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17.t Chapter 17. That he who is deficient in even one of the virtues is imperfect with respect to the good.

17.1 If, then, these things are so, the habit of the many must be corrected as far as possible; all those who strongly fight against the more shameful pleasures, but otherwise hunt for pleasure in honors and love of power, doing something similar to a servant who does not strive to get out of servitude, but changes his owners, thinking the exchange of masters is freedom—for all are equally slaves, even if they are not ruled by the same ones, so long as some ruling power with dominion prevails over them-. There are again others who, by their great battle against pleasures, have somehow become easily conquered by the opposite passion, and in the intense strictness of their life, by griefs and irritations and resentments and all the rest, which are set against the passion of pleasure, they are both easily captured and with difficulty escape. And this happens when not the reason of virtue, but some passion, governs the course of life. 17.2 "For the commandment of the Lord is exceedingly bright," as the Scripture says, so as to "enlighten the eyes" even of infants, saying it is "good to cleave to God" alone. But God is neither grief nor pleasure nor cowardice or rashness or fear or anger or any other such passion that rules the uninstructed soul, but, as the Apostle says, wisdom itself and sanctification, and truth and joy and peace and all such things. How then is it possible for one who is overcome by the opposites to cleave to the one who is these things? Or how is it not irrational for one who is zealous not to be subjected to one of the passions to consider its opposite a virtue? for example, for one fleeing pleasure to be held by grief, for one avoiding the rash and reckless to humble the soul with cowardice, or for one who has been zealous to remain unconsumed by anger to be cowering in fear. For what difference does it make to fall away from virtue in this way or another, or rather, to be outside of God himself, who is perfect virtue? For in the case of the sicknesses of the body, one would not say the evil differs whether one is destroyed by excessive lack or by immoderate fullness, since the lack of measure in both cases ends in the same limit. Therefore, he who cares for the life and health of the soul will keep himself in the middle of passionlessness, remaining unmixed and without part in the opposition lying on either side of virtue. The word is not mine, but of the divine voice itself; for the doctrine of the Lord's teaching may be clearly heard, in which he teaches the disciples, as lambs living among wolves, not to be doves only, but also to have something of the serpent in their character. And this is not to practice to an extreme what seems praiseworthy among men according to simplicity, since such a state approaches extreme foolishness; nor again, on the other hand, to consider the cleverness and craftiness praised by the many an unmixed and pure virtue; but from the seeming opposition to produce a certain blended state of character, having cut off from the one its foolishness, and from the other its wisdom in evil, so that from both one good practice might be accomplished, blended with simplicity of mind and sagacity. "For," he says, "be wise as serpents and innocent as doves."

18.t Chapter 18. That all the powers of the soul must look to virtue.

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17.t Κεφάλαιον ιζʹ Ὅτι ἀτελὴς εἰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὁ καὶ ἑνί τινι τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐλλείπων.

17.1 Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, διορθωτέον ὡς οἷόν τε τῶν πολλῶν τὴν

