33

It is clear that pleasure is one of those things spoken of in many ways. For they fall under different genera, such as noble pleasures and base ones; and some are false, while others are true; and some belong to the mind alone according to knowledge; while others are with the body according to sensation; and of those according to sensation, some are natural, and others are not; and to the pleasure in drinking is opposed the pain in being thirsty; but to that according to contemplation, nothing is opposed. All these things, therefore, show that pleasure is homonymous. Of the so-called bodily pleasures, some are both necessary and natural, without which it is impossible to live; such as the foods that replenish a deficiency and necessary clothing; others are natural, but not necessary, such as unions according to nature and law. For these contribute to the preservation of the whole race; but it is also possible to live without them in virginity; and others are neither necessary nor natural, such as drunkenness and lewdness and excesses that go beyond need. For they neither contribute to the succession of the race for us, as lawful intercourse does, nor to the maintenance of life, but they are even harmful. Therefore, for one living according to God, only the necessary and at the same time natural pleasures are to be pursued; but for one after him, placed in the second rank of virtues, both these and those that are natural but not necessary are to be pursued with the appropriate manner and measure and time and place; but the others are to be avoided in every way. And simply, one must consider those pleasures to be good which are not intertwined with pain, nor cause regret, nor are productive of other harm, nor go beyond what is moderate, nor draw us away from serious works for long or enslave us. But pleasures in the proper sense are those that somehow arise from or are intertwined with the understanding of the divine and with the sciences and the virtues, which must be placed among the things of primary importance, not for simple existence, nor for the preservation of the race, but as contributing to well-being and to being virtuous and beloved of God, and to the very perfection of man according to soul and intellect, which are neither remedies for certain affections, like those that replenish a deficiency, nor do they have pain preceding or following or opposing them at all, but they are pure and unmixed with any material entanglement, being only of the soul. For according to Plato, of pleasures some are false, and others are true; false are those that arise with sensation and an untrue opinion, and have pains intertwined with them; but true are those that belong to the soul alone by itself with knowledge and intellect and prudence, pure and unmixed with pain, which no regret ever follows. And they call the pleasures that follow contemplation and good actions not passions but dispositions. And some call such a pleasure joy in the proper sense. And they define pleasure as a sensible coming into being in accordance with nature. But this definition seems to be of bodily pleasure only. For this is a kind of replenishment and a cure of bodily deficiency, and of the pain that arises because of the deficiency. For when we are shivering or thirsty, by curing the pain from the shivering and the thirst, we take pleasure in getting warm and drinking. Therefore, they are good incidentally and not in themselves or by nature. For just as getting healthy is good incidentally, while being healthy is good by nature and in itself; so too these are good incidentally, being certain cures; but the pleasures of contemplation are good in themselves and by nature. For they do not arise from a deficiency. It is clear from this, therefore, that not every pleasure is a replenishment of a deficiency. And if this is so, the definition that says pleasure is a sensible coming into being in accordance with nature is not sound. For it does not encompass all pleasures, but leaves out that which comes from contemplation. And Epicurus, defining pleasure as the removal of all that is painful, says the same thing as those who say it is a sensible coming into being in accordance with nature. For he says that the removal of what is painful is pleasure. But since no coming into being is of the same genus or akin to its own results, neither must the coming into being of pleasure be considered pleasure, but something else besides pleasure; for while it is coming into being, the coming into being is

