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Then, how are they from God: To those who say; If the demons came from God, how are they evil? And this is the solution to the question whether the demons are evil; and he says that it is not insofar as they are good according to the production of their substance (for from the good they were produced good), but insofar as they became weak in their natural activity.

And they received a good substance. That the substance of the demons is good. As the Oracles say: Note how he understands the phrase, 'and the angels who did not keep

their own domain'; for he says their 'domain' is their production into being; for they too were produced for every good work, just as we are. The demons, therefore, are from these, being made evil in this alone, in the cessation of the possession of good things, and in not working the good; so that they are evil by choice, but not by nature; but the good belongs to beings by nature; therefore, there is a great difference.

Of the possession of divine goods: Note the terms 'possession' and 'activity'; for behold, the capacity which he mentioned before, he now calls a 'possession', as we interpreted above in the great scholion.

Therefore, if always: That the demons are not entirely devoid of the good. For 'the always the same': That 'the always the same' is proper to the good. (14S_180> But to be evil: Why the demons are called evil. To them an 'ekbasis': He calls 'ekbasis' the departure from what is fitting, and 'atelia' (imperfection)

the lack of the perfect, that is, the lack of perfection. Rash imagination: What 'phantasia' is, we have said in the first chapter. But these things: Behold also another solution for evil not being evil by nature, but

by a falling away from the good; for that which is in nature is always in the same state and is not cast down, just as the good itself, but evil is unstable, since it corrupts and alters whatever it meets, as we said above. Therefore, evil is not in nature, as this divine man says concerning the demons; for if it were in nature, it would always be in the same state. He has shown, therefore, that demons also, insofar as they exist and think and live and have a desire for the good, are not evil by nature, but by a perversion of the good, in which they also came to be.

a. Not even these things are evil in themselves: Irrational anger in itself, and mindless desire in itself, and rash imagination, are not in every way and for all things evil, when considered in themselves, but at times even their removal harms the living being that has them, as he says perfectly in the 7th chapter of this treatise. And he has well posited the slanderous things in these relations, since there is also anger with reason, as that against sin and against the enemies of God; and intelligent desire, as the desire for what is better, and the phrase, "With desire I have desired to eat this Passover with you." Thus there is also an imagination that is not rash, (14S_182> by which we apprehend intelligible things, doing this with our mind.

Not the relation: He calls 'relation' simply the having itself, but the aforementioned things, I mean anger and what is connected with it, are powers constitutive of the property in certain living beings, and according to this, such things are not evil.

b. But in that it is not: The 'according to nature' is taken in a general sense. c. Never them: Behold, here he says clearly that the demons are from the angels;

for they do not cast off the angelic gifts given to them, that is, what good they have from nature, they do not alter, even if they themselves do not wish to see the light within them, having closed their powers of seeing the good, as it was said concerning the Israelites: "their eyes they have closed, and their ears they have heard heavily, lest they should turn and I should heal them," And note that the demons are also luminous, or rather lights in substance, as are also the other angels; so also in the Gospels: "I saw Satan as lightning."

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Εἶτα, πῶς οἱ ἐκ Θεοῦ: Πρός τούς λέγοντας· Εἰ ἐκ Θεοῦ ἐγένοντο οἱ δαίμονες, πῶς εἰσι κακοί; Ἔστι δέ λύσις τῆς πεύσεως, εἰ κακοί εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες· καί φησιν, ὅτι οὐ καθό ἀγαθοί εἰσι κατά τήν παραγωγήν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν (ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γάρ παρήχθησαν ἀγαθοί), ἀλλά καθό ἠσθένησαν τῆς φυσικῆς αὐτῶν ἐνεργείας.

Καί ἀγαθήν ἔλαχον οὐσίαν. Ὅτι ἀγαθή τῶν δαιμόνων ἡ οὐσία. Ὡς τά Λόγιά φησι: Σημείωσαι, πῶς νοεῖ τό, 'ἀγγέλους τε τούς μή τηρήσαντας

τήν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχήν'· ἀρχήν γάρ αὐτῶν φησι τήν εἰς τό εἶναι παραγωγήν· παρήχθησαν γάρ καί αυτοί εἰς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καί ἠμεῖς. Ἐκ τούτων οὖν εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ κακυνόμενοι, ἐν τῇ παύσει τῆς ἕξεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καί ἐν τῷ μή ἐγεργεῖν τό ἀγαθόν· ὥστε κατά προαίρεσίν εἰσι κακοί, ἀλλ' οὐ κατά φύσιν· τό δέ ἀγαθόν πρόσετι τοῖς οὖσι κατά φύσιν· πολλή τοίνυν διαφορά.

Τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν ἕξεως: Σημείωσαι τό ἕξεως καί ἐνεργείας· ἰδού γάρ ἥν προεῖπε δύναμιν, ταύτην νῦν ἕξιν φησίν, ὡς ἡρμηνεύσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ἐν τῇ μεγάλῃ παραγραφῇ.

