28

of the blessed Godhead; for on account of its one will, there is also one hypostasis according to Sabellius; and on account of the three persons, there are also three wills; and for this reason three natures, according to Arius, if, indeed, according to the patristic definitions and canons, 0292 the difference of wills and of natures introduces a difference.

15Γ_118 PYR. It is impossible for two wills to coexist in one person without opposition to each other.

MAX. If it is not possible for two wills to be in one and the same person without opposition, then with opposition, according to you, it is possible. And if this is so, you have at least conceded that there are two; and you do not disagree as to the number, but only as to the opposition. Therefore, it remains to seek the cause that produces the conflict. What then do you say this is? Is it the will according to nature, or sin? But if you should say the will according to nature, of this we know no other cause than God; therefore, according to you, God is the creator of the conflict. But if you should say sin; but the incarnate God did not commit sin, nor did he have any opposition whatever in his wills which are according to nature. For if the cause does not exist, clearly the effect will not exist either.

PYR. Is willing, then, of nature? MAX. Yes, to will simply is of nature. PYR. If to will is of nature; but the most renowned of the Fathers have said that there is one will of God and of the saints; and so there will be one nature of the saints and of God. MAX. It was also said above that one who is making an argument about truth must distinguish the meanings of the things being said, because of the error that arises from homonymy. For I myself will ask you in return: did the saints who spoke of one will of God and of the saints say this with respect to the essential and creative will of God, or with respect to the object of will? For the will of the one who wills is not the same as the object of will, just as the sight of the one who sees is not the same as the object of sight; for the one is present in him essentially, while the other happens to be external. But if they spoke with respect to the essential will, they will be found not only to introduce the saints as consubstantial and co-creators with God, but also as contradicting themselves, having stated that things of different essence cannot have a common will. But if 15Γ_120 with respect to the object of will, then it is in a causal sense; or, as some are fond of saying, in an improper sense, the Fathers called the thing willed "will"; and nothing absurd will follow for those who define that simply to will is of nature.

PYR. If we differ by our wills both with respect to ourselves and one another; now, willing this; and now, not willing the same thing; and if this belongs to nature, and to its characteristic principle, we shall be found not only differing from one another in nature, but also changing it infinitely many times.

MAX. To will is not the same as how to will; 0293 just as to see is not the same as how to see. For to will, just as to see, is of nature; and belongs to all who are of the same nature and of the same kind; but how to will, just as how to see, that is, to will to walk, and not to will to walk, and to see to the right, or to the left, or up, or down, or for the sake of desire, or for the comprehension of the principles in existing things, is a mode of using the capacity to will and to see, belonging only to the one who uses it, and separating him from others, according to the commonly spoken of difference. But if we have nature testifying to this, then to will to eat, or not to will to eat; or to will to walk, or not to will; is not a destruction of the natural capacity to will, but of how one wills, that is, it is a coming-to-be and passing-away of the objects of will. For not even if we should suppose that the things that have come-to-be from God, being objects of His will, should pass away, would His essential and creative will, which is preconveived concerning them, pass away along with them.

28

μακαρίας θεότητος· διά μέν τό ἕν αὐτῆς θέλημα, μία καί ἡ ὑπόστασις κατά Σαβέλλιον· διά δέ τά τρία πρόσωπα, τρία καί τά θελήματα· καί διά τοῦτο τρεῖς φύσεις, κατά τόν Ἄρειον, εἴπερ, κατά τούς πατρικούς ὅρους καί κανόνας, 0292 ἡ διαφορά τῶν θελημάτων και φύσεων εἰσάγει διαφοράν.

15Γ_118 ΠΥΡ. Ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐν ἑνί προσώπῳ δύο ἀλλήλοις συνυπάρξαι θελήματα ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως.

ΜΑΞ. Εἰ ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως δύο θελήματα ἐν ἑνί καί τῷ αὐτῷ προσώπῳ εἶναι οὐ δυνατόν, ἄρα μετά ἐναντιώσεως, κατά σέ, δυνατόν. Εἰ δέ τοῦτο, τέως τά δύο εἶναι ὡμολόγησας· καί πρός τόν ἀριθμόν οὐ διαφέρῃ, ἀλλ᾿ ἤ μόνον πρός τήν ἐναντιότητα. Οὐκοῦν λείπεται ζητεῖν τήν ποιητικήν τῆς μάχης αἰτίαν. Ποίαν οὖν ταύτην φῆς; Ἆρα τήν κατά φύσιν θέλησιν, ἤ τήν ἁμαρτίαν; Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν τήν κατά φύσιν εἴπῃς θέλησιν, ταύτης δέ οὐκ ἄλλον ἤ τόν Θεόν γινώσκομεν αἴτιον· ἄρα, κατά σέ, τῆς μάχης δημιουργός ὁ Θεός. Εἰ δέ τήν ἁμαρτίαν· ἁμαρτίαν δέ οὐκ ἐποίησε, οὐδέ τήν οἱανοῦν ἐναντίωσιν ἐν τοῖς κατά φύσιν αὐτοῦ ὁ σαρκωθείς Θεός εἶχε θελήμασι. Τοῦ αἰτίου γάρ οὐκ ὄντος, οὐδέ τό αἰτιατόν προδήλως ἔσται.

