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to say that the philosophy according to God of those who pursue it consists only in word and contemplation, without practice, and, on the contrary, that their true judgment and activity concerning existing things is separated by practice—which philosophy, indeed, I have dared to define as the only truly complete one—I understand him to be introducing very clearly, having declared that it is perfected by word and contemplation, since practice is in every way joined to the word, and the judgment upon it is contained in contemplation, since it is the task of the word to order the movement of the body, as if with some bridle, with right reason, holding back with knowledge the impulse toward absurdity, and it is the task of contemplation to choose and decide prudently what has been well conceived and judged, as if a most brilliant light (14∆_120> showing the truth itself through true knowledge; by both of which especially every philosophical virtue is both created and preserved, by which it is also manifested through the body, though not entirely.

For it is not contained by the body, being an impress of divine power, but certain shadows of it, and this not for its own sake, but so that those bereft of its grace may come to imitate the godlike conduct of God-loving men, so that they too, by partaking of the good and putting away the shame of vice, may become part of the portion of those worthy of God, or so that those who need some help may receive it from those who are able, so that, having accepted the virtuous disposition hidden in the depth of the soul, made manifest through the body in practice, they too may praise the providence of God, which becomes all things to all men and is present to all through all things. For if there were no one who needed to be benefited, or who ought to be formed toward virtue by an example, each one would surely suffice for himself, delighting in the graces of the virtues in the soul. And it is not absurd to say, without the demonstration of these things through the body for the sake of manifestation.

He therefore who has piously understood through contemplation the nature of existing things, and through rational deliberation has thoughtfully and rightly defined the principle concerning them, and keeps for himself the judgment, or rather keeps himself unswerving in the judgment, possesses all virtue brought together, being moved toward nothing else after the truth has been known, and has passed beyond all things with haste, taking absolutely no account of all that belongs to and is spoken of the flesh and the world, already having practice contained in word uncontentiously in his disposition, as one who brings to himself from what is in our power all the best and dispassionate principles of the intellect, according to which all virtue and knowledge exists and subsists, being powers (14∆_122> of the rational soul, needing the body not at all for their existence, but for their manifestation 1109 for the aforementioned reasons not refusing to use it at the proper time. For they say that to the intellect belong, specifically, the conceptions of intelligible things, the virtues, the sciences, the principles of the arts, the faculty of choice, the faculty of deliberation, and generally, judgments, assents, aversions, impulses, and that some belong only to contemplation according to the mind, and others to the scientific power according to the word. And if the saints have preserved their own life, guarded by these things, then this blessed man has comprehensively, through word and contemplation, introduced all the principles according to virtue and knowledge that are encompassed by the saints, through which, attending gnostically to the comprehension of God according to contemplation, they have prudently, according to the word, impressed upon themselves the divine form through the virtues, having thought it by no means necessary to name the practice that is through the body, knowing that it is not productive of virtue, but declarative of it, and a minister only of divine concepts and reasonings.

And so that what is said may become clear in another way, those who have accurately treated the principles of our affairs say that of the rational part, one is contemplative and the other is practical; and the contemplative is that according to the mind, as things are

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λόγῳ καί θεωρίᾳ μόνον πρακτικῆς δίχα τήν κατά Θεόν τῶν μετελθόντων αὐτήν φιλοσοφίαν εἰπεῖν, τοὐναντίον δέ διηρημένην τῇ πράξει τήν ἀληθῆ περί τά ὄντα κρίσιν αὐτῶν καί ἐνέργειαν, ἥν δή φιλοσοφίαν ὄντως πληρεστάτην ἔγωγε τολμήσας μόνην ὁρίζομαι, μάλα σαφῶς εἰσηγεῖσθαι αὐτόν ὑπολαμβάνω, λόγῳ καί θεωρίᾳ κατορθοῦσθαι αὐτήν ἀποφηνάμενον, ὡς τῷ λόγῳ συνημμένης πάντως τῆς πράξεως, καί τῆς ἐπ᾿ αὐτῇ κρίσεως τῇ θεωρίᾳ περιεχομένης, εἴπερ λόγου μέν τό τάσσειν τήν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν, οἷον χαλινῷ τινι τῷ ὀρθῷ λογισμῷ τῆς πρός ἀτοπίαν φορᾶς ἐπιστημόνων ἀναχαιτίζοντος, θεωρίας δέ τό τά καλῶς νοηθέντα τε καί κριθέντα ἐμφρόνως αἱρεῖσθαι ψηφίζεσθαι, οἱονεί φῶς παμφαέστατον (14∆_120> δι᾿ ἀληθοῦς γνώσεως τήν ἀλήθειαν αὐτήν δεικνυούσης· οἷς ἀμφοτέροις μάλιστα καί δημιουργεῖται πᾶσα φιλόσοφος ἀρετή καί φυλάττεται, ὑφ᾿ ὧν καί ἐκφαίνεται διά σώματος οὐχ ὅλη.

