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having lost their voice through illness are no less rational. But uttered reason has its activity in the voice and in speech. And the organs of the voice are many. For the internal intercostal muscles and the thorax and the lung and the trachea and the larynx and of these especially the cartilaginous part and the recurrent nerves and the glottis and all the muscles that move these parts are organs of phonation. And of speech, the mouth. For in this, speech is fashioned and shaped and, as it were, formed; with the tongue and the uvula holding the place of a plectrum; the palate, of a sounding-board; and the teeth and the quality of the mouth's opening fulfilling the function of the strings, as on a lyre, with the nose also contributing something to euphony or cacophony, as is clear from singers. They also divide the soul in other ways into faculties or species or parts: into the vegetative, which is also called the nutritive and appetitive, and into the sensitive and into the rational. The organs of each of these have partly been spoken of, and will partly be spoken of in what follows. Zeno the Stoic says that the soul has eight parts, dividing it into the governing part, and into the five senses, and the vocal and the spermatic. But Panaetius the philosopher wishes the vocal part to be a part of the movement according to impulse, speaking most correctly; and the spermatic part, not a part of the soul, but of nature. But Aristotle in the Physics says that there are five parts of the soul: the vegetative and the sensitive and the locomotive and the appetitive and the intellectual; by vegetative he means that which nourishes and causes to grow and to generate and which fashions bodies; and he calls the vegetative also nutritive, calling the whole from its most important part, that which nourishes, from which the other parts of the vegetative also have their existence. So much for the Physics; but in the Ethics he divides the soul into two primary and most general parts, into the rational and the irrational; and he subdivides the irrational into that which is obedient to reason and into that which is not submissive to reason. Now, concerning the rational, it has been spoken of in the preceding sections; but concerning the irrational we will now treat. 15 Concerning the irrational part or species of the soul which is also called the affective and appetitive Some say that irrationality exists in itself, as being an irrational soul, and not a part of the rational. First, because it is also found in itself in irrational animals; from which it is clear that it is something complete, and not a part of another; then, that it is most absurd for the irrational to be a part of the rational. But Aristotle says it is both a part and a faculty and divides it into two, as we said; and these are commonly called the appetitive. And of this is also the movement according to impulse. For appetite is the beginning of movement. For having desired, animals rush into movement according to impulse. And of the irrational, one part does not obey reason, and the other is obedient to reason; and again the part obedient to reason is divided into two, into the concupiscible and the irascible. And the organs are, of the concupiscible through sense, the liver; and of the irascible, the heart, a hard part and susceptible of vigorous motion, ordained for hard service and intense impulse, just as the liver, a soft organ, has become the instrument of soft desire. And these are called obedient to reason because they are naturally disposed to obey reason and to be subject to it and to be moved as reason commands in men who are in a natural state. And these passions are also constitutive of the animal essence. For without these it is not possible for life to exist. But since the word 'passion' is used homonymously, we must first distinguish its homonymy. For passion is said of the bodily, such as sicknesses and wounds; passion is also said of the psychical, which is our present topic, both desire and anger. And commonly and generally, the passion of an animal is that which is followed by pleasure or pain. For pain follows the passion and the passion itself is not pain. For if this were so, everything that suffers would also feel pain; but as it is, inanimate things suffer but do not feel pain. Therefore the passion is not the pain, but the perception of the passion. And this must also be considerable in order to fall under perception. But of the

