Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality; and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and not only what it thinks. Therefore it knows both at once, both the intelligible object and that it is thinking it and is being thought by its thinking self. 169 Every Intellect has in eternity its substance and its power and its activity. For if it thinks itself and Intellect and the intelligible are the same, intellection is also the same as Intellect and as the intelligible; for being intermediate between that which thinks and that which is thought, since they are the same, intellection too will surely be the same with respect to both. But that the substance of Intellect is eternal, is <clear>; for it exists all at once. And intellection likewise, if it is the same as the substance; for if Intellect is unmoved, it would not be measured by time either in its being or in its activity. And since these are so, its power is also eternal. 170 Every Intellect thinks all things at once; but the unparticipated Intellect thinks all things simply, while each of those after it thinks all things in terms of one. For if every Intellect has established its own substance in eternity and its activity along with its substance, every Intellect will think all things at once. For if it thinks part by part, and one thing after another sequentially, it does not exist in eternity; for everything sequential is in time; for the sequential involves a "before" and "after," but not "all at once." If, then, all Intellects think all things in the same way, they will not differ from one another. For if they think all things in the same way, they are all things in the same way, being what they think; and being all things in the same way, one is not unparticipated and another not. For those whose intellections are the same, their substances are also the same, if the intellection of each is identical with the being of each, and each is both, both intellection and being. It remains, then, if they do not think in the same way, that either each thinks <not> all things, but one; or more than one, but still not all; or all things in terms of one. But to say that an Intellect does not think all things is to make it ignorant of some of the things that are; for it will not pass over and think what it did not think before, being unmoved; and it will be worse than a soul which, in its movement, thinks all things, because it remains thinking only one thing. Therefore it will think all things in terms of one (for either all things, or one, or all things in terms of one), since its intellection is always of all things and in all things, but defines the all by one of the all; so that there is some one thing dominant in its intellection and in the things it thinks, all things being thought at once in accordance with the one, and the one characterizing all things for it. 171 Every Intellect is an indivisible substance. For if it is without magnitude, incorporeal, and unmoved, it is indivisible. For everything that is in any way divisible is divisible either in respect of multitude or magnitude, or its activities which proceed in time; but Intellect is in all respects eternal, and beyond bodies, and the multitude in it is unified; therefore it is indivisible. Now, that Intellect is incorporeal, its reversion upon itself makes clear; for no body reverts upon itself. That it is eternal, the identity of its activity with its substance shows; for this has been demonstrated before. That its multitude is unified, the continuity of the intellectual multitude with the divine henads shows; for the henads are the first multitude, and the Intellects are after them. If, therefore, every Intellect is also a multitude, it is a unified multitude; for before the divided is the contracted, and nearer to the One. 172 Every Intellect is the proximate hypostasis of things eternal and immutable in substance. For everything produced from an unmoved cause is immutable in its substance; but Intellect is unmoved, being in every way eternal and abiding in eternity. And by its very being it produces whatever it produces; and if it always is, and is in the same way, it always produces, and in the same way; therefore it is not the cause of things that sometimes are and sometimes are not, but of things that always are. 173 Every Intellect is, intellectually, both the things before it and the things after it; for it is causally what is after it, but by participation what is before it; but it is itself Intellect and has been allotted an intellectual substance; therefore according to its own existence it defines all things, both those which exist causally and those which exist by participation. For each thing participates in its superiors according to its own nature, but not as they are in themselves. For then it would be participated in by all things in the same way; but different things participate in different ways; therefore participations are according to the particularity and power of the participants. Therefore the things before it are in Intellect intellectually. But indeed the things after it are also intellectually. For it is not from its effects, nor does it have them in itself, but the causes of them; and it is the cause of all things by its being; and its being is intellectual; and the

