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is called a passion; for an activity is a movement according to nature, but a passion is one contrary to nature. According to this account, therefore, an activity is called a passion when it is not moved according to nature, whether from itself or from another. Therefore, the movement of the heart according to its pulsations, being natural, is an activity, but the movement according to palpitations, being immoderate and not according to nature, is a passion and not an activity. But not every movement of the passible part is called a passion, but only the more vehement ones and those which proceed to perception; for the small and imperceptible ones are not yet passions; for a passion must have a considerable magnitude. For this reason, "perceptible movement" is added to the definition of passion; for small movements that escape perception do not make a passion. It is necessary to know that our soul has twofold powers, the gnostic and the vital. And the gnostic are intellect, thought, opinion, imagination, perception; and the vital, that is, the appetitive, are volition and choice. But that what is said may become clearer, let us discuss these things in detail. And first let us speak of the gnostic powers. Concerning imagination and perception, enough has already been said in what was stated before. Through perception, therefore, an affection is formed in the soul, which is called imagination; and from imagination comes opinion. Then thought, having examined the opinion, whether it is true or false, judges what is true; whence it is also called thought (dianoia) from thinking (dianoein) and discriminating (diakrinein). Therefore, that which has been judged and determined as true is called intellect. In another way: It is necessary to know that the first movement of the intellect is called intellection. But the intellection about something is called a concept, which, having persisted and impressed the soul towards the object of thought, is named a meditation. And the meditation, remaining in the same state and having tested and examined itself, is named prudence. And prudence, being expanded, makes the reasoning called internal reason, which they define by saying: a most complete movement of the soul, occurring in the reasoning part without any utterance, from which they say the expressed reason proceeds, spoken by the tongue. Having spoken, therefore, about the gnostic powers, let us also speak about the vital, that is, the appetitive ones. It is necessary to know that there is naturally sown in the soul an appetitive power for that which is according to nature and for all things essentially belonging to nature, which is called will (thelesis); for the essence longs for to be and to live and to be moved according to intellect and perception, desiring its own natural and complete existence. Therefore, they also define this natural will thus: Will (thelema) is a rational and vital appetite depending only on natural things. So that will (thelesis) is the natural and rational appetite itself, the simple power; for the appetite of irrational beings, not being rational, is not called will (thelesis). But volition (boulesis) is a certain kind of natural will (thelesis), that is, a natural and rational appetite for some thing. For there lies in the soul of man a power of rational appetition. When, therefore, this rational appetite is naturally moved towards some thing, it is called volition (boulesis); for volition is a rational appetite and desire for some thing. And volition is spoken of both for things in our power and for things not in our power, that is, both for possible and impossible things. For we often wish to fornicate or to be chaste or to sleep or some such thing; and these are in our power and possible. But we also wish to be king; this is not in our power. And we also wish, perhaps, never to die; this is among the impossible things. And volition is of the end, not of the means to the end. The end, then, is the object of volition, such as to be king, such as to be healthy; but the means to the end is the object of deliberation, that is, the way by which we ought to become healthy or be king; then after volition comes inquiry and consideration. And after these, if it is among the things in our power, deliberation or counsel occurs. And deliberation is an inquiring appetite concerning practical matters in our power; for one deliberates whether one ought to pursue the matter or not. Then one judges the better, and it is called judgment. Then one is disposed toward and loves what has been judged from the deliberation, and it is called decision; for if one judges and is not disposed toward what has been judged, that is, does not love it, it is not called decision. Then after the

