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33 On the Dianoetic Faculty To the dianoetic faculty belong judgments and

assents and impulses to action and aversions and avoidances of action, and specifically, the thoughts of intelligible things and the virtues and the sciences and the principles of the arts and the deliberative and the preferential. To this also belongs that which through dreams divines for us the future, which alone the Pythagoreans, following the Hebrews, say is true divination. The organ of this also is the middle ventricle of the brain and the psychic pneuma in it.

34 On the Faculty of Memory The faculty of memory is the cause and storehouse of memory and

recollection; for memory is an image left from some sensation appearing in actuality, or the preservation of both sensation and thought. For the soul apprehends sensible things through the organs of sense, that is, it perceives, and opinion is formed, but intelligible things through the mind, and thought is formed; when, therefore, it preserves the imprints of what it has opined and what it has thought, it is said to remember. But it is necessary to know that the apprehension of intelligible things does not occur, except from learning or a natural concept, for not from sensation; for sensible things are remembered in themselves; but of intelligible things, if we have learned something, we remember it, but of their substance we have no memory. Recollection is said to be the recovery of memory that has been lost through forgetting. Forgetting is the loss of memory. Therefore, the imaginative faculty, apprehending material things through the senses, hands them over to the dianoetic or discursive faculty (for they are both the same); which, having received and judged them, sends them on to the faculty of memory. The organ of the faculty of memory is the posterior ventricle of the brain, which they also call the cerebellum, and the psychic pneuma in it.

35 On Internal and Expressed Reason Again, the rational part of the

soul is divided into internal reason and expressed reason. Internal reason is a movement of the soul occurring in the discursive faculty without any utterance; whence often in silence we go through an entire discourse within ourselves and converse in our dreams. In this respect especially we are all rational; for even those who are deaf from birth or who have lost their voice through some disease or affliction are no less rational. But expressed reason has its activity in the voice and in speech, that is, the reason uttered by means of the tongue and mouth; for which reason it is called expressed. It is the messenger of thought. In this respect we are also called speakers. 36 On Passion and Activity Passion is spoken of homonymously; for passion is spoken of both as bodily, such as diseases and wounds, and again passion is spoken of as psychical, such as desire and anger. Commonly and generally, passion is an affection of an animal which is followed by pleasure and pain; for pain follows passion. And passion itself is not pain; for things that suffer without sensation do not feel pain. Therefore passion is not pain, but the sensation of passion. And this must be of consequence, that is, great, so that it may fall under sensation. And of the psychical passions, the definition is this: Passion is a sensible movement of the appetitive faculty based on an image of good or evil. And otherwise: Passion is an irrational movement of the soul through a supposition of good or evil. The supposition of good moves desire, while the supposition of evil moves anger. But the generic, that is, common, passion they define thus: Passion is a movement in one thing from another. Activity, however, is an active movement; and active is said of that which moves of itself. Thus anger is an activity of the spirited part, but a passion of the two parts, of the soul and moreover of the whole body, when it is led violently by anger towards actions; for the movement has occurred in one thing from another, which is called passion. And in another way, activity

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33 Περὶ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ Τοῦ δὲ διανοητικοῦ εἰσιν αἵ τε κρίσεις καὶ αἱ

συγκαταθέσεις καὶ αἱ ὁρμαὶ πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν καὶ αἱ ἀφορμαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀποφυγαὶ τῆς πράξεως, ἰδικῶς δὲ αἵ τε νοήσεις τῶν νοητῶν καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οἱ λόγοι καὶ τὸ βουλευτικὸν καὶ τὸ προαιρετικόν. Τούτου δέ ἐστι τὸ καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀνείρων θεσπίζον ἡμῖν τὸ μέλλον, ἥνπερ μόνην ἀληθῆ μαντείαν οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ λέγουσιν εἶναι τοῖς Ἑβραίοις ἀκολουθήσαντες. Ὄργανον δὲ καὶ τούτου ἡ μέση κοιλία τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου καὶ τὸ ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ.

