Elements of theology

 As one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. therefore

 Activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. for if all beings by nat

 It desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? bu

 Is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. for either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 Beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. for the mon

 The one being divided. but if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. if, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 The thing produced is other than it. therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 From something and reverting has a cyclical activity. for if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 Procession. for since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 Has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 The self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. for if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 Having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 A cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 Suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 Being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. but that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 Passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. but the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 Undiminished it contains in itself. but surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 Set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 But nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 All things. for since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 A turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. for the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 A hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 every god is supra-essenti

 Supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 Is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 Having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 Is more unified than beings. all divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 Of a henad working, with which it is connate. this, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 To the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. but the mean, s

 Proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 Presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 They have intelligible [qualities]. in the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 And sees itself. but seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. so that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 More akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. therefore, those that are h

 On the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 By its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 And to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 Of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 every period of a soul is measured by time

 The relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 It admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. but indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. for everything

Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the things after it. As, therefore, every intellect has intelligible things intellectually, so too it has perceptible things intellectually. 174 Every intellect by its thinking subsists the things after it, and its production is in its thinking, and its thinking in its production. For if the intelligible and intellect are the same, and the being of each is the same as the thinking in itself, and it produces what it produces by its being, and brings forth according to the being which it is, it would also bring forth the things brought forth by its thinking. For being and thinking are both one; for both intellect and the being which is in it are the same. If therefore it produces by its being, and its being is thinking, it produces by its thinking. And the thinking which is according to actuality is in the thinking; and this is the same as its being; and its being is in its producing (for that which produces motionlessly always has its being in its producing); and so the thinking is in the producing. 175 Every intellect is participated primarily by things that are intellectual both in substance and in actuality. For it must be participated either by these or by others which have an intellectual substance, but are not always thinking. But by the latter is impossible. For the actuality of intellect is motionless; and therefore the things by which it is participated, always thinking, always participate, since the intellectual actuality always makes the participants intellectual. For that which has its actuality in some part of time is disconnected from the eternity of actuality; and between the whole eternal actuality and the actuality perfect in some time, there is, just as in substances, so also in the gradations of actualities, that which has its perfection throughout all time. For processions never occur immediately, but through kindred and similar things, both in respect to their hypostases and likewise the perfections of their actualities. Every intellect, therefore, is participated primarily by those things that are able to think throughout all time and are always thinking, even if their thinking is in time and not eternally. From this, then, it is clear that it is impossible for a soul that at one time thinks and at another does not, to participate immediately in intellect. 176 All intellectual forms are both in one another and each for itself. For if every intellect is indivisible and its multitude is unified because of its intellectual indivisibility, all things, being in a one and indivisible, are united with one another, and all pass through all; but if all things exist immaterially and incorporeally, they are unconfused with one another, and each, preserving its own purity, remains what it is. The unconfused state of the intellectual forms is shown by the distinctive participation of those who partake of each distinctly. For if the participated things were not distinguished and were not separate from one another, neither would the participants partake of each of them distinctly, but there would be much more an indiscriminate confusion in the inferior things, being worse in rank; for whence would distinction arise, when the things that give them subsistence and perfect them are indiscriminate and confused? On the other hand, the unified state of the forms is evidenced by the indivisible hypostasis of that which contains them and its uniform substance. For things that have their existence in an indivisible and uniform substance, being in the same indivisibly (for how could you divide the indivisible and the one?), are together and in one another, wholes passing through wholes without extension. For that which contains them is not extended, so that, as in an extended thing, one part is here and another elsewhere, but everything is at once in the indivisible and one; so that they are also in one another. All intellectual forms, therefore, are both in one another in a unified way and each separately in a distinct way. And if anyone, in addition to these demonstrations, should need examples, let him consider the theorems in a single soul; which, all being in the same unextended substance, are both united with one another (for the unextended does not contain the things in it spatially, but indivisibly and without extension) and are united and are distinct; for the soul brings forth all things purely and each separately, drawing nothing from the rest, which, if they were not always distinct in their state, the actuality of the soul would not distinguish. 177 Every intellect, being a plenitude of forms, is comprehensive, one of more universal, another of more particular forms; and the higher intellects possess more universally what those after them possess more particularly, while the lower intellects possess more particularly what those before them possess more universally. For the higher intellects use greater powers, being more uniform than the secondary ones; while the lower ones, being more multiplied, diminish the powers which they have. For the things with the one

