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are the things in our power, things that are equally possible, such as to move and not to move, to be impelled and not to be impelled, to desire things that are not necessary and not to desire them, to lie and not to lie, to give and not to give, to rejoice in what one ought and not to rejoice, and likewise in what one ought not, and all such things, in which are the works of virtue and vice; for of these things we have free will. The arts are also among the things that are equally possible; for it is in our power to pursue whichever one we may wish, and not to pursue it. But one must know that the choice of actions is always in our power; but the action itself is often hindered by some dispensation of providence.

41 For what reason we have become possessed of free will We say, then, that immediately with the rational

free will enters. For everything that is created is also mutable. For those things whose origin of coming into being began from change, these must of necessity be mutable. And change is to be brought from non-being into being, and for something else to come into being from an underlying matter. Now, inanimate and irrational things are changed according to the aforementioned corporeal alterations, but rational things according to choice; for of the rational faculty, one part is theoretical, the other practical; the theoretical is that which understands how things are, while the practical is the deliberative, which determines the right reason for things to be done. And they call the theoretical part 'mind', and the practical part 'reason', and the theoretical part 'wisdom', and the practical part 'prudence'. Everyone, therefore, who deliberates does so on the assumption that the choice of actions is in his power, in order that he may choose what has been preferred from his deliberation, and having chosen, may act; and if this is so, free will necessarily accompanies the rational faculty; for either it will not be rational, or being rational it will be master of its actions and have free will. Hence, irrational beings do not have free will; for they are led by nature rather than leading it; for this reason they do not resist natural desire, but, as soon as they desire something, they rush to the action. But man, being rational, leads nature more than he is led by it; for this reason, even when desiring, if he so wishes, he has the power to restrain the desire or to follow it. Hence irrational beings are neither praised nor blamed, but man is both praised and blamed. But one must know that the angels also, being rational, have free will, as they are created and mutable. And the devil showed this, having been made good by the Creator, but by his free will becoming the inventor of evil, as did the powers that fell away with him, that is, the demons, while the other orders of angels remained in goodness.

42 Concerning things not in our power Of the things not in our power, some have their origins

or causes from the things that are in our power, that is, the rewards for our actions both in the present and in the future age; but all the rest depends on the divine will. For the creation of all things is from God, but destruction was brought on because of our wickedness for punishment and benefit. "For God did not make death, neither has he pleasure in the destruction of the living"; "but rather through man came death," that is, through the transgression of Adam, and likewise the other punishments. All other things must be attributed to God; for our creation is from His creative power, and our preservation from His sustaining power, and our governance from His providential power. But since some speak against providence, let us now say a few things also about providence.

43 Concerning providence Providence, then, is that which comes from God to existing things

care. And again: Providence is the will of God, through which all existing things receive their fitting guidance. And if providence is the will of God, it is altogether necessary that all things that happen by providence happen in the best and most God-befitting way according to right reason, and in such a way that they cannot be better. For it is necessary that the same

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ἐστὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τὰ ἐπίσης ἐνδεχόμενα, οἷον τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ κινεῖσθαι, ὁρμᾶν καὶ μὴ ὁρμᾶν, ὀρέγεσθαι τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων καὶ μὴ ὀρέγεσθαι, ψεύδεσθαι καὶ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι, διδόναι καὶ μὴ διδόναι, χαίρειν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ μὴ χαίρειν ὁμοίως καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἐν οἷς ἐστι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς κακίας ἔργα· τούτων γάρ ἐσμεν αὐτεξούσιοι. Τῶν δὲ ἐπίσης ἐνδεχομένων εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τέχναι· ἐφ' ἡμῖν γάρ ἐστι μετελθεῖν, ἣν ἂν θελήσωμεν, καὶ μὴ μετελθεῖν. Χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν αἵρεσις τῶν πρακτῶν ἀεὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν· ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις πολλάκις κωλύεται κατά τινα τρόπον τῆς προνοίας.