33

δῆλον ὡς τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή. ὑφ' ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἕτερον γένος εἰσίν, ὡς αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἡδοναὶ καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι· καὶ αἱ μὲν ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ ἀληθεῖς· καὶ αἱ μὲν τῆς διανοίας μόνης κατ' ἐπιστήμην· αἱ δὲ μετὰ σώματος κατ' αἴσθησιν· καὶ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν κατ' αἴσθησιν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαί· αἱ δὲ οὔ· καὶ τῇ μὲν ἡδονῇ τῇ ἐν τῷ πίνειν ἀντίκειται ἡ ἐν τῷ διψῆν λύπη· τῇ δὲ κατὰ θεωρίαν οὐδέν. ταῦτα οὖν πάντα δείκνυσι τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁμώνυμον. τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν καλουμένων ἡδονῶν αἱ μέν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι ἅμα καὶ φυσικαί, ὧν χωρὶς ζῆν ἀδύνατον· ὡς αἱ τροφαὶ αἱ τῆς ἐνδείας ἀναπληρωτικαὶ καὶ τὰ ἐνδύματα τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μέν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, ὡς αἱ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ νόμον μίξεις. αὗται γὰρ εἰς μὲν τὴν διαμονὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένους συντελοῦσιν· δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ χωρὶς αὐτῶν ἐν παρθενίᾳ ζῆν· αἱ δὲ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι οὔτε φυσικαί, ὡς ἡ μέθη καὶ ἡ λαγνεία καὶ πλησμοναὶ τὴν χρείαν ὑπερβαίνουσαι. οὔτε γὰρ εἰς διαδοχὴν τοῦ γένους ἡμῖν συμβάλλονται, ὡς ἡ κατὰ νόμον συνουσία, οὔτε εἰς σύστασιν τῆς ζωῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ προσβλάπτουσιν. τῷ τοίνυν κατὰ θεὸν ζῶντι μόνας μεταδιωκτέον τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἅμα καὶ φυσικὰς ἡδονάς· τῷ δὲ μετ' ἐκεῖνον, ἐν δευτέρᾳ τάξει τῶν ἀρετῶν τεταγμένῳ, ταύτας τε καὶ τὰς φυσικὰς μέν, οὐκ ἀναγκαίας δὲ μετιτέον μετὰ τοῦ προσήκοντος καὶ τρόπου καὶ μέτρου καὶ καιροῦ καὶ τόπου· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας φευκτέον παντὶ τρόπῳ. ἁπλῶς δὲ ἡγητέον ταύτας εἶναι καλὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς μὴ συμπεπλεγμένας λύπῃ μήτε μεταμέλειαν ἐμποιούσας μήτε βλάβης ἑτέρας γεννητικάς, μήτε τοῦ μετρίου πέρα χωρούσας, μήτε τῶν σπουδαίων ἡμᾶς ἔργων ἀφελκούσας ἐπὶ πολὺ ἢ καταδουλούσας. κυρίως δέ εἰσιν ἡδοναὶ αἱ τῇ κατανοήσει τοῦ θείου καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἐπιγινόμεναί πως ἢ συμπεπλεγμέναι, ἅσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ πρῶτον λόγον περισπουδάστοις θετέον, οὐκ εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἁπλῶς, οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν διαμονὴν τοῦ γένους, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ εὖ εἶναι καὶ σπουδαίοις καὶ θεοφιλέσιν εἶναι συντελούσας, καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν κατὰ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ νοερὸν τελειότητα, αἵπερ οὔτε θεραπεῖαί τινων παθῶν εἰσιν, ὡς αἱ τῆς ἐνδείας ἀναπληρωτικαί, οὔθ' ὅλως λύπην ἔχουσι προηγουμένην ἢ ἑπομένην ἢ ἀντικειμένην, ἀλλ' εἰσὶ καθαραὶ καὶ ἄμικτοι πάσης ὑλικῆς συμπλοκῆς, ψυχικαὶ μόνον οὖσαι. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ Πλάτωνα τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ ἀληθεῖς· ψευδεῖς μέν, ὅσαι μετ' αἰσθήσεως γίνονται καὶ δόξης οὐκ ἀληθοῦς, καὶ λύπας ἔχουσι συμπεπλεγμένας· ἀληθεῖς δὲ ὅσαι τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσι μόνης αὐτῆς καθ' ἑαυτὴν μετ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως, καθαραὶ καὶ ἀνεπίμικτοι λύπης, αἷς οὐδεμία μετάνοια παρακολουθεῖ ποτε. καλοῦσι δὲ τὰς ἐπακολουθούσας τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν ἡδονὰς οὐ πάθη ἀλλὰ πείσεις. τινὲς δὲ κυρίως τὴν τοιαύτην ἡδονὴν χαρὰν λέγουσιν. ὁρίζονται δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν γένεσιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητήν. ἔοικεν δὲ οὗτος ὁ ὅρος τῆς σωματικῆς μόνης ἡδονῆς εἶναι. αὕτη γὰρ ἀναπλήρωσίς τίς ἐστι καὶ ἰατρεία τῆς σωματικῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ τῆς προσγενομένης διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν λύπης. ῥιγοῦντες γὰρ ἢ διψῶντες τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ῥίγους καὶ τῆς δίψης θεραπεύοντες λύπην, ἐν τῷ θάλπεσθαι καὶ πίνειν ἡδόμεθα. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν εἰσιν ἀγαθαὶ καὶ οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὰς οὐδὲ φύσει. ὡς γὰρ τὸ ὑγιάζεσθαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν φύσει καὶ καθ' ἑαυτό· οὕτω καὶ αὗται κατὰ συμβεβηκός εἰσιν ἀγαθαί, ἰατρεῖαί τινες οὖσαι· αἱ δὲ τῆς θεωρίας ἡδοναὶ καθ' ἑαυτάς εἰσιν ἀγαθαὶ καὶ φύσει. οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐνδείᾳ γίνονται. δῆλον οὖν ἐντεῦθεν ὡς οὐ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ τῆς ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἀναπληρωτική. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐχ ὑγιὴς ὁ ὅρος ὁ λέγων γένεσιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητὴν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ γὰρ πάσας περιλαμβάνει τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀλλὰ παραλείπει τὴν ἐκ τῆς θεωρίας. καὶ Ἐπίκουρος δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁριζόμενος παντὸς τοῦ λυποῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσιν τὸ αὐτό φησι τοῖς λέγουσι γένεσιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητήν. τὴν γὰρ ἀπαλλαγὴν τοῦ λυποῦντος ἡδονὴν εἶναί φησιν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδεμία γένεσις τοῖς οἰκείοις ἀποτελέσμασιν ὁμογενής ἐστιν ἢ συγγενής, οὐδὲ τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἡγητέον, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἄλλο τι· ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἡ γένεσίς