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νόσημα τὴν φωνὴν ἀποβαλόντες οὐδὲν ἧττον λογικοί εἰσιν. ὁ δὲ προφορικὸς λόγος ἐν τῇ φωνῇ καὶ ταῖς διαλέκτοις τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει. ὄργανα δὲ τῆς φωνῆς πολλά. οἵ τε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μεσοπλεύροις ἔσωθεν μύες καὶ ὁ θώραξ καὶ ὁ πνεύμων ἥ τε τραχεῖα ἀρτηρία καὶ ὁ λάρυγξ καὶ τούτων μάλιστα τὸ χονδρῶδες καὶ τὰ παλινδρομοῦντα νεῦρα καὶ ἡ γλωττὶς καὶ πάντες οἱ κινοῦντες ταῦτα τὰ μόρια μύες τῆς ἐκφωνήσεώς εἰσιν ὄργανα. τῆς δὲ διαλέκτου τὸ στόμα. ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ διαπλάσσεται καὶ σχηματίζεται καὶ οἱονεὶ μορφοῦται ἡ διάλεκτος· τῆς μὲν γλώσσης καὶ τοῦ γαργαρεῶνος πλήκτρου λόγον ἐπεχόντων· τῆς δὲ ὑπερῴας, ἠχείου· τῶν δὲ ὀδόντων καὶ τῆς ποιᾶς τοῦ στόματος διανοίξεως, ὡς ἐν λύρᾳ, τὴν τῶν χορδῶν ἀναπληρούντων χρείαν, συντελούσης τι καὶ τῆς ῥινὸς πρὸς εὐφωνίαν ἤτοι κακοφωνίαν, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ᾀδόντων. ∆ιαιροῦσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως εἰς δυνάμεις ἢ εἴδη ἢ μέρη τὴν ψυχήν, εἴς τε τὸ φυτικόν, ὃ καὶ θρεπτικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν καλεῖται, καὶ εἰς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ εἰς τὸ λογικόν. τῶν δὲ ὀργάνων ἑκάστου τούτων τὰ μὲν εἴρηται, τὰ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ῥηθήσεται. Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Στωϊκὸς ὀκταμερῆ φησιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, διαιρῶν αὐτὴν εἴς τε τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, καὶ εἰς τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις, καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ σπερματικόν. Παναίτιος δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος τὸ μὲν φωνητικὸν τῆς καθ' ὁρμὴν κινήσεως μέρος εἶναι βούλεται, λέγων ὀρθότατα· τὸ δὲ σπερματικόν, οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ἀλλὰ τῆς φύσεως. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν μὲν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς πέντε εἶναι λέγει τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε φυτικὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν· φυτικὸν λέγων τὸ τρέφον καὶ αὔξειν καὶ γεννᾶν ποιοῦν καὶ διαπλάσσον τὰ σώματα· καλεῖ δὲ τὸ φυτικὸν καὶ θρεπτικόν, τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρατίστου μέρους καλῶν, τοῦ τρέφοντος, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέρη τοῦ φυτικοῦ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχει. οὕτω μὲν ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς· ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς εἰς δύο τὰ πρῶτα καὶ γενικώτατα διαιρεῖ τὴν ψυχήν, εἴς τε τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον· ὑποδιαιρεῖ δὲ τὸ ἄλογον εἴς τε τὸ ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ κατήκοον λόγου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ λογικοῦ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου νῦν διαληψόμεθα. 15 περὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς μέρους ἢ εἴδους ὃ καὶ παθητικὸν καὶ ὀρεκτικὸν καλεῖται Τινὲς καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι λέγουσι τὴν ἀλογίαν, ὡς ἄλογον ψυχὴν οὖσαν, καὶ οὐ μέρος τῆς λογικῆς. πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις εὑρίσκεται· ἐξ οὗ δῆλον ὅτι τελεία τίς ἐστι, καὶ οὐ μέρος ἄλλης· εἶθ' ὅτι τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων ἐστὶ τῆς λογικῆς μέρος εἶναι τὸ ἄλογον. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ μέρος εἶναι λέγει καὶ δύναμιν καὶ διαιρεῖ εἰς δύο, ὡς ἔφαμεν· καλεῖται δὲ ταῦτα κοινῶς καὶ ὀρεκτικόν· τούτου δέ ἐστιν καὶ ἡ καθ' ὁρμὴν κίνησις. ἡ γὰρ ὄρεξις κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἀρχή. ὀρεχθέντα γὰρ τὰ ζῷα ἐπὶ τὴν καθ' ὁρμὴν ᾄττει κίνησιν. τοῦ δὲ ἀλόγου τὸ μὲν οὐ πείθεται λόγῳ, τὸ δὲ ἐπιπειθές ἐστι λόγῳ· πάλιν δὲ τὸ ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ διαιρεῖται εἰς δύο εἴς τε τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμικόν. ἔστιν δὲ ὄργανα τοῦ μὲν ἐπιθυμητικοῦ τοῦ δι' αἰσθήσεως τὸ ἧπαρ· τοῦ δὲ θυμικοῦ ἡ καρδία, σκληρὸν μόριον καὶ κίνησιν εὔτονον ἐπιδεχόμενον, εἰς σκληρὰν ὑπηρεσίαν καὶ σύντονον ὁρμὴν τεταγμένον, ὥσπερ τὸ ἧπαρ, ἁπαλὸν σπλάγχνον, τῆς ἁπαλῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὄργανον γέγονεν. καλεῖται δὲ ταῦτα ἐπιπειθῆ λόγῳ ὅτι πέφυκε πείθεσθαι λόγῳ καὶ ὑποτάττεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος κελεύῃ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐχόντων ἀνθρώπων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη συστατικὰ τῆς ζῳώδους οὐσίας. ἄνευ γὰρ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συστῆναι τὴν ζωήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πάθος ὁμωνύμως λέγεται διασταλτέον πρότερον τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν. λέγεται γὰρ πάθος καὶ τὸ σωματικόν, ὡς τὰ νοσήματα καὶ τὰ ἕλκη· λέγεται πάθος καὶ τὸ ψυχικόν, περὶ οὗ νῦν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ἥ τε ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός. ἔστι δὲ κοινῶς μὲν καὶ γενικῶς ζῴου πάθος ᾧ ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη. ἕπεται γὰρ τῷ πάθει λύπη καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος ἐστὶ λύπη. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἦν πᾶν τὸ πάσχον καὶ ἤλγει· νῦν δὲ τὰ ἀναίσθητα πάσχει μὲν οὐκ ἀλγεῖ δέ· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ ἄλγημα, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ πάθους αἴσθησις. δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀξιόλογον εἶναι ἵνα τῇ αἰσθήσει ὑποπέσῃ. τῶν δὲ