34 Περὶ τοῦ μνημονευτικοῦ Τὸ δὲ μνημονευτικόν ἐστι μνήμης καὶ

ἀναμνήσεως αἴτιόν τε καὶ ταμιεῖον· μνήμη γάρ ἐστι φαντασία ἐγκαταλελειμμένη ἀπό τινος αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν φαινομένης ἢ σωτηρία αἰσθήσεώς τε καὶ νοήσεως. Ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἀντιλαμβάνεται ἤγουν αἰσθάνεται, καὶ γίνεται δόξα, τῶν δὲ νοητῶν διὰ τοῦ νοῦ, καὶ γίνεται νόησις· ὅταν οὖν τοὺς τύπους, ὧν τε ἐδόξασεν, ὧν τε ἐνόησεν, διασῴζῃ, μνημονεύειν λέγεται. ∆εῖ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὅτι ἡ τῶν νοητῶν ἀντίληψις οὐ γίνεται, εἰ μὴ ἐκ μαθήσεως ἢ φυσικῆς ἐννοίας, οὐ γὰρ ἐξ αἰσθήσεως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ μνημονεύεται· τὰ δὲ νοητά, εἴ τι μὲν ἐμάθομεν, μνημονεύομεν, τῆς δὲ οὐσίας αὐτῶν μνήμην οὐκ ἔχομεν. Ἀνάμνησις δὲ λέγεται μνήμης ἀπολλυμένης ὑπὸ λήθης ἀνάκτησις. Λήθη δέ ἐστι μνήμης ἀποβολή. Τὸ μὲν οὖν φανταστικὸν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀντιλαμβανόμενον τῶν ὑλῶν παραδίδωσι τῷ διανοητικῷ ἢ διαλογιστικῷ (ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἀμφότερα)· ὃ παραλαβὸν καὶ κρῖναν παραπέμπει τῷ μνημονευτικῷ. Ὄργανον δὲ τοῦ μνημονευτικοῦ ἡ ὄπισθεν κοιλία τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου, ἣν καὶ παρεγκεφαλίδα καλοῦσι, καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα.

35 Περὶ ἐνδιαθέτου λόγου καὶ προφορικοῦ Πάλιν δὲ διαιρεῖται τὸ λογικὸν τῆς

ψυχῆς εἴς τε τὸν ἐνδιάθετον λόγον καὶ εἰς τὸν προφορικόν. Ἔστι δὲ ἐνδιάθετος μὲν λόγος κίνημα ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ διαλογιστικῷ γινόμενον ἄνευ τινὸς ἐκφωνήσεως· ὅθεν πολλάκις σιωπῶντες λόγον ὅλον παρ' ἑαυτοῖς διεξερχόμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὀνείροις διαλεγόμεθα. Κατὰ τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα λογικοὶ πάντες ἐσμέν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐκ γεννετῆς κωφοὶ ἢ καὶ οἱ διά τι νόσημα ἢ πάθος τὴν φωνὴν ἀποβαλόντες οὐδὲν ἧττον λογικοί εἰσιν. Ὁ δὲ προφορικὸς λόγος ἐν τῇ φωνῇ καὶ ταῖς διαλέκτοις τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει, ἤγουν ὁ διὰ γλώσσης καὶ στόματος προφερόμενος λόγος· διὸ καὶ προφορικὸς λέγεται. Ἔστι δὲ ἄγγελος νοήματος. Κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ λαλητικοὶ λεγόμεθα. 36 Περὶ πάθους καὶ ἐνεργείασ Τὸ πάθος ὁμωνύμως λέγεται· λέγεται γὰρ πάθος καὶ τὸ σωματικὸν ὡς τὰ νοσήματα καὶ τὰ ἕλκη, λέγεται πάλιν πάθος καὶ τὸ ψυχικόν, ἥ τε ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός. Ἔστι δὲ κοινῶς μὲν καὶ γενικῶς πάθος ζῴου, ᾧ ἕπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη· ἕπεται γὰρ τῷ πάθει λύπη. Καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος ἐστὶ λύπη· τὰ γὰρ ἀναίσθητα πάσχοντα οὐκ ἀλγεῖ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πάθος ἐστὶν ἄλγημα, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ πάθους αἴσθησις. ∆εῖ δὲ τοῦτο ἀξιόλογον εἶναι ἤγουν μέγα, ἵνα τῇ αἰσθήσει ὑποπέσῃ. Τῶν δὲ ψυχικῶν παθῶν ὅρος ἐστὶν οὗτος· Πάθος ἐστὶ κίνησις τῆς ὀρεκτικῆς δυνάμεως αἰσθητὴ ἐπὶ φαντασίᾳ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ. Καὶ ἄλλως· Πάθος ἐστὶ κίνησις ἄλογος τῆς ψυχῆς δι' ὑπόληψιν καλοῦ ἢ κακοῦ. Ἡ μὲν ὑπόληψις τοῦ καλοῦ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν κινεῖ, ἡ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ὑπόληψις τὸν θυμόν. Τὸ δὲ γενικὸν ἤγουν κοινὸν πάθος οὕτως ὁρίζονται· Πάθος ἐστὶ κίνησις ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἐξ ἑτέρου. Ἐνέργεια δέ ἐστι κίνησις δραστική· δραστικὸν δὲ λέγεται τὸ ἐξ αὑτοῦ κινούμενον. Οὕτως καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἐνέργεια μέν ἐστι τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς, πάθος δὲ τῶν δύο μερῶν, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ προσέτι παντὸς τοῦ σώματος, ὅταν ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ βιαίως ἄγηται πρὸς τὰς πράξεις· ἐξ ἑτέρου γὰρ ἐν ἑτέρῳ γέγονεν ἡ κίνησις, ὅπερ λέγεται πάθος. Καὶ καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον ἡ ἐνέργεια