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of which we wish to grasp the scientific theory. It is impossible, therefore, for an irrefutable proof to come from negations. Proofs come from affirmations; for if I wish to prove that man is rational, I do not say that 52 he is not inanimate; for many other things are not inanimate, even irrational ones. I must therefore prove this: man is receptive of sciences. Everything receptive of sciences is rational. Therefore, man is rational. Even if, then, we have knowledge of God, even if it were perfect, we have it from negations, saying that he is incorporeal. But incorporeal is a negation of body. He is immortality, without beginning, unchangeable. Even if, then, at the end of things a perfect knowledge of God should exist, it is not that which God himself has of himself; for he does not know himself to be unbegotten by the negation of what is begotten, as the Eunomians themselves wish; for he does not know himself to be immortal by the privation of death. We, from the privation of what we know, know what immortal is. But we are not able through scientific knowledge to attain to that which is spoken of as opposite to death, and we speak of him by the privation of death, by the negation of death, and all such things, for example, invisible; we do not learn that he is invisible by some affirmation, but since we know what is visible, having sensation and sight, we grasp the invisible by the privation of this state. I say these things because of the followers of Eunomius, that it is impossible to have the same knowledge of God that God has of himself. It is not that which God himself has of himself. And another thing: our knowledge is a disposition of the soul. But dispositions admit of more and less. But the knowledge of God, which he has either of himself or of anything else, is not a disposition; it is essential. And just as I say both fire is hot, and I say heated water is hot, but water admits of more and less. Therefore it can both lose it at some point and regain it. But the heat in fire does not admit of more and less; for it is essential. The knowledge of God is essential, so that it is incomparable to knowledge which is a disposition. But incomparable things do not admit of similarity. And they do not say these things in vain; for since the argument establishes that the Son is consubstantial with the Father and of the same divinity from the fact that he is known by the Father and knows the Father, they wish to make his knowledge common with ours, saying that: "as we know God, so he also knows, because we know him perfectly, as he knows himself. And the Son thus has knowledge of him. Therefore he will not differ from us". 27 their hearts shall live for ever and ever. Often accidents are called by the same name as those things to which they are accidents. We say that soul is a substance; as when God the Word says: "do not be afraid of those who kill the body, 53 but cannot kill the soul". The name soul, therefore, here signifies a substance. And when it says: "spirits and souls of the just, bless the Lord", it signifies a substance. For the name of the soul often signifies something accidental to the soul; for when it is said in the Wisdom of Jesus: "an evil soul will destroy the one who possesses it", it calls the disposition and the thought "soul"; for the one who possesses it is the soul, is the man. And again: "having purified your souls in obedience to the truth". From this is derived that other saying: "But you, a man of like soul with me", one having the same purpose as me. And again if it is said that: "and you shall eat grapes to fill your soul", here it calls the appetitive power 'soul'. Not all things that are said, therefore, signify the underlying substances, but sometimes they also signify their accidents. But it is an accident for man to know God. Therefore man is never called knowledge, but one who knows. Here the accident does not have the same name as the subject. But the Savior is called both wise and wisdom, both knowledge and having knowledge, and righteousness and righteous, and here I do not speak of an accident and a subject, but in parallel through two names the same thing

