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Of these the energy is also the same; but of those whose natures are different, their energies are also different; for it is impossible for a substance to be devoid of natural energy. Again, a natural energy is the power which manifests each substance. And again: A natural and primary energy is the ever-moving power of the intelligent soul, that is, its ever-moving word which naturally ever springs from it. A natural energy is the power and movement of each substance, without which only non-being exists. Actions are also called energies, such as speaking, walking, eating and drinking, and things like that. And natural passions are often called energies, such as hunger, thirst, and things like that. Again, the result of a power is also called energy. But what is potential and what is actual are spoken of in two ways. For we say that a nursing child is potentially a grammarian; for he has the aptitude to become a grammarian through learning. Again, we say that the grammarian is both potentially a grammarian and actually; actually, because he has the knowledge of grammar, but potentially, because he is able to explain, but is not actively explaining. Again, we say a grammarian is actually [one], when he is active, that is, explaining. It is necessary to know, therefore, that the second way is common to the potential and the actual, being the second of the potential, and the first of the actual. The first, and only, and true energy of a nature is the volitional, that is, the rational and self-determining life which constitutes our species; of which, if they deprive the Lord, I do not know how they can say that He, being God, became man. Energy is the active movement of a nature; and that is called active which is moved of itself.

38 Concerning the voluntary and the involuntary Since the voluntary is in some action and the

supposed involuntary is in some action, and many people place the truly involuntary not only in suffering but also in acting, it is necessary to know that action is a rational energy. And praise or blame follows actions, and some of them are done with pleasure, others with pain, and some of them are desirable to the one acting, while others are to be avoided; and of the desirable, some are always desirable, others for a certain time, and likewise for those to be avoided. And again, some actions are pitied, others are deemed worthy of pardon, while others are hated and punished. Therefore, praise or blame always follows the voluntary, and being done with pleasure, and the actions being desirable to those who do them, either always or at the time when they are done; but for the involuntary, being deemed worthy of pardon or pity, and being done with pain, and not being desirable, nor the deed being accomplished through oneself, even if one should be forced. And of the involuntary, one kind is by force, the other through ignorance; by force, when the efficient principle, that is, the cause, is external, that is, when we are forced by another, not being persuaded at all, nor contributing by our own impulse, nor cooperating at all, nor doing the forced thing by ourselves; which we also define, saying: That of which the principle is external, with the one forced contributing nothing by his own impulse. And by principle we mean the efficient cause. And the involuntary through ignorance is when we ourselves do not provide the cause of the ignorance, but it so happens. For if someone drunk commits a murder, he murdered in ignorance, but not involuntarily; for he himself performed the cause of the ignorance, that is, the drunkenness. But if someone, shooting an arrow in the usual place, killed his father passing by, this is said to have been done involuntarily through ignorance. The involuntary, therefore, being twofold, one by force, the other through ignorance, the voluntary is opposed to both; for the voluntary is that which happens neither by force nor through ignorance. The voluntary, therefore, is that of which the principle, that is, the cause, is in oneself, knowing the particular circumstances, through which and in which the action takes place. "Particular circumstances" are what are called by the rhetoricians circumstantial elements, such as who, that is, the one who acted; whom, that is, the one who suffered; what, that is, the thing itself that was done, for instance, he murdered; with what, that is, the instrument; where, that is, the place; when, that is, at what time; how, the manner of the action; why, that is, for what

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τούτων καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ αὐτή, ὧν δὲ αἱ φύσεις διάφοροι, τούτων καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι διάφοροι· ἀμήχανον γὰρ οὐσίαν ἄμοιρον εἶναι φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας. Ἐνέργεια πάλιν ἐστὶ φυσικὴ ἡ δηλωτικὴ ἑκάστης οὐσίας δύναμις. Καὶ πάλιν· Ἐνέργειά ἐστι φυσικὴ καὶ πρώτη ἡ ἀεικίνητος δύναμις τῆς νοερᾶς ψυχῆς, τουτέστιν ὁ ἀεικίνητος αὐτῆς λόγος φυσικῶς ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀεὶ πηγαζόμενος. Ἐνέργειά ἐστι φυσικὴ ἡ ἑκάστης οὐσίας δύναμίς τε καὶ κίνησις, ἧς χωρὶς μόνον τὸ μὴ ὄν. Λέγονται δὲ ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις ὡς τὸ λαλεῖν, τὸ περιπατεῖν, τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Καὶ τὰ πάθη δὲ τὰ φυσικὰ πολλάκις ἐνέργειαι λέγονται οἷον πεῖνα, δίψα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Λέγεται πάλιν ἐνέργεια καὶ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τῆς δυνάμεως. ∆ιττῶς δὲ λέγεται καὶ τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ. Λέγομεν γὰρ τὸν παῖδα τὸν θηλάζοντα δυνάμει γραμματικόν· ἔχει γὰρ ἐπιτηδειότητα διὰ μαθήσεως γενέσθαι γραμματικός. Λέγομεν πάλιν τὸν γραμματικὸν καὶ δυνάμει γραμματικὸν καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἐνεργείᾳ μέν, ὅτι ἔχει τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς γραμ ματικῆς, δυνάμει δέ, ὅτι δύναται ἐξηγεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ δὲ τὴν ἐξήγησιν. Λέγομεν πάλιν ἐνεργείᾳ γραμματικόν, ὅτε ἐνεργεῖ ἤγουν ἐξηγεῖται. Χρὴ οὖν γινώσκειν, ὅτι ὁ δεύτερος τρόπος κοινός ἐστι τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ, δεύτερος μὲν τοῦ δυνάμει, πρῶτος δὲ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ. Ἐνέργεια φύσεώς ἐστι πρώτη καὶ μόνη καὶ ἀληθὴς ἡ αὐθαίρετος ἤτοι λογικὴ καὶ αὐτεξούσιος ζωὴ καὶ τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς εἴδους συστατική· ἧς ἀποστεροῦντες τὸν κύριον, οὐκ οἶδα, ὅπως αὐτὸν θεὸν ἐνανθρωπήσαντα λέγουσιν. Ἐνέργειά ἐστι φύσεως κίνησις δραστική· δραστικὸν δὲ λέγεται τὸ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον.

