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in a vessel, as we say the jar has wine, -or as a possession; for we say we have a house or a field, and we say we have a wife, and the wife has a husband. But this manner seems to be foreign to 'having', since it is convertible; for the husband having a wife means nothing more than the wife having a husband, for neither dominates the other, but perhaps they have indifferently. And if the owner has a possession and the possession an owner and it is convertible, still it is not as a husband a wife and a wife a husband; for the owner is sovereign and most master of the possession, and for this reason the owner is rather said to have, but the possession to be had. And it is clear that 'to have' is one of the homonyms. Some say the same distinctions of 'to have' as of 'to act' and 'to be acted upon'; for as things that act and are acted upon are either animate or inanimate, so also here that which has and that which is had is either animate or inanimate. How then will there be the same distinctions for different genera? But one can say that what is had is either on the whole body or on a part, and again this is either for defense or for adornment. 64 Concerning declaration, both denial and affirmation. It is necessary to know that affirmation and denial are called declaration. Affirmation, then, is that which signifies what belongs to something, that is, what someone is; for example "Socrates is wise," "Socrates walks." Denial is that which declares what does not belong to something, or what someone is not, for example "so-and-so is not wise," "so-and-so does not walk." And since to every affirmation a denial is opposed and to every denial an affirmation, the denial opposed to the affirmation and the affirmation opposed to the denial is called a contradiction; and it is necessary for one to be false and one to be true. 65 Concerning term, premise, and syllogism. It is necessary to know that the study of logic has as its goal the subject of demonstration. And demonstration is a syllogism; and the syllogism is composed of two true premises and the conclusion; for example, wishing to demonstrate that the soul is immortal, I say that everything ever-moving is immortal; this is a premise. Then I state a second premise: The soul is ever-moving; then the conclusion: The soul, therefore, is immortal. And each premise is composed of terms, for each word of the premise is called a term; for a term is that into which the premise is resolved. For example the premise says: Everything ever-moving is immortal; "Everything" is called a term as a part of a premise, and "ever-moving" is similarly called a term, and "immortal" is called a term, and "is" is called a term. It is necessary to know that the premises must be true and the conclusion must follow from the premises. For if one of the premises is found to be false, or the conclusion, it is a fallacy and not a syllogism. Simple sound, noun, verb, phrase, term; these five do not differ from one another with respect to the subject, but their difference is only with respect to relation; for example "man" as simply signifying something is called a simple sound, as a subject it is called a noun, as holding the place of a predicate it is called a verb, as a part of an affirmation or denial it is called a phrase, and as a part of a premise and syllogism it is called a term. And it is necessary to know that in a premise, that is in an affirmation and denial, the subject is called a noun, and the predicate is called a verb. For example, it is an affirmation: Man walks, "man" is the subject and is called a noun, "walks" holds the place of a predicate and is called a verb; "Socrates is handsome," "Socrates" is the subject and is called a noun, "is handsome" holds the place of a predicate and is called a verb as a part of an affirmation, even if "handsome" is called a noun by the grammarians. And simply, whatever follows "is," is a verb both in denial and in affirmation, whether it is a noun or a verb, it is called a verb by the philosophers as being a predicate. It must be known that these five do not differ at all from one another: declaration, premise, problem, objection, conclusion. For when I simply declare that the soul is immortal, it is a declaration

