Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it; for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, this it imparts secondarily to that which comes to be. Therefore, the soul possesses the manifestations of the intelligible forms secondarily. 195 Every soul is all things, paradigmatically the sensible things, but iconically the intelligible things. For being intermediate between the indivisibles and the divisibles concerning the body, it produces and substantiates the one, and has set over itself the causes from which it has proceeded. Therefore, of those things of which it is the pre-existing cause, it has pre-conceived them paradigmatically; but those things from which it subsists, it possesses by participation and as offspring of the primary things. Therefore, it has pre-conceived all sensible things causally, and possesses the principles of enmattered things immaterially, and of corporeal things incorporeally, and of extended things unextendedly; but it has received the intelligible things iconically, and their forms dividably from the indivisible, multitudinously from the unitary, and self-movingly from the unmoved. Therefore, it is all beings, some by participation, the primary ones; others paradigmatically, those after it. 196 Every soul that can be participated in uses a primary body which is eternal and has an ungenerated and incorruptible subsistence. For if every soul is eternal in its essence and by its very being primarily animates some body, it always animates it; for the being of every soul is unchangeable. And if this is so, that which is animated is always animated and always participates in life; and that which is always living, much more is it always existing; and that which is always existing is eternal; Therefore, the body which is primarily ensouled and primarily attached to [each] every soul is eternal. But indeed every soul that can be participated in is participated in primarily by some body, if indeed it is participable and not imparticipable, and by its very being it animates that which participates. Therefore, every soul that is participated in uses a primary body which is eternal and ungenerated and incorruptible in its essence. 197 Every soul is a vital and gnostic substance, and an essential and gnostic life, and knowledge as substance and life; and all are at once in it, the substantial, the vital, the gnostic, and all are in all and each is separate. For if it is intermediate between the indivisible forms and those divisible concerning the body, it is neither indivisible in the way that all intelligible things are, nor divisible in the way that corporeal things are. Therefore, since substances, lives, and knowledges are divided in corporeal things, these exist indivisibly in souls, and unitedly and incorporeally, and all together on account of their immateriality and indivisibility; and since in intelligible things all exist in union, in souls they are distinguished and divided. Therefore, all things are both together and separate. And if all are together and in one indivisible, they have passed through one another; and if separate, they are again divided without confusion; so that each is on its own and all are in all. For in the substance are both life and knowledge; for if not, not every soul will know itself, if its substance is lifeless and deprived of knowledge in itself. And in the life are both substance and knowledge; for a life without substance and without knowledge belongs to enmattered lives, which can neither know themselves nor are pure substances. And knowledge without substance and lifeless is without subsistence; for all knowledge belongs both to a living thing and to one that has obtained substance in itself. 198 Everything that partakes of time, but is always in motion, is measured by periods. For because it partakes of time, its motion has partaken of measure and limit, and proceeds according to number; but because it is always in motion, and this "always" is not eternal, but temporal, it is necessary for it to use periods. For motion is a certain change from some things to others; but beings are defined both in their multitudes and in their magnitudes; and since these are defined, the transition is not infinite in a straight line, nor is it possible for that which is always in motion to transition in a finite way. Therefore, that which is always in motion will come again from the same things to the same things, so as to make a period. 199 Every cosmic soul uses periods of its own life and restorations. For if it is measured by time and acts transitionally, and has its own proper motion, and everything that is moved and partakes of time, being eternal, uses periods and revolves periodically and is restored from the same things to the same things, it is clear that every cosmic soul, having motion and acting according to time, has periods and

καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ ὑφισταμένῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πάντων οὐσιώδεις λόγους· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τῷ εἶναι ποιοῦν, ὅ ἐστι πρώτως, τοῦτο τῷ γινομένῳ δευτέρως ἐνδίδωσι. τῶν νοερῶν ἄρα εἰδῶν ψυχὴ δευτέρως ἔχει τὰς ἐμφάσεις. 195 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα, παραδειγμα τικῶς μὲν τὰ αἰσθητά, εἰκονικῶς δὲ τὰ νοητά. μέση γὰρ οὖσα τῶν ἀμερίστων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μεριστῶν, τὰ μὲν παράγει καὶ ὑφίστησι, τὰ δὲ αἴτια προεστή σατο ἑαυτῆς, ἀφ' ὧν προελήλυθεν. ὧν μὲν οὖν αἰτία προ ϋπάρχει, ταῦτα προείληφε παραδειγματικῶς· ἀφ' ὧν δὲ ὑπέστη, ταῦτα κατὰ μέθεξιν ἔχει καὶ ὡς γεννήματα τῶν πρώτων. τὰ μὲν ἄρα αἰσθητὰ πάντα κατ' αἰτίαν προείληφε, καὶ τοὺς λόγους τῶν ἐνύλων ἀΰλως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀσωμάτως καὶ τῶν διαστατῶν ἀδιαστάτως ἔχει· τὰ δὲ νοητὰ εἰκονικῶς, καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ ἐκείνων μεριστῶς μὲν τῶν ἀμερίστων, πεπληθυσμένως δὲ τῶν ἑνιαίων, αὐτοκινήτως δὲ τῶν ἀκινήτων ὑπεδέξατο. πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα, τὰ μὲν κατὰ μέθεξιν, τὰ πρῶτα· τὰ δὲ παραδειγματικῶς, τὰ μετ' αὐτήν. 196 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ μεθεκτὴ σώματι χρῆται πρώτῳ ἀϊδίῳ καὶ ἀγένητον ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἄφθαρτον. εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα ψυχὴ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶν ἀΐδιος καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι πρώτως ψυχοῖ τι τῶν σωμάτων, ἀεὶ αὐτὸ ψυχοῖ· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι πάσης ψυχῆς ἀμετάβλητον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ ψυχού μενον ἀεὶ ψυχοῦται καὶ ἀεὶ μετέχει ζωῆς· τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ζῶν πολλῷ πρότερον ἀεὶ ἔστι· τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ὂν ἀΐδιον· τὸ ἄρα πρώτως ἔμψυχον σῶμα καὶ πρώτως ἐξημμένον [ἑκάστης] πάσης ψυχῆς ἀΐδιόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν πᾶσα μεθεκτὴ ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματός τινος μετέχεται πρώτως, εἴπερ καὶ μεθεκτή ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀμέθεκτος, καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ψυχοῖ τὸ μετέχον. πᾶσα ἄρα ψυχὴ μετεχομένη σώματι χρῆται πρώτῳ ἀϊδίῳ καὶ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ ἀφθάρτῳ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. 197 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ οὐσία ἐστὶ ζωτικὴ καὶ γνωστική, καὶ ζωὴ οὐσιώδης καὶ γνωστική, καὶ γνῶσις ὡς οὐσία καὶ ζωή· καὶ ἅμα ἐν αὐτῇ πάντα, τὸ οὐσιῶδες, τὸ ζωτικόν, τὸ γνωστικόν, καὶ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι καὶ χωρὶς ἕκαστον. εἰ γὰρ μέση τῶν ἀμερίστων ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ σῶμα μερι ζομένων εἰδῶν, οὔτε οὕτως ἀμέριστός ἐστιν ὡς τὰ νοερὰ πάντα οὔτε οὕτω μεριστὴ ὡς τὰ σωματοειδῆ. διῃρημένων οὖν ἐν τοῖς σωματικοῖς τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ ζωῶν καὶ γνώσεων, ἀμερίστως ἐστὶν ἐν ψυχαῖς ταῦτα καὶ ἡνωμένως καὶ ἀσωμάτως, καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα διὰ τὴν ἀϋλίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμέρειαν· καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοεροῖς πάντων καθ' ἕνωσιν ὄντων, διακέκριται ἐν ψυχαῖς καὶ μεμέρισται. πάντα ἄρα καὶ ὁμοῦ καὶ χωρίς. εἰ δὲ ὁμοῦ καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ πάντα ἀμερεῖ, δι' ἀλλήλων πεφοίτηκε· καὶ εἰ χωρίς, διῄρηται πάλιν ἀσυγχύτως· ὥστε καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον καὶ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ γνῶσις· εἰ γὰρ μή, οὐ γνώσεται πᾶσα ἑαυτήν, εἴπερ ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἄζως καὶ γνώσεως ἐστέρηται καθ' αὑτήν. καὶ ἐν τῇ ζωῇ ἥ τε οὐσία καὶ ἡ γνῶσις· ἡ γὰρ ἀνούσιος ζωὴ καὶ ἡ ἄνευ γνώσεως ταῖς ἐνύλοις προσήκει ζωαῖς, αἳ μήτε γινώσκειν ἑαυτὰς δύνανται μήτε οὐσίαι εἰσὶν εἰλικρινεῖς. καὶ ἡ γνῶσις ἡ ἀνούσιος καὶ ἄζως ἀνυπόστατος· πᾶσα γὰρ γνῶσις καὶ ζῶντός ἐστι καὶ οὐσίαν καθ' αὑτὸ λαχόντος. 198 Πᾶν τὸ χρόνου μετέχον, ἀεὶ δὲ κινούμενον, περιόδοις μετρεῖται. διότι μὲν γὰρ χρόνου μετέχει, μέτρου καὶ ὅρου μετείληφεν ἡ κίνησις, καὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν πορεύεται· διότι δὲ ἀεὶ κινεῖται, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὐκ αἰώνιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ χρονικόν, ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι περιόδοις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις μεταβολή τίς ἐστιν ἀφ' ἑτέρων εἰς ἕτερα· τὰ δὲ ὄντα ὥρισται καὶ τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσι· τούτων δὲ ὡρισμένων, οὔτε κατ' εὐθεῖαν ἄπειρον ἡ μετάβασίς ἐστιν οὔτε τὸ ἀεὶ κινούμενον πεπερασμένως μετα βαίνειν δυνατόν. ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν ἥξει τὸ ἀεὶ κινούμενον, ὥστε ποιῆσαι περίοδον. 199 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος περιόδοις χρῆται τῆς οἰκείας ζωῆς καὶ ἀποκαταστάσεσιν. εἰ γὰρ ὑπὸ χρόνου μετρεῖται καὶ μεταβατικῶς ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτῆς ἰδία κίνησις, πᾶν δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ χρόνου μετέχον, ἀΐδιον ὄν, χρῆται περιόδοις καὶ περιοδικῶς ἀνακυκλεῖται καὶ ἀποκαθίσταται ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, κίνησιν ἔχουσα καὶ ἐνεργοῦσα κατὰ χρόνον, περιόδους τε