Chapter XXV.—God is Not a Being of Simple Goodness; Other Attributes Belong to Him. Marcion Shows Inconsistency in the Portraiture of His Simply Good and Emotionless God.

As touching this question of goodness, we have in these outlines of our argument shown it to be in no way compatible with Deity,—as being neither natural,316    Ingenitam. In chap. xxii. this word seems to be synonymous with naturalem. Comp. book ii. 3, where it has this sense in the phrase “Deo ingenita.” nor rational, nor perfect, but wrong,317    Improbam. and unjust, and unworthy of the very name of goodness,—because, as far as the congruity of the divine character is concerned, it cannot indeed be fitting that that Being should be regarded as God who is alleged to have such a goodness, and that not in a modified way, but simply and solely. For it is, furthermore, at this point quite open to discussion, whether God ought to be regarded as a Being of simple goodness, to the exclusion of all those other attributes,318    Appendicibus. sensations, and affections, which the Marcionites indeed transfer from their god to the Creator, and which we acknowledge to be worthy characteristics of the Creator too, but only because we consider Him to be God. Well, then, on this ground we shall deny him to be God in whom all things are not to be found which befit the Divine Being. If (Marcion) chose319    Affectavit. to take any one of the school of Epicurus, and entitle him God in the name of Christ, on the ground that what is happy and incorruptible can bring no trouble either on itself or anything else (for Marcion, while poring over320    Ruminans. this opinion of the divine indifference, has removed from him all the severity and energy of the judicial321    Judiciarias vires. character), it was his duty to have developed his conceptions into some imperturbable and listless god (and then what could he have had in common with Christ, who occasioned trouble both to the Jews by what He taught, and to Himself by what He felt?), or else to have admitted that he was possessed of the same emotions as others322    De ceteris motibus. (and in such case what would he have had to do with Epicurus, who was no friend323    Nec necessario. to either him or Christians?). For that a being who in ages past324    Retro. was in a quiescent state, not caring to communicate any knowledge of himself by any work all the while, should come after so long a time to entertain a concern for man’s salvation, of course by his own will,—did he not by this very fact become susceptible of the impulse325    Concussibilis. of a new volition, so as palpably to be open to all other emotions? But what volition is unaccompanied with the spur of desire?326    Concupiscentiæ. Who wishes for what he desires not? Moreover, care will be another companion of the will. For who will wish for any object and desire to have it, without also caring to obtain it? When, therefore, (Marcion’s god) felt both a will and a desire for man’s salvation, he certainly occasioned some concern and trouble both to himself and others. This Marcion’s theory suggests, though Epicurus demurs. For he327    (i.e., Marcion’s god.) raised up an adversary against himself in that very thing against which his will and desire, and care were directed,—whether it were sin or death,—and more especially in their Tyrant and Lord, the Creator of man. Again,328    Porro. nothing will ever run its course without hostile rivalry,329    Æmulatione. which shall not (itself) be without a hostile aspect. In fact,330    Denique. when willing, desiring, and caring to deliver man, (Marcion’s god) already in the very act encounters a rival, both in Him from whom He effects the deliverance (for of course331    Scilicet. he means the liberation to be an opposition to Him), and also in those things from which the deliverance is wrought (the intended liberation being to the advantage of some other things). For it must needs be, that upon rivalry its own ancillary passions332    Officiales suæ. will be in attendance, against whatever objects its emulation is directed: anger, discord, hatred, disdain, indignation, spleen, loathing, displeasure. Now, since all these emotions are present to rivalry; since, moreover, the rivalry which arises in liberating man excites them; and since, again, this deliverance of man is an operation of goodness, it follows that this goodness avails nothing without its endowments,333    Suis dotibus. that is to say, without those sensations and affections whereby it carries out its purpose334    Administratur. against the Creator; so that it cannot even in this be ruled335    Præscribatur. to be irrational, as if it were wanting in proper sensations and affections. These points we shall have to insist on336    Defendemus. much more fully, when we come to plead the cause of the Creator, where they will also incur our condemnation.

CAPUT XXV.

Quod attinet ad bonitatis quaestionem, his lineis deduximus eam minime Deo adaequari, ut neque ingenitam, neque rationalem, neque perfectam; sed et improbam, et injustam, et ipso jam bonitatis nomine indignam: quod scilicet in quantum Deo congruat, in tantum Deum non esse conveniat, qui de tali bonitate etiam perferatur, nec de tali modo, verum et sola. Jam enim et hoc discuti par est, an Deus de sola bonitate censendus sit, negatis caeteris appendicibus , sensibus et affectibus, quos Marcionitae quidem 0276B a deo suo abigunt in Creatorem, nos vero et agnoscimus in Creatore, ut Deo dignos. Et ex hoc quoque negabimus Deum, in quo non omnia quae Deo digna sunt, constent. Si aliquem de Epicuri schola Deum affectavit Christi nomine titulare, ut quod beatum et incorruptibile sit, neque sibi, neque alii molestias praestet (hanc enim sententiam ruminans Marcion, removit ab illo severitates et judiciarias vires) aut in totum immobilem et stupentem Deum concepisse debuerat; et quid illi cum Christo, molesto et Judaeis per doctrinam, et sibi per sensum ? aut et de caeteris motibus eum agnovisse , et quid illi cum Epicuro, nec sibi nec Christianis necessario? Ecce enim hoc ipso quod retro quietus, qui nec notitiam sui aliquo interim opere curaverit, post 0276C tantum aevi senserit in hominis salutem, utique per voluntatem, nonne concussibilis tunc fuit novae voluntati, ut et caeteris motibus videatur obnoxius? Quae autem voluntas sine concupiscentiae stimulo est? Sed et cura accedet voluntati. Quis volet quod non concupiscet? Quis enim volet quid, et concupiscet, et non curabit? Igitur cum et voluit et concupiit in hominis salutem, jam et sibi et aliis negotium fecit, 0277A Epicuro nolente, consiliario Marcione . Nam et adversarium sibi constituit ipsum illud adversus quod et voluit, et concupiit et curavit, sive delictum, sive mortem; imprimis ipsum arbitrum eorum, et dominum hominis Creatorem. Porro, nihil sine aemulatione decurret, quod sine adversario non erit. Denique volens, et concupiscens, et curans hominem liberare, hoc ipso jam aemulatur et eum a quo liberat; adversus eum scilicet sibi liberaturus; et ea de quibus liberat, in alia liberaturus. Proinde enim aemulationi concurrant necesse est officiales suae in ea quae aemulatur, ira, discordia, odium, dedignatio, indignatio, bilis , nolentia, offensa. Haec omnia, si aemulationi adsistunt, aemulatio autem liberando homini procurat; liberatio autem hominis operatio bonitatis 0277B est, non poterit ea bonitas sine suis dotibus, id est sine sensibus est affectibus per quos administratur adversus Creatorem; ne sic quoque inrationalis proscribatur, si careat et sensibus et affectibus debitis. Haec multo plenius defendemus in caussa Creatoris, in qua et exprobrantur.