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By its total participation in it: Because by partial participation in the good, its privation is also substantialized.

When for some it is evil: These are forms of evil, as we said before; for the substantial is not evil-in-itself, which does not even exist. For this thing to be evil, and to cling to shameful pleasure as to some good, is not evil-in-itself, but a form of evil; for that which is entirely evil in itself does not exist, since it participates, even if as a final echo, in the good; for see what he says below; for if all things participate in the good and in all beings there is the good, evil, clearly, either does not exist, or it exists in the good; for neither is it the nature of fire to cool; if it begins to cool, it will not be fire. Therefore, evil too, if it exists, participates dimly in the good; for all (14S_170> beings are and remain in the good; but if it has nothing of the good, it does not exist; for the very will to exist is from a participation in the good, as has often been said above.

Absurd and impossible: Note that also concerning God it is well said in some cases 'he is not able,' as the Apostle also says: "if we are faithless, he remains faithful, and he cannot deny himself."

For every dyad: That every dyad is not a principle; but the monad is the principle of every dyad. Note this against the Manichaeans.

Completely contrary: Note these things; for it argues vehemently against the Manichaeans, who senselessly dogmatize a dyad as the principle of opposites; for arithmetic brings back to a limit the multitude having division in numbers, positing the monad as the principle of all number, and the dyad of even numbers. The principle, therefore, indicates the most simple thing in each genus. How then will the dyad be the principle of all things? For the dyad is not a simple principle, but composite. Therefore, the principle from composition is not simple; and how could it be called a principle? For before this composite principle there will be the principle properly so called, the one, from which, when monads are put together, a dyad was formed. It is clear then from all this that the dogma of two principles is inconsistent.

And certainly not two: That it is not possible for there to be two contrary principles of contraries. Not without difficulty: Not harmless. Wherefore also good things are friendly: Because all things participate in the good, and by their very being

are referred to the good, the good and the beautiful of all things would not be the first beautiful, in which all things participating, (14S_172> become beautiful, having been made like the beautiful in some way by participation, except it is made like in a much dimmer way to the one good and beautiful, as if it were increasing and being manifested in the nature of beautiful things; whence, also all things are very beautiful. But the nature of beautiful things, proceeding according to multitude, is already somehow also in composite things, which indeed men are especially accustomed to call beautiful, is shown in many ways with evil being composed and spoken of in many ways; but the beautiful in existing things is neither substance nor genus, but an accident possessing a certain similarity, connected by a small degree; for beautiful things are not spoken of according to one form, but in many ways; and they only resemble each other as similar things, even if multiformly, in that they too are beautiful each according to its own form, and in this respect being made similar and being cognate to each other.

But if the good is in God: That the good in God is existence. Nor simply: Instead of, eternally. According to time. Instead of, by participation. § 22. But neither in angels: Concerning angels, that evil is not in them, and

why they are called angels. The divine goodness: He says divine things concerning the nature of the angels who

remained godlike. And we said above why they are goodlike and not good-in-themselves

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Τῇ ὅλως αὐτοῦ μεθέξει: Ὅτι τῇ μερικῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μεθέξει, καί ἡ στέρησις αὐτοῦ οὐσίωται.

Ἡνίκα τοῖς μέν ἔστι κακόν: Ταῦτα εἴδη εἰσί τοῦ κακοῦ, ὡς προείπομεν· οὐ γάρ τό οὐσιῶδες αὐτόκακον, ὅ μηδέ ἐστι. Τό γάρ τόδε εἶναι κακόν, ἡδονῆς δέ αἰσχρᾶς ὡς ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἀντέχεσθαι, οὐκ αὐτόκακον, ἀλλ' εἶδος κακοῦ· τό γάρ πάντῃ κακόν αὐτό οὔτε ἐστίν, ἐπειδή μετέχει, κἄν κατ' ἔσχατον ἀπήχημα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ὅρα γάρ, τί φησι παρακατιών· εἰ γάρ πάντα μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καί ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσίν ἐστι τό ἀγαθόν, τό κακόν, προδήλως, ἤ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἤ ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἐστιν· οὐδέ γάρ φύσις πυρός τό ψύχειν· εἰ δέ ἄρξεται ψύχειν, οὐκ ἔσται πῦρ. Οὐκοῦν καί τό κακόν, ἐάν μέν ὕπεστι, μετέχει ἀμυδρῶς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· πάντα (14S_170> γάρ τά ὄντα ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ εἰσι καί μένουσιν· εἰ δέ οὐδέν ἔχει ἀγαθοῦ, οὔτε ὕπεστιν· αὐτό γάρ τό θέλειν ὑπεῖναι ἀγαθῆς ἐστι μεταλήψεως, ὡς ἀνωτέρω πολλάκις εἴρηται.