αἴτια ἄρα νοερῶς ἔχει τῶν πάντων. ὥστε πάντα νοερῶς ἐστι πᾶς νοῦς, καὶ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ μετ' αὐτόν. ὡς οὖν τὰ νοητὰ νοερῶς ἔχει πᾶς, οὕτω καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ νοερῶς. 174 Πᾶς νοῦς τῷ νοεῖν ὑφίστησι τὰ μετ' αὐτόν, καὶ ἡ ποίησις ἐν τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ ἡ νόησις ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν. εἰ γὰρ νοητόν ἐστι καὶ νοῦς ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἑκάστου τῇ νοήσει τῇ ἐν ἑαυτῷ [ταὐτόν], ποιεῖ δὲ ἃ ποιεῖ τῷ εἶναι, καὶ παρ άγει κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ὅ ἐστι, καὶ τῷ νοεῖν ἂν παράγοι τὰ παραγό μενα. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ἓν ἄμφω· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς καὶ [πᾶν] τὸ ὂν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ταὐτόν. εἰ οὖν ποιεῖ τῷ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἶναι νοεῖν ἐστι, ποιεῖ τῷ νοεῖν. καὶ ἡ νόησις ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐν τῷ νοεῖν· τοῦτο δὲ τῷ εἶναι ταὐτόν· τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν (τὸ γὰρ ἀκινήτως ποιοῦν τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν ἀεὶ ἔχει)· καὶ ἡ νόησις ἄρα ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν. 175 Πᾶς νοῦς ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' οὐσίαν ἅμα καὶ ἐνέργειαν νοερῶν μετέχεται πρώτως. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ ὑπὸ τούτων ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλων τῶν νοερὰν μὲν ἐχόντων τὴν οὐσίαν, μὴ ἀεὶ δὲ νοούντων. ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀδύνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ νοῦ ἀκίνητος· καὶ ὑφ' ὧν ἄρα μετέχεται, ταῦτα ἀεὶ νοοῦντα ἀεὶ μετέχει, τῆς νοερᾶς ἐνεργείας ἀεὶ νοερὰ τὰ μετέχοντα ποιούσης. τῷ γὰρ αἰωνίῳ τῆς ἐνεργείας τὸ ἐν μέρει τινὶ τοῦ χρόνου τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχον ἀσύναπτον· μεταξὺ δέ, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐξαλλαγαῖς τῆς αἰωνίου πάσης ἐνεργείας καὶ τῆς ἐν τινὶ χρόνῳ τελείας ἡ κατὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἔχουσα τὸ τέλειον. οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ αἱ πρόοδοι γίνονται ἀμέσως, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ ὁμοίων κατά τε τὰς ὑποστάσεις καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τελειότητας ὡσαύτως. πᾶς ἄρα νοῦς ὑπ' ἐκείνων μετέχεται πρώτως τῶν κατὰ πάντα χρόνον νοεῖν δυνα μένων καὶ ἀεὶ νοούντων, εἰ καὶ κατὰ χρόνον ἀλλὰ μὴ αἰωνίως ἡ νόησις. ἐκ δὴ τούτου φανερὸν ὅτι ψυχὴν ποτὲ νοοῦσαν, ποτὲ δὲ μή, νοῦ προσεχῶς μετέχειν ἀδύνατον. 