Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it; and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are higher up, possessing a greater power but a lesser multitude, produce more things through fewer forms in respect of quantity, because of their power; while those after them, through more forms, produce fewer, according to the deficiency of their power. If, then, the former produce more through fewer, the forms in them are more universal; and if the latter produce fewer through more, the forms in them are more partial. From which it follows that the things generated from the superior principles according to one form are produced divisibly from the secondary principles according to a plurality of ideas, and conversely that the things produced by the inferior principles through many and distinct ideas are produced by the higher principles through fewer and more universal ones; and that the whole and the common to all participants comes from above, but the divided and the particular from the secondary principles. Whence the secondary intellects, with the more partial distinctions of the forms, somehow articulate and refine the formations of the primary principles. 178 Every intellectual form is constitutive of eternal things. For if every such thing is eternal and unmoved, it is the cause of things immutable in substance and of eternal substances, but not of things that come to be and perish; so that everything which subsists according to an intellectual form is eternal. For if by its very being every form produces the things after it, and their being is always in the same state, then the things produced from them will also be in the same state and will be eternal. Therefore neither have things that come to be in time subsisted from a formal cause, nor do perishable things, insofar as they are perishable, have a pre-existing intellectual form; for they would be imperishable and ungenerated, having their substance in relation to those. 179 Every intellectual number is finite. For if there is after it another multitude, inferior in substance, and this number is nearer to the one, while that multitude is more remote, and that which is nearer to the one is lesser in quantity, while that which is more remote is greater, then the intellectual number would be less than any multitude after it. It is not therefore infinite; therefore the multitude of intellects is finite. For that which is less than something is not infinite, because the infinite is less than nothing, insofar as it is infinite. 180 Every intellect is a whole, <not> as subsisting from parts [each is both united with the others and distinguished from them], but the unparticipated Intellect is simply a whole, as containing all the parts in itself universally, while each of the partial intellects contains the whole as in a part, and thus all things are in it partially. For if all things are according to one, and "according to one" is nothing other than "partially", then the whole is thus in each of these partially, being defined by some one of the parts prevailing in the all. 181 Every participated intellect is either divine, as dependent on gods, or merely intellectual. For if there is primarily the divine and unparticipated Intellect, akin to this, surely, is not that which differs in both respects, both by not being divine and by not being unparticipated; for things dissimilar in both respects are not connected with each other. It is clear, then, that the intermediate term is in one respect similar to the primarily existing Intellect, and in another, dissimilar. It is therefore either unparticipated and not divine, or participated and divine. But everything unparticipated is divine, as having obtained the analogous rank to the one in the multitude. There will therefore be some intellect that is at once divine and participated. But indeed there must also be an intellect not participating in the divine henads, but only thinking; for in each series the first terms, being joined to their own monad, can participate in the things in the immediately superior order, but the last terms, distant from the original monad, are not able to be attached to those. There is therefore both a divine intellect and an intellect that is only intellectual, the one being established according to the intellectual property, which it has from its own monad [and from the unparticipated]; the other according to the unification, which it received from the participated henad. 182 Every divine intellect that is participated is participated by divine souls. For if participation makes the participant like that which is participated and renders it connate with it, it is clear that the soul must be divine which participates in a divine intellect and is attached to a divine intellect, and through the medium of the intellect participates in the divinity that is in it. For divinity attaches the soul that participates in it to the intellect and binds the divine to the divine. 183 Every participated intellect