38 Περὶ ἑκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου Ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον ἐν πράξει τινί ἐστι καὶ τὸ

νομιζόμενον δὲ ἀκούσιον ἐν πράξει τινί ἐστι, πολλοὶ δέ τινες καὶ τὸ ὄντως ἀκούσιον οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ πάσχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ πράττειν τίθενται, δεῖ εἰδέναι, ὅτι πρᾶξίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια λογική. Ταῖς δὲ πράξεσιν ἕπεται ἔπαινος ἢ ψόγος, καὶ αἱ μὲν αὐτῶν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, αἱ δὲ μετὰ λύπης πράττονται, καὶ αἱ μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσιν αἱρεταὶ τῷ πράττοντι, αἱ δὲ φευκταί, καὶ τῶν αἱρετῶν αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ αἱρεταί, αἱ δὲ κατά τινα χρόνον, ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν φευκτῶν. Καὶ πάλιν αἱ μὲν τῶν πράξεων ἐλεοῦνται, αἱ δὲ συγγνώμης ἀξιοῦνται, αἱ δὲ μισοῦνται καὶ κολάζονται. Τῷ μὲν οὖν ἑκουσίῳ πάντως ἐπακολουθεῖ ἔπαινος ἢ ψόγος καὶ τὸ μεθ' ἡδονῆς πράττεσθαι καὶ τὸ αἱρετὰς εἶναι τὰς πράξεις τοῖς πράττουσιν ἢ ἀεὶ ἢ τότε, ὅτε πράττονται, τῷ δὲ ἀκουσίῳ τὸ συγγνώμης ἢ ἐλέους ἀξιοῦσθαι καὶ τὸ μετὰ λύπης πράττεσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι αἱρετὰς μηδὲ δι' ἑαυτοῦ τελεῖν τὸ πραττόμενον, εἰ καὶ βιάζοιτο. Τοῦ δὲ ἀκουσίου τὸ μέν ἐστι κατὰ βίαν, τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν· κατὰ βίαν μέν, ὅταν ἡ ποιητικὴ ἀρχὴ ἤγουν αἰτία ἔξωθέν ἐστιν ἤγουν ὅταν ὑφ' ἑτέρου βιαζώμεθα, μηδ' ὅλως πειθόμενοι μηδὲ συμβαλλώμεθα κατ' οἰκείαν ὁρμὴν μηδὲ ὅλως συμπράττωμεν ἢ δι' ἑαυτῶν τὸ βιασθὲν ποιῶμεν, ὃ καὶ ὁριζόμενοί φαμεν· Οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου κατ' οἰκείαν ὁρμὴν τοῦ βιασθέντος. Ἀρχὴν δέ φαμεν τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαν. Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, ὅταν μὴ αὐτοὶ παρέχωμεν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀγνοίας, ἀλλ' οὕτω συμβῇ. Εἰ γὰρ μεθύων τις φόνον ποιήσει, ἀγνοῶν ἐφόνευσεν, οὐ μὴν ἀκουσίως· τὴν γὰρ αἰτίαν τῆς ἀγνοίας ἤγουν τὴν μέθην αὐτὸς ἔπραξεν. Εἰ δέ τις ἐν τῷ συνήθει τόπῳ τοξεύων τὸν πατέρα παριόντα ἀπέκτεινε, δι' ἄγνοιαν λέγεται ἀκουσίως τοῦτο πεποιηκέναι. Τοῦ οὖν ἀκουσίου διττοῦ ὄντος, τοῦ μὲν κατὰ βίαν, τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον ἀμφοτέροις ἀντίκειται· ἔστι γὰρ ἑκούσιον τὸ μήτε κατὰ βίαν μήτε δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενον. Ἑκούσιον τοίνυν ἐστίν, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ τουτέστιν ἡ αἰτία ἐν αὑτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, δι' ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. «Καθ' ἕκαστα» δέ ἐστιν, ἃ καλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς ῥήτορσι περιστατικὰ μόρια, οἷον τίς ἤγουν ὁ πράξας, τίνα ἤγουν τὸν παθόντα, τί ἤγουν αὐτὸ τὸ πραχθέν, τυχὸν ἐφόνευσε· τίνι ἤγουν ὀργάνῳ, ποῦ ἤγουν τόπῳ, πότε ἤγουν ἐν ποίῳ χρόνῳ, πῶς ὁ τρόπος τῆς πράξεως, διὰ τί ἤγουν διὰ ποίαν