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are being achieved by us? And this is not only among us who mock worldly wisdom and consider it foolishness, but it is also agreed upon in this way among the worldly philosophers themselves. And for this reason many did not greatly concern themselves with the matter; while others completely despised it and remained unlearned, and having spent their whole life in the more ethical part of philosophy, shone brightly, and became illustrious. For Anacharsis and Crates and Diogenes made no effort in this; and some say, not even Socrates, and he who excelled most of all in this art, and who knew his teachings more accurately than others, would bear witness to us. For having once brought him into court to defend himself, in his defense to the judges he made him speak thus: You shall hear from me the whole truth, but not, by 47.368 Zeus, O men of Athens, speeches finely phrased, like those of these men, with words and phrases, nor adorned, but you will hear things spoken plainly and at random with the words that come to mind. For I believe what I say to be just, and let none of you expect otherwise. For it would not be fitting for my age, like a young lad fabricating speeches, to come before you. He said these things to show that it was not through some laziness, but because he did not consider the matter important, that he neither learned nor used it. Therefore eloquence is not for philosophers, nor for men in general, but the ambition of playful youths, as seems to be the case even to the philosophers themselves, not only to others, but also to him who had mastered this most of all; for he does not allow the teacher to be adorned with this matter, considering this adornment to be a disgrace for a philosopher. But one might justly say these things to an unbeliever, or rather even to a believer. For how is it not strange, when those who hunt for the opinion of the many, and are able to appear from nowhere else but from worldly wisdom, consider it to be nothing, while we so admire and are astonished at it, that we even despise the most necessary things on its account? 12. These things are sufficient, then, for the unbeliever, but for the believer it is necessary to bring forward both these and the examples among us. What are these? Those great and holy men, the first, when there were no letters, those after them, when there were letters, but not yet skill in words, and those after these, when there were both letters and skill in words. But they were then unskilled in both; for they were not only without education in words, but also without experience of letters themselves; but nevertheless in these very things, in which the power of words seems to be most necessary, with such abundance they surpassed those who were masters of it, so that they appeared worse than foolish children. For when persuasion is in words. and the philosophers do not overcome even one tyrant, while the unlettered and common people convert the whole world, it is clear that the victory prize of wisdom belongs to these, to the unlettered and common people, not to those who have mastered both. Thus true wisdom and true education are nothing other than the fear of God. And let no one think that I am legislating for children to become unlearned; but if anyone could give assurance concerning the necessary things, I would not choose to prevent this from being added as a surplus. For just as, when the foundations are shaken, and the whole house and building is in danger of collapsing, it is the utmost folly and madness to run to the plasterers, and not to the builders; so again it is of untimely contentiousness, when the walls are standing safely and securely, to prevent the one who wishes to plaster. And that I say these things from the soul, which I have shown in my works, these things I will also now relate to you. A certain very wealthy young man once came to our city for education in both kinds of eloquence, both that of the Italians and that of the Greeks. This young man had a tutor following him, who had only one task: 47.369 to mold his soul. To this one

