30

directed to the harbor of the divine will. If therefore man is saved in mindlessness, how will the one with a mind acquire governance? To what by nature would the divine be more akin? To what does reason suppose the divine nature to be more suitably disposed? The flesh is something thick and resistant and is akin to the earthy nature, but the intellect is something intellectual, invisible, and unformed. Which of these would be found more akin to be joined to God, the thick and earthy or the intangible and unformed? But how is flesh joined to God, as he says, without compulsion, it which partakes of pure virtue? 3,1.198 For who does not know that virtue is an achievement of choice? But the flesh is an instrument of choice, subject to the impulse of the intellect, being moved toward whatever the mover leads it. And choice is nothing other than a certain mind and a disposition toward something. If, therefore, he says that man partakes of pure virtue, in whom there is no mind, what would that be which voluntarily receives virtue? Unless perhaps the writer means that what is compelled is uncompelled. For when the body comes to be outside the activities of wickedness without the mind assenting to the preferable inclination, what is rightly done will be the work of necessity, not of choice; but he who chooses the good through the judgment of his reasonings is superior to all necessity and force, having from within himself the inclination toward what is better. How then does the writer attest to the uncompelled for that which is without choice, which no particular reasoning has led to the good? For what is sinless not by choice is not at all praiseworthy, or in this way we will also praise those who are prevented from doing evil by bonds, whom the bond, not their will, keeps from evil actions.

But the Godhead, he says, brings the flesh to itself without compulsion; by 'without compulsion' he clearly means 'voluntarily'. How then could anyone be brought to virtue as a volunteer, not possessing a will of his own? For to choose and to will and the selection of what is advantageous and the rejection of what is harmful, all these things belong to the intellect; but to use the intellect is not a characteristic of the mindless. If, therefore, the flesh is appropriated to God without compulsion, it is testified by them through the writer that the flesh is not without choice nor does it act without judgment and unexaminedly concerning what is profitable; and such a thing one would not call irrationality. For how could reason exist in the irrational? So that through what he says 3,1.199 he agrees not only that mind is in man, but that it is even superior to others. For the voluntary and uncompelled impulse toward the good becomes a testimony of the perfection of the mind. And that the appropriation to what is better is a work of the intellect is shown especially through the things said next, which are literally as follows: For, he says, imparting pure virtue to every mind subject to him. If therefore he beholds the purity of virtue in the mind, how does he banish from that flesh the mind, in which he sees the purity? For it is necessary that his argument has failed in one of two ways, either that virtue is partaken of by the mind or that the flesh which was brought to virtue without compulsion is mindless. But as for the things he added which are stumbling and inconsistent, I think it superfluous to examine them, being of this sort: And to all, he says, who are made like Christ intellectually and not made unlike him carnally—for what does this nauseating statement mean? Let the admirers of this deceit teach us; but let us proceed to the next parts of his argument. And if God, he says, were united to a man, a perfect to a perfect, there would have been two, one a son of God by nature, and the other by adoption. I would gladly learn from those who have been taught such things, who call the mindful and perfect man an adopted son, what they would call the mindless man—for this is surely what they name the one who does not have a mind. For the only-begotten God, being himself in himself complete and perfect, has the title of true Son, his nature verifying the name. But what name does the addition of the incomplete man have? For if the perfect man

30

λιμένα τοῦ θείου θελήματος εὐθυνομένην. εἰ οὖν ἐν τῇ ἀνοίᾳ ὁ ἄνθρωπος σῴζεται, πῶς ὁ νοήμων κυβέρνησιν κτήσεται; τίνι δ' ἂν οἰκειότερον [ἐν] φύσει εἴη τὸ θεῖον; πρὸς τί μᾶλλον καταλλή λως ἔχειν τὴν θείαν φύσιν ὁ λογισμὸς ὑποτίθεται; παχεῖά τις καὶ ἀντιτυπής ἐστιν ἡ σὰρξ καὶ πρὸς τὴν γεώδη φύσιν συγγενῶς ἔχει, νοερὸν δέ τι καὶ ἀφανὲς καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον ἡ διάνοια. τί ἂν μᾶλλον οἰκειότερον εὑρεθείη ἐκ τούτων πρὸς τὸ συναρμοσθῆναι θεῷ, τὸ παχὺ καὶ γεῶδες ἢ τὸ ἀναφές τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον; πῶς δὲ συναρμόζεται τῷ θεῷ σάρξ, ὥς φησιν, ἀβιάστως ἡ μεταλαμβάνουσα τῆς καθαρᾶς ἀρετῆς; 3,1.198 τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι ἀρετὴ προαιρέσεώς ἐστι κατόρθωμα; ἡ δὲ σὰρξ ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς προαιρέσεως, τῇ ὁρμῇ τῆς δια νοίας ἐγκείμενον, πρὸς ὅπερ ἂν ὁ κινῶν ἄγῃ, πρὸς τοῦτο μετατιθέμενον. ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις οὐδὲν ἕτερον εἰ μὴ νοῦς τίς ἐστι καὶ πρός τι διάθεσις. εἰ οὖν μεταλαμβάνειν φήσει τὸν ἄνθρωπον καθαρᾶς ἀρετῆς, ἐν ᾧ νοῦς οὐκ ἔστι, τὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἑκουσίως ὑποδεχόμενον τί ἂν εἴη; εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ βεβιασμένον ἀβίαστον ὁ λογογράφος νοεῖ. ὅταν γὰρ μὴ τοῦ νοῦ συντιθεμένου τῇ προτιμοτέρᾳ ῥοπῇ ἔξω τῶν κατὰ κακίαν ἐνεργημάτων τὸ σῶμα γένηται, ἀνάγκης ἔργον, οὐ προαιρέ σεως ἔσται τὸ κατορθούμενον· ὁ δὲ διὰ τῆς τῶν λογισμῶν ἐπικρίσεως τὸ ἀγαθὸν προαιρούμενος κρείττων πάσης ἀνάγ κης καὶ βίας ἐστὶν οἴκοθεν ἔχων τὴν πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ῥοπήν. πῶς οὖν τῷ ἀπροαιρέτῳ ὁ λογογράφος μαρτυρεῖ τὸ ἀβίαστον, οὗ μηδεὶς λογισμὸς ἴδιος πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καθηγήσατο; τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐκ προαιρέσεως ἀναμάρτητον οὐδὲ ἐπαινετόν ἐστι πάν τως, ἢ οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ δεσμῶν πρὸς κακουργίαν κωλυο μένους ἐπαινεσόμεθα, οὓς ἀφίστησι τῆς τῶν κακῶν ἐνεργείας ὁ δεσμός, οὐχ ἡ γνώμη.