41 ∆ιὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν αὐτεξούσιοι γεγόναμεν Φαμὲν τοίνυν εὐθέως τῷ λογικῷ

συνεισέρχεσθαι τὸ αὐτεξούσιον. Πᾶν γὰρ γεννητὸν καὶ τρεπτόν ἐστιν. Ὧν γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἀπὸ τροπῆς ἤρξατο, ἀνάγκῃ ταῦτα τρεπτὰ εἶναι. Τροπὴ δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραχθῆναι καὶ τὸ ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης ἕτερόν τι γενέσθαι. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄψυχα καὶ ἄλογα τρέπονται κατὰ τὰς προειρημένας σωματικὰς ἀλλοιώσεις, τὰ δὲ λογικὰ κατὰ προαίρεσιν· τοῦ γὰρ λογικοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι θεωρητικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν, θεωρητικὸν μὲν τὸ κατανοοῦν, ὡς ἔχει τὰ ὄντα, πρακτικὸν δὲ τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ ὁρίζον τοῖς πρακτοῖς τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. Καὶ καλοῦσι τὸ μὲν θεωρητικὸν νοῦν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεωρητικὸν σοφίαν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν φρόνησιν. Πᾶς οὖν ὁ βουλευόμενος ὡς ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῆς αἱρέσεως οὔσης τῶν πρακτῶν βουλεύεται, ἵνα τὸ προκριθὲν ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς ἕληται καὶ ἑλόμενος πράξῃ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης παρυφίσταται τῷ λογικῷ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον· ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἔσται λογικόν, ἢ λογικὸν ὂν κύριον ἔσται πράξεων καὶ αὐτεξούσιον. Ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ἄλογα οὔκ εἰσιν αὐτεξούσια· ἄγονται γὰρ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἤπερ ἄγουσι· διὸ οὐδὲ ἀντιλέγουσι τῇ φυσικῇ ὀρέξει, ἀλλ', ἅμα ὀρεχθῶσί τινος, ὁρμῶσι πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν. Ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος λογικὸς ὢν ἄγει μᾶλλον τὴν φύσιν, ἤπερ ἄγεται· διὸ καὶ ὀρεγόμενος, εἴπερ ἐθέλοι, ἐξουσίαν ἔχει τὴν ὄρεξιν ἀναχαιτίσαι ἢ ἀκολουθῆσαι αὐτῇ. Ὅθεν τὰ μὲν ἄλογα οὐδὲ ἐπαινεῖται οὐδὲ ψέγεται, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐπαινεῖται καὶ ψέγεται. Χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι λογικοὶ ὄντες αὐτεξούσιοι ὑπάρχουσι καὶ ὡς κτιστοὶ καὶ τρεπτοί. Καὶ ἔδειξεν ὁ μὲν διάβολος ἀγαθὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γενόμενος, αὐτεξουσίως δὲ τῆς κακίας εὑρετὴς γεγονώς, καὶ αἱ σὺν αὐτῷ ἀποστατήσασαι δυνάμεις ἤγουν οἱ δαίμονες, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τάγματα τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ διαμείναντα.

42 Περὶ τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν Τῶν δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔχει τὰς

ἀρχὰς ἤτοι τὰς αἰτίας, τουτέστιν αἱ ἀμοιβαὶ τῶν πράξεων ἡμῶν ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα τῆς θείας βουλῆς ἐξήρτηται. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ γένεσις πάντων ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἡ δὲ φθορὰ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν κακίαν ἐπήχθη πρὸς τιμωρίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν. «Θεὸς γὰρ θάνατον οὐκ ἐποίησεν οὐδὲ τέρπεται ἐπ' ἀπωλείᾳ ζώντων· «δι' ἀνθρώπου δὲ μᾶλλον θάνατος, τουτέστι τῆς τοῦ Ἀδὰμ παραβάσεως, ὁμοίως καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τιμωρίαι. Τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα τῷ θεῷ ἀναθετέον· ἥ τε γὰρ γένεσις ἡμῶν τῆς δημιουργικῆς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεώς ἐστι, καὶ ἡ διαμονὴ τῆς συνεκτικῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ κυβέρνησις τῆς προνοητικῆς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως. Ἐπειδὴ δέ τινες ἀντιλέγουσι τῇ προνοίᾳ, εἴπωμεν λοιπὸν ὀλίγα καὶ περὶ προνοίας.

43 Περὶ προνοίασ Πρόνοια τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἐκ θεοῦ εἰς τὰ ὄντα γινομένη

ἐπιμέλεια. Καὶ πάλιν· Πρόνοιά ἐστι βούλησις θεοῦ, δι' ἣν πάντα τὰ ὄντα τὴν πρόσφορον διεξαγωγὴν λαμβάνει. Εἰ δὲ θεοῦ βούλησίς ἐστιν ἡ πρόνοια, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ τῇ προνοίᾳ γινόμενα κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κάλλιστά τε καὶ θεοπρεπέστατα γίνεσθαι καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔνι κρείττω γενέσθαι. Ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν