31
is said. But when it is taken as part of a syllogism, then it is a proposition to say: The soul is immortal. But when someone objects to the proposition, saying: Whence is it clear that the soul is immortal? then such a thing is called an objection. But when again we propose for inquiry: Is the soul immortal? it is called a problem. But when it is deduced from a proposition, it is called a conclusion, for example: The soul is ever-moving, the ever-moving is immortal, from these propositions is deduced: Therefore the soul is immortal; this is a conclusion. A proposition is a declarative statement of something from something, which is a negation, for example "Socrates does not laugh," or of something about something, which is an affirmation, as "Socrates laughs." A term is that into which a proposition is analyzed. A syllogism is an argument in which, certain things having been laid down, that is, agreed upon, something else necessarily follows from what is laid down through what is laid down; for through the propositions that are laid down, the conclusion comes about, not requiring any other external proof. A problem is a theorem tending toward choice and avoidance, that is, toward denial and assent for knowledge and theory. An inquiry is a question requiring a detailed, that is, a broad answer; for a questioning statement differs from an inquiring one, because for the questioning one a quick answer follows, that is, in few words, but for the inquiring one, a lengthy one and in many words. A dialogical character is said to be that which proceeds by question and answer. An objection is that which from the preambles overturns the argument. A counter-position is that which accepts the argument as true, but shows that it does no harm to the matter at hand. A lemma is that which is taken as agreed upon for the construction of something. A sect is the opinion of several people agreeing with each other, but disagreeing with others. A common notion is that which is agreed upon by all, for example that the sun exists. A thesis is a paradoxical opinion of one of the notable philosophers, that is, a strange notion, like the argument of Parmenides, that he said being is one, and like that of Heraclitus, that all things are in motion. "Common" is that which is observed in many things or predicated of many things. "Common" is said in four ways: either that which is divisible into parts like inherited land; or that which is taken indivisibly in common use, but not at the same time, like one slave or one horse of two masters, fulfilling the command sometimes of this one, sometimes of that one; or that which is appropriated in pre-occupation, but referred to the common, like a place in a theater or in a bath; or that which is indivisibly put forth for a common and the same notion, like the voice of the herald. In this manner must be taken in the case of homonyms and synonyms the phrase "of which the name is common." "In itself" is that which belongs to something primarily and according to essence and not by accident, like rationality to man. A universal is that which signifies many things, like man, animal, substance. "By accident" is that which can belong to something and not belong, like being sick and being healthy to man. "To make" is said of the productive arts, in which what is made remains, as in carpentry and such things; for after the making, the couch remains. "To do" is said of things in which the end, that is, the result, does not remain, as in flute-playing and dancing. "To contemplate" is said of thinking, studying astronomy, doing geometry, and such things. The true account shows concept to be twofold. For on the one hand, it is a kind of concept and after-thought that unfolds and clarifies the general and unarticulated theory and knowledge of things, so that what seems by sense to be simple is shown by the mind's investigation to be multipartite and various, for example man, appearing simple, is understood by concept to be double, composed of both soul and body, while on the other hand it happens to be a fiction of the mind, which by a combination of both sense and imagination composes and opines from existing things things that in no way exist. Such is the myth-making of hippocentaurs and sirens and goat-stags. For taking parts of wholes and from the parts composing something else with great license and ease things in no way in subsistence and
31
