it will campaign against His glory to think that others are also able to create and to call into existence the things that once were not; for it is not right to say that the properties and excellences of the divine and ineffable nature can naturally inhere in any of those things that have come to be from it. But rather it will befit her and her alone, and this thing will be for her highest renown; for the properties of the highest substance alone and specifically are inaccessible to creation, as I just said. And one of such things we say is also the ability to work creatively and to bring into existence the things that once were not. Then how could a generated and created nature, which must in every way and entirely be subject to corruption, according to the principles inherent in its nature, I say, how could it perform the works of God? 2.40 For if creating is understood in God as a mode of knowledge, one might not grant beyond reason that the knowledge of how to create has been given by him to creation, since indeed we ourselves sometimes create things, having the underlying matter and using skill concerning these things; but if, as I said, it is an activity and power of a magnificent nature, and to create in a manner befitting God is beyond the measures of creation, why do they drag down the dignity of the highest nature and bestow it upon those in generation and corruption according to their own opinion? Then they think they understand something necessary, but rather they slander the divine words; for they say the unbegotten allowed the begotten to be able to fulfill his own and only works. But yes, they say, for it was surely necessary that if anything came from God, this would certainly be better than to die and to perish. Then, O best of men, did the Creator begrudge some, and not allow them to partake of the most beautiful, but did he inject it, as it were, into the worse things, by not enduring to create them himself? Did he then fear necessity not allowing him to be able to make mortal things, or perhaps he was altogether ignorant of it. If then they say he was ignorant, creation knows something more than he does; for it creates, as they themselves say, things subject to corruption. But if, passing over this, they will affirm that he knew, how is it the mark of a good being not to do what he knows is good? for surely the immortal is better than the mortal. 2.41 Then in addition to these things, I think it is not ignorant, but rather wise, to say that as well. For they say that the gods to whom they say the King and Lord of all entrusted creating are not immortal, but are bound together and dissoluble and remain for a time outside of perishing, with God willing them to be in these conditions. Since, therefore, nothing is incorruptible or immortal or indissoluble by its own nature, how could they not be ignorant, saying that the God of all did not endure to create the three mortal kinds, but rather handed this over to others to do? But leaving aside the nonsense of the Greeks, we say that the Creator made what is diverse and multiform in creation, and what is different from another and not the same in both genus and species, using his most god-befitting authority. For, as I said, nothing is immortal or indissoluble; but the will of God for each of the things he has made, this is its nature, and it reaches without any hesitation even to the things among us; for he is one and alone, having learned this from no other; for this thing is not a form of knowledge, but a god-befitting advantage of his own nature, belonging to it and it alone, just as, of course, are the other dignities, which are by no means accessible to begotten beings, but are allotted, as I said, to it and it alone by nature. And that it is among the most exceedingly absurd things for us to attribute the work of creation to other gods, removing it from the God who is so by nature and in truth, one might perceive even from his own teachers. 2.42 For thus writes Hermes, surnamed Trismegistus, to Asclepius concerning the