συνήθειαν· ὅσοι πρὸς μὲν τὰς αἰσχροτέρας τῶν ἡδονῶν ἰσχυρῶς ἀπομάχονται, ἄλλως δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν τιμαῖς καὶ φιλαρχίαις θηρεύουσι, παραπλήσιον ποιοῦντες ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις οἰκέτης μὴ ὅπως ἔξω τῆς δουλείας γενήσεται σπεύδοι, ἀλλ' ἐναμείβοι τοὺς κεκτημένους, τὴν ἐναλλαγὴν τῶν κυριευόντων ἐλευθερίαν οἰόμενος-δοῦλοι γάρ εἰσιν ἐπίσης πάντες, κἂν μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν κυριεύωνται, ἕως ἂν ὅλως ἐπικρατῇ τις αὐτῶν μετὰ δυναστείας ἀρχή-. Εἰσὶ δὲ πάλιν οἳ τῇ πολλῇ πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς μάχῃ εὐκαταγώνιστοί πως τῷ ἀντικειμένῳ πάθει γεγόνασι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐπιτεταμένῃ τῆς ζωῆς ἀκριβείᾳ λύπαις καὶ παροξυσμοῖς καὶ μνησικακίαις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσιν, ὅσα πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν πάθους ἀντικαθέστηκεν, εὐκόλως τε ἁλίσκονται καὶ δυσχερῶς διεκδύνουσι· τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν μὴ ὁ λόγος ὁ κατ' ἀρετήν, ἀλλά τι πάθος τῆς κατὰ τὸν βίον πορείας ἡγεμονεύῃ. 17.2 «Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐντολὴ τοῦ κυρίου σφόδρα τηλαυγής», κα θώς φησιν ἡ γραφή, ὡς καὶ νηπίων «ὀφθαλμοὺς φωτίσαι», μόνῳ «τῷ θεῷ προσκολλᾶσθαι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι» λέγουσα. Ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὔτε λύπη ἐστὶν οὔτε ἡδονὴ οὔτε δειλία ἢ θράσος ἢ φόβος ἢ ὀργὴ ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον πάθος, ὃ τῆς ἀπαιδεύτου κυριεύει ψυχῆς, ἀλλ', ὥς φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος, αὐτοσοφία καὶ ἁγιασμός, ἀλήθειά τε καὶ χαρὰ καὶ εἰρήνη καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. Πῶς οὖν ἔστι τῷ ταῦτα ὄντι προσκολληθῆναι τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων κρατούμενον; Ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἄλογον τὸν ἔν τινι τῶν παθῶν ὅπως μὴ ὑπαχθῇ σπουδάζοντα ἀρετὴν νομίζειν τὸ ἀντικείμενον; οἷον ἡδονὴν μὲν φεύγοντα λύπῃ κατέ χεσθαι, τὸ δὲ θρασὺ καὶ προπετὲς διακλίνοντα δειλίᾳ ταπεινοῦν τὴν ψυχήν, ἢ θυμοῖς ἀνάλωτον μένειν ἐσπου δακότα κατεπτηχέναι τῷ φόβῳ. Τί γὰρ διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκπεσεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ ἔξω γενέσθαι, ὅς ἐστιν ἡ παντελὴς ἀρετή; Καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρρωστημάτων οὐκ ἂν διαφέρειν τὸ κακόν τις εἴποι δι' ὑπερβαλλούσης ἐνδείας ἢ ἀπὸ πλησμονῆς ἀμέτρου διαφθαρῆναι, εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πέρας τῆς ἀμετρίας ἐν ἑκατέροις ληγούσης. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν ζωῆς τε καὶ ὑγείας ἐπιμελούμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου τῆς ἀπαθείας ἑαυτὸν τηρήσει, ἀμιγὴς καὶ ἀμέτοχος διαμένων τῆς ἑκατέ ρωθεν τῇ ἀρετῇ παρακειμένης ἐναντιότητος. Οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' αὐτῆς τῆς θείας φωνῆς· τὸ δόγμα φανερῶς γὰρ τῆς τοῦ κυρίου διδασκαλίας ἔστιν ἀκοῦσαι, ἐν οἷς διδάσκει τοὺς μαθητάς, ὡς ἄρνας λύκοις συναναστρεφομένους, μὴ περιστερὰς εἶναι μόνον, ἀλλ' ἔχειν τι καὶ τοῦ ὄφεως ἐν τῷ ἤθει. Τοῦτο δέ ἐστι μὴ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἁπλότητα δοκοῦν ἐπαινετὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰς ἄκρον ἐπιτηδεύειν, ὡς τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἀνοίᾳ τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως πλησιαζούσης· μηδ' αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἐπαινουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν δεινότητα καὶ πανουργίαν ἀμιγῆ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ ἄκρατον ἀρετὴν νομίζειν· ἐκ δὲ τῆς δοκούσης ἐναντιότητος μίαν τινὰ συγκεκραμένην ἤθους κατάστασιν ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τῆς μὲν τὸ ἀνόητον, τῆς δὲ τὸ ἐν πονηρίᾳ σοφὸν περικόψαντας, ὡς ἐξ ἑκατέρων ἓν ἀποτελεσθῆναι καλὸν ἐπιτήδευμα ἁπλό τητι γνώμης καὶ ἀγχινοίᾳ συγκεκραμένον. «Γίνεσθε γάρ», φησί, «φρόνιμοι ὡς οἱ ὄφεις καὶ ἀκέραιοι ὡς αἱ περιστε ραί.»

18.t Κεφάλαιον ιηʹ Ὅτι χρὴ πάσας τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις πρὸς

ἀρετὴν βλέπειν.