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and self-manhood, and the rest; thus also they are neither confused with one another, but each is also distinct, and they possess the indivisible not with disorder in each one partaking of them as it is able. For each partakes of the forms according to its own aptitude; so also God and the whole and parts of love.

§ 18. For it desires him: Since he said, that even non-being somehow desires the good and wishes to be in it, which you will find him saying above, a few pages before, even if it is clarified from Greek doctrines (for he fights especially against Greeks, and Manichaeans, the champions of the doctrine of evil), it is necessary to set forth more broadly, what is called non-being, and why it is pious and necessary for there to be one principle of beings. For this is sound to think. For this is God; for if there were different principles, they will certainly appear infinite in number. If, then, God is one principle, so also is that which truly is, and the good itself. But the argument will of necessity find also the opposites of what has been said; for where there is a beginning, there will certainly also be an end; and if there is being, there will also be non-being; and if there is good, there will also be evil. But since beings are substances and forms, non-being would be formless and without substance, contemplated by reason alone. Therefore, the ancients called this non-being and formless 'matter', which they also name 'utmost baseness'.

(14S_148> Matter is called non-being, not because it is absolutely nothing, but because it is not; for that which truly is is God, and the good itself; for matter was also brought forth from non-beings by God; but not, as some have supposed, formless and unshaped; whence matter is not the principle of sensible things, but rather complementary to them and a last thing and foundation of beings. Therefore it is neither an image of God, like rational beings, nor an idol of that which truly is. And the sensible is an idol of the truly intelligible world, which sensible thing, is not without matter, but is better than matter, partaking of form in some way. Therefore, matter will never be shown apart from form and qualities, which are states; for when did fire come to be without heat or light or the color white, or water without coldness or wetness or the color of blue? The earth and the air likewise. For this reason they also said that matter is contemplated by reason as formless, and qualityless, and unshaped; for from which the visible and the invisible have come to be, was evidently brought forth from non-beings by God, not with amorphous matter pre-existing and then being ordered, as the divine Moses teaches. Therefore, matter is in God, inasmuch as it was also brought forth by him; but supra-essential, He as good holding all things together, it is conceived in him. You will find these things lying scattered in what will be said.

How the demonic multitude: He then works through problems, saying that, If all things are from the good, from where are evils, and from where did angels become demons? All against the Manichaeans.

b. It is not good-like: He has rightly and accurately posited 'good-like' in the case of the angels; for God is essentially the good itself, while the things after him, as being made good by participation and from without by the desire for him, are rightly called good-like, not good in themselves.

(14S_150> c. And how the good: See how he brings forth problems as in an inquiry, having also the very antitheses of the enemies, such as the Manichaeans, but nevertheless showing the purpose of this divine man to be the correct one. For he says, from what principle was evil brought forth; and if from another cause, and as many such things are of the adversaries. Then, therefore, how the good willed to bring it forth, and how evil is also by providence, showing from these things, that, even if evil had a production at all, it had this from the good, and that providence alone governs the whole, so that from this there is one good principle for beings. This divine man examined these things also in the problems; for going down he clearly resolves the problems, showing that neither

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τό δέ αὐτοανδρία, καί τά ἑξῆς· οὕτω καί οὔτε συγκέχυται εἰς ἀλλήλας, ἀλλά καί ἑκάστη διακέκριται, καί οὔτε μετά ἀταξίας τό ἀδιαίρετον ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ μεταλαμβάνειν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὡς δύναται. Τῶν γάρ εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει ἕκαστος πρός τήν οἰκείαν ἐπιτηδειότητα· οὕτω καί ὁ Θεός καί ὅλον καί μέρη τοῦ ἔρωτος.

§ 18. Ἐφίεται γάρ αὐτοῦ: Ἐπειδή εἶπε, καί τό μή ὄν ἐφίεσθαί πως τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καί ἐν αὐτῷ βούλεσθαι εἶναι, ὅπερ καί ἄνω πρό ὀλίγων φύλλων εὑρήσεις αὐτόν λέγοντα, εἰ καί ἐξ ἑλληνικῶν σαφηνίζεται δογμάτων (πρός γάρ Ἕλληνας μάχεται μάλιστα, καί Μανιχαίους τούς τοῦ κακοῦ δόγματος προεστῶτας), δεῖ πλατύτερον παραστῆσαι, τί ὀνομάζεται μή ὄν, καί διά τί μίαν ἀρχήν τῶν ὄντων εὐσεβές καί ἐπάναγκες εἶναι. Τοῦτο γάρ ὑγιές ἐστι φρονεῖν. Ἔστι γάρ αὕτη ὁ Θεός· εἰ γάρ εἶεν ἀρχαί διάφοροι, πάντως ἀπειροπληθεῖς φανήσονται. Εἰ οὖν ἀρχή μία ὁ Θεός, οὕτω καί τό ὄντως ὄν, καί αὐτό τό ἀγαθόν. Εὑρήσει δέ ὁ λόγος καί τά ἐναντία τῶν εἰρημένων ἀναγκαίως· ἔνθα γάρ ἀρχή, ἔσται πάντως καί ἔσχατον· καί εἰ ἔστιν ὄν, ἔσται καί μή ὄν· καί εἰ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, ἔσται καί κακόν. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδή τά ὄντα οὐσίαι εἰσί καί εἴδη, τό μή ὄν ἀνείδεον ἄν εἴη καί ἀνούσιον, λόγῳ μόνῳ θεωρητόν. Τό μή ὄν οὖν τοῦτο καί ἀνείδεον ὕλην ἐκάλεσαν οἱ παλαιοί, ἥν καί ἔσχατον αἶσχος ὀνομάζουσι.