καταστρατεύσεται δόξης τὸ καὶ ἑτέρους οἴεσθαι δημιουργεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ καλεῖν εἰς ὕπαρξιν τὰ οὐκ ὄντα ποτέ· οὐ γάρ τοι θέμις εἰπεῖν τὰ τῆς θείας καὶ ἀπορρήτου φύσεως ἴδια καὶ ἐξαίρετα φυσικῶς ἐνεῖναι δύνασθαί τισι τῶν παρ' αὐτῆς γεγονότων. Ἁρμόσει δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτῇ τε καὶ μόνῃ καὶ πρὸς εὐκλείας ἔσται τῆς ἀνωτάτω τὸ χρῆμα αὐτῇ· ἀνέμβατα γὰρ τῇ κτίσει, καθάπερ ἔφην ἀρτίως, τὰ μόνης καὶ ἰδικῶς τῆς ἀνωτάτω πασῶν οὐσίας. Ἓν δὲ δὴ τῶν τοιούτων εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν δύνασθαι δημιουργικῶς καὶ παρακομίζειν εἰς ὕπαρξιν τὰ οὐκ ὄντα ποτέ. Εἶτα πῶς γενετὴ καὶ πεποιημένη φύσις, ᾗ καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι δεῖν πάντη τε καὶ πάντως ἕποιτο ἄν, κατά γέ φημι τοὺς ἐνόντας τῇ φύσει λόγους, ἐνεργήσειε ἂν τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ; 2.40 Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἐπιστήμης νοεῖται τρόπος ἐν Θεῷ τὸ δημιουργεῖν, οὐχὶ πέρα λόγου δοίη τις ἂν τὸ δεδόσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ τῇ κτίσει τὸ εἰδέναι δημιουργεῖν, ἐπεί τοι καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ δημιουργοῦμεν ἔσθ' ὅτε τινά, ὕλην ἔχοντες τὴν ὑποκειμένην καὶ εὐτεχνίᾳ τῇ περὶ ταῦτα χρώμενοι· εἰ δὲ φύσεως, ὡς ἔφην, μεγαλοπρεποῦς ἐνέργειά τε καὶ δύναμις, καὶ τῶν τῆς κτίσεως ἐπέκεινα μέτρων τὸ δημιουργεῖν ἐστι θεοπρεπῶς, τί τὸ τῆς ἀνωτάτω φύσεως ἀξίωμα κατασύρουσι καὶ τοῖς ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ δωροῦνται κατὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς δοκοῦν; Εἶτά τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων οἴονται νοεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰς θείας συκοφαντοῦσι φωνάς· ἐπιτρέψαι γάρ φασι τὸν ἀγένητον τοῖς γενητοῖς τὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ μόνου δύνασθαι πληροῦν. Ἀλλὰ ναί, φασίν, ἦν γὰρ δήπου καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ παρὰ Θεοῦ γένοιτό τι, τοῦτο δὴ πάντως κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ τεθνάναι καὶ φθείρεσθαι. Εἶτα, ὦ βέλτιστοι, διεφθόνησεν ἄρα τισὶν ὁ ∆ημιουργός, καὶ οὐκ ἐφῆκεν αὐτοῖς τοῦ καλλίστου μεταλαχεῖν, ἐνῆκε δὲ ὥσπερ τοῖς χείροσι, διὰ τοῦ μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι δημιουργεῖν αὐτά. ∆έδιεν ἄρα τὴν ἀνάγκην οὐκ ἐφιεῖσαν αὐτῷ τὸ ποιεῖν δύνασθαι θνητά, ἢ τάχα που καὶ ἠγνόησεν ὅλως. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἠγνοηκέναι φασὶν αὐτόν, οἶδεν αὐτοῦ τι πλέον ἡ κτίσις· κτίζει γάρ, ὡς αὐτοί φασι, τὰ ὑπὸ φθοράν. Εἰ δὲ δὴ τοῦτο παρέντες εἰδέναι διαβεβαιώσονται, πῶς ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὴ δρᾶν ὅπερ οἶδεν ὑπάρχον ἀγαθόν; ἄμεινον δὲ δήπου τοῦ θνητοῦ τὸ ἀθάνατον. 2.41 Εἶτα πρὸς τούτοις οὐκ ἀμαθὲς οἶμαί που, μᾶλλον δὲ σοφόν, κἀκεῖνο εἰπεῖν. Τοὺς γάρ τοι θεοὺς οἷς ἐπιτρέψαι φασὶ τὸν τῶν ὅλων Βασιλέα καὶ Κύριον τὸ δημιουργεῖν οὐκ ἀθανάτους εἶναί φασιν, ἀλλὰ συνδεθέντας καὶ λυομένους καὶ ἔξω τοῦ φθείρεσθαι μένοντας τέως, ἐν τούτοις αὐτοὺς ἐθέλοντος εἶναι Θεοῦ. Ὅτε τοίνυν κατ' ἰδίαν φύσιν ἄφθαρτον ἢ ἀθάνατον ἢ ἄλυτον οὐδέν, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἶεν ἀμαθεῖς οὐκ ἀνασχέσθαι λέγοντες τὸν τῶν ὅλων Θεὸν τὰ τρία θνητὰ δημιουργῆσαι γένη, παραδοῦναι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑτέροις τοῦτο δρᾶν; Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸν Ἑλλήνων ἀφέντες λῆρόν φαμεν ὅτι τὸ ἐν κτίσει ποικίλον καὶ πολυειδὲς καὶ τὸ ἄλλως ἄλλο καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν ὡς ἐν γένει τε καὶ εἴδει πεποίηκεν ὁ ∆ημιουργός, ἐξουσίᾳ χρώμενος τῇ θεοπρεπεστάτῃ. Ἀθάνατον μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔφην, ἢ ἄλυτον οὐδέν· ἡ δὲ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ τῶν πεποιημένων τοῦ Θεοῦ βούλησις, τοῦτο φύσις αὐτῷ, καθικνεῖται δὲ παντὸς ὄκνου δίχα καὶ μέχρι τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς· εἷς γάρ ἐστι καὶ μόνος, οὐ παρ' ἑτέρου τοῦτο μαθών· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιστήμης εἶδος τὸ χρῆμά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ φύσεως τῆς αὐτοῦ πλεονέκτημα θεοπρεπές, αὐτῇ τε καὶ μόνῃ προσπεφυκός, καθάπερ ἀμέλει καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἀξιωμάτων, ἃ βάσιμα μὲν ἥκιστά γε τοῖς γενητοῖς ἐστιν, ἐκνενέμηται δέ, ὡς ἔφην, αὐτῇ τε καὶ μόνῃ φυσικῶς. Ὅτι δέ ἐστι τῶν ἄγαν ἐκτοπωτάτων ἑτέροις ἡμᾶς ἀναθεῖναι θεοῖς τῆς δημιουργίας τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἀφιστῶντας αὐτὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀληθῶς, κἀκ τῶν αὐτοῦ διδασκάλων κατίδοι τις ἄν. 2.42 Γράφει γὰρ οὕτως Ἀσκληπιῷ ὁ ἐπίκλην Τρισμέγιστος Ἑρμῆς περὶ τῆς τοῦ