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30

Things that come to be and pass away are memorable, the things that are constituted in time; and memory is indeed of things absent, but it is not produced by things absent. But it is called recollection when forgetfulness intervenes in memory. For recollection is the recovery of a memory that has become faded; and it becomes faded by forgetfulness; and forgetfulness is a loss of memory; but the one is continuous, the other for a time, of which there is recollection. But there is another kind of recollection which is not a forgetfulness of things from sensation and intellection, but of natural concepts; and we call natural concepts those which are present in all without being taught. such as that God exists; and Plato says this is a recollection of the ideas; but what the idea is we will say in what follows. The imaginative faculty, then, hands over to the dianoetic faculty the things that appear; and the dianoetic or discursive faculty, having received and judged them, passes them on to the mnemonic faculty. And its instrument is the posterior ventricle of the brain, which they also call the cerebellum and parencranis, and the psychic pneuma in it. And since we say that the anterior ventricles of the brain are the beginnings and roots of the senses, the middle one of the dianoetic faculty, and the posterior of the mnemonic, it is necessary to demonstrate if these things are this way, so that we may not seem to believe what is said without reason. But the most sufficient proof is that which is taken from the activity of the parts themselves. For when the anterior ventricles are damaged in any way, the senses are impeded, but the dianoetic faculty still remains preserved; but when only the middle ventricle suffers, the intellect is impaired, but the sense-organs remain, preserving their natural sensation; and if both the anterior and the middle ventricle suffer, reasoning along with the senses is impaired; but when the cerebellum suffers, memory alone is destroyed, while sensation and intellect are in no way harmed [but it is clear that our discussion is not now about movement according to impulse]; and if along with the anterior, the middle and the posterior also suffer something, both sensation and reasoning and memory are destroyed together, in addition to the whole living being being in danger of perishing. And this becomes clear both through many other affections and symptoms, but especially from phrenitis. For of those suffering from phrenitis, some preserve their senses, with only the intellect being harmed. Galen records such a case of phrenitis, of one who, when a certain wool-worker was working beside him, got up and taking glass vessels, and rushing to the windows, asked the passers-by, calling each of the vessels by name, if they wanted it to be thrown down; and when those standing by said they wanted it, he first hurled each of the vessels; then he asked those present if they also wanted the wool-worker to be thrown; and when they, thinking the matter was a joke and for this reason saying they wanted it, he took the wool-worker and pushed him down from above. This man was healthy in his senses; for he knew that these were vessels and this was a wool-worker; but he was sick in his intellect. But others draw an empty fantasy, thinking they see things that are not seen; but in other respects they think according to reason; these have had only the anterior ventricles damaged, the middle one remaining unaffected. And from the affections that follow each part, their activities are impeded; for the living being is harmed in that activity which the affected part is by nature designed to perform, just as when the foot is affected, we are impeded in walking. For the foot has this activity. 14 Concerning the internal and the expressed reason This, then, is one division of the psychic power, with which certain parts of the body are also divided; but there is another division in another manner of the rational part of the soul, both that which is called internal reason and the expressed. Internal reason is the movement of the soul that occurs in the discursive faculty without any utterance. Whence often, even when silent, we go through a whole speech by ourselves; and in dreams we converse; and according to this we are all especially rational. For not so much according to expressed reason as according to this one. For both those who are deaf from birth and those who through an affliction or

