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(14S_160> The good is present: For the more things in creation descend into what is denser and more material, the less they partake of the good, through a privation and a lack, as if from a faint and final echo; for as we have said, suppose someone shouts loudly; and those who are near and have strong hearing will receive the whole shout and understand what was spoken, but those who are far away will, in proportion to their distance, hear less of the sound, and those who are very far distant will perceive it most faintly, as a last echo.

And its own privation: That which is not wholly deprived of the beautiful, but only partially, causes even that which is deprived of the good to subsist, by partaking of the good in some way at all; for evil is not the partial, but the complete lack of the good.

And the things that fight against it: See how he says that even the things that fight against the power of the good have their subsistence and are preserved through it. Is God then the cause of evils? May it not be! For God, as the principle and creator of all things, through an excess of goodness and an ineffable love, endures even sinners, in order to show His own love for mankind, and the free will of His creature; for it is said: "love bears all things"; and again "who makes his sun rise on the just and on the unjust."

But in every way. His purpose is to show that there is no substance that is simply evil-in-itself; and he says that nothing among existing things and in creation is completely devoid of the good; for things that are in every way devoid of the good, since they were not brought forth by the good, do not even exist. What other creator is there? But neither can anything subsist which does not partake of the disposition, (14S_162> that is, the quality, of the good accidentally; for many things, even when abandoned by their acquired disposition, that is, quality, remain in subsistence; for example, iron, having been heated and having acquired extreme heat, when the fire is extinguished, remains what it was; and water, the element in itself is said to be without quality, but passing through earth, it acquires quality from there; and yet, when diverted, it ceases to have that quality, and still subsists; so also things that are snowed upon and chilled, when the coldness ceases, still subsist. But also things devoid of life, like trees, and stones, and stars, and those of mind, like cattle, nevertheless subsist. And God is removed from substance, being supersubstantial, and yet He is and presides; but it is not possible to say this in the case of the good; for if something did not partake of the quality of the good, in which it must subsist, it cannot have its being, "for in him we live and are," as the Apostle says. What then? Is the licentious man, in his licentiousness, not deprived of the good? And yet he subsists; and he says that according to licentiousness itself, being in privation of the good, it does not properly exist, but neither does it desire non-beings; for what is licentiousness-in-itself apart from the form of being licentious? Nevertheless, since according to a false opinion he seems to cling to some good and to be united in friendship with that which is corrupted along with him, even if the friendship seems to be corrupt, it is nevertheless a faint echo of divine love, and through the good he has an image; for one must not be ignorant that, when the rational part of the soul is overcome by the irrational part, it is prevented from performing its proper activities, and so it comes to share the opinion of the irrational part, (14S_164> so as neither to control its impulses, nor to concur with its actions for false opinions are not opinions of the rational part, nor are false thoughts among the thoughts of the rational part; for false thoughts are not properly thoughts. Hence even the irascible man sometimes attacks in error; nevertheless he is not devoid of good, thinking he is using his anger for the correction of the one being punished, and the shameful man likewise, supposing pleasure to be a good end. Therefore, from this, even those who fight against God are permitted to exist, because they exist entirely from the good; for that which is not deprived of the beautiful, but partially so, causes that which is deprived of the good to subsist, by partaking at all of some good. For evil is not the partial, but the complete lack of the good;

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(14S_160> Παρέστι τἀγαθόν: Ὅσον γάρ ἐπί τό παχύτερον καί ὑλικώτερον ὑποβαίνει τά ἐν δημιουργίᾳ, τοσοῦτον κατά στέρησιν καί ἔλλειψιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἧττον μετέχει, ὡς ἐξ ἀμυδροῦ καί ἐσχάτου ἀπηχήματος· ὡς γάρ ἔφημεν, ἤδη ὑπόθου τινά βοῆσαι μέγα· καί τούς μέν πλησίον ὄντας καί ἐρρωμένους τό ἀκουστικόν ὅλην δέξασθαι τήν βοήν καί γνῶναι καί τό λαληθέν, τούς δέ ἀφεστηκότας ἀναλόγως τῇ διαστάσει ἧττον ἀκοῦσαι τοῦ φθέγματος, τούς δέ πάνυ πόρρω διεστηκότας ἀμυδρότατα ὡς ἀπηχήματος ὑστάτου ποσῶς αἰσθέσθαι.

Καί τήν ἑαυτοῦ στέρησιν: Τό μή ὅλως ἐστερημένον τοῦ καλοῦ, ἀλλά μερικῶς, καί αὐτό τό ἐστερημένον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, συνεστάναι ποιεῖ, τῷ ὅλως κατά τι μετέχειν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· οὐ γάρ ἡ μερική, ἀλλ' ἡ παντελής ἔλλειψις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστι τό κακόν.

Καί τά μαχόμενα αὐτῷ: Ὅρα πῶς φησιν, ὅτι καί τά μαχόμενα τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δι' αὐτοῦ ὑπέστη καί σῴζεται. Οὑκοῦν αἴτιος τῶν κακῶν ὁ Θεός; Μή γένοιτο! Ὁ μέν γάρ Θεός, ὡς πάντων ἀρχή καί δημιουργός, δι' ὑπερβολήν ἀγαθότητος καί δι' ἀγάπην ἄφατον, καί ἁμαρτωλῶν ἀνέχεται, ἵνα καί τήν ἰδίαν δείξη φιλανθρωπίαν, καί τό τοῦ πλάσματος αὐτεξούσιον· εἴρηται γάρ· «ἡ ἀγάπη πάντα στέγει»· καί πάλιν «ὁ ἀνατέλλων τόν ἥλιον αὐτοῦ ἐπί δικαίους καί ἀδίκους».

