Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately to the completely different processions, but through genera common to both, from which they proceed and of which they are the immediate causes; for these bring the extremes together into one union, being connaturally subordinated to the one, and proximately exalted above the other, and it preserves the well-ordered generation of the divine. 133 Every god is a beneficent henad or a unifying goodness, and possesses this existence insofar as each is a god; but the very first is simply the Good and simply the One, while each of those after the first is a particular goodness and a particular henad. For the divine property has distinguished the henads and the goodnesses of the gods, so that each makes all things good according to some property of goodness, such as perfecting or containing or guarding; for each of these is a particular good, but not the whole good, whose unitary cause the first pre-established; wherefore that one is the Good, as being constitutive of all goodness. For not even all the existences of the gods together are equal to the One; so great a superiority has that one obtained over the multitude of gods. 134 Every divine intellect thinks as an intellect, but provides as a god. For it is the special perfection of the intellect to know beings and to have them in its thoughts; but of the god, to provide and to fill all things with good things. And this participation and fulfillment comes about through a union of the things fulfilled with those before them; which the intellect also, imitating, comes to be the same as the intelligible. Inasmuch, therefore, as it provides, it is a god, since the activity of providence is established before intellect. Wherefore it imparts itself to all things as a god, but it is not present to all things as an intellect; for where the intellectual property does not proceed, thither the divine reaches. For even things that do not think wish to be provided for and to partake of some good; and this is because not all things desire intellect, not even those for which it is possible to participate in it, but all things desire the good and hasten to attain it. 135 Every divine henad is participated in immediately by some one of the beings, and everything that is deified is referred back to one divine henad; and as many as are the participated henads, so many also are the participating genera of beings. For neither are two or more henads participated in by one being (for how, since the properties in them are different, is that which is connatural to each not also different, since the connection comes about through likeness?), nor is one henad participated in by many in a divided way. For the many beings are unconnected to the henad, both as beings to that which is before beings, and as many to a henad; but the participant must be in some way like the participated, and in another way different and unlike. Since, therefore, the participant is some one of the beings, but the henad is super-essential, and in this respect they are unlike, the participant must therefore be one, so that in this respect it may be like the participated one, even if the one is one in such a way as a henad, while the other is one as having been affected by the one and unified through its participation in that. 136 Every god, being more universal and ranked nearer to the first, is participated in by a more universal genus of beings, but being more particular and more remote, by a more particular one; and as being is to being, so is the henad to the divine henad. For if as many as are the beings, so many also are the henads, and vice versa, one being participated in by one, it is clear indeed that according to the order of the henads the order of beings proceeds, being made like to that which is before it, and the more universal beings are connatural with the more universal henads, while the more particular beings are with the more particular henads. For if not, it will again connect the unlike with the unlike, and the distribution according to worth will not exist. But these things are impossible, if indeed for all other things the one and their proper measure shines forth from there and comes from them; much more, therefore, will there be in them an order of participation, attaching the like to the like according to their power. 137 Every henad co-establishes with the One the being that participates in it. For the One, as it is constitutive of all things, is thus also the cause both of the participated henads and of the beings that are suspended from the henads, but that which is suspended from each, the henad that illuminates into it produces; its being simply is from the One's making, but its being connatural is from the

