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MAX. If the property of each [species] has been shown to be distinct and unconfused, I ask again, if the nutritive, and augmentative, and generative motion belongs by nature to the vegetative [faculty]; and to the sensitive [faculty], that according to impulse.

PYR. By nature, undoubtedly. MAX. Therefore, the self-determining motion consequently [belongs] to the intellective [faculty]. PYR. And he who dogmatizes in accordance with his own principles will certainly grant this. MAX. If, then, the self-determining motion belongs by nature to intellective beings, then

every intellective being is also by nature volitional. For the blessed Diadochus of Photice defined the self-determining faculty to be will. But if every intellective being is also by nature volitional, and the Word of God truly became flesh, animated rationally and intellectually, then He Himself, insofar as He is man, was essentially volitional. If this is so, then the term 'natural will' does not strike the ears of the pious, but those of the heretics.

15Γ_134 PYR. I have already been persuaded by what has been said that the wills in Christ are natural; and concerning this I seek no other proof. For no less than the divinely uttered [proofs], reason has shown the very nature of beings to bear witness, that the same one was willing in a manner appropriate to His own natures, consenting as God, obeying as man, and that the natural wills are in every way appropriate to the natures. That of the unbegun is unbegun, and that of the begun is begun; and that it is not possible for them ever to collapse into one will, even though they belong to one and the same [person], just as the natures [do not], the unbegun and the begun, the uncreated and the created, the maker and the made, the 0304 infinite and the finite, the deifying and the deified. But those in Byzantium, still resisting the natural wills, say that the Fathers spoke of the Lord having the human will by appropriation.

MAX. Since you yourself have expounded their so wonderful and illustrious teaching: according to what sort of appropriation do they say this? Is it the essential one, according to which each person, having what is naturally his, appropriates it on account of nature; or the relational one, according to which we appropriate and cherish the things of others in a friendly way, while we ourselves are neither suffering nor effecting any of these things?

PYR. The relational one, of course. MAX. Therefore, before showing the absurdity of this, it would be more just to examine more precisely

to examine whether man is by nature volitional or not. For when this is shown, the blasphemy of such a heresy will become clearer.

PYR. If it seems good, let us examine this. MAX. That natural things are unteachable, not only have those who have investigated nature by reason,

and are distinguished from the many, declared, but also the common experience of the more vulgar. And if natural things are unteachable, and we have the act of willing as unteachable—for no one is ever taught to will—then man is by nature volitional. And again, if man is by nature rational 15Γ_136; and what is by nature rational is also by nature self-determining; for the self-determining faculty, according to the Fathers, is will; then man is by nature volitional. And again, if in irrational creatures nature leads, but in man it is led, as he moves with authority according to will; then man is by nature volitional. And again, if man was made in the image of the blessed and super-essential Godhead; and the divine nature is by nature self-determining; then man also, as truly its image, is by nature self-determining; and if he is by nature self-determining, then man is by nature volitional; for it has already been said that the Fathers defined the self-determining faculty as will. Furthermore, does not the act of willing exist in all men? And it is not that it exists in some but does not exist in others. And that which is observed in common in all characterizes the nature in the individuals under it; therefore man is by nature volitional.

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ΜΑΞ. Εἰ εὐκρινής καί ἀσύγχυτος ἡ ἑκάστου ἐδείχθη [εἴδους] ἰδιότητος, πάλιν ζητῶ, εἰ κατά φύσιν πρόσεστι τῇ φυτικῇ ἡ θρεπτική, καί αὐξητική, καί γεννητική κίνησις· καί τῇ αἰσθητικῇ, ἡ καθ᾿ ὁρμήν.

ΠΥΡ. Κατά φύσιν ἀναμφιβόλως. ΜΑΞ. Οὐκοῦν καί τῇ νοερᾷ ἀκολούθως ἡ αὐτεξούσιος κίνησις. ΠΥΡ. Καί τοῦτο πάνως δώσει ὁ ἀκόλουθα ταῖς οἰκείαις ἀρχαῖς δογματίζων. ΜΑΞ. Εἰ οὖν κατά φύσιν πρόσεστι τοῖς νοεροῖς ἡ αὐτεξούσιος κίνησις, ἄρα

πᾶν νοερόν καί φύσει θελητικόν. Θέλησιν γάρ τό αὐτεξούσιον ὁ μακάριος ὡρίσατο ∆ιάδοχος ὁ Φωτικῆς εἶναι. Εἰ δέ πᾶν νοερόν καί φύσει θελητικόν, γέγονε δέ ὁ Θεός Λόγος σάρξ ἀληθῶς καί λογικῶς τε καί νοερῶς ἐψυχωμένη, ἄρα καί καθ᾿ ὅ ἄνθρωπος, οὐσιωδῶς ὁ αὐτός ἦν θελητικός. Εἰ δέ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἄρα τάς τῶν εὐσεβῶν ἀκοάς πλήττει λεγόμενον τό φυσικόν θελημα, ἀλλά τάς τῶν αἱρετιζόντων.

