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disposition becomes choice, that is, selection; for choice is, when two things are set before one, the choosing and selecting of this before the other. Then it impels towards the action, and is called impulse. Then it uses, and is called use. Then it ceases from desire after the use. Now in the case of irrational beings, a desire for something arises, and immediately an impulse towards the action; for the desire of irrational beings is irrational, and they are led by their natural desire. For this reason the desire of irrational beings is not called will nor volition; for will is a rational and free natural desire. But in the case of men, being rational, the natural desire is led rather than leads; for it is moved with free will and with reason, because the cognitive and vital faculties are joined together in him. Therefore he desires with free will and wishes with free will and seeks and considers with free will and deliberates with free will and judges with free will and is disposed with free will and chooses with free will and impels with free will and acts with free will in those things which are according to nature. But it is necessary to know that in the case of God we speak of volition, but we do not properly speak of choice; for God does not deliberate. For to deliberate belongs to ignorance; for no one deliberates about what is known. And if deliberation is of ignorance, then certainly choice is also. But God, knowing all things simply, does not deliberate. Neither do we speak of deliberation or choice in the case of the Lord's soul; for it had no ignorance. For even if it was of a nature that is ignorant of the future, yet nevertheless, being united in hypostasis to God the Word, it had the knowledge of all things, not by grace, but, as has been said, because of the hypostatic union; for He was the same, both God and man. Therefore it did not have a gnomic will. For it had the natural will, the simple will, that which is seen equally in all the hypostases of men, but a gnomic will, that is, the object of will, His holy soul did not have contrary to His divine will, nor anything other than His divine will. For the gnomic will is divided along with the hypostases, except for the holy and simple and uncompounded and undivided Godhead; for there, since the hypostases are not completely divided and separated, neither is the object of will divided. And there, since the nature is one, the natural will is also one; and since the hypostases are also inseparable, the object of will is also one and the movement of the three hypostases is one. But in the case of men, since the nature is one, the natural will is also one; but since the hypostases are separate and are distant from one another in both place and time and in disposition towards things and in many other respects, for this reason the objects of will and the gnomic wills are different. But in the case of our Lord Jesus Christ, since the natures are different, the natural wills of His divinity and of His humanity, that is, the faculties of will, are also different; but since the hypostasis is one and the one who wills is one, the object of will, that is, the gnomic will, is also one, His human will evidently following His divine will and willing those things which His divine will willed. But it is necessary to know that will is one thing, volition another, the object of will another, the faculty of will another, and the one who wills another. For will is the simple faculty of willing itself, while volition is will concerning something, and the object of will is the thing that is subject to the will, that is, what we will (for example, the appetite is moved toward food; the rational appetite simply is will, but the appetite for food is volition, and the food itself is the object of will), and the faculty of will is that which has the power of will, for example, man, and the one who wills is he who uses the will. It is necessary to know that the word 'will' sometimes signifies the will, that is, the faculty of will, and is called natural will, and sometimes the object of will, and is called gnomic will. 37 Concerning energy It is necessary to know that all the aforementioned faculties, both the cognitive and the vital and the natural and the artificial, are called energies; for energy is the natural faculty and movement of each substance. And again: Natural energy is the innate movement of every substance. Whence it is clear that, of those things whose substance is the same,

