Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient; and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-itself, nor the things from which it subsists, being unitary. 128 Every god, being participated in by the nearer things, is participated in immediately; but by the things further off, through certain intermediaries, either fewer or more numerous. For the former, being themselves of a single form through kinship, are able to participate directly in the divine henads; but the latter, on account of their declension and extension into multitude, need others that are more unified in order to participate in what are henads-in-themselves, and not merely unified things. For between the henad and the divided multitude is the unified multitude, able to be conjoined with the henad on account of its unification, but also being somehow akin to the divided multitude on account of the appearance of multitude. 129 Every divine body is divine through a soul that is being deified, and every divine soul is divine through the divine intellect, and every [divine] intellect is so by participation in the divine henad; and the henad is a god in itself, the intellect is most divine, the soul is divine, and the body is godlike. For if the entire number of the gods is beyond intellect, and participations are accomplished through kindred and similar things, then the unparticipated substance will participate first in the superessential henads, secondly, that which borders on generation, and thirdly, generation itself; and each through the things immediately superior to it. And the property of the gods proceeds as far as the last things among the participants, but through intermediaries that are kindred to itself. For the henad first gives to the intellect its own eminent power among the divine things, and makes that intellect such as it is itself in respect of its unitary multitude. And through intellect it is present also to soul, attaching the soul to the intellect and kindling it with fire, if this intellect is participable. And through soul it gives an echo of its own property also to the body, if any body should participate in soul; and thus the body becomes not only ensouled and intellectual, but also divine, having received life and motion from soul, indissoluble permanence from intellect, and a divine unification from the participated henad; for each imparts of its own existence to the things that come after it. 130 Of every divine order, the first members are more greatly transcendent of those ranked immediately under them than these are of their successors; and the second members are exceeded by those immediately superior to them more greatly than are the members after them by these. For by as much as anything is more unitary and more universal, by so much has it obtained a greater superiority in relation to its successors; but by as much as it is inferior in power, by so much is it more connatural with the things after it; and the higher things are more unified with their own causes, while the inferior are less so. For it is a mark of greater power to be more exempt from inferiors and more unified with superiors; just as, on the contrary, to stand further away from the one and to be co-affected with the other, is a diminution of power, which indeed happens to the second members in each order, but not to the first. 131 Every god begins his own proper activity from himself. For he first displays in himself the property of his presence to secondary things; because he indeed imparts of himself to others in virtue of his own superabundance. For neither that which is deficient is proper to the gods, nor that which is merely full. For all that is deficient is imperfect, and it is impossible for it to make another perfect, being itself not perfect; while that which is full is only self-sufficient, and not yet ready for impartation. Therefore, that which fills others must be superabundant and extending its own bounties to others. If, therefore, the divine fills all things from itself with the goods that are in it, each is superabundant; and if this is so, having first established in itself the property of what it gives to others, so it then furnishes to them also the impartations of its superabundant goodness. 132 All the orders of the gods are bound together by mean terms. For all the processions of beings are accomplished through similars; and much more indeed do the dispositions of the gods possess an indissoluble continuity, inasmuch as they have subsisted in a unitary manner and are defined according to the One, their ruling cause. Therefore the declensions occur in a unified manner and more so than according to the similarity in beings of the second to the first, inasmuch as indeed the existence of the gods in the

