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cause. It must be known that there are certain things intermediate between voluntary and involuntary, which, being unpleasant and painful, we accept because of a greater evil, as on account of a shipwreck we throw overboard the things in the ship. It must be known that children and irrational animals act voluntarily, but not with choice, and whatever things we do through anger without having deliberated, we do voluntarily, but not according to choice. And the friend who arrived suddenly came to us voluntarily, but not by choice. And he who unexpectedly came upon a treasure, came upon it voluntarily, but not by choice. All these things are voluntary because one takes pleasure in them, but not according to choice, because they are not from deliberation. For deliberation must in every case precede choice, as has been said.

39 Concerning that which is in our power, that is, of free will The discussion concerning free will

discussion, that is, concerning what is in our power, has as its first inquiry, whether anything is in our power; for there are many who oppose this. Second, what things are in our power and over what things we have authority. Third, to examine the cause for which God who made us, made us with free will. Taking up then the first point, let us first speak, proving that some things are in our power, from things admitted by them, and let us speak thus: Of all things that happen, they say that the cause is either God or necessity or fate or nature or chance or the spontaneous. But the work of God is substance and providence; of necessity, the motion of things that are always the same; of fate, that the things accomplished through it are accomplished by necessity (for this too is of necessity); of nature, generation, growth, decay, plants and animals; of chance, rare and unexpected things (for they define chance as the coincidence and concurrence of two causes, having their origin in choice, which produce something other than what is natural, as when someone digging a trench finds a treasure; for neither did the one who placed the treasure place it so that this man might find it, nor did the one who found it dig so as to find a treasure, but the one so that he might take it up when he wished, and the other so that he might dig a trench; but something else happened, contrary to what both had chosen); of the spontaneous, the coincidences of inanimate or irrational things without nature and art. Thus they themselves say. To which of these, then, shall we subordinate the actions of men, if man is not the cause and beginning of action? For it is not right to ascribe to God deeds that are sometimes shameful and unjust, nor to necessity (for they are not among the things that are always the same) nor to fate (for they say the things of fate are not of the contingent but of the necessary) nor to nature (for the works of nature are animals and plants) nor to chance (for the actions of men are not rare and unexpected) nor to the spontaneous (for they say the coincidences of the spontaneous belong to inanimate or irrational things). It remains, therefore, that man himself, the one acting and doing, is the beginning of his own works and has free will. Further, if man is the beginning of no action, deliberation is superfluous; for to what end will he use deliberation, being master of no action? For all deliberation is for the sake of action. To show that the finest and most honorable thing in man is superfluous would be among the most absurd things. If, therefore, he deliberates, he deliberates for the sake of action; for all deliberation is for the sake of action and on account of action.

40 Concerning things that happen Of things that happen, some are in our power, and others are not in our

power. Therefore, those things are in our power which we have the free will to do and not to do, that is, all things done voluntarily by us (for an action would not be said to be done voluntarily if the action were not in our power) and, in short, those things which are followed by blame or praise and to which exhortation and law apply. And properly in our power are all things of the soul and about which we deliberate; and deliberation is concerned with things that are equally possible. And that is equally possible which we are able to do, and its opposite; and our mind makes the choice of this, and this is the beginning of action. These things, therefore

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αἰτίαν. Ἰστέον, ὥς εἰσί τινα μέσα ἑκουσίων καὶ ἀκουσίων, ἅτινα ἀηδῆ καὶ λυπηρὰ ὄντα διὰ μεῖζον κακὸν καταδεχόμεθα, ὡς διὰ ναυάγιον ἀποβάλλομεν τὰ ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ. Ἰστέον, ὡς τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ἑκουσίως μὲν ποιεῖ, οὐ μὴν δὲ καὶ προαιρούμενα, καὶ ὅσα διὰ θυμὸν πράττομεν μὴ προβουλευσάμενοι, ἑκουσίως ποιοῦμεν, οὐ μὴν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν. Καὶ ὁ φίλος αἰφνιδίως ἐπέστη ἑκουσίως μὲν ἡμῖν, οὐ μὴν καὶ προαιρούμενος. Καὶ ὁ θησαυρῷ ἀνελπίστως περιτυχὼν ἑκουσίως περιέτυχεν, οὐ μὴν καὶ προαιρούμενος. Πάντα ταῦτα ἑκούσια μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἥδεσθαι, οὐ μὴν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, διότι οὐκ ἀπὸ βουλῆς. ∆εῖ δὲ πάντως βουλὴν προηγεῖσθαι τῆς προαιρέσεως, καθὼς εἴρηται.

