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evil is not substantial, nor in nature, but comes into being by the privation of the good, neither being, nor considered as not-being. And this is alluded to in what is said in the thirty-sixth psalm: “I saw the wicked man highly exalted, like the cedars of Lebanon, and I passed by, and behold, he was not, and I sought him,” that is, his place, “and he was not found”; for this shows that evil, even if it is greatly exalted, yet it is not, nor will it leave a place for itself, that is, a trace; for as soon as it appears it is dissolved, having no substance; therefore, you should not suppose him to be saying anything contradictory.

§ 19. Is not evil from the good? Note how wonderfully he weaves the solution from various arguments.

The purpose of beings: For the one who is angered, or enraged (the argument is by way of example, it seems), when the one at whom he is enraged is doing something evil, wishing to move this one to the opposite, that is, the good, he uses such a motion.

And if all beings: We said above, if God is said to be supersubstantially (14S_152> being, as without beginning and the cause of all things, the opposite, as the last of beings, and insubstantial, as God is supersubstantial, that is, matter, is also called not-being, and is said to be in God, having come into being through his goodness, even if through being mixed with sensible things it is not entirely evil, nor entirely good, as it shows through its instability; for evil in its instability has a share of the good, since it was also brought forth by God, and is in God; evil-in-itself (I do not mean vice, which as a form and quality happens to and departs from the rational, but evil simply in itself) is neither in beings, which in some way desire the good, nor in non-beings, instead of 'in material things' as conceived in the supersubstantial, but also from not-being, which is matter, evil is more distant from the good, and is therefore reasonably more insubstantial than matter, this same evil being in every way nothing. Therefore, evil simply in itself is in no way anywhere, but that of matter is by a lack of goodness, inasmuch as it is also seen as insensible and formless; whence you will understand also what was said by the prophet Obadiah, “and they shall be as though they had not been,” concerning sinners, clearly.

Whence then is evil: From this point, proposing a contrary position, he broadly examines the objection, as from a plausible opposition; for if we do not grant that there is something contrary to the beautiful, that is, evil, virtue will not be seen as good, but all things will be mixed and indistinct, neither will virtue be praised, nor will there be its contrary. But now the objector says, if we do not grant evil as contrary (14S_154> to the good, the good itself will be contrary to itself in those who sin through a lack of the good; but also before the activity of the virtue of a virtuous man, we see in his soul the vices distinguished from virtue; for when the rational part of the soul performs its proper activities, it is hindered in none of the goods, but when the irrational part of the soul, which is mixed with matter and body, prevails, then the rational is hindered from acting properly. Therefore the irrational is corrupted from its mixture with matter, but the rational is corrupted not by being mixed with matter, but by inclining towards matter, that is, by giving in to the irrational and not mastering it, just as an eye, when it is dark, is prevented from seeing; this does not show, therefore, whether evil-in-itself subsists; for what is evil for someone is not evil-in-itself, but vice is also a form and accident of evil; for by additions it is established as being a particular thing, for example, injustice is a wickedness of the soul, and again, the species of injustice are in relation to the matter of desire, for one occurs concerning money, another concerning honors. And species of evils also come into being by additions and from the parts of the soul; for cowardice or rashness from the spirited part, and intemperance or folly from the appetitive part. And species of evils also come into being from activities; for cowardice is a deficiency, as it were, regarding impulse, while rashness is an excess regarding impulse, the

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ἐνυπόστατον τό κακόν, οὔτε ἐν φύσει, ἀλλά κατά στέρησιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γινόμενον, οὔτε ὄν, οὔτε ὡς μή ὄν λογιζόμενον. Καί τοῦτο αἰνίττεσθαι τό ἐν ψαλμῷ τριακοστῷ ἕκτῳ εἰρημένον· «εἶδον τόν ἀσεβῆ ὑπερυψούμενον ὡς τάς κέδρους τοῦ Λιβάνου, καί παρῆλθον, καί ἰδού οὐκ ἦν, καί ἐζήτησα αὐτόν», τουτέστι τόν τόπον αὐτοῦ, «καί οὐχ εὑρέθη»· τοῦτο γάρ δηλοῖ, ὅτι τό κακόν, ἤ καί σφόδρα ἐπαίρεται, ἀλλ' οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὔτε καταλείψει τόπον ἑαυτοῦ, τουτέστιν ἴχνος· ἅμα γάρ τῷ φανῆναι διαλέλυται, μή ἔχον ὑπόστασιν· μή οὖν ὑπολάβοις αὐτόν ἐναντίον λέγειν τι.

§ 19. Τό κακόν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τἀγαθοῦ; Σημείωσαι, πῶς θαυμασίως πλέκει τήν λύσιν ἐκ διαφόρων ἐπιχειρημάτων.

Ὁ τῶν ὄντων σκοπός: Καί γάρ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, ἤτοι θυμούμενος (ὡς ἐν ὑποδείγματι δέ ὁ λόγος, ὡς δοκεῖ), κακόν τι ποιοῦντος τοῦ πρός ὅν θυμοῦται, πρός τό ἐναντίον τοῦτον μεταγαγεῖν βουλόμενος, τουτέστι τό ἀγαθόν τῇ τοιαύτη κινήσει χρῆται.