176 Πάντα τὰ νοερὰ εἴδη καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶ καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ ἕκαστον. εἰ γὰρ ἀμέριστος πᾶς νοῦς καὶ ἡνωμένον διὰ τὴν νοερὰν ἀμέρειαν καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ πλῆθος, ἐν ἑνὶ πάντα ὄντα καὶ ἀμερεῖ ἥνωται ἀλλήλοις, καὶ φοιτᾷ πάντα διὰ πάντων· εἰ δὲ ἀΰλως ἔστι πάντα καὶ ἀσωμάτως, ἀσύγχυτά ἐστι πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ χωρὶς ἕκαστον φυλάττον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καθαρότητα μένει ὅ ἐστι. δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀσύγχυτον τῶν νοερῶν εἰδῶν ἡ τῶν ἑκάστου διακεκριμένως μετεχόντων ἰδιάζουσα μέθεξις. εἰ μὴ γὰρ τὰ μετεχόμενα διεκέκριτο καὶ ἦν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων, οὐδ' ἂν τὰ μετέ χοντα αὐτῶν ἑκάστου μετεῖχε διακεκριμένως, ἀλλ' ἦν ἂν πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς καταδεεστέροις ἀδιάκριτος σύγχυσις, χείροσιν οὖσι κατὰ τὴν τάξιν· πόθεν γὰρ ἂν ἐγίνετο διάκρισις, τῶν ὑφιστάντων αὐτὰ καὶ τελειούντων ἀδιακρίτων ὄντων καὶ συγ κεχυμένων; τὸ δὲ αὖ ἡνωμένον τῶν εἰδῶν ἡ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀμερὴς ὑπόστασις τεκμηριοῦται καὶ ἡ ἑνοειδὴς οὐσία. τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἀμερεῖ καὶ ἑνοειδεῖ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχοντα, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀμερίστως ὄντα (πῶς γὰρ ἂν μερίσαις τὸ ἀμερὲς καὶ τὸ ἕν;), ὁμοῦ ἐστι καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις, ὅλα δι' ὅλων φοιτῶντα ἀδιαστάτως. οὐ γὰρ διαστατὸν τὸ περιέχον, καὶ ὡς ἐν διαστατῷ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῳδί, τὸ δὲ ἀλλαχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἅμα ἐν τῷ ἀμερεῖ καὶ ἑνὶ πᾶν· ὥστε καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις. πάντα ἄρα τὰ νοερὰ εἴδη καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ἡνωμένως καὶ χωρὶς ἕκαστον διακεκριμένως. εἰ δέ τις ἐπὶ ταῖσδε ταῖς ἀποδείξεσι καὶ παραδειγμάτων δέοιτο, τὰ θεωρήματα νοείτω τὰ ἐν μιᾷ ψυχῇ· ἃ δὴ πάντα ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ὄντα ἀμεγέθει οὐσίᾳ καὶ ἥνωται ἀλλήλοις (τὸ γὰρ ἀμέγεθες οὐ τοπικῶς ἔχει τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ἀμερίστως καὶ ἀδιαστάτως) [καὶ ἥνωται] καὶ διακέκριται· πάντα γὰρ εἰλικρινῶς ἡ ψυχὴ προάγει καὶ χωρὶς ἕκαστον, μηδὲν ἐφέλκουσα ἀπὸ τῶν λοιπῶν, ἃ εἰ μὴ διεκέκριτο ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ἐνέργεια διέκρινε τῆς ψυχῆς. 177 Πᾶς νοῦς πλήρωμα ὢν εἰδῶν, ὁ μὲν ὁλικωτέρων, ὁ δὲ μερικωτέρων ἐστὶ περιεκτικὸς εἰδῶν· καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνωτέρω νόες ὁλικώτερον ἔχουσιν ὅσα μερικώτερον οἱ μετ' αὐτούς, οἱ δὲ κατω τέρω μερικώτερον ὅσα ὁλικώτερον οἱ πρὸ αὐτῶν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀνωτέρω δυνάμεσι χρῶνται μείζοσιν, ἑνοειδέστεροι τῶν δευτέρων ὄντες· οἱ δὲ κατωτέρω, πληθυνόμενοι μᾶλλον, ἐλαττοῦσι τὰς δυνάμεις ἃς ἔχουσι. τὰ γὰρ τῷ ἑνὶ