καὶ ὁρᾷ ἑαυτόν. ὁρῶν δὲ νοοῦντα καὶ ὁρῶντα γινώσκων, οἶδεν ὅτι νοῦς ἐστι κατ' ἐνέργειαν· τοῦτο δὲ εἰδώς, οἶδεν ὅτι νοεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ἃ νοεῖ μόνον. ἅμα ἄρα ἄμφω οἶδε, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ ὅτι νοεῖ ἐκεῖνο καὶ νοεῖται ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ νοοῦντος. 169 Πᾶς νοῦς ἐν αἰῶνι τήν τε οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ καὶ ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν, καὶ ἡ νόησις τῷ νῷ ταὐτὸν καὶ τῷ νοητῷ· μέση γὰρ οὖσα τοῦ τε νοοῦντος καὶ τοῦ νοουμένου, τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ὄντων, ἔσται δήπου καὶ ἡ νόησις ἡ αὐτὴ πρὸς ἄμφω. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ νοῦ αἰώνιος, <δῆλον>· ὅλη γὰρ ἅμα ἐστί. καὶ ἡ νόησις ὡσαύτως, εἴπερ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ταὐτόν· εἰ γὰρ ἀκίνητος ὁ νοῦς, οὐκ ἂν ὑπὸ χρόνου μετροῖτο οὔτε κατὰ τὸ εἶναι οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τούτων δὲ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων, καὶ ἡ δύναμις αἰώνιος. 170 Πᾶς νοῦς πάντα ἅμα νοεῖ· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀμέθεκτος ἁπλῶς πάντα, τῶν δὲ μετ' ἐκεῖνον ἕκαστος καθ' ἓν πάντα. εἰ γὰρ ἅπας νοῦς ἐν αἰῶνι τήν τε οὐσίαν ἱδρύσατο τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἅμα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, πάντα ἅμα νοήσει πᾶς. εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἐφεξῆς, οὐκ ἐν αἰῶνι· τὸ γὰρ ἐφεξῆς ἐν χρόνῳ πᾶν· πρότερον γὰρ καὶ ὕστερον τὸ ἐφεξῆς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοῦ πᾶν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως πάντα νοήσουσι πάντες, οὐ διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων. εἰ γὰρ ὁμοίως πάντα νοοῦσιν, ὁμοίως πάντα εἰσίν, ἃ νοοῦσιν ὄντες· ὁμοίως δὲ πάντα ὄντες, οὐχ ὁ μὲν ἀμέθεκτος, ὁ δὲ οὔ. ὧν γὰρ αἱ νοήσεις αἱ αὐταί, καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι, εἴπερ ἡ νόησις ἡ ἑκάστου ταὐτὸν τῷ ἑκάστῳ εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστος ἄμφω, καὶ ἡ νόησις καὶ τὸ εἶναι. λείπεται δὴ οὖν, εἰ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ <μὴ> πάντα νοεῖν ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' ἕν· ἢ πλείω, μὴ πάντα δὲ ὅμως· ἢ πάντα καθ' ἕν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν μὴ πάντα νοεῖν λέγειν νοῦν ἐστι ποιεῖν ἀγνοοῦντά τι τῶν ὄντων· οὐδὲ γὰρ μεταβήσεται καὶ νοήσει ἃ μὴ πρότερον, ἀκίνητος ὤν· καὶ ἔσται ψυχῆς χείρων τῆς ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι πάντα νοούσης, διὰ τὸ μένειν ἓν μόνον νοῶν. πάντα ἄρα νοήσει καθ' ἕν (ἢ γὰρ πάντα ἢ ἓν ἢ πάντα καθ' ἕν), τῆς νοήσεως ἀεὶ μὲν καὶ ἐν πᾶσι πάντων οὔσης, τὰ δὲ πάντα ἑνὶ τῶν πάντων ὁριζούσης· ὥστε εἶναί τι κρατοῦν ἐν τῇ νοήσει καὶ τοῖς νοουμένοις ἕν, πάντων ἅμα κατὰ τὸ ἓν νοουμέ νων, καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα χαρακτηρίζοντος. 171 Πᾶς νοῦς ἀμέριστός ἐστιν οὐσία. εἰ γὰρ ἀμεγέθης καὶ ἀσώματος καὶ ἀκίνητος, ἀμέριστός ἐστι. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν μεριστὸν ἢ κατὰ πλῆθος ἢ κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ μεριστὸν ἐν χρόνῳ φερομένας· ὁ δὲ νοῦς κατὰ πάντα αἰώνιος, καὶ ἐπέκεινα σωμάτων, καὶ ἥνωται τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ πλῆθος· ἀμέριστος ἄρα ἐστίν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀσώματος ὁ νοῦς, ἡ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστροφὴ δηλοῖ· τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων οὐδὲν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφεται. ὅτι δὲ αἰώνιος, ἡ τῆς ἐνεργείας πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν ταυτότης· οὕτω γὰρ δέδεικται πρότερον. ὅτι δὲ ἥνωται τὸ πλῆθος, ἡ πρὸς τὰς ἑνάδας τὰς θείας τοῦ νοεροῦ πλήθους συνέχεια· αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσι πρῶτον πλῆθος, οἱ δὲ νόες μετ' ἐκείνας. εἰ οὖν καὶ πλῆθος ἅπας νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἡνωμένον πλῆθος· πρὸ γὰρ τοῦ διῃρημένου τὸ συν επτυγμένον καὶ ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ἑνός. 172 Πᾶς νοῦς ἀϊδίων ἐστὶ προσεχῶς καὶ ἀμεταβλήτων κατ' οὐσίαν ὑποστάτης. τὸ γὰρ ἀπὸ ἀκινήτου παραγόμενον αἰτίας ἅπαν ἀμετάβλητόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· νοῦς δὲ ἀκίνητος, αἰώνιος πάντῃ ὢν καὶ ἐν αἰῶνι μένων. καὶ τῷ εἶναι παράγει ἃ ἂν παράγῃ· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ἔστι καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔστιν, ἀεὶ παράγει καὶ ὡσαύτως· οὐκ ἄρα ποτὲ μὲν ὄντων, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ ὄντων αἴτιος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων. 173 Πᾶς νοῦς νοερῶς ἐστι καὶ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ μετ' αὐτόν· τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι κατ' αἰτίαν, ὅσα μετ' αὐτόν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μέθεξιν, ὅσα πρὸ αὐτοῦ· νοῦς δὲ αὐτός ἐστι καὶ νοερὰν ἔλαχεν οὐσίαν· κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρα ὕπαρξιν ἀφορίζει πάντα, καὶ ἃ κατ' αἰτίαν ἐστὶ καὶ ἃ κατὰ μέθεξιν. καὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον, ὡς πέφυκεν, οὕτω μετέχει τῶν κρειττόνων, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἐκεῖνα ἔστιν. ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ὡσαύτως ὑπὸ πάντων μετείχετο· μετέχει δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλως· κατὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα ἄρα τῶν μετεχόντων καὶ δύναμιν αἱ μεθέξεις. νοερῶς ἄρα ἐν τῷ νῷ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ μετ' αὐτὸν νοερῶς ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἐστίν, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὰς αἰτίας τὰς ἐκείνων· ἔστι δὲ πάντων τῷ εἶναι αἴτιος· τὸ δὲ εἶναι αὐτοῦ νοερόν· καὶ τὰ