ARTICLE 2

(7) St. Thomas adopts the ethics and psychology of Aristotle in the same sense and for the same reason that he adopts the Aristotelian physics and metaphysics from which they proceed, and this because they are the most rational expression of objective truth. Nevertheless, it is instructive to notice that he accepts the classical Augustinian definition of virtue as perfectly expressive of the whole notion of virtue . . . Undoubtedly this definition can be interpreted (as St. Thomas interprets it) in an Aristotelian sense as regards its philosophical implications, but it is equally certain that it was formulated without any regard at all for philosophical implications. Its author was concerned solely with the moral content of virtue and not with the psychological concomitants."--Carpenter, op. cit. p. 109.

             It is interesting to note, as Father Carpenter remarks, that this definition was, in fact, not formulated by St. Augustine himself, but is a reconstruction from Augustine's words in De Lib. Arb. II, 19, by the Master of the Sentences, Peter Lombard, II, d. 17. The context of the passage cited in De Lib. Arb. is on liberty, and Augustine is intent on showing the great goodness of this noble faculty. He says that virtues are among these great goods, for by them one lives righteously, nor can anyone use them badly. In c. 20 (PL 32, col. 1270), Augustine notes that, while sin, or aversion from the Immutable Good, is not from God, still, every good thing, including virtue, is from God: "omne autem bonum ex Deo; nulla ergo natura est quae non sit ex Deo."

             (8) "Augustine does not intend here to define every sort of virtue, but infused virtue; and this he defines most completely, stating its formal elements: genus and difference, when he says: 'a good quality;' its subject or matter 'in which' when he says: 'of the mind;' its act, which is also virtue's end, when he says: 'by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use;' and its efficient cause, when he says: 'which God works in us, without us.'" In II Sent. d. 21, q. 1, a. 2.

             (9) "If it be a question of a definition of something which embraces the thing's entire being, insofar as it is constituted by all its causes, then of a single thing there can be only one definition, and this is the perfect definition. Now Augustine's definition of virtue comprises all its causes, as was said; however, there may be other definitions which express some of these causes, as that given by the Philosopher, II Ethics, c. 6: 'A habit of choice, consisting in a mean, etc.' which expresses the formal constituent of virtue and its act; and in VII Physics, text 17: 'The disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best,' expressing the ordination of virtue to the end. There are, besides these, various descriptive definitions, indicative of diverse conditions realized in virtue. Therefore, it is not inappropriate that there be many definitions of virtue."--Ibid. ad 9.

             (10) "Although goodness is convertible with being, nevertheless it is found in a special manner in things which have a soul and the power of election, as it says in V Metaph. text 19. The reason for this is that goodness bespeaks the nature of end. Hence, although it may be found in all things which have an end, it is found more especially in those beings which choose an end for themselves and know the meaning of end as such. This is why habits of choice take their species from their end, and why 'good' and 'bad' are the constitutive differentiae of these habits, not indeed as they (good and bad) are commonly taken (ontologically), but in the sense we have explained"--Ibid. ad 2.

             (11) Thomas prefers mens, mind, to anima, soul, because the former is more specifically human, without being any the less spiritual: "Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except insofar as this participates in the reason (I Ethics, c. 13). And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue" I-II, 55, 4 ad 3. The rational part is the preeminent seat of our virtues, whether acquired or infused. Hence human virtue, the proper good of our soul, consists in living according to reason, and thereby causing the "spiritual man" to triumph in us.

             (12) "Living righteously is pertinent to two things, namely, to virtue and free choice. But free choice can be used badly; and hence to complete it by way of differentia is added: 'which no one uses badly' For although one who lives righteously does not make a bad use, still, not every thing by which one lives righteously is such that no one can use it badly."--In Sent., loc. cit. ad 6.

             (13) Note that "by which we live righteously" applies, in meaning, both to the proximate rule of reason, namely, human virtue, and to the Divine movement which the infused gifts bring: "This definition (Augustine's) applies to virtue taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished from the gifts, we must explain the words, 'whereby we lead a good life' as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God, ordered to His motion; that is, something which makes a man follow well the promptings of God."--I-II, 68, 1 ad 3.

             (14) "As regards those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature"--I-II, 55, 4 ad 6. The entire, immense reality of the Divine concursus is evoked in these simple, unequivocal words, as something inescapably true and truly inescapable. St. Thomas combines, in due subordination and with perfect tranquility, two beautiful doctrines in a magnificent antithesis: nothing we do is done without God; He does nothing in us without our consent--but our consent is from Him.

             (15) It is worthwhile to note that, while St. Thomas' study of the nature of virtue is basically directed by Aristotelian psychology and ethics, its chief inspiration, so to speak, remains Christian throughout. Augustine, the great Doctor of Grace, is enlisted and his definition accepted as perfect and ultimate in this inquiry. In this respect, Thomas is but true to his age, in which the definition and classification of virtue as handed down by St. Augustine was universally received. The Angelic Doctor's fidelity to the best of tradition never falters.