συγγενέσ τερα, τῷ ποσῷ συνεσταλμένα, τῇ δυνάμει τὰ μετ' αὐτὰ ὑπεραίρει· καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς πορρώτερον ἔμπαλιν. δύναμιν οὖν οἱ ἀνωτέρω προστησάμενοι μείζονα, πλῆθος δὲ ἔλαττον, δι' ἐλαττόνων κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν εἰδῶν πλείω παράγουσι διὰ τὴν δύνα μιν· οἱ δὲ μετ' ἐκείνους διὰ πλειόνων ἐλάττω κατὰ τὴν τῆς δυνάμεως ἔλλειψιν. εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνοι δι' ἐλαττόνων πλείονα παρ άγουσιν, ὁλικώτερα τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἴδη· καὶ εἰ οἵδε διὰ πλειόνων ἐλάττονα, μερικώτερα τὰ ἐν τούτοις. ἐξ ὧν δὴ συμβαίνει τὰ καθ' ἓν εἶδος ἐκ τῶν ὑπερτέρων ἀπο γεννώμενα κατὰ πλείους ἰδέας ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων διῃρημένως παράγεσθαι, καὶ ἔμπαλιν τὰ διὰ πολλῶν καὶ διακεκριμένων ἰδεῶν ὑπὸ τῶν καταδεεστέρων παραγόμενα δι' ἐλαττόνων καὶ ὁλικωτέρων ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνωτέρω παράγεσθαι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ὅλον καὶ κοινὸν πᾶσι τοῖς μετέχουσιν ἄνωθεν παραγίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μεμε ρισμένον καὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων. ὅθεν οἱ δεύτεροι νόες ταῖς τῶν εἰδῶν μερικωτέραις διακρίσεσιν ἐπιδιαρθροῦσί πως καὶ λεπτουργοῦσι τὰς τῶν πρώτων εἰδοποιΐας. 178 Πᾶν νοερὸν εἶδος ἀϊδίων ἐστὶν ὑποστατικόν. εἰ γὰρ αἰώνιόν ἐστι καὶ ἀκίνητον πᾶν, ἀμεταβλήτων ἐστὶ κατ' οὐσίαν αἴτιον καὶ ἀϊδίων ὑποστάσεων, ἀλλ' οὐ γινομένων καὶ φθειρομένων· ὥστε πᾶν τὸ κατ' εἶδος νοερὸν ὑποστὰν [νοερὸν] ἀΐδιόν ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ εἰ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι πάντα τὰ εἴδη παράγει τὰ μετ' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ εἶναι αὐτῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, καὶ τὰ [παραγόμενα] ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὡσαύτως ἕξει καὶ ἀΐδια ἔσται. οὔτε ἄρα τὰ γενητὰ κατά τινα χρόνον ἀπ' αἰτίας ὑφέστηκεν εἰδητικῆς οὔτε τὰ φθαρτά, ᾗ φθαρτά, εἶδος ἔχει νοερὸν προϋπάρχον· ἦν γὰρ ἂν ἄφθαρτα καὶ ἀγένητα, πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχοντα. 179 Πᾶς ὁ νοερὸς ἀριθμὸς πεπέρασται. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι μετ' αὐτὸν ἄλλο πλῆθος κατ' οὐσίαν ὑφειμένον, καὶ οὗτος ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ἑνός, ἐκεῖνο δὲ πορρώτερον, τὸ δὲ ἐγγυ τέρω τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔλαττον κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, πλεῖον δὲ τὸ πορρώ τερον, καὶ ὁ νοερὸς ἀριθμὸς ἐλάττων ἂν εἴη παντὸς τοῦ μετ' αὐτὸν πλήθους. οὐκ ἄρα ἄπειρός ἐστι· πεπέρασται ἄρα τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νόων. τὸ γὰρ τινὸς ἔλαττον οὐκ ἄπειρον, διότι τὸ ἄπειρον οὐδενὸς ἔλαττον, ᾗ ἄπειρον. 180 Πᾶς νοῦς ὅλος ἐστίν, <οὐχ> ὡς ἐκ μερῶν ὑποστάς [ἕκαστος καὶ ἥνωται τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ διακέκριται ἀπ' αὐτῶν], ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀμέθεκτος νοῦς ἁπλῶς ὅλος, ὡς καὶ τὰ μέρη πάντα ὁλικῶς ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν δὲ μερικῶν ἕκαστος ὡς ἐν μέρει τὸ ὅλον ἔχει, καὶ οὕτως πάντα ἐστὶ μερικῶς. εἰ γὰρ καθ' ἓν πάντα, τὸ δὲ καθ' ἓν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ μερικῶς, τὸ ἄρα ὅλον οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ τούτων μερικῶς, καθ' ἕν τι τῶν μερικῶν ἐπικρατοῦν ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν ἀφοριζόμενον. 181 Πᾶς ὁ μετεχόμενος νοῦς ἢ θεῖός ἐστιν, ὡς θεῶν ἐξημ μένος, ἢ νοερὸς μόνον. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ θεῖος καὶ ἀμέθεκτος νοῦς πρώτως, τούτῳ δήπου συγγενής ἐστιν οὐχ ὁ κατ' ἀμφότερα διαφέρων, καὶ τῷ μὴ εἶναι θεῖος καὶ τῷ μὴ ἀμέθεκτος εἶναι· τὰ γὰρ κατ' ἄμφω ἀνόμοια ἀσύναπτα ἀλλήλοις. δῆλον δὴ οὖν ὅτι τῇ μὲν ὅμοιόν ἐστι τῷ πρώτως ὄντι νῷ τὸ μέσον, τῇ δὲ ἀνόμοιον. ἢ οὖν ἀμέθ εκτόν ἐστι καὶ οὐ θεῖον ἢ μετεχόμενον καὶ θεῖον. ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἀμέθεκτον θεῖον, ὡς τῷ ἑνὶ τὴν ἀνάλογον τάξιν ἐν τῷ πλήθει λαχόν. ἔσται ἄρα τις νοῦς θεῖος ἅμα καὶ μετεχόμενος. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶναι δεῖ νοῦν καὶ μὴ μετέχοντα τῶν θείων ἑνάδων, ἀλλὰ νοοῦντα μόνον· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ σειρὰν τὰ μὲν πρῶτα καὶ τῇ ἑαυτῶν μονάδι συνημμένα μετέχειν δύναται τῶν ἐν τῇ ὑπερκειμένῃ προσεχῶς τάξει, τὰ δὲ πολλοστὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχικῆς μονάδος οὐχ οἷά τέ ἐστιν ἐκείνων ἐξῆφθαι. ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ νοῦς θεῖος καὶ νοῦς τις νοερὸς μόνον, ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα τὴν νοερὰν ἱστάμενος, ἣν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ μονάδος ἔχει [καὶ τοῦ ἀμεθέκτου]· ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, ἣν ἀπὸ τῆς μετεχομένης ἑνάδος ὑπεδέξατο. 182 Πᾶς θεῖος νοῦς μετεχόμενος ὑπὸ ψυχῶν μετέχεται θείων. εἰ γὰρ ἡ μέθεξις ἐξομοιοῖ τῷ μετεχομένῳ τὸ μετέχον καὶ συμφυὲς ἀποτελεῖ, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι θείαν εἶναι ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη τὴν τοῦ θείου νοῦ μετέχουσαν καὶ εἰς θεῖον νοῦν ἀνηρτημένην, καὶ διὰ μέσου τοῦ νοῦ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ θεότητος μετέχειν. ἡ γὰρ θεότης συνεξάπτει τῷ νῷ τὴν μετέχουσαν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν καὶ συνδεῖ τῷ θείῳ τὸ θεῖον. 183 Πᾶς νοῦς μετεχόμενος