπὸ τὸ χρῶμα, ἢ ὑπὸ τὰ ἐναντία γένη ὡς δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία ὑπὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, ἅτινα ἐναντία εἰσίν, ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐναντία γένη εἰσὶν ὡς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἐναντία ὄντα γένη. 59 Περὶ ἕξεως καὶ στερήσεως. Ἕξις λέγεται ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἐχομένου καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ὡς τοῦ ὅπλου καὶ τοῦ ὡπλισμένου ἤγουν τοῦ ἐνδύοντος καὶ τοῦ ἐνδυομένου· -δεύ τερον αἱ ἐπείσακτοι ἐνέργειαι μόνιμοι οὖσαι εἴτε φυσικαὶ εἴτε ψυχικαί· καὶ φυσικαὶ μὲν ὡς ἡ θερμότης ἐν τοῖς θερμαινομένοις, ψυχικαὶ δὲ ὡς ἐπιστήμη· -τρίτον, ὅπερ οὔπω μὲν ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ ἐπιτηδειότητα δέξασθαι, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρῶτον σημαινόμενον τοῦ δυνάμει· -τέταρτον ἡ φυσικὴ ποιότης ἤγουν φυσικὴ ἕξις ὡς ἡ θερμότης τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τοῦ καθεύδοντος ἡ ὄψις, ὅπερ ἐστὶ δεύτερον