ΠΥΡ. Φύσεως οὖν τό θέλειν; ΜΑΞ. Ναί, τό ἁπλῶς θέλειν, φύσεως. ΠΥΡ. Εἰ φύσεως τό θέλειν· οἱ ἐμφανέστεροι δέ τῶν Πατέρων ἕν θέλημα τοῦ

Θεοῦ καί τῶν ἁγίων εἶπον· καί μία φύσις ἔσται οὕτω γε τῶν ἁγίων καί τοῦ Θεοῦ. ΜΑΞ. Καί ἀνωτέρω ἐῤῥέθη, ὅτι δεῖ, τόν περί ἀληθείας λόγον ποιούμενον

διαστέλλεσθαι τῶν λεγομένων τά σημαινόμενα, διά τήν ἐκ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας πλάνην. Ἀντερήσομαι γάρ σε καί αὐτός, ὅτι, οἱ ἕν θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ καί τῶν ἁγίων εἰπόντες ἅγιοι, πρός τό οὐσιῶδες τοῦ Θεοῦ καί δημιουργικόν θέλημα ἀποβλέποντες τοῦτο εἶπον, ἤ πρός τό θελητόν; Οὐ ταὐτόν γάρ τό τοῦ θέλοντος θέλημα, καί τό θελητόν, ὥσπερ οὐδέ τό τοῦ ὁρῶντος ὀπτικόν, καί τό ὁρατόν· τό μέν γάρ οὐσιωδῶς αὐτῷ προσέστι, τό δέ ἐκτός τυγχάνει. Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν πρός τό οὐσιῶδες ἀπιδόντες εἶπον, οὐ μόνον ὁμοφυεῖς καί συνδημιουργούς εἰσάγοντες εὑρεθήσονται τῷ Θεῷ τούς ἁγίους, ἀλλά καί ἑαυτοῖς ἐναντιούμενοι, φύσαντες μή δύνασθαι τά ἑτερούσια κοινόν ἔχειν θέλημα. Εἰ δέ 15Γ_120 πρός τό θελητόν, ἄρα αἰτιολογικῶς· ἤ, ὥς τισι φίλον λέγειν, καταχρηστικῶς, τό θεληθέν θέλημα προσηγόρευσαν οἱ Πατέρες· καί οὐδέν ἕψεται ἄτοπον, τῶν φύσεως εἶναι τό ἁπλῶς θέλειν ὁριζομένων.

ΠΥΡ. Εἰ τοῖς θελήμασι πρός τε ἑαυτούς καί ἀλλήλους διαφέρομεν· νῦν μέν, τοῦτο θέλοντες· νῦν δέ, τό αὐτό οὐ θέλοντες· φύσεως δέ τοῦτο, καί τοῦ αὐτῆς χαρακτηριστικοῦ λόγου, οὐ μόνον τῇ φύσει ἀλλήλων διαφέροντες εὑρεθησόμεθα, ἀλλά καί ἀπειράκις ταύτην μεταβάλλοντες.

ΜΑΞ. Οὐ ταὐτόν τό θέλειν καί τό πῶς θέλειν· 0293 ὥσπερ οὐδέ τό ὁρᾷν καί τό πῶς ὁρᾷν. Τό μέν γάρ θέλειν, ὥσπερ καί τό ὁρᾷν, φύσεως· καί πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοφυέσι καί ὁμογενέσι προσόν· τό δέ πῶς θέλειν, ὥσπερ καί τό πῶς ὁρᾷν, τουτέστι θέλειν περιπατῇσαι, καί μή θέλειν περιπατῇσαι, καί δεξιά ὁρᾷν, ἤ ἀριστερά, ἤ ἄνω , ἤ κάτω, ἤ πρός ἐπιθυμίαν, ἤ κατανόησιν τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι λόγων, τρόπος ἐστί τῆς τοῦ θέλειν καί ὁρᾷν χρήσεως, μόνῳ τῷ κεχριμένῳ προσόν, καί τῶν ἄλλων αὐτόν χωρίζον, κατά τήν κοινῶς λεγομένην διαφοράν. Εἰ δέ τοῦτο μαρτυροῦσαν τήν φύσιν ἔχομεν, ἄρα τό θέλειν φαγεῖν, ἤ μή θέλειν φαγεῖν· ἤ τό θέλειν περιπατῆσαι, ἤ μή θέλειν· οὐ τοῦ πεφυκέναι θέλειν ἐστίν ἀναίρεσις, ἀλλά τοῦ πῶς θέλειν, τουτέστι, τῶν θελητῶν ἐστι γένεσις καί ἀπογένεσις. Οὔτε γάρ, εἰ ὑποθώμεθα τά ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γενόμενα, θελητά αὐτοῦ ὄντα, ἀπογενέσθαι, τούτοις καί τό προεπινοούμενον αὐτῶν, οὐσιῶδες αὐτοῦ καί ποιητικόν θέλημα συναπογενήσεται.