30

μνημονευτά ἐστι τὰ γινόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα, τὰ ἐν χρόνῳ συνιστάμενα· καὶ ἔστι μὲν τῶν ἀπόντων ἡ μνήμη, οὐ μὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπόντων γίνεται. ἀνάμνησις δὲ λέγεται ὅταν λήθη μεσολαβήσῃ τὴν μνήμην. ἔστι γὰρ ἀνάμνησις μνήμης ἐξιτήλου γενομένης ἀνάκτησις· γίνεται δὲ ἐξίτηλος ὑπὸ τῆς λήθης· λήθη δέ ἐστι μνήμης ἀποβολή· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν διηνεκὴς ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ ποσόν, ἧς ἐστιν ἡ ἀνάμνησις. ἑτέρα δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις ἥτις οὐκ ἔστιν λήθη τῶν ἐξ αἰσθήσεως καὶ νοήσεως, ἀλλὰ τῶν φυσικῶν ἐννοιῶν· φυσικὰς δὲ λέγομεν ἐννοίας τὰς ἀδιδάκτως πᾶσι προσούσας. ὡς τὸ εἶναι Θεόν· ταύτην δὲ ὁ Πλάτων ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι λέγει τῶν ἰδεῶν· τί δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἰδέα ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ἐροῦμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν φανταστικὸν παραδίδωσι τῷ διανοητικῷ τὰ φαινόμενα· τὸ δὲ διανοητικὸν ἢ διαλογιστικὸν παραλαβὸν καὶ κρῖναν παραπέμπει τῷ μνημονευτικῷ. ὄργανον δὲ καὶ τούτου ἡ ὄπισθεν κοιλία τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου, ἣν καὶ παρεγκεφαλίδα καὶ παρεγκρανίδα καλοῦσιν, καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν μὲν αἰσθήσεων ἀρχὰς καὶ ῥίζας τὰς ἔμπροσθεν εἶναι κοιλίας φαμὲν τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου, τοῦ δὲ διανοητικοῦ τὴν μέσην, τοῦ δὲ μνημονευτικοῦ τὴν ὄπισθεν, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἐπιδεῖξαι εἰ ταῦτα τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, ἵνα μὴ δόξωμεν ἀλόγως πιστεύειν τοῖς λεγομένοις. ἱκανωτάτη δὲ ἀπόδειξις ἡ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τῶν μορίων ἐνεργείας λαμβανομένη. τῶν μὲν γὰρ προσθίων κοιλιῶν καθ' ὅντινα δήποτε τρόπον βλαβεισῶν, αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσεις παραποδίζονται, τὸ δὲ διανοητικὸν ἔτι μένει σῳζόμενον· τῆς δὲ μέσης κοιλίας μόνης παθούσης, ἡ μὲν διάνοια σφάλλεται, τὰ δὲ αἰσθητήρια μένει φυλάττοντα τὴν κατὰ φύσιν αἴσθησιν· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ αἱ πρόσθιοι καὶ ἡ μέση κοιλία πάθωσιν, ὁ λογισμὸς ἅμα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι παρακόπτει· τῆς δὲ παρεγκεφαλίδος παθούσης, ἡ μνήμη μόνη παραπόλλυται, τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῆς διανοίας εἰς οὐδὲν βλαπτομένων [δῆλον δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος νῦν περὶ τῆς καθ' ὁρμὴν κινήσεως]· ἐὰν δὲ σὺν ταῖς προσθίοις καὶ ἡ μέση καὶ ἡ ὄπισθεν πάθῃ τι, καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν καὶ τὴν μνήμην ὁμοῦ παραφθείρονται, πρὸς τῷ καὶ τὸ πᾶν κινδυνεύειν ἀπολέσθαι ζῷον. γίνεται δὲ τοῦτο δῆλον καὶ δι' ἄλλων μὲν πολλῶν παθῶν τε καὶ συμπτωμάτων, μάλιστα δὲ ἐκ τῆς φρενίτιδος. τῶν γὰρ φρενιτιζόντων οἱ μὲν τὰς αἰσθήσεις διασῴζουσι, τῆς διανοίας μόνης βλαβείσης. τοιοῦτον ἀναγράφει Γαληνὸς φρενιτίσαντα, ὃς ἐριουργοῦ τινος ἐργαζομένου παρ' αὐτῷ διαναστὰς καὶ λαβὼν ὑαλᾶ σκεύη, ἐπί τε τὰς θυρίδας ὁρμήσας, ἠρώτα τοὺς παριόντας, ἕκαστον τῶν σκευῶν ἐξ ὀνόματος καλῶν, εἰ θέλουσιν αὐτὸ ῥιφῆναι κάτω· τῶν δὲ παρεστώτων βούλεσθαι φησάντων, πρῶτον ἠκόντισε τῶν σκευῶν ἕκαστον· εἶτα ἤρετο τοὺς παρόντας εἰ καὶ τὸν ἐριουργὸν βούλοιντο ῥιφῆναι· τῶν δὲ παιδιὰν νομισάντων εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο θέλειν φησάντων, λαβὼν ὤθησεν ἄνωθεν κάτω τὸν ἐριουργόν. οὗτος τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ὑγίαινεν· ᾔδει γὰρ ὅτι σκεύη ταῦτα καὶ ἐριουργὸς οὗτος· ἐνόσει δὲ τὴν διάνοιαν. ἄλλοι δὲ διάκενον ἕλκουσι φαντασίαν, ὁρᾶν οἰόμενοι τὰ μὴ ὁρώμενα· τὰ δ' ἄλλα φρονοῦσι κατὰ λόγον· οὗτοι τὰς προσθίους μόνας κοιλίας ἐβλάβησαν, τῆς μέσης ἀπαθοῦς μεινάσης. ἐκ δὲ τῶν παθῶν τῶν παρακολουθούντων ἑκάστῳ μορίῳ τὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν ἐμποδίζεται· εἰς ἐκείνην γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καταβλάπτεται τὸ ζῷον ἣν πέφυκεν ἐνεργεῖν τὸ πεπονθὸς μόριον, ὡς καὶ τοῦ ποδὸς παθόντος, εἰς τὸ περιπατεῖν ἐμποδιζόμεθα. ταύτην γὰρ ὁ ποὺς ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν. 14 περὶ τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου καὶ προφορικοῦ λόγου Αὕτη μὲν οὖν μία διαίρεσις τῆς ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως, ᾗ συνδιαιρεῖται μέρη τινὰ τοῦ σώματος· ἑτέρα δὲ διαίρεσις καθ' ἕτερον τρόπον τοῦ λογικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅ τε καλούμενος ἐνδιάθετος λόγος καὶ ὁ προφορικός. ἔστι δὲ ἐνδιάθετος μὲν λόγος τὸ κίνημα τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐν τῷ διαλογιστικῷ γινόμενον ἄνευ τινὸς ἐκφωνήσεως. ὅθεν πολλάκις καὶ σιωπῶντες λόγον ὅλον παρ' ἑαυτοῖς διεξερχόμεθα· καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὀνείροις διαλεγόμεθα· κατὰ τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα λογικοὶ πάντες ἐσμέν. οὐ γὰρ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν προφορικὸν λόγον ὡς κατὰ τοῦτον. καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐκ γενετῆς κωφοὶ καὶ οἱ διὰ πάθος ἢ