Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life by reason and judgment, but by its very being which it is supplying life to that which is capable of participation. Therefore its being is the same as its living. If, then, it has its being from itself, and this is the same as living, and it possesses living essentially, it would both provide life to itself and have it from itself. And if this is so, the soul would be life-itself. 190 Every soul is intermediate between the indivisibles and the divisibles that are concerned with bodies. For if it is life-itself and self-subsistent and has its existence separate from bodies, it is set apart, being superior to all the divisibles connected with bodies; for those things are entirely inseparable from their substrates, having been divided along with the divisible masses, and having departed from themselves and their own indivisibility and having been extended along with bodies, even if they subsist in lives, they are not lives of themselves, but of those which have participated in them, and even if they exist in substance and in forms, they are not forms of themselves, but of the things that have been given form. But if the soul is not only these things, a self-subsistent substance and life-itself and knowledge cognitive of itself, and in respect to all these things separate from bodies, but also a participant of life, and if this is so, also a participant of substance, and it participates also in knowledge from other causes, it is clear then that it is inferior to the indivisibles. That it is filled with life from another source, then (and also of substance, if also of life), is clear; for prior to soul is both unparticipated life and unparticipated substance. And that it is not primarily cognitive is evident, since insofar as it is soul, every soul lives, but not insofar as it is soul, does every soul have knowledge; for a certain soul is ignorant of beings while remaining a soul. Therefore it is not primarily cognitive, nor is it knowledge by its very being. Therefore it has its substance in a secondary rank to those things that are primarily and by their very being cognitive. But since its being is divided from knowledge, the soul is therefore not among the indivisibles. And it has been shown that it is not among the divisibles connected with bodies either. Therefore it is intermediate between both. 191 Every participated soul has its substance eternal, but its activity in time. For either it will have both eternally, or both in time, or the one eternally, and the other in time. But it has neither both eternally (for it will be an indivisible substance, and the nature of the soul will in no way differ from the intellectual hypostasis, the self-moved from the unmoved) nor both in time; for it would be only generated and neither life-itself nor self-subsistent; for nothing of those things measured in its substance by time is self-subsistent. But the soul is self-subsistent; for that which reverts to itself in activity is also revertible to itself in substance and proceeds from itself. It remains, therefore, that every soul is in one respect eternal, and in another, participant of time. Either, then, it is eternal in substance, and participant of time in activity; or the reverse. But this latter is impossible. Therefore, every participated soul has obtained an eternal substance, but its activity in time. 192 Every participated soul is both among the things that are forever and is the first of generated things. For if it is eternal in substance, it is truly being in respect to its existence and is forever; for that which participates in eternity has partaken of being forever. But if it is in time in respect to its activity, it is generated; for everything that participates in time, always coming to be according to the prior and posterior of time and not being at once all that it is, is generated. And if every soul is in some way generated, in respect to its activity, it would be the first of generated things; for that which is in every way generated is further from the eternal things. 193 Every soul subsists immediately from Intellect. For if it has an unchangeable and eternal substance, it proceeds from an unmoved cause; for everything that proceeds from a moved cause changes in respect to its substance. Therefore the cause of every soul is unmoved. And if it is perfected immediately by Intellect, it also reverts to Intellect; and if it participates in the knowledge which Intellect gives to those able to participate (for all knowledge is from Intellect for all things to which it belongs), and that to which all things revert according to nature, from this they also have their procession in respect to substance, therefore every soul proceeds from Intellect. 194 Every soul has all the forms which Intellect primarily has. For if it proceeds from Intellect and Intellect is the hypostatizer of soul, and if Intellect, being unmoved by its very being, produces all things, it will give