ταὐτὸν προστησάμενον αὐταρκέστατον· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ θεῖον πᾶν. οὔτε οὖν τῶν ἄλλων δεῖται, αὐτοαγαθότης ὑπάρχον, οὔτε ἐξ ὧν ὑφέστηκεν, ἑνιαῖον ὑπάρχον. 128 Πᾶς θεός, ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἐγγυτέρω μετεχόμενος, ἀμέσως μετέχεται· ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πορρωτέρω, διὰ μέσων ἢ ἐλαττόνων ἢ πλειόνων τινῶν. τὰ μὲν γάρ, διὰ συγγένειαν ἑνοειδῆ καὶ αὐτὰ ὄντα, μετέχειν αὐτόθεν δύναται τῶν θείων ἑνάδων· τὰ δὲ δι' ὕφεσιν καὶ τὴν εἰς πλῆθος ἔκτασιν ἄλλων δεῖται τῶν μᾶλλον ἡνωμένων ἵνα μετά σχῃ τῶν αὐτοενάδων οὐσῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡνωμένων. τῆς γὰρ ἑνάδος μεταξὺ καὶ τοῦ διῃρημένου πλήθους ἐστὶ τὸ ἡνωμένον πλῆθος, συμφύεσθαι μὲν τῇ ἑνάδι δυνάμενον διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, συγγενὲς δέ πως ὂν καὶ τῷ διῃρημένῳ πλήθει διὰ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ἔμφασιν. 129 Πᾶν μὲν σῶμα θεῖον διὰ ψυχῆς ἐστι θεῖον τῆς ἐκθεου μένης, πᾶσα δὲ ψυχὴ θεία διὰ τοῦ θείου νοῦ, πᾶς δὲ νοῦς [θεῖος] κατὰ μέθεξιν τῆς θείας ἑνάδος· καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑνὰς αὐτόθεν θεός, ὁ δὲ νοῦς θειότατον, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ θεία, τὸ δὲ σῶμα θεοειδές. εἰ γὰρ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἐστιν ἅπας ὁ τῶν θεῶν ἀριθμός, αἱ δὲ μεθ έξεις διὰ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐπιτελοῦνται, ἡ μὲν ἀμέριστος οὐσία μεθέξει πρώτως τῶν ὑπερουσίων ἑνάδων, δευτέ ρως δὲ ἡ γενέσεως ἐφαπτομένη, τρίτως δὲ ἡ γένεσις· καὶ ἕκαστα διὰ τῶν προσεχῶς ὑπερκειμένων. καὶ φοιτᾷ μὲν ἄχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσιν ἡ τῶν θεῶν ἰδιότης, διὰ μέσων δὲ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὴν συγγενῶν. ἡ γὰρ ἑνὰς πρώτῳ μὲν τῷ νῷ δίδωσι τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐξαίρετον ἐν τοῖς θείοις δύναμιν, καὶ ἀποτελεῖ κἀκεῖνον τοιοῦτον νοῦν, οἵα ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὴ κατὰ τὸ ἑνιαῖον πλῆ θος. διὰ δὲ νοῦ καὶ ψυχῇ πάρεστι, συνεξάπτουσα κἀκείνην τῷ νῷ καὶ συνεκπυροῦσα, εἰ ὁ νοῦς οὗτος εἴη μεθεκτός. διὰ δὲ ψυχῆς ἀπήχημα τῆς οἰκείας ἰδιότητος καὶ τῷ σώματι δίδωσιν, εἰ μετέχοι τι σῶμα ψυχῆς· καὶ οὕτω γίνεται τὸ σῶμα οὐ μόνον ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῖον, ζωὴν μὲν καὶ κίνησιν λαβὸν παρὰ ψυχῆς, διαμονὴν δὲ ἄλυτον ἀπὸ νοῦ, ἕνωσιν δὲ θείαν ἀπὸ τῆς μετεχομένης ἑνάδος· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὑπάρξεως μεταδίδωσι τοῖς ἐφεξῆς. 130 Πάσης θείας τάξεως τὰ πρῶτα μειζόνως ἐξῄρηται τῶν προσεχῶς ὑπ' αὐτὰ τεταγμένων ἢ ταῦτα τῶν ἐφεξῆς, καὶ μει ζόνως ἐξέχεται τὰ δεύτερα τῶν προσεχῶς ὑπερκειμένων ἢ τούτων τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα. ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν ἑνικώτερον ᾖ τι καὶ ὁλικώτερον, τοσούτῳ καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἔλαχε μείζονα πρὸς τὰ ἐφεξῆς, ὅσῳ δ' ἂν ὑφει μένον κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλόν ἐστι τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸ συμφυέστερον· καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑψηλότερα μᾶλλον ἑνίζεται τοῖς ἑαυτῶν αἰτιωτέροις, τὰ δὲ καταδεέστερα ἧττον. δυνάμεως γάρ ἐστι μείζονος τὸ μᾶλλον ἐξῃρῆσθαι τῶν ὑφειμένων καὶ μᾶλλον ἡνῶσθαι τοῖς κρείττοσιν· ὥσπερ αὖ ἔμπαλιν τὸ τῶν μὲν ἀφί στασθαι μᾶλλον, τοῖς δὲ συμπάσχειν, ἐλάττωσίς ἐστι δυνά μεως, ὃ δὴ συμβαίνει τοῖς δευτέροις καθ' ἑκάστην τάξιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς πρώτοις. 131 Πᾶς θεὸς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῆς οἰκείας ἐνεργείας ἄρχεται. τὴν γὰρ ἰδιότητα τῆς εἰς τὰ δεύτερα παρουσίας ἐν ἑαυτῷ πρῶτον ἐπιδείκνυσι· διότι δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑαυτοῦ μεταδίδωσι, κατὰ τὸ ὑπέρπληρες ἑαυτοῦ. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον οἰκεῖον τοῖς θεοῖς οὔτε τὸ πλῆρες μόνον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐλλεῖπον πᾶν ἀτελὲς ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἄλλο τέλειον ποιεῖν, αὐτὸ μὴ τέλειον ὑπάρχον, ἀμήχανον· τὸ δὲ πλῆρες αὔταρκες μόνον, οὔπω δὲ εἰς μετάδοσιν ἕτοιμον. ὑπέρπληρες ἄρα εἶναι δεῖ τὸ πληρωτικὸν ἄλλων καὶ εἰς ἄλλα διατεῖνον τὰς ἑαυτοῦ χορηγίας. εἰ οὖν τὸ θεῖον ἅπαντα ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πληροῖ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἕκαστον ὑπέρπληρές ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐν ἑαυτῷ πρώτῳ τὴν ἰδιότητα ἱδρυσάμενον ὧν δίδωσι τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὕτω δὴ κἀκείνοις ἐπορέγει τὰς μεταδόσεις τῆς ὑπερπλήρους ἀγαθότητος. 132 Πᾶσαι τῶν θεῶν αἱ τάξεις μεσότητι συνδέδενται. καὶ γὰρ πᾶσαι τῶν ὄντων αἱ πρόοδοι διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀποτε λοῦνται· καὶ πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον αἱ τῶν θεῶν διακοσμήσεις ἀδιά λυτον κέκτηνται τὴν συνέχειαν, ἅτε ἑνοειδῶς ὑφεστηκυῖαι καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἓν ἀφωρισμέναι τὸ ἀρχηγικὸν αὐτῶν αἴτιον. ἡνω μένως οὖν αἱ ὑφέσεις γίνονται καὶ μειζόνως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τῶν δευτέρων πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα ὁμοιότητα, ὅσῳ δὴ καὶ ἡ τῶν θεῶν ὕπαρξις ἐν τῷ