Ἄτοπον καί ἀδύνατον: Σημείωσαι, ὅτι καί ἐπί τοῦ Θεοῦ καλῶς λέγεται ἔν τισι τό 'οὐ δύναται;, ὡς καί ὁ Ἀπόστολός φησιν· «εἰ ἀπιστοῦμεν, ἐκεῖνος πιστός μένει, καί ἀρνήσασθαι ἑαυτόν οὐ δύναται».

Πᾶσα γάρ δυάς: Ὅτι πᾶσα δυάς οὐκ ἀρχή· μονάς δέ πάσης δυάδος ἀρχή. Σημείωσαι κατά Μανιχαίων.

Παντελῶς ἐναντία: Σημείωσαι ταῦτα· πάνυ γάρ κατά Μανιχαίων ἀγωνίζεται, τῶν δυάδα ἀρχήν ἐναντίων δογματιζόντων ἀνοήτως· ἡ μέν γάρ ἀριθμητική τό ἐν ἀριθμοῖς διαίρεσιν ἔχον πλήθους εἰς πέρας ἀνάγει, τήν μέν μονάδα τοῦ παντός ἀριθμοῦ ἀρχήν τιθεμένη, τήν δέ δυάδα τῶν ἀρτίων. Ἡ τοίνυν ἀρχή τό ἁπλούστατον ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει δηλοῖ. Πῶς οὖν ἡ δυάς ἀρχή πάντων ἔσται; οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἁπλῆ ἀρχή ἡ δυάς, ἀλλά σύνθετος. Οὐκοῦν οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἡ ἐκ συνθέσεως ἀρχή· καί πῶς ἄν κληθείη ἀρχή; Πρό γάρ τῆς συνθέτου ταύτης ἀρχῆς ἔσται ἡ κυρίως ἀρχή, τό ἕν, ἀφ' οὗ μονάδων συντεθεισῶν, δυάς ἀπετελέσθη. ∆ῆλον οὖν ἁπανταχόθεν, ὡς ἀσύστατον τῶν δύο ἀρχῶν τό δόγμα.

Καί μήν οὔτε δύο: Ὅτι οὐ δυνατόν δύο ἐναντίας ἀρχάς ἐναντίων εἶναι. Οὐδ' ἐκτός δυσχερείας: Οὐκ ἀβλαβής. ∆ιό καί φίλα τά ἀγαθά: Ἐπειδή τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πάντα μετέχει, καί αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι

εἰς τό ἀγαθόν ἀνάγονται, τό ἀγαθόν καί τό καλόν τῶν πάντων οὐκ ἄν εἴη τό πρῶτον καλόν, οὗ πάντα μετέχοντα, (14S_172> καλά γίνονται, ὁμοιωθέντα πως τῇ μεταλήψει τῷ καλῷ, πλήν πολλῷ ἀμυδρότατα ὁμοιοῦται τοῦ ἑνός ἀγαθοῦ καί καλοῦ, καθάπερ αὐξομένου καί εἰς τήν τῶν καλῶν φύσιν ἐκφαινομένου· ὅθεν, καί πάντα καλά λίαν. Ἡ δέ τῶν καλῶν φύσις, προϊοῦσα κατά πλῆθος, ἤδη πως καί εἰς τά σύνθετα, ἅ δή καί μάλιστα καλά εἰώθασι καλεῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀποδείκνυται πολλαχῶς τοῦ κακοῦ συντιθεμένου καί κατά πολλούς τρόπους λεγομένου· τό δέ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι καλόν οὔτε οὐσία ἐστίν, οὔτε γένος, ἀλλά συμβεβηκός ὁμοιότητά τινα κεκτημένον, κατά μικρόν συναπτομένην· οὐ γάρ καθ' ἕν εἶδος λέγεται τά καλά, ἀλλά πολλαχῶς· προσέοικε δέ μόνον ἀλλήλοις ὡς ὅμοια, κἄν πολυειδῶς περί τό καί αυτά καλά εἶναι κατά τά οἰκεῖα εἴδη ἕκαστα, καί κατά τοῦτο ἅτε ὁμοιούμενα καί προσήγορα ὄντα ἀλλήλοις.

Εἰ δέ ἐν Θεῷ τἀγαθόν: Ὅτι τό ἀγαθόν ἐν Θεῷ ὕπαρξίς ἐστιν. Οὔτε ἁπλῶς: Ἀντί τοῦ, ἀϊδίως. Κατά χρόνον. Ἀντί τοῦ, μεθεκτῶς. § 22. Ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐν ἀγγέλοις: Περί ἀγγέλων, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τό κακόν, καί

διά τί ἄγγελοι λέγονται. Τήν ἀγαθότητα τήν θείαν: Θεῖα λέγει τά περί φύσεως ἀγγέλων τῶν

μεινάντων θεοειδῶν. Εἴπομεν δέ ἀνωτέρω, διατί ἀγαθοειδεῖς καί οὐκ αὐτοαγάθους