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has something to be rejected, but just as having become in flesh he was not defiled, so also having received the mind, he was not altered into change. But again I will take up the same argument, setting forth his saying word for word.

Therefore, he says, the human race is not saved by the assumption of a mind and of a whole man, but by the assumption of flesh, for which it is natural to be led; and it needed an immutable mind not subject to it through weakness of knowledge, but joining it to itself without compulsion. Who does not know that that which is in need of the one who is without need is entirely different in nature, and that which is naturally led is likewise different in the principle of its being from that which by nature has the rule, just as the nature of irrational creatures was made to be subject to that of men, and man has dominion over the irrational not as something acquired, but as his own? If, therefore, it is natural for the flesh to be led, as Apollinarius says, and the divine is by nature what leads, how does he who grants these things define that both are one in nature from the beginning, when it is 3,1.196 manifest to all that the principle of the one that is subject is different from that of the one who presides, and that which is naturally guided is one thing, and again, that for which it is natural to lead is another? If, therefore, the nature of one of these is seen in opposite properties, I mean that of the flesh and that of the divinity, how are the two natures one? And how does he fashion in his argument a certain divine and heavenly flesh, or rather pre-enflesh the Word himself, not as one who in the economy in the last days assumed our form, but as being this always and always remaining in the same state? For he who says that the flesh is in need of the immutable and requires a guide is speaking plainly of our flesh, which on account of the mutability of its nature fell into sin. But if, as he says, a certain super-heavenly and divine body is contemplated around the Word, he by no means consequently attributes to it either mutability or the need of one to direct it; and this is not our argument but that of the divine voice, which said that those who are healthy have no need of a physician, but those who are sick. For in heaven the sickness of sin does not exist, but it is we who have sickened with sin, who have become weak through the reception of evil, we who, because we have turned to evil, have needed the immutable; we who have wandered from the saving way have come to be in need of a guide to the good; so that if the writer bears witness to these truths concerning the flesh of the Lord, that it is naturally led and needs an immutable guide, he is in his argument interpreting nothing other than our own constitution. But if he defines the divinity in the flesh, and the divine, as long as it is what it is called, has no need of another to guide it (for it does not admit of a turn and change for the worse), then the things he has now said about the flesh have been stitched together 3,1.197 in vain; for if this is divine, it is clear that it is also immutable; but if it is mutable, it is certainly not divine.

Who, then, could recount this confused and inconsistent myth of dogmas, never resting on the same foundation but, like dream-phantoms, appearing different at different times? Now he says the flesh of the Word is divine and co-eternal, again that it is acquired and assumed, then that it has a nature foreign [as] to our own, the passible and mortal one, again that it is in need of one to direct it and is liable to the passion of change and alteration; and for this reason he makes it mindless, so that it may be healed by the divinity, as if considering the mind an obstacle to the divine care for men, and the mindless more dear to God. Therefore, he thinks it is more blessed not to have a mind, if, as he says, what is mindless is assumed by God. Why then does he not correct Solomon, who says: But the intelligent man will acquire governance? For I do not think any other governance is spoken of here by the proverbial enigma, than our nature, which has been storm-tossed and shipwrecked in wickedness, by the supervision of the true pilot to the

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ἀπόβλητον ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενος οὐκ ἐμολύνθη, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸν νοῦν παραδεξάμενος εἰς τροπὴν ἠλλοιώθη. πάλιν δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ὑπολήψομαι λόγον ἐκθέμενος τὴν ῥῆσιν αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ λέξεως.