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ἡμῖν κατορθουμένων; Καὶ ταῦτα οὐ παρ' ἡμῖν μόνον τοῖς καταγελῶσι τῆς ἔξωθεν σοφίας, καὶ μωρίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔξωθεν φιλοσόφοις οὕτω συνωμολόγηται. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ οὐ σφόδρα ἐπεμελήθησαν τοῦ πράγματος· οἱ δὲ καὶ τέλεον κατεφρόνησαν καὶ διετέλεσαν ὄντες ἀμαθεῖς, καὶ τὸν ἅπαντα βίον ἐν τῷ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἠθικωτέρῳ διατρίψαντες μέρει, σφόδρα ἔλαμψαν, καὶ γεγόνασι περιφανεῖς. Καὶ γὰρ Ἀνάχαρσις καὶ Κράτης καὶ ∆ιογένης οὐδεμίαν ἐποιήσαντο σπουδὴν τούτου· φασὶ δέ τινες, οὐδὲ Σωκράτης, καὶ μαρτυρήσειεν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ μάλιστα πάντων ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ταύτῃ διενεγκὼν, καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου τῶν ἄλλων εἰδὼς ἀκριβέστερον. Εἰσαγαγὼν γὰρ αὐτόν ποτε εἰς δικαστήριον ἀπολογησόμενον, ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίᾳ ἐποίησεν οὕτω λέγοντα· Ὑμεῖς δὲ ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐ μέντοι μὰ 47.368 ∆ί', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε ἁπλῶς καὶ εἰκῆ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασι. Πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρέποι τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τῇδε, ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους, εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. Ταῦτα δὲ ἔλεγε δεικνὺς, ὅτι οὐ διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν τινὰ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ μέγα τὸ πρᾶγμα ἡγεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἔμαθεν, οὔτε ἐχρήσατο. Οὐκ οὖν φιλοσόφων μὲν ἡ εὐγλωττία, καὶ ἀνδρῶν δὲ ἁπλῶς, μειρακίων δὲ παιζόντων ἡ φιλοτιμία, ὡς καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς φιλοσόφοις δοκεῖ, οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πάντων μάλιστα ἐν τούτῳ κεκρατηκότι· τὸν γὰρ διδάσκαλον οὐκ ἀφίησι κοσμεῖσθαι τῷ πράγματι, αἰσχρὸν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ τὸν κόσμον τοῦτον εἶναι νομίζων. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὡς πρὸς ἄπιστον δικαίως ἄν τις εἴποι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πρὸς πιστόν. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον, ὅταν οἱ μὲν τὴν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν θηρώμενοι, καὶ οὐδὲ ἄλλοθεν φανῆναι δυνάμενοι, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξωθεν σοφίας, μηδὲν αὐτὴν εἶναι νομίζωσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὕτω θαυμάζωμεν καὶ ἐκπληττώμεθα, ὡς καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων διὰ ταύτην καταφρονεῖν; ιβʹ. Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸν ἄπιστον ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν πιστὸν καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὑποδείγματα ἀναγκαῖον παράγειν. Ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα; Τοὺς μεγάλους ἄνδρας καὶ ἁγίους ἐκείνους, τοὺς πρώτους, ὅτε γράμματα οὐκ ἦν, τοὺς μετ' ἐκείνους, ὅτε γράμματα μὲν ἦν, ἐμπειρία δὲ λόγων οὐδέπω τοὺς μετὰ τούτους, ὅτε καὶ γράμματα ἦν καὶ ἐμπειρία λόγων. Ἀμφοτέρων δὲ ἦσαν τότε ἄπειροι ἐκεῖνοι· οὐ μόνον γὰρ τῆς τῶν λόγων παιδεύσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς τῶν γραμμάτων ἐμπειρίας ἐκτὸς ἦσαν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις, οἷς μάλιστα ἡ τῶν λόγων ἰσχὺς ἀναγκαία εἶναι δοκεῖ, μετὰ τοσαύτης περιουσίας τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ κρατοῦντας παρήλασαν, ὡς παίδων ἀνοήτων αὐτοὺς φανῆναι χείρους. Ὅταν γὰρ τὸ πείθειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ᾖ. καὶ οἱ μὲν φιλόσοφοι μηδὲ ἑνὸς περιγίνονται τυράννου, οἱ δὲ ἀγράμματοι καὶ ἰδιῶται τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐπιστρέφωσιν ἅπασαν, εὔδηλον ὅτι παρὰ τούτοις τὰ νικητήρια τῆς σοφίας ἐστὶ, τοῖς ἀγραμμάτοις καὶ ἰδιώταις, οὐ παρ' ἐκείνοις τοῖς τὰ ἑκάτερα διηκριβωκόσιν. Οὕτως ἡ ὄντως σοφία καὶ ἡ ὄντως παίδευσις οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ φόβος. Καὶ μή μέ τις νομιζέτω νομοθετεῖν ἀμαθεῖς τοὺς παῖδας γίνεσθαι· ἀλλ' εἴ τις ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων παρέχοι θαῤῥεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ἑλοίμην κωλῦσαι καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ περιουσίας γενέσθαι. Ὥσπερ γὰρ, τῶν θεμελίων σαλευομένων, καὶ πάσης τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τῆς οἰκοδομῆς κινδυνευούσης καταπεσεῖν, ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας καὶ παραπληξίας ἐστὶ πρὸς τοὺς κονιῶντας, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκοδομοῦντας τρέχειν· οὕτω πάλιν ἀκαίρου φιλονεικίας, τῶν τοίχων ἑστώτων ἀσφαλῶς καὶ βεβαίως, κωλύειν τὸν βουλόμενον κονιᾷν. Καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα ἀπὸ ψυχῆς λέγω, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων ἐπεδειξάμην, ταῦτα ὑμῖν διηγήσομαι καὶ νῦν. Νέος τις κομιδῇ πλούσιος ὢν ἐπεδήμησέ ποτε τῇ πόλει τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ κατὰ λόγων παίδευσιν ἑκατέραν, τήν τε Ἰταλῶν τήν τε Ἑλλήνων. Οὗτος ὁ νέος εἶχεν ἀκολουθοῦντα παιδαγωγὸν, ἓν ἔργον ἔχοντα μόνον 47.369 διαπλάττειν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχήν. Τούτῳ