Οὐ γάρ χωρεῖται σώματι, χαρακτήρ ὑπάρχουσα θείας δυνάμεως, ἀλλά τινα τῶν αὐτῆς σκιάσματα, καί τοῦτο οὐ δι᾿ ἑαυτήν, διά δέ τό τούς γυμνούς τῆς κατ' αὐτήν χάριτος εἰς μίμησιν ἐλθεῖν τῆς θεοειδοῦς τῶν φιλοθέων ἀνδρῶν ἀναστροφῆς, ἐφ' ᾧ τῇ μετοχῇ τοῦ καλοῦ καί αὐτούς τό τῆς κακίας αἶσχος ἀποθεμένους τῆς τῶν ἀξίων Θεοῦ γενέσθαι μοίρας, ἤ τούς δεομένους ἐπικουρίας τινός ὑπό τῶν δυναμένων τυχεῖν, ἐφ᾿ ᾧ τήν κρυπτομένην τῷ βάθει τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν ἐναρέτων διάθεσιν διά τοῦ σώματος κατά τήν πρᾶξιν φανεῖσαν ἀποδεξαμένους, τήν πᾶσι πάντα γινομένην καί διά πάντων πᾶσι παροῦσαν τοῦ Θεοῦ πρόνοιαν, καί αὐτούς ἀνυμνῆσαι. Ὡς εἴγε μηδείς ἦν ὁ εὖ παθεῖν δεόμενος, ἤ ὁ πρός ἀρετήν παραδείγματι τυπωθῆναι ὀφείλων, αὐτόν ἕκαστον ἀρκεῖν ἑαυτῷ πάντως, ταῖς κατά ψυχήν τῶν ἀρετῶν χάρισιν ἀβρυνόμενον. Καί δίχα τῆς τούτων διά τοῦ σώματος πρός τό ἐμφανές ἀποδείξεως λέγειν οὐκ ἄτοπον.

Ὁ τοίνυν εὐσεβῶς διά θεωρίας κατανοήσας ὡς ἔχει τά ὄντα, καί διά βουλῆς λογικῆς ἐστοχασμένως τε καί ὀρθῶς τόν περί αὐτῶν ὁρισάμενος λόγον, καί φυλάττων ἑαυτῷ τήν κρίσιν, μᾶλλον δέ ἑαυτόν τῇ κρίσει ἀπαρέγκλιτον, πᾶσαν ὁμοῦ συλλαβών ἔχει τήν ἀρετήν, πρός οὐδέν ἄλλο μετά τήν ἐγνωσμένην ἀλήθειαν ἔτι κινούμενος, καί πάντα παρῆλθε διά σπουδῆς, οὐδενός τό παράπαν λόγον ποιούμενος τῶν ὅσα σαρκός καί κόσμου ἐστί καί λέγεται, ἐνδιαθέτως ἔχων ἤδη τῷ λόγῳ περιεχομένην ἀμάχως τήν πρᾶξιν, οἷα τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν πάντας ἑαυτῷ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ τούς κρατίστους ἀπαθεῖς ἐπικομιζομένους λόγους, καθ᾿ οὕς πᾶσα ἀρετή καί γνῶσίς ἐστι καί ὑφέστηκεν, ὡς δυνάμεις (14∆_122> ὄντας ψυχῆς λογικῆς, πρός μέν τό εἶναι σώματος οὐδ᾿ ὅλως χρῄζοντας, πρός δέ τό φανῆναι 1109 διά τάς εἰρημένας αἰτίας κατά καιρόν αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἀναινομένους. Φασί γάρ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ εἶναι, ἰδικῶς μέν τάς νοήσεις τῶν νοητῶν, τάς ἀρετάς, τάς ἐπιστήμας τούς τῶν τεχνῶν λόγους, τό προαιρετικόν, τό βουλευτικόν, γενικῶς δέ τάς κρίσεις, τάς συγκαταθέσεις, τάς ἀποφυγάς, τάς ὁρμάς, καί τάς μέν εἶναι μόνης τῆς κατά νοῦν θεωρίας, τάς δέ τῆς κατά τόν λόγον ἐπιστημονικῆς δυνάμεως. Εἰ δέ τούτοις φρουρουμένην οἱ ἅγιοι τήν οἰκείαν ζωήν συνετήρησαν, ἄρα περιληπτικῶς διά τοῦ λόγου καί τῆς θεωρίας ὁ μακάριος οὗτος ἀνήρ πάντας τούς κατ᾿ ἀρετήν καί γνῶσιν εἰσηγήσατο λόγους τοῖς ἁγίοις συνηνειλημμένους, δι᾿ ὧν τῇ κατανοήσει τοῦ Θεοῦ κατά θεωρίαν γνωστικῶς προσανέχοντες ἐμφρόνως κατά λόγον διά τῶν ἀρετῶν τήν θείαν ἑαυτοῖς μορφήν ἐντυπώσαντο, πάντως οὐκ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον οἰηθείς τήν διά τοῦ σώματος ὀνομάσαι πρᾶξιν, γινώσκων μή ἀρετῆς αὐτήν εἶναι ποιητικήν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκφαντικήν, καί μόνων τῶν θείων νοημάτων τε καί λογισμῶν ὑπουργόν.

Ὡς ἄν δέ καί δι᾿ ἑτέρου τρόπου φανερόν γένηται τό λεγόμενον, φασίν οἱ τῶν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς πραγμάτων δι᾿ ἀκριβείας μετελθόντες τούς λόγους τοῦ λογικοῦ τό μέν εἶναι θεωρητικόν, τό δέ πρακτικόν· καί θεωρητικόν μέν τό κατά νοῦν, ὡς ἔχει τά