Καί εἰ τά ὄντα πάντα: Ἔφημεν ἀνωτέρω, εἰ ὁ Θεός ὑπερουσιως (14S_152> ὤν λέγεται ὡς ἄναρχος καί πάντων αἴτιος, τό ἀντίθετον, ὡς ἔσχατον τῶν ὄντων, καί ἀνούσιον, ὡς ὑπερούσιου τοῦ Θεοῦ, τουτέστιν ἡ ὕλη, καί μή ὄν λέγεται, καί ἐν Θεῷ λέγεται, δι' ἀγαθότητα αὐτοῦ γενομένη, εἰ καί διά τοῦ μεμίχθαι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὐ πάντῃ κακόν, οὔτε πάντῃ ἀγαθόν, ὡς δηλοῖ διά τό ἄστατον· ἔχει μέν γάρ τό κακόν ἐν τῷ ἀστάτῳ μερίδα δέ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐπειδή καί ὑπό Θεοῦ παρήχθη, καί ἐν Θεῷ ἐστι· αὐτόκακον (οὐ λέγω ἡ κακία, ἥτις ὡς εἶδος καί ποιότης συμβαίνει τῷ λογικῷ καί ἀποσυμβαίνει, ἀλλ' αὐτό τό ἁπλῶς κακόν) οὔτε ἐν τοῖς οὖσίν ἐστι, τοῖς ὁπωσοῦν ἐφιεμένοις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὔτε ἐν τοῖς μή οὖσιν, ἀντί τοῦ 'ἐν τοῖς ὑλικοῖς' ὡς νοουμένοις ἐν τῷ ὑπερουσίῳ, ἀλλά καί τοῦ μή ὄντος, ὅ ἐστι τῆς ὕλης, τό κακόν πλέον ἀφέστηκε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καί ἔστιν ἐντεῦθεν εἰκότως ἀνουσιώτερον τῆς ὕλης, τό αὐτό κακόν ὡς πάντῃ οὐδέν ὄν. Τό οὖν ἁπλῶς αὐτόκακον οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς, τό δέ τῆς ὕλης κατ' ἔλλειψιν τῆς ἀγαθότητος, καθό καί ἀναίσθητος καί ἀνείδεος ὁρᾶται· ὅθεν νοήσεις καί τό παρά Ἀβδιοῦ τῷ προφήτῃ εἰρημένον, «καί ἔσονται ὡς μή ὄντες», πρός τούς ἁμαρτωλούς δηλονότι.

Πόθεν οὖν ἐστι τό κακόν: Ἐντεῦθεν ἀντίθεσιν προτιθείς, πλατέως γυμνάζει τήν ὑπόκρουσιν, ὡς ἐξ εὐλογαφανοῦς ἀντιθέσεως· εἰ γάρ μή δοίημεν εἶναί τι τῷ καλῷ ἐναντίον, τουτέστι τό κακόν, οὐκ ὀφθήσεται ἀγαθόν ἡ ἀρετή, ἀλλ' ἀναμίξ ἀδιάκριτα ἔσται πάντα, οὔτε ἀρετῆς ἐπαινουμένης, οὔτε τοῦ ἐναντία ἔσται. Νῦν δέ φησιν ὁ ἀντιθείς, εἰ μή δοίημεν κακόν ἐναντίον (14S_154> τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ἔσται αὐτό τό ἀγαθόν ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἔλλειψιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἁμαρτάνουσιν· ἀλλά καί πρό τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς ἀρετῆς τοῦ ἐναρέτου ἀνθρώπου ὁρῶμεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτοῦ διακεκριμένας τῆς ἀρετῆς τάς κακίας· ὅταν μέν γάρ τό λογικον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς τά οἰκεῖα ἐνεργῇ, εἰς οὐδέν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐμποδίζεται, ὅταν δέ τό ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπερ μέμικται ὕλη καί σώματι, ἐπικρατῇ, τότε ἐμποδίζεται τό λογικόν οἰκείως ἐνεργεῖν. Κακύνεται οὖν τό ἄλογον ἐκ τῆς πρός τήν ὕλην ἐπιμιξίας, τό δέ λογικόν οὐ τῷ μεμίχθαι τῇ ὕλη, ἀλλά τῷ νεύειν εἰς ὕλην, τουτέστι τῷ ἐνδιδόναι τῷ ἀλόγῳ καί μή κρατεῖν αὐτοῦ, κακύνεται, ὡς ὄμμα σκότους ὄντος, κωλύεται ὁρᾷν· οὐ δείκνυσιν οὖν τοῦτο, εἰ ὑφέστηκε τό αὐτόκακον· οὐ γάρ τό τινι κακόν, τοῦτ' ἔστι τό αὐτόκακον, ἀλλα καί κακία ἐστίν εἶδος οὖσα καί συμβεβηκός τοῦ κακοῦ· ταῖς γάρ προσθήκαις καθίσταται εἰς τό τόδε τι εἶναι, οἷον ἀδικία μέν ψυχῆς ἐστι πονηρία, καί πάλιν,. τῆς ἀδικίας εἴδη πρός τήν τῆς ὀρέξεως ὕλην, ἡ μέν γάρ περί χρήματα, ἡ δέ περί τιμάς συμβαίνει. Γίνεται δέ καί κατά προσθήκας εἴδη κακῶν καί ἀπό τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· δειλία μέν γάρ ἧ θρασύτης ἀπό τοῦ θυμικοῦ, ἀκολασία δέ ἡ ἡλιθιότης ἀπό τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ. Γίνεται δέ καί ἀπό τῶν ἐνεργειῶν εἴδη κακῶν· ἡ μέν γάρ δειλία οἷον περί τό ὁρμᾷν ἐστιν ἔλλειψις, ἡ δέ θρασύτης περί τό ὁρμᾷν ὑπερβολή, ἡ