Οὐκ ἄρα, φησί, σῴζεται τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος δι' ἀναλήψεως νοῦ καὶ ὅλου ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ διὰ προσλήψεως σαρκός, ᾗ φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ ἡγεμονεύεσθαι· ἐδεῖτο δὲ ἀτρέπτου νοῦ μὴ ὑποπίπτοντος αὐτῇ διὰ ἐπιστημοσύνης ἀσθένει αν, ἀλλὰ συναρμόζοντος αὐτὴν ἀβιάστως ἑαυτῷ. τίς οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι τὸ δεόμενον τοῦ ἀνενδεοῦς ἕτερον τῇ φύσει πάντως ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς ἡγεμονεύεσθαι τοῦ ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸ ἄρχειν ἔχοντος ὁμοίως κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς οὐσίας παρήλ λακται, ὡς ἡ τῶν ἀλόγων φύσις ὑποχειρίως ἔχειν τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατεσκευάσθη καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐπίκτητον τὴν κατὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ἀρχὴν ἀλλ' οἰκείαν ἔχει; εἰ οὖν φυσικὸν τῇ σαρκὶ τὸ ἡγεμονεύεσθαι, καθώς φησιν ὁ Ἀπολινάριος, ἡγεμονικὸν δὲ τῇ φύσει τὸ θεῖον, πῶς ὁ ταῦτα διδοὺς ἓν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶναι τὰ ἀμφότερα τῇ φύσει διορίζεται, πᾶσιν ὄντος 3,1.196 προδήλου, ὅτι ἕτερος τοῦ ὑποχειρίου καὶ ἄλλος τοῦ ἐπιστα τοῦντος ὁ λόγος καὶ ἄλλο τὸ πεφυκὸς ὁδηγεῖσθαι καὶ ἕτερον πάλιν, ᾧ φύσις τὸ ἡγεμονεύειν ἐστίν; εἰ οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἰδιώμασιν ἡ θατέρου τούτων θεωρεῖται φύσις, τῆς σαρκὸς λέγω καὶ τῆς θεότητος, πῶς μία αἱ δύο φύσεις εἰσίν; πῶς δὲ θείαν τινὰ καὶ οὐρανίαν σάρκα περιπλάσσει τῷ λόγῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτὸν προαποσαρκοῖ τὸν λόγον, οὐκ οἰκονομικῶς ἐπ' ἐσχάτων ἡμερῶν τὴν ἡμετέραν ὑπελθόντα μορφήν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοῦτο ὄντα καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ διαμένοντα; ὁ γὰρ ἐπιδεᾶ λέγων εἶναι τοῦ ἀτρέπτου τὴν σάρκα καὶ τοῦ καθηγουμένου προσδέεσθαι, τὴν ἡμετέραν ἄντικρυς λέγει σάρκα τὴν διὰ τὸ τρεπτὸν τῆς φύσεως εἰς ἁμαρτίαν πεσοῦσαν. εἰ δὲ ὑπερ ουράνιόν τι καὶ θεῖον σῶμα, καθώς φησι, θεωρεῖται περὶ τὸν λόγον, οὔτε τὸ τρεπτὸν αὐτῷ πάντως κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον δίδωσιν οὔτε τὸ ἐπιδεὲς τοῦ εὐθύνοντος· καὶ οὗτος οὐχ ἡμέτερος ἀλλὰ τῆς θείας φωνῆς ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ὁ εἰπὼν μὴ δεῖσθαι τοὺς ὑγιαίνοντας ἰατροῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς κακῶς ἔχοντας. ἐν γὰρ τῷ οὐρανῷ ἡ ἐξ ἁμαρτίας νόσος οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς μὲν οἱ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν νοσήσαντες, οἱ διὰ τῆς τοῦ κακοῦ παραδοχῆς ἀσθενήσαντες, ἡμεῖς διὰ τὸ τραπῆναι πρὸς τὸ κακὸν τοῦ ἀτρέπτου προσεδεήθημεν, οἱ τῆς σῳζούσης ἀπο πλανηθέντες ὁδοῦ τοῦ καθηγουμένου πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν χρείᾳ γεγόναμεν· ὥστε εἰ ἀληθῆ ταῦτα τῇ περὶ τὸν κύριον σαρκὶ προσμαρτυρεῖ ὁ λογογράφος, ὅτι καὶ πέφυκεν ἡγεμο νεύεσθαι καὶ ἀτρέπτου τοῦ καθηγουμένου χρῄζει, οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ τὸ ἡμέτερον σύγκριμα διερμηνεύει τῷ λόγῳ. εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ὁρίζεται τὴν θεότητα, τὸ δὲ θεῖον, ἕως ἂν ᾖ τοῦτο, ὃ λέγεται, ἄλλου τοῦ ὁδηγοῦντος οὐκ ἐπιδέεται (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται τὴν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον τροπὴν καὶ ἀλλοίωσιν), μάτην οὖν αὐτῷ τὰ περὶ τῆς σαρκὸς νῦν εἰρημένα διερραψῴ 3,1.197 δηται· εἰ γὰρ θεία τις αὕτη, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἄτρεπτος· εἰ δὲ τρεπτή, πάντως οὐ θεία.

Τίς ἂν οὖν διεξέλθοι τὸν συγκεχυμένον τοῦτον καὶ ἀσύ στατον τῶν δογμάτων μῦθον μηδέποτε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ βαίνοντα ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐνυπνίους φαντασίας ἄλλοτε ἄλλον φαινόμενον; νῦν μέν φησι θείαν εἶναι τὴν σάρκα τοῦ λόγου καὶ συναΐδιον, πάλιν ἐπίκτητον καὶ προσειλημμένην, εἶτα ἀλλοτρίως [ὡς] πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν ἔχουσαν φύσιν, τὴν παθητὴν καὶ ἐπίκηρον, πάλιν ἐπιδεᾶ τοῦ εὐθύνοντος καὶ τῷ κατὰ τροπήν τε καὶ ἀλλοίωσιν πάθει ἐνεχομένην· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὴν ἄνουν ποιεῖ, ἵνα ἰατρευθῇ τῇ θεότητι ὥσπερ ἐμπόδιον ἡγούμενος τὸν νοῦν τῆς θείας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων κηδε μονίας καὶ προσφιλέστερον τῷ θεῷ τὸ ἀνόητον. οὐκοῦν μα καριστότερον οἴεται τὸ νοῦν μὴ ἔχειν, εἴπερ προσλαμβάνεται, καθώς φησιν οὗτος, παρὰ θεοῦ τὸ ἀνόητον. τί οὖν οὐ διορθοῦ τὸν Σολομῶντα, ὅς φησιν· Ὁ δὲ νοήμων κυβέρνησιν κτήσεται; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλην οἶμαι τὴν κυβέρνησιν ἐνταῦθα παρὰ τοῦ παροιμιακοῦ αἰνίγματος λέγεσθαι, εἰ μὴ τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν τὴν ἐν κακίᾳ χειμασθεῖσαν καὶ ναυαγήσασαν, τῇ ἐπιστασίᾳ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ κυβερνήτου πρὸς τὸν