Ἀλλ' ἀβιάστως, φησί, τὴν σάρκα ἡ θεότης προσάγεται· τὸ ἀβίαστον δηλαδὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον λέγει. πῶς οὖν ἄν τις ἐθελοντὴς τῇ ἀρετῇ προσαχ θείη, θέλημα οἰκεῖον μὴ κεκτημένος; τὸ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ ἡ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐκλογὴ καὶ ἡ τοῦ βλά πτοντος ἀποβολή, ταῦτα πάντα διανοίας ἐστί· τὸ δὲ δια νοεῖσθαι τῶν ἀνοήτων οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ οὖν ἀβιάστως τῷ θεῷ προσοικειοῦται ἡ σάρξ, μαρτυρεῖται παρὰ τούτων διὰ τοῦ λογογράφου μὴ ἀπροαίρετος εἶναι ἡ σὰρξ μηδὲ ἀκρίτως τε καὶ ἀνεπισκέπτως τοῦ λυσιτελοῦντος ἔχειν· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἄν τις ἀλογίαν εἴποι. πῶς γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ὁ λόγος; ὥστε οὐ μόνον εἶναι τὸν νοῦν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δι' 3,1.199 ὧν λέγει συντίθεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι. ἡ γὰρ ἑκούσιός τε καὶ ἀβίαστος πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὁρμὴ μαρτυρία τῆς τοῦ νοῦ τελειότητος γίνεται. καὶ ὅτι διανοίας ἐστὶν ἡ πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον οἰκείωσις, διὰ τῶν ἐφεξῆς εἰρημένων μάλιστα δείκνυται, οὑτωσὶ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐχόντων· Μεταδιδόντος γάρ, φησί, τῆς καθαρᾶς ἀρετῆς παντὶ τῷ ὑποχειρίῳ νοῦ. εἰ οὖν ἐν τῷ νῷ θεωρεῖ τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς καθα ρότητα, πῶς ἐξοικίζει τῆς σαρκὸς ἐκείνης τὸν νοῦν, ἐν ᾗ τὴν καθαρότητα βλέπει; ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἓν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων διημαρτῆ σθαι τῷ λόγῳ, ἢ τὸ μεθεκτὴν εἶναι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ τὸ ἄνουν εἶναι τὴν σάρκα τὴν ἀβιάστως τῇ ἀρετῇ προσαχθεῖσαν. Ὅσα δὲ προσέθηκε κατὰ τὸ ἀπρόσκολλόν τε καὶ ἀνακό λουθον, περιττὸν οἶμαι διεξετάζειν τοῦτον ἔχοντα τὸν τρόπον· Καὶ πᾶσι, φησί, τοῖς νοερῶς ὁμοιουμένοις Χριστῷ καὶ μὴ σαρκικῶς ἀνομοιουμένοις, τί γὰρ βούλεται ἡ τῶν εἰρημένων ναυτία, διδασκέτωσαν ταῦτα οἱ θαυμασταὶ τῆς ἀπάτης· ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐφεξῆς τοῦ λόγου προέλθωμεν. Καὶ εἰ ἀνθρώπῳ, φησί, συνήφθη ὁ θεός, τέλειος τελείῳ, δύο ἂν ἦσαν, εἷς μὲν φύσει υἱὸς θεοῦ, εἷς δὲ θετός. ἡδέως ἂν μάθοιμι παρὰ τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα πεπαιδευμένων, οἳ τὸν ἔννουν καὶ τέλειον ἄνθρω πον υἱὸν θετὸν λέγουσι, τὸν ἀνόητον ἄνθρωπονοὕτω γὰρ πάντως τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα νοῦν ὀνομάζουσιτί προσεροῦσιν; ὁ γὰρ μονογενὴς θεὸς αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀνελλιπὴς καὶ τέλειος ὢν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίαν ἔχει ἐπαληθευούσης τὴν κλῆσιν τῆς φύσεως· ἡ δὲ προσθήκη τοῦ ἡμιτελοῦς ἀνθρώπου ποῖον ὄνομα ἔχει; εἰ γὰρ ὁ τέλειος ἄνθρωπος