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διάθεσιν γίνεται προαίρεσις ἤγουν ἐπιλογή· προαίρεσις γάρ ἐστι δύο προκειμένων τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ ἐκλέγεσθαι τοῦτο πρὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου. Εἶτα ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν, καὶ λέγεται ὁρμή. Εἶτα κέχρηται, καὶ λέγεται χρῆσις. Εἶτα παύεται τῆς ὀρέξεως μετὰ τὴν χρῆσιν. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀλόγων ὄρεξις γίνεταί τινος, καὶ εὐθέως ὁρμὴ πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν· ἄλογος γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὄρεξις τῶν ἀλόγων, καὶ ἄγονται ὑπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ὀρέξεως. ∆ιὸ οὐδὲ θέλησις λέγεται ἡ τῶν ἀλόγων ὄρεξις οὐδὲ βούλησις· θελήσις γάρ ἐστι λογικὴ καὶ αὐτεξούσιος φυσικὴ ὄρεξις. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λογικῶν ὄντων ἄγεται μᾶλλον ἡ φυσικὴ ὄρεξις ἤπερ ἄγει· αὐτεξουσίως γὰρ καὶ μετὰ λόγου κινεῖται, ἐπειδὴ συνεζευγμέναι εἰσὶν αἱ γνωστικαὶ καὶ ζωτικαὶ δυνάμεις ἐν αὐτῷ. Αὐτεξουσίως οὖν ὀρέγεται καὶ αὐτεξουσίως βούλεται καὶ αὐτεξουσίως ζητεῖ καὶ σκέπτεται καὶ αὐτεξουσίως βουλεύεται καὶ αὐτεξουσίως κρίνει καὶ αὐτεξουσίως διατίθεται καὶ αὐτεξουσίως προαιρεῖται καὶ αὐτεξουσίως ὁρμᾷ καὶ αὐτεξουσίως πράττει ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὄντων. Χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὅτι ἐπὶ θεοῦ βούλησιν μὲν λέγομεν, προαίρεσιν δὲ κυρίως οὐ λέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ βουλεύεται ὁ θεός. Ἀγνοίας γάρ ἐστι τὸ βουλεύεσθαι· περὶ γὰρ τοῦ γινωσκομένου οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται. Εἰ δὲ ἡ βουλὴ ἀγνοίας, πάντως καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις. Ὁ δὲ θεὸς πάντα εἰδὼς ἁπλῶς οὐ βουλεύεται. Οὔτε δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ κυρίου ψυχῆς φαμεν βουλὴν ἢ προαίρεσιν· οὐ γὰρ εἶχεν ἄγνοιαν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῆς ἀγνοούσης τὰ μέλλοντα φύσεως ἦν, ἀλλ' ὅμως καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἑνωθεῖσα τῷ θεῷ λόγῳ πάντων τὴν γνῶσιν εἶχεν οὐ χάριτι, ἀλλ', ὡς εἴρηται, διὰ τὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσιν· ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ ἦν καὶ θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος. ∆ιὸ οὐδὲ γνωμικὸν εἶχε θέλημα. Θέλησιν μὲν γὰρ εἶχε τὴν φυσικὴν, τὴν ἁπλῆν, τὴν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ὑποστάσεσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμοίως θεωρουμένην, τὴν δὲ γνώμην ἤγουν τὸ θελητὸν οὐκ εἶχεν ἡ ἁγία αὐτοῦ ψυχὴ ἐναντίον τοῦ θείου αὐτοῦ θελήματος οὐδὲ ἄλλο παρὰ τὸ θεῖον αὐτοῦ θέλημα. Ἡ γὰρ γνώμη συνδιαιρεῖται ταῖς ὑποστάσεσι πλὴν τῆς ἁγίας καὶ ἁπλῆς καὶ ἀσυνθέτου καὶ ἀδιαιρέτου θεότητος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ τῶν ὑποστάσεων μὴ εἰς ἅπαν διαιρουμένων καὶ διισταμένων οὐδὲ τὸ θελητὸν διαιρεῖται. Κἀκεῖ μέν, ἐπειδὴ μία ἡ φύσις, μία καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ θέλησις· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ αἱ ὑποστάσεις ἀδιάστατοί εἰσιν, ἓν καὶ τὸ θελητὸν καὶ μία ἡ κίνησις τῶν τριῶν ὑποστάσεων. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπειδὴ μὲν ἡ φύσις μία, μία καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ θέλησις· ἐπειδὴ δὲ αἱ ὑποστάσεις κεχωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ διεστήκασιν ἀλλήλων κατά τε τόπον καὶ χρόνον καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα διάθεσιν καὶ ἕτερα πλεῖστα, τούτου ἕνεκα διάφορα τὰ θελήματα καὶ αἱ γνῶμαι. Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἐπειδὴ μὲν διάφοροι αἱ φύσεις, διάφοροι καὶ αἱ θελήσεις αἱ φυσικαὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ θεότητος καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀνθρωπότητος ἤγουν αἱ θελητικαὶ δυνάμεις· ἐπειδὴ δὲ μία ἡ ὑπόστασις καὶ εἷς ὁ θέλων, ἓν καὶ τὸ θελητὸν ἤγουν τὸ γνωμικὸν θέλημα, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης αὐτοῦ θελήσεως ἑπομένης δηλαδὴ τῇ θείᾳ αὐτοῦ θελήσει καὶ ταῦτα θελούσης, ἃ ἡ θεία αὐτοῦ ἤθελε θέλησις. Χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὡς ἕτερον μέν ἐστιν ἡ θέλησις, ἕτερον δὲ βούλησις, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ θελητὸν καὶ ἕτερον τὸ θελητικὸν καὶ ἕτερον ὁ θέλων. Θέλησις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν αὐτὴ ἡ ἁπλῆ δύναμις τοῦ θέλειν, βούλησις δὲ ἡ περί τι θέλησις, θελητὸν δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῇ θελήσει πρᾶγμα ἤγουν ὅπερ θέλομεν (οἷον κινεῖται ἡ ὄρεξις πρὸς βρῶσιν· ἡ μὲν ἁπλῶς ὄρεξις ἡ λογικὴ θέλησίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ πρὸς βρῶσιν ὄρεξις βούλησίς ἐστιν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ βρῶσις θελητόν ἐστι), θελητικὸν δὲ τὸ ἔχον τὴν θελητικὴν δύναμιν οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος, θέλων δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ κεχρημένος τῇ θελήσει. ∆εῖ εἰδέναι, ὡς τὸ θέλημα ποτὲ μὲν τὴν θέλησιν δηλοῖ ἤτοι τὴν θελητικὴν δύναμιν καὶ λέγεται θέλημα φυσικόν, ποτὲ δὲ τὸ θελητὸν καὶ λέγεται θέλημα γνωμικόν. 37 Περὶ ἐνεργείασ Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὡς πᾶσαι αἱ δυνάμεις αἱ προειρημέναι, αἵ τε γνωστικαὶ αἵ τε ζωτικαὶ καὶ αἱ φυσικαὶ καὶ αἱ τεχνικαί, ἐνέργειαι λέγονται· ἐνέργεια γάρ ἐστιν ἡ φυσικὴ ἑκάστης οὐσίας δύναμίς τε καὶ κίνησις. Καὶ πάλιν· Ἐνέργειά ἐστι φυσικὴ ἡ πάσης οὐσίας ἔμφυτος κίνησις. Ὅθεν δῆλον, ὅτι, ὧν ἡ οὐσία ἡ αὐτή,