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πάθος λέγεται· ἐνέργεια μὲν γάρ ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις, πάθος δὲ παρὰ φύσιν. Κατὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν λόγον ἡ ἐνέργεια πάθος λέγεται, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ φύσιν κινῆται, εἴτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, εἴτε ἐξ ἑτέρου. Τῆς οὖν καρδίας ἡ μὲν κατὰ τοὺς σφυγμοὺς κίνησις φυσικὴ οὖσα ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παλμοὺς ἄμετρος οὖσα καὶ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν πάθος ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐνέργεια. Οὐ πᾶσα δὲ κίνησις τοῦ παθητικοῦ πάθος καλεῖται, ἀλλ' αἱ σφοδρότεραι καὶ εἰς αἴσθησιν προβαίνουσαι· αἱ γὰρ μικραὶ καὶ ἀνεπαίσθητοι οὐδέπω πάθη εἰσί· δεῖ γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ πάθος καὶ μέγεθος ἀξιόλογον. ∆ιὸ πρόσκειται τῷ ὅρῳ τοῦ πάθους κίνησις αἰσθητή· αἱ γὰρ μικραὶ κινήσεις λανθάνουσαι τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐ ποιοῦσι πάθος. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ διττὰς ἔχει τὰς δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν γνωστικάς, τὰς δὲ ζωτικάς. Καὶ γνωστικαὶ μέν εἰσι νοῦς, διάνοια, δόξα, φαντασία, αἴσθησις, ζωτικαὶ δὲ ἤγουν ὀρεκτικαὶ βούλησις καὶ προαίρεσις. Ἵνα δὲ σαφέστερον γένηται τὸ λεγόμενον, λεπτολογήσωμεν τὰ περὶ τούτων. Καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τῶν γνωστικῶν εἴπωμεν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἱκανῶς ἤδη ἐν τοῖς προλελεγμένοις εἴρηται. ∆ιὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τοίνυν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ συνίσταται πάθος, ὃ καλεῖται φαντασία· ἐκ δὲ τῆς φαντασίας γίνεται δόξα. Εἶτα ἡ διάνοια ἀνακρίνασα τὴν δόξαν, εἴτε ἀληθής ἐστιν εἴτε ψευδής, κρίνει τὸ ἀληθές· ὅθεν καὶ διάνοια λέγεται ἀπὸ τοῦ διανοεῖν καὶ διακρίνειν. Τὸ οὖν κριθὲν καὶ ὁρισθὲν ἀληθὲς νοῦς λέγεται. Ἄλλως δέ· Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι ἡ μὲν πρώτη τοῦ νοῦ κίνησις νόησις λέγεται. Ἡ δὲ περί τι νόησις ἔννοια λέγεται, ἥτις ἐπιμείνασα καὶ τυπώσασα τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ νοούμενον ἐνθύμησις προσαγορεύεται. Ἡ δὲ ἐνθύμησις ἐν ταὐτῷ μείνασα καὶ ἑαυτὴν βασανίσασα καὶ ἀνακρίνασα φρόνησις ὀνομάζεται. Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πλατυνθεῖσα ποιεῖ τὸν διαλογισμὸν ἐνδιάθετον λόγον ὀνομαζόμενον, ὃν ὁριζόμενοί φασι· κίνημα ψυχῆς πληρέστατον, ἐν τῷ διαλογιστικῷ γινόμενον ἄνευ τινὸς ἐκφωνήσεως, ἐξ οὗ τὸν προφορικὸν λόγον φασὶ προέρχεσθαι διὰ γλώσσης λαλούμενον. Εἰπόντες τοίνυν περὶ τῶν γνωστικῶν δυνάμεων εἴπωμεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ζωτικῶν ἤγουν ὀρεκτικῶν. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι τῇ ψυχῇ ἐνέσπαρται φυσικῶς δύναμις ὀρεκτικὴ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ὄντος καὶ πάντων τῶν οὐσιωδῶς τῇ φύσει προσόντων συνεκτική, ἥτις λέγεται θέλησις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ τε εἶναι καὶ ζῆν καὶ κινεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν τε καὶ αἴσθησιν ὀρέγεται τῆς οἰκείας ἐφιεμένη φυσικῆς καὶ πλήρους ὀντότητος. ∆ιόπερ καὶ οὕτως ὁρίζονται τοῦτο τὸ φυσικὸν θέλημα· Θέλημά ἐστιν ὄρεξις λογική τε καὶ ζωτικὴ μόνων ἠρτημένη τῶν φυσικῶν. Ὥστε ἡ μὲν θέλησίς ἐστιν αὐτὴ ἡ φυσικὴ καὶ λογικὴ ὄρεξις, ἡ ἁπλῆ δύναμις· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων ὄρεξις μὴ οὖσα λογικὴ οὐ λέγεται θέλησις. Βούλησις δέ ἐστι ποιὰ φυσικὴ θέλησις ἤγουν φυσικὴ καὶ λογικὴ ὄρεξίς τινος πράγματος. Ἔγκειται μὲν γὰρ τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ δύναμις τοῦ λογικῶς ὀρέγεσθαι. Ὅτε οὖν φυσικῶς κινηθῇ αὕτη ἡ λογικὴ ὄρεξις πρός τι πρᾶγμα, λέγεται βούλησις· βούλησις γάρ ἐστιν ὄρεξις καὶ ἔφεσίς τινος πράγματος λογική. Λέγεται δὲ βούλησις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τουτέστι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων. Βουλόμεθα γὰρ πολλάκις πορνεῦσαι ἢ σωφρονῆσαι ἢ ὑπνῶσαι ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· καὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσι καὶ δυνατά. Βουλόμεθα δὲ καὶ βασιλεῦσαι· τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Βουλόμεθα δὲ τυχὸν καὶ μηδέποτε ἀποθανεῖν· τοῦτο τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. Ἔστι δὲ ἡ βούλησις τοῦ τέλους, οὐ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος. Τέλος μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ βουλητὸν ὡς τὸ βασιλεῦσαι, ὡς τὸ ὑγιᾶναι· πρὸς τὸ τέλος δὲ τὸ βουλευτὸν ἤγουν ὁ τρόπος, δι' οὗ ὀφείλομεν ὑγιᾶναι ἢ βασιλεῦσαι· εἶτα μετὰ τὴν βούλησιν ζήτησις καὶ σκέψις. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, εἰ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι, γίνεται βουλὴ ἤγουν βούλευσις. Βουλὴ δέ ἐστιν ὄρεξις ζητητικὴ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρακτῶν γινομένη· βουλεύεται γάρ, εἰ ὤφειλε μετελθεῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ οὔ. Εἶτα κρίνει τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ λέγεται κρίσις. Εἶτα διατίθεται καὶ ἀγαπᾷ τὸ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κριθέν, καὶ λέγεται γνώμη· ἐὰν γὰρ κρίνῃ καὶ μὴ διατεθῇ πρὸς τὸ κριθὲν ἤγουν ἀγαπήσῃ αὐτό, οὐ λέγεται γνώμη. Εἶτα μετὰ τὴν