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And that which is not partially, but entirely deprived of the good, this neither was, nor is, nor will be, nor can be.

Nor does it desire beings: Because the intemperate man, even if in the very act of being intemperate he neither is nor desires beings, nevertheless according to the very form of union and friendship he dimly partakes of the good.

Towards the seeming good: Note that even he who gives way to anger is said to partake of the good in being moved towards the correction of seeming evils; so also he who desires the worst, that is, the most evil life, partakes of the good in desiring what seems to him to be the best life; and he who pursues evil, in seeming to do good, partakes of the good.

Inasmuch as it is also a disease: Disease, it is clear, is a lack of health, and an excess of material bodies, having neither measure nor order, but disease is produced through the incontinence of the matters, one of them rebelling against the well-ordered state. To this extent (14S_166> then disease is in the body, as long as the order is in any way lacking and the body holds together; for if a complete lack of measure dissolves the body, that is, the order of the matters, the disease also disappears, the body in which the disease subsisted being dissolved; so also in the case of the good, while it is preserved in us, we have the power to do evil also; for when the good departs, not even evil can be found in us.

For that which is entirely bereft: The aim of the divine Dionysius is clear from many things; for fighting against the opinions of certain Greeks concerning evil, he says that evil is not a being. For evil itself could not be essentially evil at all, unless it were that which through a complete lack of the good is wholly bereft of it; for this is nowhere to be found, not even in matter itself which is without form, even if this seems so to some of the Greeks; for whatever has been brought forth by God at all, even dimly and in the last degree, has nevertheless partaken of the good. And going forward, in the tenth chapter of this problem, he demonstrates this perfectly. For if evil were mixed with the good, that is, in one way a non-being through a small lack of the good, and in another way a non-being because the maker exists at all, this is not evil; for evil is not in any lack whatsoever, but in the complete lack of the good. Therefore, that which lacks little of the good is not evil; for it can even be perfect with respect to its own nature; for there is something that is lacking with respect to the good, but perfect with respect to its own nature, which is indeed good, but in no way evil; although it partakes of lack with respect to the first good. But that which is not entirely bereft of the good, but for the most part approaches evil, is not entirely evil; just as that which less approaches the good, has something of the good, and is substantiated by it, (14S_168> and it substantiates its own privation in fighting entirely from the good; for if there were an unmixed and complete absence of the good, it is clear that there would be neither a universal good, nor a mixed good, nor evil-in-itself; for where the good is not, there is not anything in nature. How then will evil exist, not being substantiated by something? For take away bodies and the light, and there will be no shadow. Therefore evil is not a being simply, but as in a substrate, but the good both without a substrate has a nature and is preserved, and is good in and of itself, but evil apart from the substrate preserved by the good; for from it nothing either exists, or appears, or is destroyed; for how could they, there being no substrate? but it is utterly non-existent and in no way and nowhere a being.

And it substantiates: That is, it substantiates evil; for if evil is the privation of the good, and the good substantiates its own privation, then it substantiates evil, which is the privation of the good.

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καί οὐ τό μερικῶς, ἀλλά τό παντελῶς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστερημένον, τοῦτο οὔτε ἦν, οὔτε ἐστίν, οὔτε ἔσται, οὔτε εἶναι δύναται.

Οὔτε ὄντων ἐπιθυμεῖ: Ὅτι ὁ ἀκόλαστος, εἰ καί κατά τό αὐτό τό ἀκολασταίνειν οὔτε ἐστίν οὔτε ὄντων ἐπιθυμεῖ, ὅμως κατ' αὐτό τό τῆς ἑνώσεως καί φιλίας σχῆμα ἀμυδρῶς μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

Πρός τό δοκοῦν καλόν: Σημείωσαι, ὅτι καί ὁ τῷ θυμῷ ἀποχρώμενος μετέχειν λέγεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐν τῷ πρός διόρθωσιν κινεῖσθαι τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν· οὕτω καί ὁ χειρίστης, ἤγουν κακίστης ζωῆς ἐφιέμενος, μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐν τῷ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς αὐτῷ δοκούσης ἐφίεσθαι· καί ὁ τό κακόν δέ μετιών, ἐν τῷ δοκεῖν καλόν ποιεῖν, μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

Καθ' ὅσον καί νόσος: Ἡ νόσος, εὔδηλον, ὡς ἔλλειψίς ἐστιν ὑγιείας, καί ὑπερβολή σωμάτων ἐνύλων, οὔτε μέτρον, οὔτε τάξιν ἐχομένη, ἀλλά δι' ἀκρασίας τῶν ὑλῶν μιᾶς ὑπέρ τήν εὔτακτον στασιαζούσης ποιούντων τήν νόσον. Ἐπί τοσοῦτον (14S_166> μέν οὖν ἡ νόσος ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁπωσοῦν ἡ τάξις ἐλλείποι καί τό σῶμα συνίσταται· εἰ γάρ παντελής ἀμετρία λύσει τό σῶμα, τουτέστι τῶν ὑλῶν τήν τάξιν, καί ἡ νόσος ἀφανίζεται, τοῦ σώματος λυομένου ἐν ᾧ συνεστήκει ἡ νόσος· οὕτω καί ἐπί τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ὅσῳ σῴζεται ἐν ἡμῖν, ἔχομεν ἐξουσίαν πράττειν καί τό κακόν· ἀφισταμένου γάρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὔτε κακόν ἔστιν εὑρεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν.