Τό δέ κατά πάντα τρόπον. Τό προκείμενον αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἀποδεῖξαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία τό ἁπλῶς αὐτόκακον· καί φησιν, ὅτι οὐδέν τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι καί ἐν δημιουργίᾳ ἀμέτοχόν ἐστι παντελῶς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· τά γάρ πάντῃ ἄμοιρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς μηδέ παραχθέντα ὑπό τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὔτε εἰσί. Τίς ἄλλος δημιουργός; Ἀλλ' οὔτε δύναταί τι ὑφεστάναι, μή τῆς ἕξεως, (14S_162> ἤτοι ποιότητος, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετέχον κατά συμβεβηκός· πολλά μέν γάρ καί καταλειφθέντα ὑπό τῆς προσγενομένης ἕξεως, ἤτοι ποιότητος, μένει συνεστῶτα· οἷον ὁ σίδηρος πυρωθείς καί θερμότητος ἄκρας μεταλαβών, σβεσθέντος τοῦ πυρός, μένει ὅπερ ἦν· καί τό ὕδωρ καθ' ἑαυτό μέν τό στοιχεῖον ἄποιον λέγεται εἶναι, διά δέ γῆς παριόν, ἐκεῖθεν ποιοῦται· καί ὅμως μετοχετευθέν, παύεται τῆς ποιότητος, καί ἔτι συνέστηκεν· οὕτω καί τά χιονιζόμενα καί ψυχόμενα, παυσαμένης τῆς ψυχρότητος, ἔτι συνέστηκεν, Ἀλλά καί τά ζωῆς ἄμοιρα, ὡς δένδρα, καί λίθοι, καί ἄστρα, καί τά νοῦ, ὡς τά κτήνη, ὅμως ὑφίσταται. Καί οὐσίας δέ ὁ Θεός ἐξῄρηται ὑπερούσιος ὤν, καί ὅμως ἐστί καί πρόεστιν· οὕτω δέ καί οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἐπί τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· εἰ μή γάρ μετέχοι ποιότητος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ συνίστασθαι χρή, οὐ δύναται ὑφεστάναι «ἐν αὐτῷ γάρ ζῶμεν καί ἐσμέν», ὥς φησιν ὁ Ἀπόστολος. Τί οὖν; ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἐν τῷ ἀκολασταίνειν οὐκ ἐστέρηται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; καί ὅμως ὑφέστηκε· καί φησί μέν κατ' αὐτό τό ἀκολασταίνειν, ὡς ἐν στερήσει ὤν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κυρίως οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὔτε ὄντων ἐκθυμεῖ· τί γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοακολασία δίχα τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ ἀκολασταίνειν; Ὅμως, ἐπειδή κατά ψευδοδοξίαν δοκεῖ αὐτός ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἔχεσθαι καί ἡνῶσθαι κατά φιλίαν τῷ συμφθειρομένῳ αὐτῷ, κἄν διεφθαρμένη δοκῇ ἡ φιλία εἶναι, ὅμως τοῦ θείου ἔρωτος ἀμυδρόν ἐστιν ἀπήχημα, καί διά τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαντασίαν ἔχει· οὐ γάρ δεῖ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι, ὅταν κρατηθῇ ὑπό τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τό λογικόν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐμποδίζεται μέν τά οἰκεῖα ἐνεργεῖν, συνδοξάζει δέ οὕτω λοιπόν τῷ ἀλόγῳ, (14S_164> ὡς μήτε κρατεῖν αὐτοῦ τῶν ὁρμῶν, μήτε συμψηφίζεσθαι ταῖς πράξεσιν αἱ γάρ ψευδοδοξίαι οὔκ εἰσι τοῦ λογικοῦ δόξαι, οὔτε αἱ ψευδεῖς διάνοιαι τῶν διανοιῶν τοῦ λογικοῦ μέρους· οὔτε γάρ διάνοιαι κυρίως αἱ ψευδεῖς. Ἔνθεν καί ὁ θυμικός ἔσθ' ὅτε ἐσφαλμένως ἐπέξεισιν· ὅμως οὐκ ἄμοιρος ἀγαθοῦ, δοκῶν ἐπί διορθώσει τοῦ κολαζομένου τῷ θυμῷ χρῆσθαι, καί ὁ αἰσχρός οὕτως ὑπονοῶν ἀγαθόν τέλος τήν ἡδονήν. Ἐκ τούτου οὖν καί οἱ θεομαχοῦντες, διά τό ὅλως εἶναι ὑπό τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, συγχωροῦνται· τό γάρ μή ἐστερημένον τοῦ καλοῦ, ἀλλά μερικῶς αὐτό τό ἐστερημένον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ συνεστάναι, ποιεῖ τό ὅλως μετέχειν τι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Οὐ γάρ ἡ μερική, ἀλλ' ἡ παντελής ἔλλειψις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστι τό κακόν·