τῷ εἶναι, κἂν ᾖ τὸ μετέχον ἐπιτήδειον, εὐθὺς ἔμψυχον γίνεται καὶ ζῶν, οὐ λογισαμένης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ προελο μένης, οὐδὲ λογισμῷ καὶ κρίσει ζωοποιούσης, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ὅ ἐστι τὴν ζωὴν τῷ μεθεκτικῷ χορηγούσης. τὸ ἄρα εἶναι αὐτῆς ταὐτὸν τῷ ζῆν. εἰ οὖν τὸ εἶναι παρ' ἑαυτῆς ἔχει, τοῦτο δὲ τῷ ζῆν ταὐτὸν καὶ ἔχει κατ' οὐσίαν τὸ ζῆν, καὶ τὴν ζωὴν ἂν ἑαυτῇ παρέχοι καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῆς ἔχοι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, αὐτόζως ἂν εἴη ἡ ψυχή. 190 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ μέση τῶν ἀμερίστων ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τοῖς σώμασι μεριστῶν. εἰ γὰρ αὐτόζως ἐστὶ καὶ αὐθυπόστατος καὶ χωριστὴν ἔχει σωμάτων τὴν ὕπαρξιν, ἐξῄρηται κρείττων οὖσα τῶν μεριστῶν πάντων περὶ τοῖς σώμασιν· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ ἀχώριστα πάντῃ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐστί, συμμερισθέντα τοῖς μεριστοῖς ὄγκοις, καὶ ἑαυτῶν μὲν ἐκστάντα καὶ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀμερείας συνδιαστάντα δὲ τοῖς σώμασι, κἂν ἐν ζωαῖς ὑφεστήκῃ, οὐχ ἑαυτῶν ζωαὶ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ τῶν μετασχόντων, κἂν ἐν οὐσίᾳ καὶ ἐν εἴδεσιν ὑπάρχῃ, οὐχ ἑαυτῶν ὄντα εἴδη, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰδοπεποιημένων. εἰ δὲ μὴ ταῦτα μόνον ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, οὐσία αὐθυπόστατος καὶ ζωὴ αὐτόζως καὶ γνῶσις ἑαυτῆς γνωστική, καὶ χωριστὴ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα σωμάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετέχον ζωῆς, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον, μετέχει δὲ καὶ γνώσεως ἀπ' ἄλλων αἰτίων, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι καταδεεστέρα τῶν ἀμερίστων ἐστίν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ζωῆς ἀλλαχόθεν πληροῦται (ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐσίας, εἴπερ καὶ ζωῆς), δῆλον· πρὸ γὰρ ψυχῆς καὶ ἡ ἀμέθεκτος ζωὴ καὶ ἡ ἀμέθεκτος οὐσία. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸ πρώτως γνωστικὸν οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν, εἴπερ καθὸ μὲν ψυχή, πᾶσα ζῇ, οὐ καθὸ δὲ ψυχή, πᾶσα γνῶσιν ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ ὄντα ψυχή τις μένουσα ψυχή. οὐκ ἄρα πρώτως ἐστὶ γνωστικόν, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι γνῶσίς ἐστι. δευτέραν ἄρα τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχει τῶν πρώτως καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι γνωστικῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτης τὸ εἶναι διῄρηται τῆς γνώσεως, οὐκ ἄρα τῶν ἀμερίστων ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή. δέδεικται δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν περὶ τοῖς σώμασι μεριστῶν. μέση ἄρα ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν. 191 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ μεθεκτὴ τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν αἰώνιον ἔχει, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν κατὰ χρόνον. ἢ γὰρ ἄμφω αἰωνίως ἕξει, ἢ ἄμφω κατὰ χρόνον, ἢ τὸ μὲν αἰωνίως, τὸ δὲ κατὰ χρόνον. ἀλλ' οὔτε ἄμφω αἰωνίως (ἔσται γὰρ ἀμέριστος οὐσία, καὶ οὐδὲν διοίσει τῆς νοερᾶς ὑποστάσεως ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις, τῆς ἀκινήτου ἡ αὐτοκίνητος) οὔτε ἄμφω κατὰ χρόνον· εἴη γὰρ ἂν γενητὴ μόνον καὶ οὔτε αὐτόζως οὔτε αὐθ υπόστατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ὑπὸ χρόνου κατ' οὐσίαν μετρουμένων αὐθυπόστατον. ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ αὐθυπόστατος· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἐνέρ γειαν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφον καὶ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐπιστρεπτικόν ἐστι πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ προϊόν. λείπεται ἄρα τῇ μὲν αἰώνιον εἶναι ψυχὴν πᾶσαν, τῇ δὲ χρόνου μετέχουσαν. ἢ οὖν κατ' οὐσίαν αἰώνιός ἐστι, κατ' ἐνέρ γειαν δὲ χρόνου μέτοχος· ἢ ἔμπαλιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον. πᾶσα ἄρα ψυχὴ μεθεκτὴ τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν αἰώνιον ἔλαχε, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν κατὰ χρόνον. 192 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ μεθεκτὴ τῶν τε ἀεὶ ὄντων ἐστὶ καὶ πρώτη τῶν γενητῶν. εἰ γὰρ αἰώνιός ἐστι κατ' οὐσίαν, ὄντως ὄν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ὕπαρξιν καὶ ἀεὶ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ αἰῶνος μετέχον τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι μετεί ληφεν. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειάν ἐστιν ἐν χρόνῳ, γενητή ἐστι· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ χρόνου μετέχον, γινόμενον ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ οὐχὶ ἅμα ὅ ἐστιν ὂν ὅλον, γενητόν ἐστιν. εἰ δέ πῃ γενητή ἐστι πᾶσα ψυχή, κατ' ἐνέργειαν, πρώτη ἂν εἴη τῶν γενητῶν· τὸ γὰρ πάντῃ γενητὸν πορρωτέρω τῶν αἰωνίων. 193 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ προσεχῶς ἀπὸ νοῦ ὑφέστηκεν. εἰ γὰρ ἀμετάβλητον ἔχει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ αἰώνιον, ἀπὸ ἀκινήτου πρόεισιν αἰτίας· τὸ γὰρ ἀπὸ κινουμένης προϊὸν αἰτίας πᾶν μεταβάλλει κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. ἀκίνητον ἄρα τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πάσης αἴτιον. εἰ δὲ προσεχῶς ὑπὸ νοῦ τελειοῦται, καὶ ἐπι στρέφεται πρὸς νοῦν· καὶ εἰ μετέχει τῆς γνώσεως, ἣν ὁ νοῦς δίδωσι τοῖς μετέχειν δυναμένοις (πᾶσα γὰρ γνῶσις ἀπὸ νοῦ πᾶσίν ἐστιν, οἷς ἐστιν), εἰς ὃ δὲ πάντα ἐπιστρέφεται κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ τὴν πρόοδον ἔχει κατ' οὐσίαν, πᾶσα ἄρα ψυχὴ ἀπὸ νοῦ πρόεισιν. 194 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ πάντα ἔχει τὰ εἴδη, ἃ ὁ νοῦς πρώτως ἔχει. εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ νοῦ πρόεισι καὶ νοῦς ὑποστάτης ψυχῆς, καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ἀκίνητος ὢν πάντα ὁ νοῦς παράγει, δώσει