15Γ_134 ΠΥΡ. Ἐγώ μέν ἤδη ἐν τοῖς φθάσασι ἐπείσθην, φυσικά εἶναι τά ἐπί Χριστοῦ θελήματα· καί περί τούτου ἑτέραν οὐκ ἐπιζητῶ ἀπόδειξιν. Οὐχ ἦττον γάρ τῶν θεωδῶς ἐκπεφασμένων, αὐτήν τῶν ὄντων τήν φύσιν ὁ λόγος μαρτυροῦσαν ἔδειξε, ὡς καταλλήλως ταῖς ἑαυτοῦ φύσεσιν ὁ αὐτός θέλων ἦν, εὐδοκῶν μέν ὡς Θεός, ὑπακούων ὡς ἄνθρωπος, καί ὅτι κατάλληλα πάντως τά φυσικά θελήματα ταῖς φύσεσιν. Ἄναρχον μέν τῆς ἀνάρχου, καί τῆς ἠργμένης ἠργμένον· καί ὅτι οὐ δυνατόν εἰς ἕν θέλημά ποτε συμπεσεῖν ἀλλήλοις, κἄν ἑνός καί τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰσιν, ὥσπερ καί αἱ φύσεις, τό ἄναρχον καί τό ἠργμένον, τό ἄκτιστον καί τό κτιστόν, τό ποιῆσαν καί τό ποιηθέν, τό 0304 ἄπειρον καί τό πεπερασμένον, τό θεῶσαν καί τό θεωθέν. Οἱ δέ ἐν τῷ Βυζαντίῳ, ἔτι πρός τά φυσικά θελήματα ἀντιστατοῦντες, κατ᾿ οἰκείωσίν φασιν εἰρηκέναι τούς Πατέρας ἔχειν τόν Κύριον τό ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα.

ΜΑΞ. Ἐπειδή αὐτός τῆς τοιαύτης αὐτῶν θαυμαστῆς καί λαμπρᾶς καθηγήσω παιδεύσεως· κατά ποίαν οἰκείωσιν τοῦτό φασιν; Ἆρα τήν οὐσιώδη, καθ᾿ ἥν τά φυσικῶς προσόντα ἕκαστος ἔχων, διά τήν φύσιν οἰκειοῦται· ἤ τήν σχετικήν, καθ ἥν φιλικῶς τά ἀλλήλων οἰκειούμεθα καί στέργομεν, μηδέν τούτων αὐτοί ἤ πάσχοντες, ἤ ἐνεργοῦντες;

ΠΥΡ. Τήν σχετικήν δολονότι. ΜΑΞ. Οὐκοῦν πρίν τούτου δεῖξαι τό ἄτοπον, δικαιότερον ἄν εἴη ἀκριβέστερον

ἐξετάσει, εἴ τε φύσει θελητικός ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, εἴ τε καί μή. Τούτου γάρ δεικνυμένου, σαφέστερον γενήσεται τῆς τοιαύτης αἱρέσεως τό βλάσφημον.

ΠΥΡ. Εἰ δοκεῖ, τοῦτο ἐξετάσωμεν. ΜΑΞ. Ἀδίδακτα εἶναι τά φυσικά, οὐ μόνον οἱ λόγῳ τήν φύσιν διασκεψάμενοι,

καί τῶν πολλῶν διαφέροντες ἔφασαν, ἀλλά καί ἡ τῶν χυδαιοτέρων συνήθεια. Εἰ δέ τά φυσικά ἀδίδακτα, ἀδίδακτον δέ ἔχομεν τό θέλειν· οὐδείς γάρ ποτε θέλειν διδάσκεται· ἄρα φύσει θελητικός ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Καί πάλιν, εἰ φύσει λογικός 15Γ_136 ὁ ἄνθρωπος· τό δέ φύσει λογικόν καί φύσει αὐτεξούσιον· τό γάρ αὐτεξούσιον, κατά τούς Πατέρας, θέλησίς ἐστιν· ἄρα φύσει θελητικός ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Καί πάλιν, εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἄγει μέν ἡ φύσις· ἄγεται δέ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐξουσιαστικῶς κατά θέλησιν κινουμένῳ· ἄρα φύσει θελητικός ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Καί πάλιν, εἰ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα τῆς μακαρίας καί ὑπερουσίου Θεότητος ὁ ἄνθρωπος γεγένηται· αὐτεξούσιος δέ φύσει ἡ θεία φύσις· ἄρα καί ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς αὐτῆς ὄντως εἰκών, αὐτεξούσιος τυγχάνει φύσει· εἰ δέ αὐτεξούσιος φύσει, θελητικός ἄρα φύσει ὁ ἄνθρωπος· εἴρηται γάρ ἤδη, ὡς τό αὐτεξούσιον θέλησιν ὡρίσατο οἱ Πατέρες. Ἔτι τε, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐνυπάρχει τό θέλειν· καί οὐ τοῖς μέν ἐνυπάρχει, τοῖς δέ οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει· τό δέ κοινῶς πᾶσιν ἐνθεωρούμενον φύσιν χαρακτηρίζει ἐν τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτό ἀτόμοις· ἄρα φύσει θελητικός ὁ ἄνθρωπος.