ἡνῶσθαι τῶν ὄντων μᾶλλον ὑφέστηκε. πάντα οὖν τὰ θεῖα γένη συνδέδεται ταῖς οἰκείαις μεσότησι, καὶ οὐκ ἀμέσως ἐπὶ τὰς διαφερούσας πάντῃ προόδους χωρεῖ τὰ πρῶτα, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν ἑκατέροις κοινῶν γενῶν, ἀφ' ὧν τε πρόεισι καὶ ὧν ἐστιν ἀμέσως αἴτια· ταῦτα γὰρ συνάγει τὰ ἄκρα κατὰ μίαν ἕνωσιν, τοῖς μὲν ὑπεστρωμένα συμφυῶς, τῶν δὲ ἐξῃρημένα προσεχῶς, καὶ τὴν εὔτακτον διαφυλάττει τῶν θείων ἀπογέννησιν. 133 Πᾶς μὲν θεὸς ἑνάς ἐστιν ἀγαθουργὸς ἢ ἀγαθότης ἑνοποιός, καὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν ὕπαρξιν καθόσον ἕκαστος θεός· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν πρώτιστος ἁπλῶς τἀγαθὸν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἕν, τῶν δὲ μετὰ τὸν πρῶτον ἕκαστος τὶς ἀγαθότης ἐστὶ καὶ τὶς ἑνάς. ἡ γὰρ ἰδιότης ἡ θεία διέστησε τὰς ἑνάδας καὶ τὰς ἀγαθό τητας τῶν θεῶν, ὥστε ἕκαστον κατά τι τῆς ἀγαθότητος ἰδίωμα πάντα ἀγαθύνειν, οἷον τελεσιουργεῖν ἢ συνέχειν ἢ φρουρεῖν· τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστον τὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶν τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὗ τὴν ἑνιαίαν αἰτίαν τὸ πρῶτον προεστήσατο· διὸ καὶ τἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο, ὡς πάσης ἀγαθότητος ὑποστατικόν. οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ πᾶσαι τῶν θεῶν ὑπάρξεις ἅμα παρισοῦνται τῷ ἑνί· τοσαύτην ἐκεῖνο πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν θεῶν ἔλαχεν ὑπερβολήν. 134 Πᾶς θεῖος νοῦς νοεῖ μὲν ὡς νοῦς, προνοεῖ δὲ ὡς θεός. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ νοῦ τὸ γινώσκειν τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἐν νοήσεσιν ἔχειν τὸ τέλειον ἐξαίρετόν ἐστι· τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τὸ προνοεῖν καὶ ἀγαθῶν πάντα πληροῦν. ἡ δὲ μετάδοσις αὕτη καὶ ἡ πλήρωσις δι' ἕνωσιν γίνεται τῶν πληρουμένων πρὸς τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν· ἣν καὶ ὁ νοῦς μιμούμενος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἔρχεται τοῖς νοητοῖς. ᾗ οὖν προ νοεῖ, θεός, ἐν τῇ πρὸ νοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ τῆς προνοίας ἱσταμένης. διὸ καὶ πᾶσι μὲν ἑαυτοῦ μεταδίδωσιν ὡς θεοῦ, οὐ πᾶσι δὲ πάρ εστιν ὡς νοῦς· καὶ γὰρ ἐφ' ἃ τὸ νοερὸν ἰδίωμα μὴ πρόεισιν, ἐπὶ ταῦτα φθάνει τὸ θεῖον. καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ νοοῦντα προνοεῖσθαι βούλεται καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τινος μεταλαγχάνειν· τοῦτο δὲ διότι νοῦ μὲν οὐ πάντα ἐφίεται, οὐδὲ οἷς μετασχεῖν δυνατόν, τοῦ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ πάντα ἐφίεται καὶ σπεύδει τυχεῖν. 135 Πᾶσα θεία ἑνὰς ὑφ' ἑνός τινος μετέχεται τῶν ὄντων ἀμέσως, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐκθεούμενον εἰς μίαν ἑνάδα θείαν ἀνατεί νεται· καὶ ὅσαι αἱ μετεχόμεναι ἑνάδες, τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ μετέ χοντα γένη τῶν ὄντων. οὔτε γὰρ δύο ἢ πλείους ἑνάδες ὑφ' ἑνὸς μετέχονται (πῶς γάρ, τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ἰδιοτήτων ἐξηλλαγμένων, οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ ἑκάστῃ συμφυόμενον ἐξήλλακται, δι' ὁμοιότητος τῆς συναφῆς γινομένης;) οὔτε μία ἑνὰς ὑπὸ πλειόνων μετέχεται διῃρημένως. ἀσύναπτα γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ ὄντα τῇ ἑνάδι, καὶ ὡς ὄντα τῇ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὡς πολλὰ ἑνάδι· δεῖ δὲ τὸ μετέχον πῇ μὲν ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ μετεχομένῳ, πῇ δὲ ἕτερον καὶ ἀνόμοιον. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ μετέχον τῶν ὄντων τί ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἑνὰς ὑπερούσιος, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνωμοίωνται, ἓν ἄρα εἶναι χρὴ τὸ μετέχον, ἵνα [καὶ] κατὰ τοῦτο ὅμοιον ᾖ τῷ μετεχομένῳ ἑνί, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὲν οὕτως ἓν ὡς ἑνάς, τὸ δὲ ὡς πεπονθὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ ἡνωμένον διὰ τὴν ἐκείνης μέθεξιν. 136 Πᾶς θεὸς ὁλικώτερος μὲν ὑπάρχων καὶ ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ πρώτου τεταγμένος ὑπὸ ὁλικωτέρου γένους τῶν ὄντων μετέχεται, μερικώτερος δὲ καὶ πορρώτερον, ὑπὸ μερικωτέρου· καὶ ὡς τὸ ὂν πρὸς τὸ ὄν, οὕτως ἡ ἑνὰς πρὸς τὴν ἑνάδα τὴν θείαν. εἰ γὰρ ὅσα τὰ ὄντα, τοσαῦται καὶ αἱ ἑνάδες, καὶ ἔμπαλιν, μιᾶς ὑφ' ἑνὸς μετεχομένης, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἑνάδων τάξιν ἡ τῶν ὄντων πρόεισι τάξις, ὁμοιουμένη τῇ πρὸ αὐτῆς, καὶ ταῖς μὲν ὁλικωτέραις τὰ ὁλικώτερα συμφύεται, ταῖς δὲ μερι κωτέραις ἑνάσι τὰ μερικώτερα ὄντα. εἰ γὰρ μή, πάλιν τὰ ἀνόμοια τοῖς ἀνομοίοις συνάψει, καὶ ἡ κατ' ἀξίαν διανομὴ οὐκ ἔσται. ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατα, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιλάμπεται καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνων ἐφήκει· πολλῷ δὴ οὖν μᾶλλον ἐν αὐτοῖς τάξις ἔσται τῆς μεθέξεως, τὰ ὅμοια κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν ὁμοίων ἐξάπτουσα. 137 Πᾶσα ἑνὰς συνυφίστησι τῷ ἑνὶ τὸ μετέχον αὐτῆς ὄν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕν, ὡς πάντων ἐστὶν ὑποστατικόν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἑνάδων τῶν μετεχομένων καὶ τῶν ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς ἑνάδας ἀνηρτημένων αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ ἑκάστης ἐξημμένον ἡ ἑνὰς ἡ εἰς αὐτὸ ἐλλάμπουσα παράγει· ἁπλῶς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ ἑνὸς ποιοῦντος, τὸ δὲ συμφυὲς εἶναι τῆς