39 Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τουτέστι τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου Ὁ περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου

λόγος τουτέστι τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρώτην μὲν ἔχει ζήτησιν, εἰ ἔστι ἐφ' ἡμῖν· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντιβαίνοντες. ∆ευτέραν δέ, τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ τίνων ἐξουσίαν ἔχομεν. Τρίτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἐξετάσαι, δι' ἣν ὁ ποιήσας ἡμᾶς θεὸς αὐτεξουσίους ἐποίησεν. Ἀναλαβόντες οὖν περὶ τοῦ πρώτου, πρῶτον εἴπωμεν ἀποδεικνύντες, ὅτι ἔστι τινὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἐκ τῶν παρ' ἐκείνοις ὁμολογουμένων καὶ εἴπωμεν οὕτως· Τῶν γινομένων πάντων ἢ θεόν φασιν αἴτιον εἶναι ἢ ἀνάγκην ἢ εἱμαρμένην ἢ φύσιν ἢ τύχην ἢ τὸ αὐτόματον. Ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν θεοῦ ἔργον οὐσία καὶ πρόνοια· τῆς δὲ ἀνάγκης τῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων ἡ κίνησις· τῆς δὲ εἱμαρμένης τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ δι' αὐτῆς ἐπιτελεῖσθαι (καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τῆς ἀνάγκης ἐστί)· τῆς δὲ φύσεως γένεσις, αὔξησις, φθορά, φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα· τῆς δὲ τύχης τὰ σπάνια καὶ ἀπροσδόκητα (ὁρίζονται γὰρ τὴν τύχην σύμπτωσιν καὶ συνδρομὴν δύο αἰτίων ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐχόντων, ἄλλο τι, παρ' ὃ πέφυκεν, ἀποτελούντων, ὡς τάφρον ὀρύσσοντα θησαυρὸν εὑρεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ θεὶς τὸν θησαυρὸν οὕτως ἔθηκεν, ὥστε τοῦτον εὑρεῖν, οὔτε ὁ εὑρὼν οὕτως ὤρυξεν, ὡς εὑρεῖν θησαυρόν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἵν' ὅταν θέλῃ, ἀνέληται, ὁ δὲ ἵνα τάφρον ὀρύξῃ· συνέπεσε δὲ ἄλλο τι, παρ' ὃ προῃροῦντο ἀμφότεροι)· τοῦ δὲ αὐτομάτου τὰ τῶν ἀψύχων ἢ ἀλόγων συμπτώματα ἄνευ φύσεως καὶ τέχνης. Οὕτως αὐτοί φασι. Τίνι τοίνυν τούτων ὑπαγάγωμεν τὰ διὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἴπερ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεως; Οὐδὲ γὰρ θεῷ θεμιτὸν ἐπιγράφειν αἰσχρὰς ἔσθ' ὅτε πράξεις καὶ ἀδίκους οὐδὲ ἀνάγκῃ (οὐ γὰρ τῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων ἐστίν) οὐδὲ εἱμαρμένῃ (οὐ γὰρ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων τὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης λέγουσιν) οὔτε φύσει (φύσεως γὰρ ἔργα ζῷα καὶ φυτά) οὐδὲ τύχῃ (οὐ γὰρ σπάνιοι καὶ ἀπροσδόκητοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἱ πράξεις) οὔτε τῷ αὐτομάτῳ (ἀψύχων γὰρ λέγουσιν ἢ ἀλόγων συμπτώματα τοῦ αὐτομάτου). Λείπεται δὴ αὐτὸν τὸν πράττοντα καὶ ποιοῦντα ἄνθρωπον ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων καὶ αὐτεξούσιον. Ἔτι, εἰ μηδεμιᾶς ἐστιν ἀρχὴ πράξεως ὁ ἄνθρωπος, περιττῶς ἔχει τὸ βουλεύεσθαι· εἰς τί γὰρ χρήσεται τῇ βουλῇ μηδεμιᾶς ὢν κύριος πράξεως; Πᾶσα γὰρ βουλὴ πράξεως ἕνεκα. Τὸ δὲ κάλλιστον καὶ τιμιώτατον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ περιττὸν ἀποφαίνειν τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων ἂν εἴη. Εἰ τοίνυν βουλεύεται, πράξεως ἕνεκα βουλεύεται· πᾶσα γὰρ βουλὴ πράξεως ἕνεκα καὶ διὰ πρᾶξιν.

40 Περὶ τῶν γινομένων Τῶν γινομένων τὰ μέν εἰσιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ'

ἡμῖν. Ἐφ' ἡμῖν μὲν οὖν εἰσιν, ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν αὐτεξούσιοι ποιεῖν τε καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν, τουτέστι πάντα τὰ δι' ἡμῶν ἑκουσίως πραττόμενα (οὐ γὰρ ἑκουσίως ἐλέγετο πράττεσθαι τῆς πράξεως οὐκ οὔσης ἐφ' ἡμῖν) καὶ ἁπλῶς, οἷς ἕπεται ψόγος ἢ ἔπαινος καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἐστι προτροπὴ καὶ νόμος. Κυρίως δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι τὰ ψυχικὰ πάντα καὶ περὶ ὧν βουλευόμεθα· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ τῶν ἐπίσης ἐνδεχομένων ἐστίν. Ἐπίσης δὲ ἐνδεχόμενόν ἐστιν, ὃ αὐτό τε δυνάμεθα, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ· ποιεῖται δὲ τούτου τὴν αἵρεσιν ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἡμέτερος, καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ πράξεως. Ταῦτα τοίνυν