λέγεται. Ὅταν δὲ ὡς μέρος συλλογισμοῦ ληφθῇ, τότε πρότασίς ἐστιν τὸ λέγειν· Ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν. Ἡνίκα δέ τις ἐνίσταται πρὸς τὴν πρότασιν λέγων· Πόθεν δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι; τότε τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔνστασις προσαγορεύεται. Ἡνίκα δὲ πάλιν προτείνομεν εἰς ζήτησιν· Ἆρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι; καλεῖται πρόβλημα. Ὅτε δὲ ἐκ προτάσεως συναχθῇ, καλεῖται συμπέρασμα, οἷον· Ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεικίνητός ἐστι, τὸ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον, ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων τούτων συνάγεται· Ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι· τοῦτό ἐστι συμπέρασμα. Πρότασίς ἐστι λόγος ἀποφαντικός τινος ἀπό τινος, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις, οἷον «Σωκράτης οὐ γελᾷ», ἤ τινος κατά τινος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατάφασις, ὡς «Σωκράτης γελᾷ». Ὅρος ἐστίν, εἰς ὃν ἀναλύεται ἡ πρότασις. Συλλογισμός ἐστι λόγος, ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἤγουν ὁμολογηθέντων ἕτερον ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν κειμένων συμβαίνει διὰ τὰ κείμενα· διὰ γὰρ τὰς κειμένας προτάσεις γίνεται τὸ συμπέρασμα μὴ δεόμενον ἔξωθεν ἑτέρας τινὸς συστάσεως. Πρόβλημά ἐστι θεώρημα συντεῖνον εἰς αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἤγουν εἰς ἄρνησιν καὶ συγκατάθεσιν πρὸς γνῶσιν καὶ θεωρίαν. Πύσμα ἐστὶν ἐρώτημα διεξοδικὴν ἤγουν πλατεῖαν ἀπαιτοῦν ἀπόκρισιν· διαφέρει γὰρ ὁ ἐρωτηματικὸς λόγος τοῦ πυσματικοῦ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἐρωτηματικῷ ταχεῖα ἕπεται ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἤγουν δι' ὀλίγων, τῷ δὲ πυσματικῷ χρονία καὶ διὰ πολλῶν. ∆ιαλογικὸς χαρακτὴρ λέγεται ὁ κατὰ πεῦσιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν. Ἔνστασίς ἐστιν ἡ ἐκ προοιμίων ἀνατρέπουσα τὸν λόγον. Ἀντιπαράστασις δὲ ἡ δεχομένη μὲν τὸν λόγον ὡς ἀληθῆ, δεικνύουσα δέ, ὡς οὐδὲν βλάπτει πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον. Λημμάτιόν ἐστιν, ὅπερ εἴληπται ὡς ὁμολογούμενον πρὸς κατασκευήν τινος. Αἵρεσίς ἐστι δόξα πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων πρὸς ἀλλήλους μὲν συμφωνούντων, πρὸς ἄλλους δὲ διαφωνούντων. Κοινὴ δὲ ἔννοιά ἐστιν ἡ παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογουμένη, οἷον ὅτι ἔστιν ἥλιος. Θέσις δέ ἐστι παράδοξος ὑπόληψίς τινος τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ γνωρίμων ἤγουν ξένη ἔννοια ὡς ὁ Παρμενίδου λόγος, ὅτι ἓν ἔλεγε τὸ ὄν, καὶ ὡς ὁ Ἡρακλείτου, ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται. Κοινόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν πολλοῖς θεωρούμενον ἢ πολλῶν κατηγορούμενον. Κοινὸν δὲ τετραχῶς λέγεται· ἢ τὸ εἰς τὰ μέρη διαιρετὸν ὡς ἡ κληρουχουμένη γῆ· ἢ τὸ ἀδιαιρέτως ἐν χρήσει κοινῇ λαμβανόμενον, οὐχ ἅμα δὲ ὡς εἷς δοῦλος ἢ εἷς ἵππος δύο δεσποτῶν ποτὲ μὲν τοῦδε, ποτὲ δὲ τοῦδε τὴν κέλευσιν πληρῶν· ἢ τὸ ἐν προκαταλήψει ἰδιοποιούμενον, εἰς δὲ τὸ κοινὸν ἀναπεμπόμενον ὡς ὁ ἐν θεάτρῳ τόπος ἢ ἐν βαλανείῳ· ἢ τὸ ἀδιαιρέτως εἰς κοινὴν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔννοιαν προβαλλόμενον ὡς ἡ φωνὴ τοῦ κήρυκος. Κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον χρὴ ληφθῆναι ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμωνύμων καὶ συνωνύμων τὸ «ὧν ὄνομα κοινόν». Καθ' αὑτό ἐστι τὸ πρώτως καὶ κατ' οὐσίαν προσόν τινι καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς τὸ λογικὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. Καθόλου ἐστὶ τὸ πολλὰ σημαῖνον ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ζῷον, οὐσία. Κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, ὃ δύναται ὑπάρχειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ νοσεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν. Ποιεῖν λέγεται ἐπὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν τεχνῶν, ἐφ' ὧν διαμένει τὸ γινόμενον ὡς ἐπὶ τεκτονικῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων· διαμένει γὰρ μετὰ τὴν ποίησιν ἡ κλίνη. Πράττειν λέγεται, ἐφ' ὧν οὐ διαμένει τὸ τέλος ἤγουν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς καὶ ὀρχηστικῆς. Θεωρεῖν δὲ λέγεται τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ ἀστρονομεῖν, τὸ γεωμετρεῖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Τὴν ἐπίνοιαν ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος διττὴν ἀποφαίνεται. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπέννοιά τις καὶ ἐπενθύμησίς ἐστι τὴν ὁλοσχερῆ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτον ἐξαπλοῦσα καὶ διασαφοῦσα θεωρίαν καὶ γνῶσιν, ὡς τὸ αἰσθήσει δόξαν εἶναι ἁπλοῦν τῇ πολυπραγμοσύνῃ τοῦ νοῦ πολυμερές τε καὶ ποικίλον ἀναφαίνεσθαι, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἁπλοῦς φαινόμενος τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ διπλοῦς κατανοεῖται, ἐκ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος συγκείμενος, ἡ δὲ ἀνάπλασμα διανοίας τυγχάνει κατὰ συμπλοκὴν αἰσθήσεώς τε καὶ φαντασίας ἐκ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μηδαμῶς ὄντα συντιθεῖσα καὶ δοξάζουσα. Τοιαύτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἱπποκενταύρων καὶ σειρήνων καὶ τραγελάφων μυθοπλαστία. Τῶν γὰρ ὅλων τὰ μέρη λαμβάνουσα καὶ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ἄλλο τι συντιθεῖσα κατὰ πολλὴν ἐξουσίαν τε καὶ εὐκολίαν τὰ μηδαμῶς ἐν ὑποστάσει τε καὶ