(14S_148> Λέγεται δέ μή ὄν ἡ ὕλη, οὐχ ὅτι παντελῶς οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ ' ὅτι μή ἐστι· τό γάρ ὄντως ὄν ὁ Θεός, καί αὐτό τό ἀγαθόν· παρῆκται γάρ ἐκ μή ὄντων ὑπό τοῦ Θεοῦ καί ἡ ὕλη· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς τινες ὑπέλαβον ἀνείδεος καί ἀσχημάτιστος· ὅθεν οὐδέ ἀρχή τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλά μᾶλλον συμπληρωτική τούτων καί ἕσχατόν τι καί ὑποστάθμη τῶν ὄντων. ∆ιό οὔτε εἰκών Θεοῦ, ὡς τά λογικά, οὔτε εἴδωλον τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος. Καί τό αἰσθητόν δέ εἴδωλον τοῦ ὄντως νοητοῦ κόσμου, ὅπερ αἰσθητόν, οὐκ ἄνευ μέν ὕλης ἐστί, κρεῖττον δέ τῆς ὕλης, εἴδους ὁπωσοῦν μετέχον. Οὐδέποτε οὖν δειχθήσεται ἡ ὕλη δίχα τοῦ εἴδους καί τῶν ποιοτήτων, αἵτινές εἰσιν ἕξεις· πότε γάρ γέγονε τό πῦρ ἄνευ θερμότητος ἤ φωτός ἤ τοῦ λευκοῦ τῆς χροιᾶς, ἤ τό ὕδωρ ἄνευ ψυχρότητος ἤ ὑγρότητος ἤ τοῦ κυανίζοντος χρώματος; Ἡ γῆ καί ὁ ἀήρ ὁμοίως. ∆ιά τοῦτο καί λόγῳ θεωρητήν εἶπον τήν ὕλην ἀνείδεον, καί ἄποιον, καί ἀσχημάτιστον· ἐξ οὗ γάρ τά ὁρατά καί τά ἀόρατα γέγονεν, ἐκ μή ὄντων δηλονότι ὑπό Θεοῦ παρήχθη, οὐ πρότερον ὕλης ἀμόρφου ὑποκειμένης, εἶτα κοσμηθείσης, ὡς διδάσκει Μωσῆς ὁ θεῖος. Ἐν μέν οὖν τῷ Θεῷ ἐστιν, ἅτε καί ὑπ' αὐτοῦ παραχθεῖσα ἡ ὕλη· ὑπερούσιος δέ, τά πάντα ἐκείνου ὡς ἀγαθοῦ συνέχοντος, νοεῖται ἐν αὐτῷ. Ταῦτα εὑρήσεις ἐν τοῖς λεχθησομένοις σποράδην ἐγκείμενα.

Πῶς ἡ δαιμονία πληθύς: Λοιπόν προβλήματα διαγυμνάζει λέγων, ὅτι, Εἰ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πόθεν τά κακά, καί πόθεν ἄγγελοι ἐγένοντο δαίμονες; Πάντα κατά Μανιχαίων.

β. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθοειδές: Καλῶς καί ἀκριβῶς ἐπί τῶν ἀγγέλων τέθεικε τό ἀγαθοειδές· ὁ μέν γάρ Θεός οὐσιωδῶς αὐτό τό ἀγαθόν ὤν, τά δέ μετ' αὐτόν, ὡς ἐκ μετοχῆς καί ἔξωθεν ἀγαθυνόμενα τῇ περί αὐτόν ἐφέσει, εἰκότως ἀγαθοειδῆ λέγονται, οὐκ αὐτόχρημα ἀγαθά.

(14S_150> γ. Καί πῶς ὁ ἀγαθός: Ὄρα ὅπως προβλήματα ὡς ἐν ζητήσει παράγει, ἔχοντα μέν καί αὐτάς τάς τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀντιθέσεις, οἷον Μανιχαίων, δηλούσας δέ ὅμως τόν σκοπόν τοῦ θείου τούτου ἀνδρός τό ὀρθόν. Λέγει γάρ, ἐκ τίνος ἀρχῆς παρήχθη τό κακόν· καί εἰ ἐξ ἄλλης αἰτίας, καί ὅσα τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀντιδίκων εἰσίν. Εἴτα λοιπόν, πῶς ὁ ἀγαθός αὐτό παραγαγεῖν ἠβουλήθη, πῶς δέ καί προνοίᾳ ἐστί τό κακόν, ἐκ τούτων δεικνύς, ὅτι, εἰ καί ὅλως παραγωγήν ἔσχε τό κακόν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ταύτην ἔσχε, καί ὅτι μόνη ἡ πρόνοια διοικεῖ τό ὅλον, ὡς ἐκ τούτου μίαν ἀγαθήν ἀρχήν εἶναι τοῖς οὖσι. Ταῦτα καί ἐν τοῖς προβλήμασιν ἐξήτασεν ὁ θεῖος οὗτος ἀνήρ· παρακατιών γάρ ἀναλύει σαφῶς τά προβλήματα, δεικνύς ὡς οὔτε