Οὐκοῦν, εἰ ἀεί: Ὅτι οὐ πάντῃ ἄμοιροι οέ δαίμονες τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Τό γάρ ἀεί ταὐτόν: Ὅτι τό ἀεί ταὐτόν, ἴδιον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. (14S_180> Κακοί δέ εἶναι: ∆ιά τί κακοί λέγονται οἱ δαίμονες. Αὐτοῖς ἔκβασις: Ἔκβασιν τήν ἀναχώρησιν τοῦ ἁρμόζοντος λέγει, ἀτέλειαν δέ

τήν τοῦ τελείου, ἤτοι τῆς τελειότητος την ἔλλειψιν. Φαντασία προπετής: Τί ἐστι φαντασία, ἐν πρώτῳ κεφαλαίῳ εἴπομεν. Ἀλλά ταῦτα: Ἰδού καί ἑτέρα λύσις τοῦ μή εἶναι τό κακόν φύσει κακόν, ἀλλά

κατά ἔκπτωσιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· τό γάρ ἐν φύσει ὄν ἀεί ὡσαύτως ἔχει καί οὐ καταβάλλεται, ὥσπερ αὐτό τό ἀγαθόν, τό δέ κακόν ἄστατόν ἐστιν, ἐπειδή φθείρει καί ἀλλοιοῖ τό προστυχόν, ὡς εἴπομεν ἄνω. Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἐν φύσει τό κακόν, ὥσπερ ἐπί τῶν δαιμόνων φησίν ὁ θεῖος οὗτος ἀνήρ εἰ γάρ ἐν φύσει ὄν, ἀεί ὡσαύτως ἔχει. Ἀπέδειξεν οὖν, ὅτι καί δαίμονες καθό εἰσί καί νοοῦσι καί ζῶσι καί ἔφεσιν ἔχουσι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὔκ εἰσι φύσει κακοί, ἀλλά κατά παρατροπήν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ καί ἐγένοντο.

α. Οὐδέ αὐτά καθ' αὑτά κακά: Ὁ θυμός ὁ ἄλογος καθ' ἑαυτόν, καί ἡ ἄνους ἐπιθυμία καθ' ἑαυτήν, καί ἡ προπετής φαντασία, οὐ πάντως καί ἐπί πάντων κακόν, καθ' ἑαυτά σκοπούμενα, ἀλλ' ἔσθ' ὅτε καί ἡ ἀναίρεσις αὐτῶν λυμαίνεται τῷ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ζώῳ, ὥς φησι τελείως ἐν τῷ ζ' κεφαλαίῳ τούτου τοῦ λόγου. Καλῶς δέ ἐν ταῖς σχέσεσι ταύταις τά διαβάλλοντα τέθεικεν, ἐπεί ἔστι καί θυμός μετά λόγου, ὡς ὁ κατά τῆς ἁμαρτίας καί κατά τῶν ἐχθρῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ· καί ἐπιθυμία ἔννους, ὡς τό ἐπιθυμεῖν τοῦ βελτίονος, καί τό, «ἐπιθυμία ἐπεθύμησα φαγεῖν τό πάσχα τοῦτο μεθ' ὑμῶν». Οὕτως ἐστί καί φαντασία οὐ προπετής, (14S_182> καθ' ἥν ἐφαπτόμεθα τῶν νοητῶν, τῷ νῷ ἡμῶν τοῦτο ποιοῦντες.

Οὐχ ἡ σχέσις: Σχέσιν μέν φησιν αὐτό τό ἔχειν ἁπλῶς, τά δέ προειρημένα, λέγω δή θυμός καί τά συνημμένα, τῆς ἔν τισι ζώοις ἰδιότητος συστατικαί δυνάμεις εἰσί, καί κατά τοῦτο οὐ κακόν τά τοιαῦτα.

β. Ἀλλ ' ᾖ οὐκ ἔστι: Κατά κοινοῦ τό κατά φύσιν. γ. Οὐ μήποτε αὐτάς: Ἰδού ἐνταῦθα σαφῶς φησιν, ὅτι ἐξ ἀγγέλων οἱ δαίμονες·

τάς γάρ δοθείσας αὐτοῖς ἀγγελικάς δωρεάς οὐκ ἀποβάλλουσι, τουτέστιν ὅπερ ἐκ φύσεως ἔχουσιν ἀγαθόν, οὐ μετατρέπουσιν, εἰ καί αὐτοί μή βούλονται ὁρᾷν τό ἐν αὐτοῖς φῶς, μύσαντες αὑτῶν τάς ἀγαθοπτικάς δυνάμεις, ὡς τό εἰρημένον περί τῶν Ἰσραηλιτῶν· «τούς ὀφθαλμούς αὑτῶν ἐκάμμυσαν, καί τοῖς ὠσίν αὑτῶν βαρέως ἤκουσαν, μήποτε ἐπιστρέψωσι καί ἰάσωμαι αὐτούς», Σημείωσαι δέ, ὅτι φωτοειδεῖς καί οἱ δαίμονες, μᾶλλον δέ φῶτα κατ' οὐσίαν, ὡς καί οἱ λοιποί ἄγγελοι· οὕτω καί ἐν Εὐαγγελίοις· «ἐθεώρουν τόν Σατανᾶν ὡς ἀστραπήν».