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ἀγγείῳ, ὡς λέγομεν οἶνον ἔχειν τὸ κεράμιον, -ἢ ὡς κτῆμα· λεγόμεθα γὰρ οἰκίαν ἔχειν ἢ ἀγρόν, λεγόμεθα δὲ καὶ γυναῖκα ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἄνδρα ἔχειν. Ἔοικε δὲ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἀλλότριος εἶναι τοῦ ἔχειν, ἐπειδὴ ἀντιστρέφει· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον σημαίνει ἔχειν τὸν ἄνδρα γυναῖκα ἢ τὴν γυναῖκα ἄνδρα, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕτερον ἑτέρου ἐπικρατεῖ, ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχουσιν. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ὁ κτήτωρ ἔχει κτῆμα καὶ τὸ κτῆμα κτήτορα καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἀνὴρ γυναῖκα καὶ γυνὴ ἄνδρα· ὁ γὰρ κτήτωρ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ κυριώτατόν ἐστι τοῦ κτήματος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον ὁ μὲν κτήτωρ ἔχειν λέγεται, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα ἔχεσθαι. ∆ῆλον δέ, ὅτι τὸ ἔχειν τῶν ὁμωνύμων ἐστί. Τινὲς τὰς αὐτὰς διαφορὰς λέγουσι τοῦ ἔχειν, ὅσας καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν· ὡς γὰρ τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ πάσχοντα ἢ ἔμψυχά ἐστιν ἢ ἄψυχα, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἔμψυχόν ἐστι τὸ ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἐχόμενον ἢ ἄψυχον. Πῶς οὖν τῶν διαφόρων γενῶν αἱ αὐταὶ διαφοραὶ ἔσονται; Ἀλλ' ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τὸ ἔχον ἢ περὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ περὶ μέρος, καὶ πάλιν τοῦτο ἢ ἀμυντήριόν ἐστιν ἢ κόσμος. 64 Περὶ ἀποφάνσεως ἀποφάσεώς τε καὶ καταφάσεως. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι ἡ κατάφασις καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἀπόφανσις λέγεται. Κατάφασις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ σημαίνουσα, τί τινι ὑπάρχει, τουτέστι τί ὑπάρχει τις· οἷον «Σωκράτης σοφός ἐστι», «Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ». Ἀπόφασις δὲ ἡ δηλοῦσα τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον τινὶ ἤγουν τί οὐκ ἔστι τις, οἷον «ὁ δεῖνα οὐκ ἔστι σοφός», «ὁ δεῖνα οὐ περιπατεῖ». Ἐπειδὴ δὲ πάσῃ καταφάσει ἀντίκειται ἀπόφασις καὶ πάσῃ ἀποφάσει κατάφασις, ἡ ἀπόφασις ἡ ἀντικειμένη τῇ καταφάσει καὶ ἡ κατάφασις ἡ ἀντικειμένη τῇ ἀποφάσει ἀντίφασις λέγεται· ἀνάγκη δὲ τὴν μίαν ψεύδεσθαι καὶ τὴν μίαν ἀληθεύειν. 65 Περὶ ὅρου καὶ προτάσεως καὶ συλλογισμοῦ. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι σκοπὸν ἔχει ἡ λογικὴ πραγματεία περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως. Ἡ δὲ ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμός ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς σύγκειται ἐκ δύο ἀληθῶν προτάσεων καὶ τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οἷον θέλων ἀποδεῖξαι, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι, λέγω, ὅτι πᾶν ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν· αὕτη πρότασίς ἐστιν. Εἶτα λέγω καὶ δευτέραν πρότασιν· Ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεικίνητός ἐστιν· εἶτα τὸ συμπέρασμα· Ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἀθάνατός ἐστιν. Ἑκάστη δὲ πρότασις ἐξ ὅρων σύγκειται, ἑκάστη γὰρ λέξις τῆς προτάσεως ὅρος λέγεται· ὅρος γάρ ἐστιν, εἰς ὃν ἀναλύεται ἡ πρότασις. Οἷον ἡ πρότασις λέγει· Πᾶν ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατόν ἐστι· τὸ «Πᾶν» ὅρος λέγεται ὡς μέρος προτάσεως καὶ τὸ «ἀεικίνητον» ὁμοίως ὅρος λέγεται καὶ τὸ «ἀθάνατον» ὅρος λέγεται καὶ τὸ «ἐστιν» ὅρος λέγεται. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰς προτάσεις ἀληθεῖς εἶναι καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς προτάσεσιν. Εἰ γὰρ εὑρεθῇ ἡ μία τῶν προτάσεων ψευδὴς ἢ τὸ συμπέρασμα, παραλογισμός ἐστι καὶ οὐ συλλογισμός. Ἁπλῆ φωνή, ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, φάσις, ὅρος· ταῦτα τὰ πέντε κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐδὲν ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσι, μόνον δὲ κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἡ διαφορά· οἷον ἄνθρωπος ὡς μὲν ἁπλῶς σημαντικόν τινος λέγεται ἁπλῆ φωνή, ὡς δὲ ὑποκείμενον λέγεται ὄνομα, ὡς δὲ τάξιν ἐπέχον κατηγορουμένου λέγεται ῥῆμα, ὡς δὲ μέρος καταφάσεως ἢ ἀποφάσεως λέγεται φάσις, ὡς δὲ μέρος προτάσεως καὶ συλλογισμοῦ λέγεται ὅρος. Χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὅτι ἐν τῇ προτάσει ἤτοι τῇ καταφάσει καὶ ἀποφάσει τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὄνομα λέγεται, τὸ δὲ κατηγορούμενον λέγεται ῥῆμα. Οἷον κατάφασίς ἐστιν· Ἄνθρωπος περιπατεῖ, τὸ «ἄνθρωπος» ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι καὶ λέγεται ὄνομα, τὸ «περιπατεῖ» τάξιν ἐπέχει κατηγορουμένου καὶ λέγεται ῥῆμα· «Σωκράτης καλός ἐστι», τὸ «Σωκράτης» ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι καὶ λέγεται ὄνομα, τὸ «καλός ἐστι» τάξιν ἐπέχει κατηγορουμένου καὶ λέγεται ῥῆμα ὡς μέρος καταφάσεως, εἰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς γραμματικοῖς ὄνομα λέγεται τὸ «καλός». Καὶ ἁπλῶς, ᾧτινι ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ «ἐστι», ῥῆμά ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσει καὶ ἐν τῇ καταφάσει, κἂν ὄνομά ἐστι κἂν ῥῆμα, ῥῆμα λέγεται παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὡς κατηγορούμενον. Ἰστέον, ὅτι τὰ πέντε ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἀλλήλων διενηνόχασιν, ἀπόφανσις, πρότασις, πρόβλημα, ἔνστασις, συμπέρασμα. Ὅταν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἀποφαίνωμαι, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν, ἀπόφανσις