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ὧν τὴν θεωρίαν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν λαβεῖν θέλομεν. ἀδύνατον οὖν ἐστιν ἐξ ἀποφάσεων ἀπόδειξιν ἀναντίρρητον γενέσθαι. ἐκ καταφάσεών εἰσιν αἱ ἀποδείξεις· μὴ γὰρ ἐὰν θέλω ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος λογικός ἐστιν, λέγω ὅ52 τι· οὐκ ἄψυχός ἐστιν· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα γὰρ πολλά εἰσιν μὴ ἄψυχα, καὶ τὰ ἄλογα. δεῖ με τοίνυν ἀποδεῖξαι τοῦτο· ὁ ἄνθρωπος δεκτικός ἐστιν ἐπιστημῶν. πᾶν τὸ ἐπιστημῶν δεκτικόν, λογικόν. ὁ ἄρα ἄνθρωπος λογικός ἐστιν. κἂν οὖν ἔχωμεν περὶ θεοῦ γνῶσιν, κἂν τελεία ᾖν, ἐξ ἀποφάσεων αὐτὴν ἔχομεν λέγοντες ὅτι ἀσώματος. τὸ ἀσώματον δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφασις σώματος. ἐστὶν ἀθανασία, ἄναρχος, ἀναλλοίωτος. κἂν ἐπὶ τέλει οὖν τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπαρχθῇ γνῶσις τελεία περὶ θεοῦ, οὐκ ἐκείνη ἐστίν, ἣν αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἔχει· μὴ γὰρ ἀναιρέσει γενητοῦ οἶδεν ἑαυτὸν ἀγένητον, ὡς βούλονται αὐτοὶ οἱ Εὐνομιανοί· μὴ γὰρ στερήσει θανάτου οἶδεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθάνατον. ἡμεῖς ἐκ στερήσεως ὧν ἴσμεν οἴδαμεν τί ἐστιν ἀθάνατος. οὐκ ἔχομεν δὲ κατὰ ἐπιστημονικὴν γνῶσιν ἐπιβαλεῖν εἰς τὸ ἀντικειμένως τῷ θανάτῳ λεγόμενον, καὶ στερήσει θανάτου λέγομεν αὐτόν, ἀποφάσει θανάτου, καὶ πάντα, οἷον ἀόρατος· οὐ κατὰ κατάφασίν τινα μανθάνομεν αὐτὸν ἀόρατον, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἴσμεν τί ἐστιν ὁρατόν, αἴσθησιν ἔχοντες καὶ ὄψιν ἔχοντες, στερήσει τῆς καταστάσεως ταύτης λαμβάνομεν τὸ ἀόρατον. ταῦτα λέγω διὰ τοὺς Εὐνομίου, ὅτι ἀδύνατον τὴν αὐτὴν θεοῦ γνῶσιν ἔχειν περὶ θεοῦ. οὐκ ἐκείνη ἐστίν, ἣν αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἔχει. καὶ ἄλλο· ἡ ἡμετέρα γνῶσις διάθεσίς ἐστιν ψυχῆς. αἱ δὲ διαθέσεις δέχονται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. ἡ δὲ θεοῦ γνῶσις, ἣν ἔχει ἤτε περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινός, οὔκ ἐστιν διάθεσις· οὐσιώδης ἐστίν. καὶ ὥσπερ θερμὸν λέγω καὶ τὸ πῦρ, λέγω καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ θερμανθέν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὕδωρ δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. διὸ καὶ ἀποβαλεῖν αὐτό ποτε δύναται καὶ ἀναλαβεῖν. τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμὸν οὐ δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον· οὐσιῶδες γάρ ἐστιν. ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ γνῶσις οὐσιώδης ἐστὶν ὥστε ἀσύνκριτός ἐστιν τῇ κατὰ διάθεσιν γνώσει. τὰ δὲ ἀσύνκριτα οὐ δέχονται ὁμοιότητα. ταῦτα δὲ οὐ ματαίως λέγουσιν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ κατασκευάζει ὁ λόγος ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ τὸν υἱὸν εἶναι καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς θεότητος ἐκ τοῦ γιγνώσκεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ γιγνώσκειν τὸν πατέρα, θέλουσιν κοινοποιῆσαι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ λέγοντες ὅτι· "ὡς ἡμεῖς γιγνώσκομεν τὸν θεόν, καὶ ἐκεῖνος γιγνώσκει, ὅτι ἡμεῖς τελείως αὐτὸν ἐπιστάμεθα, ὡς αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν. καὶ ὁ υἱὸς οὕτως ἔχει περὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν γνῶσιν. ὅθεν οὐ διοίσει ἡμῶν". 27 ζήσονται αἱ καρδίαι αὐτῶν εἰς αἰῶνα αἰῶνος. πολλάκις τὰ συμβεβηκότα ὁμωνύμως καλεῖται ἐκείνοις οἷς συμβέβηκεν. λέγομεν οὐσίαν εἶναι ψυχῆς· ὅταν λέγῃ ὁ θεὸς λόγος· "μὴ φοβεῖσθε ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποκτεννόντων τὸ σῶμα, 53 τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μὴ δυναμένων ἀποκτεῖναι". τὸ ὄνομα οὖν τὸ ψυχὴ οὐσίαν ὧδε δηλοῖ. καὶ ὅταν λέγῃ· "πνεύματα καὶ ψυχαὶ δικαίων, εὐλογεῖτε τὸν κύριον", οὐσίαν δηλοῖ. σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ ὄνομα τῆς ψυχῆς πολλάκις συμβεβηκός τι τῇ ψυχῇ· ὅταν γὰρ λέγηται ἐν τῇ Ἰησοῦ Σοφίᾳ· "ψυχὴ πονηρὰ ἀπολεῖ τὸν κτησάμενον αὐτήν", τὴν διάθεσιν καὶ τὴν νόησιν "ψυχὴν" ὀνομάζει· ὁ γὰρ κτησάμενος αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν, ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. καὶ ἔτι· "τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν ἐν ἠγγικόσιν ἡγνικότες ἐν τῇ ὑπακοῇ τῆς ἀληθείας". ἀπὸ τούτου παρωνόμασται κἀκεῖνο· "σὺ δέ, ἄνθρωπε ἰσόψυχέ μου", ὁ ἴσην μου ἔχων προαίρεσιν. καὶ πάλιν ἐὰν λέγηται ὅτι· "καὶ φάγῃ σταφυλὴν ὅσον ἐμπλήσεις ψυχήν", ψυχὴν ὧδε τὴν ὀρεκτικὴν λέγει δύναμιν. οὐ πάντα οὖν τὰ λεγόμενα τὰς ὑποκειμένας οὐσίας δηλοῖ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐταῖς σημαίνει. συμβέβηκεν δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ γιγνώσκειν θεόν. διὸ γνῶσις οὐ λέγεταί ποτε ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ γιγνώσκων. οὐχ ὁμωνυμεῖ ὧδε τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ. ὁ δὲ σωτὴρ λέγεται καὶ σοφὸς καὶ σοφία, καὶ γνῶσις καὶ γνῶσιν ἔχων, καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ δίκαιος, καὶ οὐ λέγω ὧδε συμβεβηκὸς καὶ ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλ' ἐκ παραλλήλου διὰ δύο ὀνομάτων τὸ αὐτὸ