Τό γάρ πάντῃ ἄμοιρον: Ὁ σκοπός τοῦ θείου ∆ιονυσίου ἐκ πολλῶν σαφής· μαχόμενος ταῖς τινων Ἑλλήνων δόξαις περί τοῦ κακοῦ, λέγει γάρ μή εἶναι ὄν τό κακόν. Κακόν γάρ αὐτό καθάπαξ οὐσιῶδες οὐκ ἄν εἴη, εἰ μή τό κατά παντελῆ ἔλλειψιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὁλοσχερῶς ἄμοιρον ὄν τούτου· τοῦτο γάρ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδαμοῦ εὑρεῖν, οὐδέ ἐν τῇ ὕλη αὐτῇ τῇ ἀνειδέῳ, κἄν τοῦτό τισι τῶν Ἑλλήνων δοκῇ· ὅ γάρ ὅλως ὑπό Θεοῦ παρῆκται, κἄν ἀμυδρῶς καί ἐσχάτως, μετέσχε δ' οὖν ὅμως τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Τοῦτο δέ προϊών ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ κεφαλαίῳ τούτου τοῦ προβλήματος τελείως ἀποδείκνυσιν. Εἰ γάρ μικτόν εἴη τῷ ἀγαθῷ τό κακόν, τουτέστι, πῇ μέν μή ὄν διά τῆς ἐπ' ὀλίγον ἐλλείψεως τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πῇ δέ μή ὄν διά τό εἶναι ὅλως τόν ποιοῦντα, οὐ κακόν τοῦτο· οὐ γάρ ἐν τῇ ὁπωσοῦν ἐλλείψει, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ παντελεῖ ἐλλείψει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τό κακόν. Τό γοῦν ἐλλεῖπον ὀλίγον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐ κακόν· δύναται γάρ καί τέλειον εἶναι ὡς πρός τήν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν· ἔστι μέν γάρ τι ὡς πρός μέν τό ἀγαθόν ἐλλιπές, ὡς δέ πρός τήν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν τέλειον, ὅ δή ἀγαθόν μέν ἐστι, κακόν δέ οὐδαμῶς· καίτοι τε ἐλλείψεως μετέχον ὡς πρός τό πρῶτον ἀγαθόν. Τό δέ μή παντελῶς ἄμοιρον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλά κατά τό πλέον ἐγγίζον τῷ κακῷ, οὐ πάντῃ κακόν· ὥσπερ καί τό ἔλλατον ἐγγίζον τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ἔχει τι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καί οὐσιοῦται ἐξ αὐτοῦ, (14S_168> καί τήν ἑαυτοῦ στέρησιν οὐσιοῖ ἐν τῷ ὅλως μάχεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· εἰ γάρ ἀκράτως καί παντελῶς ἀπουσία εἴη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, δῆλον ὡς οὔτε καθ' ὅλου ἀγαθόν, οὔτε μικτόν ἀγαθόν, οὔτε αὐτόκακον· ἔνθα γάρ οὐκ ἔστι τό ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἐστί τι ἐν τῇ φύσει. Πῶς οὖν ἔσται τό κακόν μή ὑπό τινος οὐσιούμενον; Ἄνελε γάρ τά σώματα καί τό φῶς, καί οὐκ ἔσται σκιά. Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ὄν τό κακόν ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, τό δέ ἀγαθόν καί δίχα τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καί φύσιν ἔχει καί σῴζεται, καί αὐτό καθ' ἑαυτό ἀγαθόν, τό δέ κακόν δίχα τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τοῦ ὑπό τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φυλαττομένου· πάντα γάρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἐστίν, οὔτε φαίνεται, οὔτε φθείρεται· πῶς γάρ, μή ὄντος ὑποκειμένου τινός; ἀλλά παντελῶς ἀνύπαρκτον καί οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ὄν.

Καί οὐσιοῖ: Τουτέστιν οὐσιοῖ τό κακόν· εἰ γάρ τό κακόν στέρησίς ἐστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τό δέ ἀγαθόν οὐσιοῖ τήν ἑαυτοῦ στέρησιν, οὐσιοῖ ἄρα τό κακόν, ὅπερ στέρησις ἐστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.